Well you can usually go partway just by retarding throttles and observing the effects on each engine at a time. The only rush point would be if EGT was overlimits and did not respond to a throttle reduction.

But like every new report on this site, I wasn't there so I have no need to critizize

Spot on!! A case of a little knowledge is dangerous.
Have I missed the post (with all these wonderful ways of determining a failed engine) of "Dead foot, dead engine" ??
Tootle pip!!
PS: I have read the Kegworth report, (and I used to work for BMA) and I do know that other actions disguised/didn't help the proper identification of the failed engine.

Kegworth was down to many factors supporting the pilot's bias, not least, inadequate training by their employer.

For the next generation of rules and aircraft it may be wort rethinking the auto-rudder-trim vs. dead foot - dead engine philosophy...
Nothing is as clear to understand as tactile indications.
Maybe some remaining mis-trim (low enough to prevent loss of control, high enough to be clearly felt by the pilot) or artificial feel might be the way to go ?

Or having a "throtlle shaker" which makes the power lever vibrate with the vibration indication? (Healthy engine lever feels fine, failed engine lever vibrates)

There is a lot aircraft designers could do to support pilots, which due to their human nature do make mistakes, even more if you automate many items and take the pilot out of the loop.

I like your idea, but this manufacturer isn't big on tactile feedback.

I'm just puzzled why they set the operating engine to idle in the attempt to restart the good engine.

I like the sound of a throttle shaker to indicate which engine has high vibs. Mobile phones have a vibrate mode, so there are small and robust mechanisms out there. It doesn't sound like the biggest job in the world to incorporate something similar into a throttle lever.

That didn't even come into the picture in the Sim where one engine caught fire on takeoff and after firing both bottles the PNF ran the checklist and at the end the checklist called to switch off the affected engine so the PNF reached for the switch and as he did so the PF let out a yell but it was too late and a glider we became at 2k feet. It seems that the challenge action at the front of a drill works OK by rote but when the action.is called for a minute or two later it didn't have a challenge

From aviation herald

"was in the takeoff roll at about 115 KIAS out of Delhi's runway 09 when a bird struck the right hand engine (CFM56) causing vibrations and abnormal sounds. The crew continued takeoff"

115 KIAS and they continued, is that not way below V1 with 158 pax on board?

Not what I want when I have a double birdstrike and I am trying to fly a crippled aircraft round the circuit!

I think we would be better to ensure we put people into the flight deck with better non-technical skills and who can read a basic instrument display. Compared to some of the old steam driven engine instrument displays the Airbus is a doddle.

From DGAC: Final Investigation Report on Air Turn Back Incident due to Bird Strike to Go Airlines (India) Ltd Airbus A320-214 Aircraft VT-GOS On 21/06/2017 at Delhi:

Difficult maybe with just two throttle levers when there is an engine vibration and a lot else going on.
Four throttle levers.... Eeny, meeny, miny, moe that one's vibrating let it go. Not viable!

This hasn't been mentioned. No excuse but also shows this wasn't a beautiful smooth day like we often practice in the sim..

A terrible display of poor airmanship. Especially the alpha floor part. Lucky they were in a bus forcing alpha floor protection on them, kept them from becoming another statistic. It is astounding who all is issued with a license to be up front these days. Training standards?

Good idea. But not a shaker, just put red/amber rings on the edge of each throttle handle that can light up as a master warning/caution for the corresponding engine.

Airbus tried hard to do the right thing, putting all the indications for the left engine in the left column and those for the right engine in the right column. Nevertheless the FO got confused, and page 37 in the report is a good illustration of what he thought he saw and why.

I'm surprised that among the recommendations in the report there is none for Airbus to improve that part of the engine display. One could easily give the text column a better symmetry by putting the "VIB" above the N1/N2 rather than next to it. And, like zahnpastaesser said, maybe the terms N1/N2 should better be avoided in this context. LP/HP or FAN/CORE would be obvious alternatives.

I am still surprised that, under normal conditions, but particularly after suffering an engine failure, there is no operating engine(s) proving check, at a safe height above the ground, just as you would check your response to flight controls had any control malfunction occurred. While this would not have helped in this case, it certainly would in others, perhaps Kegworth, or the BA777 at LHR. It may be too late if you leave it until approach checks. Or perhaps there is such a check nowadays?

I don't think (in)ability to identify a failed engine was a factor in the BA38 accident.

Of course when seeing the display it makes "sense" why the FO confused this in times of high stress. Its a terrible design. Speaking generally - I have noticed the smartphone generation coming through in many industries have a default expectation of visual intuition... software displays today are designed in a specific and logical way, placing a legacy or non-standard display to younger generation reaps confusion in unpredictable ways

The bus gauge is awfully designed. However, when you fly the thing day in and day out there is an expectation you understand it!

True, but my point was that in all conditions, failure or not, proving engines with height beneath before approach makes sense to me.