The report, unfortunately, failed to factually state how the airplane got airborne and climbed to 85 feet with the engines at idle.
Unless I am missing something, by rearranging the time sequence one can notice the thrust being at idle since approximately time 08:37:20. The TL were actioned at time 08:37:35 and took two seconds to start spooling up the engines. it would suggest that those 85 feet were reached through a bounce.
Regarding automation, it's all very neat to have it. Yet, airlines are spending lots of money in such "awareness" equipment and forcing pilots to abide by those calls and leave airmanship aside. In the old days (I am old), accidents were caused by reasons which were supposed to have been mitigated, or eliminated by automation. However, automation is becoming a new reason for accidents, different types of accidents.

It's called latent energy

When touchdown occurred, they were at Vref+15 (162kts), which is plenty fast enough to get airborne again with idle thrust if you rotate the aeroplane. They traded speed for height and got to 85’ and Vref-13 (134kts) before coming back down to earth again, which taking account of the drag from gear and flap and time on the ground seems reasonable. 162kts to 134kts is equivalent to c.360’ worth of height in a no-drag world, without adding in gains from an increasing headwind. No bounce required to explain the behaviour.

Nothing latent about it, it is just energy.

Looks like I've stumbled into airliners.net by mistake.

It was taught to me way back during training as being valid when it was actually a landing that was long and outside the touchdown zone e.g. Not as a result of temporary displaced threshold, database error etc. I can also recall the TRE stating its the only case it's mandatory and not optional (mayyyte) to go around for a RAAS call.
Now applying common sense and airmanship, I would be prepared to go into the office and say I didn't go around as a captain because it wasn't valid on the basis I had 2.5km of runway even if I landed halfway down it.. but this is the place where trainers divert a 380 because of OM-A auto callouts and not cause of common sense.

It does seem to me as a bystander that the definition of the TDZ as the first 3000ft of runway is somewhat arbitrary. You could land a good 2000ft past the end of the TDZ at Dubai and still have more runway left than landing at the correct point on many other runways around the world.

Going around after missing the TDZ by 600ft when there is still over 8000ft ahead does seem like overkill!

Basic skill sets
 

There are some basic skills that you need to master in order to be called a professional pilot, for example, being able to take off and or carry out an RTO within the confines of the runway, also you need to be able to land an aircraft and or carry out simple missed approach.

What is being missed by all of the posts seemingly blaming the unnecessary auto call out for a GA, is simply this; regardless of whether or not the GA was done or not, the basic skill of being able to carry out a bog standard missed approach was for some reason beyond this crew. This is a very basic skill that should be in every pilots toolbox. To put it another way, if the crew had of ignored the call out to do a GA, and instead continued with the landing, the gap in their skill set would not have been exposed this time but would still have existed.

This loss of basic skills seems to be becoming a common theme as more and more crew have not had any experience on anything other than modern late generation airliners. By way of recent examples, AF447, Asiana @ SFO, Air Asia X off Sumatra, and the ATR72 in Taiwan.

There is a very strong emphasis in our company for crew to use automatics in all phases of flight to the maximum extent, and manual flying is actively discouraged. This, I believe is a very flawed approach to both training and normal operations. The net result is, I believe, a very substantial eroding of basic hand flying skills in our company, and it would appear from recent industry accident history, that this insidious global reduction in basic skills is a very extensive problem.

Unfortunately the blame for this accident will be sheeted home to the crew, and the real culprits, the middle management of airlines around the world responsible for running training departments, and setting SOP's will come out unscathed.

What gazumped said!:ok:

Yes, it seems to be yet another case of 'automation complacency' and a lack of understanding about what the automatics will or won't do.

I wonder. The preliminary report includes a section on 'Go-around procedure' and also includes extracts from Emirates 777 FCOM and FCTM. Those documents are obviously in the investigators' sights.

The FCOM and FCTM are vague about the procedures required for a go-around after touchdown. The FCOM mentions that the TOGA switches are inhibited after touchdown, but the FCTM only states that 'an automatic go-around cannot be initiated after touchdown'. The FCTM also states that 'if a go-around is initiated after touchdown but before thrust reverser selection, continue with normal go-around procedures'. Normal procedures would imply pressing the TOGA switches, but in this case they are inhibited. It seems to me there's plenty of room for confusion if pilots don't fully understand the limitations of the system and nowhere does it state that the thrust levers must be manually advanced.

Agreed gazumped
The logical outcome of this will be the continuation of such accidents until something changes. Ultimately the industry managers will have to come to the realisation that in order to gain another step down in the accident rate, they must acknowledge the problem & there must be training in both automation AND manual skills.

Buzzbox
 

Nowhere is it stated on my bedroom door that I must open it before I attempt to enter. I can assure you quite emphatically that if you attempt to enter your bedroom without opening the door you will bump your head.

