Luckily the dead engine wasn't dead after all.
 

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Curt Lewis & Associates, LLC Flight Safety Information [June 23, 2017] [No. 125] Fri 11:27 PM 299 KB

Pilots switch off healthy engine after bird-hit
• A GoAir flight suffered a bird-hit during takeoff at Delhi's IGI airport
• Pilots allegedly turned off the healthy engine which was a wrong decision
• Directorate General of Civil Aviation has grounded both pilots, said a source

NEW DELHI: Over 160 people on a GoAir flight from Delhi to Mumbai on Wednesday had a narrow escape when the aircraft suffered a bird-hit during takeoff at IGI Airport. One of the Airbus A-320's engines ingested the bird during takeoff roll, but instead of switching this engine off as per procedure, the pilots allegedly turned off the healthy one.
"The pilots soon realised their mistake and switched on the healthy engine. The aircraft reached an altitude of about 2,000 feet before it returned to land safely in Delhi. It was a dangerous situation and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation has grounded both pilots. Luckily, the other engine had not failed after the bird-hit and was still powering the plane even after the pilots reportedly switched off the 'healthy' engine, which had not suffered the bird-hit. Otherwise, it would have been bad," said a source.

A GoAir spokesman said: "GoAir flight G8 338 from New Delhi to Mumbai, carrying 155 passengers, suffered a bird-hit on Wednesday. Following standard operating procedure, the aircraft returned to Delhi as a precautionary measure at 11.28am. All passengers were transferred to another aircraft, which was airborne at 1.04pm. The matter is under investigation."

The airline did not comment on the allegedly wrong switching-off of the engine and grounding of the pilots.

Senior commanders said switching off the wrong engine could lead to a disaster. If an engine is damaged for any reason like a bird-hit and the pilots mistakenly switch off the healthy engine too, the aircraft has no working engine.
In February 2015, a Taiwanese airliner (which ceased operations last year) smashed into a highway bridge in Taiwan and then crashed into a river, killing 43 of its 58 passengers, after the pilot turned off the wrong engine.

Pilots switch off healthy engine after bird-hit | Delhi News - Times of India

Not the first and not the last time. Hopefully they switched on the APU. Sully found out, that this is not a bad idea in any case. On a small prop plane the training to verify the bad engine after TO is rushed, because it creates a lot of drag. On a jet that should be much more relaxed since the bad engine does not create as much drag. As long as there is positive rate of climb there should be no rush and a thorough check from both pilots. So some of the CRM and checklist procedure broke down. Sitting in an armchair it is so easy...

For the next generation of pilots, not a bad time to re-read the British Midland M1 'Kegworth' crash.

https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavig...rways%2092.pdf

If an engine is not on fire and not shaking itself to pieces then why shut it down at all?
If it's giving elec. and hyd. power and can be kept below vibration rpm, keep it running.

One reason (THE reason?) for making the first action of a shutdown procedure 'Thrust Lever - Identify - Close' is that it is the one that is quickly reversible. It's a very good time to consider whether the reaction and outcome is what you would expect. I always thought it worth emphasising in the pre T/O brief.

I was thinking this same thing, sort of, from a PAX point of view.

Kegworth was almost understandable -- 737-300 vs. -400, with the change in ducting and the poor gauges on the -300. Trust the smoke rather than the dials.

Glad everything worked out, it's a testament to the flexibility of twins.

I wouldn't spend too much time judging what the pilots did based on a news story likely transcribed into English.

For instance I really don't know exactly where they were in the flight regime when they ingested a bird and got symptoms of some sort. Seeing as there was a report that it later was producing power they may have had no more symptoms than a bang followed by a buzz sound.

At the point that they alleged grabbed the wrong throttle they may have been free of symptoms except for the buzz sound. If all they did was pull back the throttle on the unaffected engine to idle or greater, the buzz sound on the damaged engine would continue and so would its thrust. At that point they may have simply advanced the undamaged engines thrust and made an airturnback having sorted out the correct response.

You should probably cut the crew some slack until you know what the terms above really mean.

It has happened before - and it will happen again. Other then extreme caution and verification by both pilots, what else can be done? Verify = and verify again/ This should NOT Happen, but it will. Close call!!

