Is fatigue a problem at Emirates?
 

With this latest crash-landing, following previous flydubai crash, is there a serious fatigue problem in UAE?

From what I hear from the rumour mill it is a BIG problem and that Emirates schedules are punishing compared with other long-haul airlines but that could just be disgruntled employees grumbling. However, it has been mentioned with the rate of deliveries, the airline simply cannot keep up with demand for aircrew and is also losing a lot of aircrew due to the conditions.

Very interested to hear of FC experience in this area....

Nothing to see here, move along, move along!

Couldn't Possibly Comment
 

In a word... yes

Pilots lining up to leave, lots of experience departing the company. And it's the rosters. Crippling!

Is the pope a catholic?.......

Suggest a quick glance at ME forums might be advisable:ugh:

Disgruntled employees grumbling ..... oh yes, you bet!
 

But the reality is, 102 hours this month, nine days off total with no more than two consecutive days anywhere on the roster. Mixed short, medium, long and ultra long haul ops. Oh and freighter too. Much overnight flying, much east - west. Month after month, year after year.

Those that can are leaving.......

But it's legal, so surely it's okay??

Over the last decade Flight & Duty Limits have been increased due to Management in all countries & at all levels of Aviation. This has been to save costs & has nothing to do with safety. I am sure it will continue until disaster dictates otherwise!

Numerous disasters have already proven that fatigue won't be taken seriously by any authority, Tanua. The FAA have at least acknowledged the issue and curbed their previously very lax FTLs, but not enough. No others have the slightest interest - look at how EASA recently extended the FTLs considerably despite already significant fatigue issues in Europe. .

So will Paula Slier be a very busy girl in the upcoming weeks and months? :D :E

http://www.pprune.org/middle-east/57...stigation.html

The problem is not with the airlines who apply the rules but with the authorities who approve them. Pressure needs to be put on the regulators to do their jobs and stop the abuse of the FTL's.

It's a bit hard when the boss of the regulator is the boss of the airline. :hmm:

When the Regulator has a "closer than normal" relationship with the Operator, you're already up against it if you "complain" that you are "fatigued".

Haven't seen any actual FTL figures from EK crews (official or candid). That would be interesting. Only know a friend there who does a lot of "East then West" flying and seems to rarely get a decent "block" of days off.

As I say, a proper analysis of FTL would be interesting.

Remain silent or you'll be shot at dawn.

Thought beheading was the method of choice in that region :hmm:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td_kSWUl9tY

Here is a joint press conference held by

1. The Chairman of Emirates
2. The Chairman of the investigative committee in the UAE
3. The President of the Aviation Authority of the UAE
4. The Chairman of the Airport Authority of DXB
5. Executive Member of the royal Family of Dubai

They are all sitting at the same table, commenting on the accident.

What more can one say about transparency?

With any accident there is the James Reason model. I think it might be time to refresh....

Back in the 1940s and 1950s, in the days of steam railways, locomotive crews typically worked five or six 8-hour shifts per week, starting at any time in the 24 hours. Shifts were often, but not always, fixed for a week at a time, but different every week, and sometimes varied widely from day to day. The work was both physically and mentally demanding - there is no autopilot on a steam locomotive.

Does anyone know of any fatigue-related studies done on railwaymen at the time, and would their results have any bearing on demands on flight crew today?

Back in the 80s where I worked there was a lot of shiftwork, in potentially hazardous plants. We wanted to know the medical science about the effects of shiftwork. We talked to lots of UK Unis. None of them were very interested - it just wasn't a sexy subject.
Back in the 80s, the only people who had evidence-based approach to shift work were the MoD.
Surprisingly, both the electricity industry and rail did not have the evidence based science we were looking for.
A bit later, but still in the 80s, there was a fashion for 12 hour shifts instead of 8 hour shifts. Again, there was no evidence for or against 12 hour shifts.
I hope this has changed now....

Evidence of shift work and detrimental effects on health.
 

Quite a lot of work has now been carried out on this subject, but getting the airlines to admit it's an issue is quite a separate matter. Even when knowingly stepping into areas of poor industry practice, some of them still do it...........

My own outfit for example recognises in its Ops Manual that 24 hour layover periods are poor practice, and yet routinely schedules them.

