notapilot:
Are you referring to the airline or the country? I am not sure you and 4468 are both referring to the same entity.

Neither Dubai City nor Emirates Airline are rich. Both are highly leveraged. Low oil prices created a credit crunch within the region which was Dubai/EK's staple credit source. Global credit is available, but not to already leveraged entities.

On the day in question A6-EMW - like any other 777 landing on a dry runway could land with up to 45 knots cross wind component.

Personally, as a 777 driver, I very much doubt the wind conditions were anywhere near the limits of the aircraft. All this drivel about anemometers and obstacle-induced windshear is getting tedious.

Let's all see what the preliminary report has to say. Annex 13 states 30 days, so let's see some facts, from some professionals that know what they are looking at.
Patience boys please.
DD

yes, some FACTS would be nice

It is possible, and I hope so!

And then what?

Will we get another magenta line overcrowding the PFD with some result of these marvels? Will there be another monotonous voice in the cockpit advising pilots of some shifts or shears?

As long as more and more pilots occupy the cockpits without the skills and experience to apply some basic escape manoeuvres, you can install whatever you want, inside or outside the cockpits, without any safety improvement.

Fight the root cause and not the symptoms.

Sooo.....How is the preliminary report coming along? It has been 32 days now, so I suppose it is hidden, tucked safely under a thick carpet....

Didn't see the report? Here is the essence:

777 Final approach etc..
Violent unpredictable wind shear..
Bravery and skill of the captain alone saved all the lives..
Three zillion dollars to be invested..
Airport to be expanded..
UAE to help Boeing improve their planes for this situation.
UAE to offer everyone pilot training
etc
etc
etc

Don't bet against this report

About Annex 13

1) There is no mandate to release any report to public.
2) There is no mandate to report FACTS.

I believe that you're half right. While there is no requirement to release reports publicly, the requirement for factual information is set out in very specific terms in the Appendix to Annex 13 headed "Format of the Final Report."

Automation will continue to increase, not only for the aircraft, but for the aerodrome. Automation is useless without correct information.
The detailed winds will help operations and help to optimize the capacity, especially in regards to changes in runway ends.
There are time based operations, and wake mitigation strategies, which require detailed winds to be put into use.

There is already automation on the aircraft for windshear alert, but the anticipation if/then scenario doesnt work very well. The SOP requires mandatory go around, and how many times have you wondered why? Couple the ground based data with the ac data, and it will be far better on final.

The wind data is critical for wake transport and dissipation, so it would be good for ATC to know when there are wakes hanging around so the distances can be increased, or when they arent, decrease the distances.

The winds aloft are critical to enable Time Based Operations, as the headwind data from the ground is useless for this type of operation.

How many times has the measured winds on final be nothing like what is experienced on final? Due to rate of descent, turns, and the wind gusting/turning, the winds measured by the aircraft on final are less accurate, yet the automation on the aircraft completely relies on that data.

It is about getting more aircraft in safely, and greater access. Not only are pilots better informed, but so is ATC and operations.I am certain no one is going to complain about that.

Dear undefire

You seem to be one of the prototype pilots (or not ...) that have a hard time to grasp the essence of our criticism .....

Agreed, and nothing against that.

Agreed again. Now following your argument, if information is absent, automation is useless. Then the pilot has to step in. Recent incidents however show, that too many pilots are barely capable of doing just that, due to lack of experience, exposure and training.
My point is, that if the effort is mainly in increasing the amount of information, trying to build in more redundancy and/or coupling, you still can't totally eliminate the possibility of a loss of information, thus rendering automation useless. Enhancing pilots skills however, would bring them back to being able to step in and by that would enhance safety by a much higher factor.

More often than not! That's quite a silly rhetorical question.
It is the very reason why we still have onboard sensors and our skills.
It's called flying.

They are not, because they reflect what your wings and engines feel and at that very moment you depend on those values and not what some sophisticated instruments all around the airport measure.
Again: it's called flying!!

So first you're pretending that such data are less accurate, but in the same sentence you tell us, that automation completely relies on these data.
Following your logic, we should therefore not rely on automation! Your proposed remedy however is even more and remote automation and coupling .... Inconsistent and i totally disagree.

Agreed. More information for pilots and ATC is good (leave operations out, please), but more coupling and automation should only be considered after the pilots get back their skills to intervene. Because all these marvels will eventually fail and somebody will have to step in and too many were not up to that task.

Here you go...https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublicat...-%20A6-EMW.pdf

Executive summary:

Don't go around with throttle at idle

Don't put the gear up before climbing away



Total flying time (hours) 7457.16 7957.56
Total on this type (hours) 5128.20 1296.55
Total last 90 days (hours) 194.4 233.22
Total on type last 90 days (hours) 194.4 233.22

Availability of slides is concerning:

L1 Open Yes Not used (detached from door sill. Commander and a cabin crewmember evacuated from this door.)
R1 Open Yes Used (the slide deflated after several passengers had evacuated.)
L2 Open Yes Not used (wind affected.)
R2 Open Yes Used (same side as the fire.)
L3 Closed No Not used (door was not opened.)
R3 Closed No Not used (door partially opened then closed due to the external fire.)
L4 Open Yes Not used (wind affected.)
R4 Open Yes Used (blocked due to passenger congestion. The slide was filled with water as a result of firefighting activity.)
L5 Open Yes Used (used only at the start of the evacuation. Wind affected.)
R5 Open Yes Used (temporarily blocked when the slide was wind affected

Firefighter killed when centre tanks exploded. Tragic

37:23 Go around attempted

37:35 Full forward throttles pushed up

for 12 secs on a 49 deg C day no thrust was available during the go around. :sad:

Seems to me it was always 'available'. Just not effectively selected until 12 secs after becoming airborne?

Due presumably to auto thrust inhibit, and lack of FMA awareness?

Not a FBW pilot: it would seem to me that the a/c touched down and as the 2nd main gear touched the "long Landing' caution announced. The GA was initiated because of this, even though the a/c had main wheels on the ground and the crew, I presume, were visual and could see their touchdown point and runway remaining. The TL's were advanced manually AFTER the a/c was airborne and speed decreasing.
I know it is not quite apples & apples, but I relate back to the A380 Emirates diversion from Manchester when HAL, on board, declared on short finals that the runway was too short. The crew SOP was no discretion and off they went to LHR. The subsequent debate was whether the all seeing all knowing computer was in fact correct, and the conclusion was NO. (note: not what the crew did). If the root cause of this accident is found to be a reaction to an erroneous computer call out it will make the future of SOP re-writing very interesting.
Surely Mk.1 eyeball should have discretion over a blind computer, sometimes? Commander's discretion, and all that.

I wonder if the aircraft would have stopped ok if the crew had ignored the RAAS,

(Rat5 sorry posts crossed. That is what I was alluding too)