I agree. But there are some circumstances where the Airbus ECAM logic will lead you down the wrong path. It is still advisable to take your time and analyze the entire scenario before you start listening to FIFI.

Probably a case of ASS (arrogant skipper syndrome) with an absence of CRM.

Trust the smoke, rather than the dials.
 

This is a classic example of where a little knowledge is very dangerous. If "rottenray" really believes that the Kegworth was almost understandable, based on the flawed understanding of the pneumatic system by the pilots, then I think he is sadly mistaken. Kegworth need not have happened. Time taken to properly identify the defective engine, based on the indications presented, would/should have prevented the Kegworth accident.

Those two statements are not mutually exclusive.

Picked an OEI technique some time ago in the SIM from a colleague. One was quite ashamed of not being trained to do so earlier, nor devising it on my own.

Attachment 2577

a) As the trust-lever is moved to idle, as a part of the shut-down drill, focus the eyes on the TL position indicator (white doughnut on the picture above). Observe its movement on the correct engine.
b) move the TL slowly, watching with your other eye the good engine's N1 - that they do NOT move, with sharp ears and sensitive pants towards any undesired change.

It is easily done with a two-phased movement: retard to 2/3rds, check the gauges and gut, if all ok then close the TL all the way.

c) do not let go of the retarded TL straight away, pause for one deep breath with the eyes on the instruments.

Rush is the ultimate killer. Tenerife, Spanair, Taipei, sadly many others.

From Flight Global website 5th February 2019

"Once airborne the first officer “misinterpreted” the N1 speed reading of the right-hand engine as a vibration of the left-hand engine, the inquiry states.
The first officer called out a beyond-limit vibration of the unaffected left-hand engine and, as a result of the incorrect assessment, the left-hand engine was incorrectly shut down around 30s after rotation.
Thrust of the problematic right-hand engine was increased and the aircraft was left to climb on this engine alone for over 3min.
The first officer, says the inquiry, “repeatedly” advised the captain, incorrectly, that the left-hand engine was experiencing out-of-limit vibration."

I would post the full link but I'm more of a lurker and haven't posted enough times yet to be allowed to post a link.

I know its a pressure situation, but identifying the wrong engine for shutdown when the instrumentation clearly identified the correct engine is a bad error.
How can high vibration indications be made clearer to avoid mis-reading which engine has suffered damage? I'm not familiar with the cockpit display in the 737, presumable its graphical rather than spell out "HIGH VIBS LEFT" ?

The VIB display (according to picture at Aviation Herald: Incident: GoAir A320 at Delhi on Jun 21st 2017, bird strike, wrong engine shut down and restarted) looks like

0.0 — VIB N1 — 0.0
0.0 — ......N2 — 0.0

... and it did occur to me that in a rush, or lacking experience with a VIB indication (or one's morning coffee), the brain could read

0.0 — VIB N1 — 3.6

as "(Engine) N(umber) 1, Vibration 3.6"

Not an excuse, possibly a reason.

My thought exactly! And the most propable scenario in my opinion.

They could redesign it to read NL (low) and NH (high) instead. But then again you´ll have folks reading N-"left" when under stress...

From what I read the Captain PF and 20000 hrs and the First Officer PM less than 1000 made a mistake and got all safely on the ground.... well done
The worry for me is that the flight crew then took the replacement aircraft and landed no more than 4 hrs behind schedule
WTF no one grounded them immediately while investigating what happened

Why the rush to shut down engines. If it's vibrating it's vibrating. Wait until everything else is sorted then both of you take your time to identify the problem. Wait long enough and it will resolve itself!

The incident report goes on to tell that the crew managed to alpha floor the aircraft during the restart phase. Not a great day's work by any measure.

Well you can usually go partway just by retarding throttles and observing the effects on each engine at a time. The only rush point would be if EGT was overlimits and did not respond to a throttle reduction.

But like every new report on this site, I wasn't there so I have no need to critizize

Spot on!! A case of a little knowledge is dangerous.
Have I missed the post (with all these wonderful ways of determining a failed engine) of "Dead foot, dead engine" ??
Tootle pip!!
PS: I have read the Kegworth report, (and I used to work for BMA) and I do know that other actions disguised/didn't help the proper identification of the failed engine.

Kegworth was down to many factors supporting the pilot's bias, not least, inadequate training by their employer.