Sorry to say but the industry generally responds reactively to problems, as opposed to proactively. The harsh reality recognised by the realists (as opposed to cynics) amongst us, is that as a business we just don't kill enough people. Not that anyone wants to, but history shows that is the only time things change.

When we get it wrong we sadly have the ability to destroy many hundreds of lives, and yet still poor industry practice prevails in such basic issues as fatigue. We've decided quite correctly that we don't want drunk pilots flying our planes, but have we genuinely decided that we don't want tired / fatigued pilots flying them? And please let's not get into the semantics of tired vs. fatigued, let's just accept that widespread industry support has yet to mature to the point of acceptance of this problem.

In the developed world (name your own choice of the globe as you see fit) these battles are maybe easier to fight with logic and outside support, but translate that to parts of the industry where lots of money, many new aircraft and rapid company growth, combined with antiquated thinking and feeble levels of managerial accountability, and the stage is set.

Indeed, it may appear that the chickens are all ready coming home to roost......

Plank
Ref 24 hour rest periods. This is a extract from UK CAP371 and was specifically aimed at Charter airlines flying from UK to Orlando often via Bangor for fuel e.g. in the days that they used 757's. So outbound in the day and return at night.
On arrival in USA the (best practice) advice was to stay up as long as possible thus avoiding being awake at 0200 local time watching mickey mouse or bible programmes waiting for breakfast.
Some 20 years on the science says stick to departure local time, keep the iPad stocked up and have emergency rations. Then get up early and then nap before the night flight home.
This takes a serious amount of dedication and selfishness e.g. no I'm not being g social and or taking in the sights.
Not for every trip I agree and again it depends on the operation. At EK v difficult as the ops are so varied
And even with the above- fatiguing

So why isn't there an industry institution with a noble name and purpose e.g. "Airline Safety Institute" supported by affected flight staff and others, hopefully some enlightened philanthropists, that regularly releases reports and rankings to the world press? An institution with a well-defined mission staffed with the kinds of people skilled in delivering that message might have a positive effect without fire and crunch.

Twiglet1: Been there, done that. You illustrate exactly a point I've been thumping on for years; the XAA's bent the rules to suit the performance of the a/c and the routes flown. They came up with 'fixes' to allow the bends to be applied. Later on there was the 'Florida dispensation'. B767 could do it direct, non-stop, but it was a long duty. The return was also long, after <24hrs rest. To avoid having extra nights of layover you could opt for a 24hr turn-round and an extra day off at home base. I never understood how extra rest AFTER the event made the event any safer or more acceptable. Having said that, for me a 1 day lay-over was less tiring than 2. To be truly fresh I needed 3 days to recover the jet-lag from the outbound; but it's personal.
But I still believe it is the case that FL's have evolved not via good medical common sense but via a/c performance and lack of coordinated crew opposition.

Poorjohn, no. Sadly. But as said, it's not sexy enough. It would also be risky in terms of libel, suggesting z,y or z are behaving dangerously by not complying with best practice though complying with the law. There lays the rub - the defence is always "it's legal"; so is sticking a fork in a plug socket, but it is neither safe nor intelligent, and the results are predictable. That is why the entire industry continues to have a problem, not just isolated carriers or even nations.

Seriously !!
 

You may need to google before posting ... 2 and 3 are wrong !

Twiglet, you are on the money re fatigue in my book.
I've spent the last 30 years on long haul, including a season with Brittania flying to Orlando and the Caribbean, and would offer the following comments in support of twiglets point.
Stay in local departure time or nearby whilst away. It can be antisocial, but you will arrive home in better shape.
Even on our Air NZ 10 day return trip to London and back I practise this, even though the best time for sleep in the UK is after lunch, around midnight NZ time.
Regarding scientific fatigue testing, I believe AirNZ were the first, or amongst the first to use actigraph wristwatch monitors for awake/asleep monitoring, along with a reaction timer device used at regular intervals during a tour of duty. We now have good baseline data to measure any new TODuty against.
Interestingly, when we tested one night Vs two night London layovers, as part of the 10 day TOD mentioned above the fatigue levels were similar, but in my opinion one night away in the most distant time zone is the best option, although antisocial, and hopeless for enjoying the sights of London.
We also put any new tours through the British DERA model to assess the potential for fatigue.