Likewise if you attempt a GA without pushing up the power levers you will hit the ground, I don't care what is written in what book, FCTM, OM etc, basic physics.

Also if you retract the gear without having POSITIVE rate, and you neglect to push up the power levers you will make headlines. Basic, basic stuff.

We as in industry, have been let down by very very poor training. The lack of skill displayed by this crew is not isolated to this crew, but, in my opinion very widespread, and I say again, the responsibility should sheeted home to training departments, not only in this airline but worldwide. Unfortunately this will not happen, the crew will be sacrificed, and the lapses in global crew skills will continue.

Our company has now incorporated into the next cyclic a GA from on the ground, just prior to reverse selection, talk about experts in shutting the door after the horse has bolted!

It's invalid if annunciated after touchdown, as per current Company Notam.

Am I the only one here who is troubled by the statements who claim that the pilots are entirely to blame and it was simply their incompetence that led to this accident. "Poor training, automation dependency, children of the magenta line etc etc".

Never heard of the Swiss cheese model? As for bog standard go around well if you touchdown PRIOR to the go around then it ain't a go around! Also, it's one thing to fail to fly the aircraft to within set limits through poor flying skills but another to be caught out, perhaps, in an unusual situation. Rejected a landing after touchdown isn't something I've practiced regularly but I suspect it will be part of the next cycle of sim scenarios.

I don't know out it's SOP at this airline to leave autothrottle engaged on a manual landing but if it is not then that MIGHT explain why a crew could be surprised when TOGA doesn't engage. On a similar type it works on a time/radalt combination and a colleague related to me how it surprised him when he rejected a landing during the flare. Of course when he realised what had happened he manually selected an appropriate thrust setting. In all honesty I think I may have reacted in the same way.

So perhaps we can give the crew the benefit of the doubt and not proclaim their guilt just yet. Just a thought.

BBK

The report doesn't mention whether actions were commanded and perhaps a prelim report doesn't do that anyway.

But from the timings in the report:

0837:19 RAAS aural message
0837:23 Aircraft becomes airborne
0837:27 Flap lever moved
0837:28 ATC issue clearance, which was also read back correctly
0837:29 Gear lever selected up
0837:35 Both TL's moved from idle

In a 3 second period:

The flaps were moved, presumably after being commanded
A clearance was given and read back
The gear handle was moved, again presumably after being commanded

Perhaps the readback could have been made after the gear selection. That's not clear but either way, it's a busy 3 second period.

gazumped
 

Thanks very much for the physics lesson. Really.

You might have noticed the term 'automation complacency' at the beginning of my previous post. Far too many pilots have become far too reliant on the automation instead of using it as a tool to help them fly the aircraft. The procedures and training at most airlines are geared towards the maximum use of automation and there is precious little opportunity for most pilots to practice their 'basic skills'. It's no wonder that such skills are being eroded.

In my opinion, the problem is exacerbated by poorly documented procedures and poor training. Many pilots simply do not understand the limitations of the automatic systems they have become reliant upon. When something goes wrong and the automatics don't operate as expected, those same pilots lack the currency (or training) to fall back on their basic skills.

The Final Report into EK521 will no doubt highlight many different factors that contributed to this accident. I'm betting that poor documentation of the TOGA inhibit function and its implications for a go-around after touchdown will be one of those factors.

BBK
 

My posts are not blaming the crew, but the training department of this and every other airline, mine included.

It is a sad fact that the middle management of this airline will sacrifice this crew rather that address their own inadequacies.

It did not miss my attention that just when 100% of effort should have been on flying the aircraft and monitoring the PM made a radio transmission.

Possibly whilst moving the flap lever and raising the gear?

I have to say a.net put up their decent behavior on this topic, on the other hand ft showed its dark side. Of course pprune always encourages freedom of speech more than any other forum.

For those questioning why did they pull the gear? Well the aircraft went from 0 to 85' so I would assume that qualifies as positive rate.

I agree. I think it is high time that aircraft manuals were rewritten to actually educate pilots on how and why things work, rather than just the legal minimum.

This crash might also point the fingers at a few safety 'committees' who have turned every runway in the world into something that is less than 2000m long with their whole 'touchdown zone' mantra. This combined with the way that company's seem to treat you if you land outside the touchdown zone has created a grey area of fear in where you could easily land and stop comfortably after touching down at 1050m but get a bollocking from the company or you go around and attempt a difficult maneuver which is rarely practiced with automation changing modes and a high cognitive workload.

The question for safety committees is why are you going around when you have 3000m left to stop in? On long runways the touch down zone is merely arbitrary. In reality it should be calculated on the actual physical length of available runway you are landing on. So on a short runway it will be tight on a long runway you have much more flexibility.