For the next generation of rules and aircraft it may be wort rethinking the auto-rudder-trim vs. dead foot - dead engine philosophy...
Nothing is as clear to understand as tactile indications.
Maybe some remaining mis-trim (low enough to prevent loss of control, high enough to be clearly felt by the pilot) or artificial feel might be the way to go ?

Or having a "throtlle shaker" which makes the power lever vibrate with the vibration indication? (Healthy engine lever feels fine, failed engine lever vibrates)

There is a lot aircraft designers could do to support pilots, which due to their human nature do make mistakes, even more if you automate many items and take the pilot out of the loop.

I like your idea, but this manufacturer isn't big on tactile feedback.

I'm just puzzled why they set the operating engine to idle in the attempt to restart the good engine.

I like the sound of a throttle shaker to indicate which engine has high vibs. Mobile phones have a vibrate mode, so there are small and robust mechanisms out there. It doesn't sound like the biggest job in the world to incorporate something similar into a throttle lever.

That didn't even come into the picture in the Sim where one engine caught fire on takeoff and after firing both bottles the PNF ran the checklist and at the end the checklist called to switch off the affected engine so the PNF reached for the switch and as he did so the PF let out a yell but it was too late and a glider we became at 2k feet. It seems that the challenge action at the front of a drill works OK by rote but when the action.is called for a minute or two later it didn't have a challenge

From aviation herald

"was in the takeoff roll at about 115 KIAS out of Delhi's runway 09 when a bird struck the right hand engine (CFM56) causing vibrations and abnormal sounds. The crew continued takeoff"

115 KIAS and they continued, is that not way below V1 with 158 pax on board?

Not what I want when I have a double birdstrike and I am trying to fly a crippled aircraft round the circuit!

I think we would be better to ensure we put people into the flight deck with better non-technical skills and who can read a basic instrument display. Compared to some of the old steam driven engine instrument displays the Airbus is a doddle.

From DGAC: Final Investigation Report on Air Turn Back Incident due to Bird Strike to Go Airlines (India) Ltd Airbus A320-214 Aircraft VT-GOS On 21/06/2017 at Delhi:

Difficult maybe with just two throttle levers when there is an engine vibration and a lot else going on.
Four throttle levers.... Eeny, meeny, miny, moe that one's vibrating let it go. Not viable!

This hasn't been mentioned. No excuse but also shows this wasn't a beautiful smooth day like we often practice in the sim..

A terrible display of poor airmanship. Especially the alpha floor part. Lucky they were in a bus forcing alpha floor protection on them, kept them from becoming another statistic. It is astounding who all is issued with a license to be up front these days. Training standards?

Good idea. But not a shaker, just put red/amber rings on the edge of each throttle handle that can light up as a master warning/caution for the corresponding engine.

Airbus tried hard to do the right thing, putting all the indications for the left engine in the left column and those for the right engine in the right column. Nevertheless the FO got confused, and page 37 in the report is a good illustration of what he thought he saw and why.

I'm surprised that among the recommendations in the report there is none for Airbus to improve that part of the engine display. One could easily give the text column a better symmetry by putting the "VIB" above the N1/N2 rather than next to it. And, like zahnpastaesser said, maybe the terms N1/N2 should better be avoided in this context. LP/HP or FAN/CORE would be obvious alternatives.

I am still surprised that, under normal conditions, but particularly after suffering an engine failure, there is no operating engine(s) proving check, at a safe height above the ground, just as you would check your response to flight controls had any control malfunction occurred. While this would not have helped in this case, it certainly would in others, perhaps Kegworth, or the BA777 at LHR. It may be too late if you leave it until approach checks. Or perhaps there is such a check nowadays?

I don't think (in)ability to identify a failed engine was a factor in the BA38 accident.

Of course when seeing the display it makes "sense" why the FO confused this in times of high stress. Its a terrible design. Speaking generally - I have noticed the smartphone generation coming through in many industries have a default expectation of visual intuition... software displays today are designed in a specific and logical way, placing a legacy or non-standard display to younger generation reaps confusion in unpredictable ways

The bus gauge is awfully designed. However, when you fly the thing day in and day out there is an expectation you understand it!

True, but my point was that in all conditions, failure or not, proving engines with height beneath before approach makes sense to me.