However we don't do 100 hour rosters, around 75-85 duty time is normal for us, and time in the bunk counts.
In our recent pilot intakes we have had, Emirates, Ethihad, Qantas, and Cathay pilots, so it can't be too tough down here.

So to put that in perspective, if an EK pilot is doing 102 hours and bunk time doesn't count, they are doing what compared to an Air NZ pilot? Ie if you included bunk time for an EK pilot who regularly does 100 hours, would that be 1.5 times the amount of time an Air NZ pilot spends in an airborne aircraft? 1.6 times? 1.7 times? I've never done long haul so I don't know the answer.

The 100hr EK roster also includes bunk time. As EK pays/credits the whole trip on the published roster. The bunk time does not count towards the 900hrs in 365days nor the 100hrs in 28 days. Meaning more than 9months flying at 100hrs can happen.

PS. Staying on local time is near impossible even at DXB due to so many departures leaving between 10pm and 6am. So although I fully endorse the ways of fighting jet-lag discussed above, the realist in me says if ya haven't done it, you don't know.

Agreed. I have tried the whole stay on DXB time thing, but I just can't, it may be scientifically wrong of me but I sleep when my poor old bod tells me to.

"Studies on railwaymen......any bearing on flight crew..?" Apples and oranges, save that, if the suggestion is that such levels of rest are "safe", it's worth observing that even the comparatively low-level mental task of recognising and acting on a red danger signal is not achieved. As recently as the 90's there was still a shockingly high incidence of SPAD (signals passed at danger) events. Back in the days of steam these mostly weren't even recorded unless they resulted in an accident.

To be honest...
 

... I am glad of a separate thread...

We all know crashes are multifactorial. Fatigue is one factor often enough. A real and significant factor. But it is boring to hear it 100 times on every thread. Because we all know already.

There are three answers to fatigue. (1) get more sleep. Okay, not likely in today's world. (2) learn to do it in your sleep. I reckon you could pretty much throw anything at Sully. (3) rely on automation to take the strain.

I like answer 2, I do. But Sully's are hard to come by. And fatigue is not just the domain of the ME, it wasn't long ago that it was the scourge of the US regional lines. Calgon 3407... Stall warning... PF pulled up. If there is one thing you should learn to do in your sleep it is how to handle a stall warning at altitude.

Today's reality is (1) or (3). You are lucky if you can get (1). Most will be in (3) territory. And that is how it will go.

Every day I take a driverless train. It runs smoothly and predictably. How long will it be before pilotless aircraft? And how will its performance compare? It isn't far away.

No doubt some will crash. As do the ones with pilots. But would it be worse? I can't see them heading off to the southern Indian ocean..

Just to play devils advocate....

......could well be programmed to do so. Pilotless would certainly not eliminate foul play!

"Just to play devils advocate" ? Sure, fatigue ceases to be an issue if someone were to invent an entirely automatic airliner but otherwise, increasing automation doesn't reduce fatigue. And to anyone who has experienced the extreme tiredness induced by some rostering patterns the "advice" to get more sleep won't be seen as anything other than highly patronising.

Fatigue or Boredom or Both?
 

THE HAZARDS OF GOING ON AUTOPILOT
By Maria Konnikova , SEPTEMBER 4, 2014
At 9:18 p.m. on February 12, 2009, Continental Connection Flight 3407, operated by Colgan Air, took off from Newark International Airport. Rebecca Shaw, the first officer, was feeling ill and already dreaming of the hotel room that awaited in Buffalo. The captain, Marvin Renslow, assured her that she’d feel just fine once they landed. As the plane climbed to its cruising altitude of sixteen thousand feet, the pair continued to chat amiably, exchanging stories about Shaw’s ears and Renslow’s Florida home.

The flight was a short one and, less than an hour after takeoff, the plane began its initial descent. At 10:06 p.m., it dropped below ten thousand feet. According to the F.A.A.’s “sterile cockpit” rule, all conversation from that point forward is supposed to be essential to the flight. “How’s the ears?” Renslow asked. “Stuffy and popping,” Shaw replied. Popping is good, he pointed out. “Yeah, I wanna make ’em pop,” she assured him. They laughed and began talking about how a different Colgan flight had reached Buffalo before theirs did.

As ground control cleared the flight to descend to twenty-three hundred feet, the pilots’ conversation continued, unabated. There was the captain’s own training, which was, when he first got hired, substantially less than Shaw’s. There were Shaw’s co-workers, complaining about not being promoted quickly enough. There was the ice outside. Renslow recalled his time flying in Charleston, West Virginia, and how, being a Florida man, the cold had caught him doubly off guard. As the plane lost altitude, it continued to decelerate.


At 10:16 p.m., the plane’s impending-stall alert system—the stick shaker—kicked in. “Jesus Christ,” Renslow said, alarmed. In his panicked confusion, he pulled the shaker toward him instead of pushing it away from him. Seventeen seconds later, he said, “We’re down,” and, two seconds after that, the plane crashed, killing everyone on board and one person on the ground.

In its report about Flight 3407, the National Transportation Safety Board (N.T.S.B.) concluded that the likely cause of the accident was “the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.” The factors that the board said had contributed to Renslow’s response were, “(1) the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-speed cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.” All but the fourth suggested a simple failure to pay attention.

In this respect, Flight 3407 followed a long-established trend. A 1994 N.T.S.B. review of thirty-seven major accidents between 1978 and 1990 that involved airline crews found that in thirty-one cases faulty or inadequate monitoring were partly to blame. Nothing had failed; the crew had just neglected to properly monitor the controls.

The period studied coincided with an era of increased cockpit automation, which was designed to save lives by eliminating the dangers related to human error. The supporting logic was the same in aviation as it was in other fields: humans are highly fallible; systems, much less so. Automation would prevent mistakes caused by inattention, fatigue, and other human shortcomings, and free people to think about big-picture issues and, therefore, make better strategic decisions. Yet, as automation has increased, human error has not gone away: it remains the leading cause of aviation accidents.

***

In 1977, the House Committee on Science and Technology identified automation as a major safety concern for the coming decade, and, three years later, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation repeated the warning. Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and other leading commercial-aviation companies were, at the time, developing new aircraft models with ever more sophisticated cockpits. With the move toward automation seemingly inevitable, Congress requested that nasa research the effects of the changes on pilots.

Leading the charge at nasa’s Ames Research Center was Earl Wiener, a pioneer of human-factors and automation research in aviation. Wiener had been studying flight records in the years since automation was first introduced into the cockpit. Beginning in the nineteen-seventies, he published a series of papers that analyzed the interplay among automation, pilot error, and accidents. By the early nineteen-eighties, he had concluded that a striking number of innovations designed to address the perceived risk of human error had, in fact, led to accidents. Among the most notorious examples he cited was the 1983 crash of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, which was shot down by the Soviet Union after veering three hundred miles off course. The official report attributed the crew’s “lack of alertness” as the most plausible cause of the navigational error. Such inattention, the report went on to say, was far from unique in civilian-aircraft navigation.

By 1988, Wiener had added more cases to his list and had begun supplementing his research with extensive pilot interviews. He was well aware that automation could work wonders: computers had markedly improved navigation, for example, and their ability to control the airplanes’ every tiny wiggle via the yaw damper was helping to prevent potentially fatal Dutch rolls. But, as pilots were being freed of these responsibilities, they were becoming increasingly susceptible to boredom and complacency—problems that were all the more insidious for being difficult to identify and assess. As one pilot whom Wiener interviewed put it: “I know I’m not in the loop, but I’m not exactly out of the loop. It’s more like I’m flying alongside the loop.”

Wiener accused the aviation industry of succumbing to what he called the “let’s just add one more computer” phenomenon. Companies were introducing increasingly specialized automated functions to address particular errors without looking at their over-all effects, he said, when they should have been be making slow and careful innovations calibrated to pilots’ abilities and needs. As it stood, increased automation hadn’t reduced human errors on the whole; it had simply changed their form.

***

It was against this backdrop, in 1990, that Stephen Casner arrived at Ames, armed with a doctorate in Intelligent Systems Design from the University of Pittsburgh. Casner had been studying automation, and although he didn’t have any particular experience with planes (he became a licensed pilot soon after), he brought a new perspective to the problem: that of human psychology. His adviser at Pitt had been a psychologist, and the field had deeply influenced his understanding of automation. He hoped to bring a new experimental rigor to the problem, by testing the effects of computerized systems on pilots.

Over the next two decades, Casner dedicated himself to systematically studying how, exactly, humans and computers were interacting in the cockpit, and how that interaction could be improved to minimize error and risk. How were the pilots solving complex problems as a flight progressed along its regular course? How well-suited were the displays and functions to the pilots’ preferences and behaviors?

Cockpit systems, he found, were not particularly well understood by the pilots who had to use them, and he concurred with Wiener that the forms of automation in use were not particularly well suited to the way pilots’ minds operated during a flight. In 2006, Casner attempted to remedy the first part of the problem by publishing a textbook on automation in the cockpit. Since then, he has focussed increasingly on the problem of inattention. Last year, he teamed up with the psychologist Jonathan Schooler, from the University of California, Santa Barbara, who studies attention and problem-solving ability, to see whether automation was genuinely responsible for the kinds of monitoring errors that Wiener had identified. If computerized systems performed as intended ninety-nine per cent of the time, Casner and Schooler asked, how would a pilot’s ability to engage at a moment’s notice if something went wrong, as it had for Colgan Air, be affected?

When Casner and Schooler ran tests using a Boeing 747-400 flight simulator, they confirmed that the degree of automation a pilot relied on during a flight directly impacted how closely he paid attention to his work. It was true, as automation proponents argued, that pilots spent less time worrying about the minutiae of flying when they were using more highly automated systems. But they weren’t necessarily using the newfound mental space to perform higher-order computations. Instead, a full twenty-one per cent of the pilots surveyed reported thinking about inconsequential topics, just as Shaw and Renslow had done.

Even more troublingly, a new study published by Casner and Schooler in Human Factors reveals that automation has also caused some pilots’ skills to atrophy. In the experiment, a group of sixteen pilots, each with approximately eighteen thousand hours of flight time, were asked to fly in a Boeing 747-400 simulator. As the simulated flights progressed, the researchers systematically varied the levels of automation in use. At some point in the flight, they would disable the alert system without advising their subjects and introduce errors into the instrument indicators. Casner and Schooler wanted to see if the pilots would notice, and, if so, what they would do.

Surprisingly, the pilots’ technical skills, notably their ability to scan instruments and operate manual controls, had remained largely intact. These were the skills that pilots and industry experts had been most concerned about losing, but it seemed that flying an airplane was much like riding a bike. The pilots’ ability to make complex cognitive decisions, however—what Casner calls their “manual thinking” skills—had suffered a palpable hit. They were less able to visualize their plane’s position, to decide what navigational step should come next, and to diagnose abnormal situations. “The things you do with your hands are good,” Casner told me. “It’s the things you do with your mind and brain that we really need to practice.”

Only one pilot had been able to complete the test without making a mistake. The rest exhibited the same behavior that Casner and Schooler had identified in their earlier study: mind-wandering. The more the pilots’ thoughts had drifted—which the researchers affirmed increased the more automated the flight was—the more errors they made. In most cases, they could detect that something had gone wrong, but they didn’t respond as they should have, by cross-checking other instruments, diagnosing the problem, and planning for the consequences. “We’re asking human beings to do something for which human beings are just not well suited,” Casner said. “Sit and stare.”

The more a procedure is automated, and the more comfortable we become with it, the less conscious attention we feel we need to pay it. In Schooler’s work on insight and attention, he uses rote, automated tasks to induce the best mind-wandering state in his subjects. If anyone needs to remain vigilant, it’s an airline pilot. Instead, the cockpit is becoming the experimental ideal of the environment most likely to cause you to drift off.

In the cockpit, as automated systems have become more reliable, and as pilots have grown accustomed to their reliability—this is particularly the case for younger pilots, who have not only trained with those systems from the outset of their careers but grown up in a world filled with computers and automation—they have almost inevitably begun to abdicate responsibility on some deeper level. “It’s complacency,” Casner said. “If a buzzer goes off, I’ll do something about it. If it doesn’t, I’m good.” The July, 2013, crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 as it attempted to land in San Francisco is a recent example. None of the four pilots on board had noticed that the plane was coming in too slowly. “One explanation is they had the automation configured so that something like this couldn’t happen,” Casner said. “They truly believed it would keep flying that airspeed.”

***

The problems identified by Wiener, Casner, and Schooler have implications that reach far beyond the airline industry. Think about cruise control in cars: the moment you set it, you’re no longer forced to vigilantly monitor your speed. Does this make you look more closely at the road, or does your mind begin to drift off? Casner compared the dynamic to our modern collective inability to remember phone numbers programmed into our phones—normally not a problem, but in the event of an emergency potentially a major issue.

“What we’re doing is using human beings as safety nets or backups to computers, and that’s completely backward,” Casner said. “It would be much better if the computing system watched us and chimed in when we do something wrong.” Ideally, he said, automation would adopt a human-centered approach—one that takes seriously our inability to sit and stare by alerting us when we need to be alerted rather than by outright replacing our routines with computerized ones. This kind of shift from passive observation to active monitoring would help to ensure that our minds remain stimulated. Casner likened the desired approach to one taken by good lifeguards. In the absence of a safety net, they must remain aware. “They don’t just sit and wait to see if someone’s screaming,” he said. “They scan the pool, look for certain signs.” While lifeguards are taught all the possible signs of a person who is drowning, pilots don’t receive elaborate training on all the things that can go wrong, precisely because the many things that can go wrong so rarely do. “We need to give pilots more practice at the thinking skills,” Casner said. “Present them with abnormal situations, show them some interesting-looking instrument panels and say, ‘What’s going on?’ “

Active monitoring may be difficult to achieve in aviation, given the degree of automation already present in cockpits. But industries in which automation is nascent—automotive, medical, housing construction—still have the opportunity to learn from the problems that have occurred in the cockpit. Casner is working with the designer Don Norman to apply what he has learned to other fields, beginning with the car industry. As we visualize a future in which more of our tasks are left to machines—Google’s driverless car, computer-guided surgery—we may be able to make our systems easier and safer without inducing complacency. We assume that more automation is better—that a driverless car or a drone-delivered package is progress, no matter the guise it takes—but the experience we’ve had in aviation teaches us to be suspicious of that assumption. “Don’t just automate something because you can,” Casner said. “Automate it because you should.”

It's business.
Crashs and their costs are factored into the bottom line.
As someone said earlier, the rules are bent to adjust to aircraft performance.
Fixes are then applied for crew to work the hours involved.
In most cases extra salary, bonuses, perks etc were added on for "long duty" rosters, with a plan to slowly erode those over time, especially for crew beginning new contracts.
One of the reasons I left all this behind was when I worked out that senior non-flying staff at airlines were getting paid far more than aircrew.
Flying is marvelous, but when you do the math...it's a mug's game. (And the same staff above can get you killed implementing the policies you're now a victim to.)

About eight or nine years ago, when I ran the global health committee for the oil industry my committee of senior oil co physicians asked me to coordinate a best practices manual on fatigue. We turned (don't laugh) to the airline industry as we assumed that they would have this sorted.

I quickly identified a leading consultant and it was clear that the issues and best practices were well understood. The only thing that surprised me was that there were relatively few airlines on their — or their competitors —books. And the ones that were were not the ones that I had expected — it included an up and coming lo-co for example.

The problem is not the science or the research. It is mostly well known and understood. It is where operators choose to place themselves on the continuum / slider between basic regulation-good practice-best practice.

And, from my observation, the degree to which management pilots are able to stand up to internal forces to cut costs and increase short term "efficiency".

Agreed. The problem is well understood by the industry but addressing it costs money. As flight crew we don't do a good enough job of communicating the issue, specifically the hazards of fatigue. Passengers would be rightly appalled to see a pilot down a beer -yet routinely we accept a level of fatigue equivalent to several drinks.

'bout time someone started a 'Fair Trade' airline.
There was much surprise and reaction when it was publicised about the working conditions of the sub-continent workers (often children) making the cheap jeans sold by leading supermarkets. Boycotts occurred until T's & C's improved above sweat shop levels. It was believed that customers s would turn a blind eye if they could get jeans etc. at rock bottom prices. When the consequence of this greedy attitude was shoved under their faces there was a recoil.
I dare say the life of a LoCo cabin crew might cause raised eyebrows of the passengers. Pilots would find it more difficult to gain sympathy; it would be harder to break through the myth of the glamour; that does't mean it's not worth trying, but it would take a very professional PR person to create a campaign. To date there has never been such a thing. If pax were aware of the true cost of their cheap tickets they would be surprised; and at how large the bonuses of the senior managers are at the same time as employee T's & C's have crashed.