To the earlier post (now deleted?) suggesting a recurrence of of Egyptair 667 a few years back:

Though that incident and resulting hull loss was probably due to a cockpit fire from an electrical fault on the RHS oxy hose/system ... that aircraft was a B772. Enough said.

It is interesting to me that we "only" have 19 pages of comments. I think it is because it is such a puzzle. The ACARS data gives enough information to keep people focused on trying to explain those messages. Without those, the speculation is all over the place.

Would it be possible to reverse the thought process and speculate as to what messages may be transmitted via ACARS based on some of the theories presented? I don't have the knowledge to do this, but a bus pilot would.

For example, what ACARS messages would you expect to see if there was an explosive decompression? If a message indicating a drop in cabin altitude would be expected but not received, it would be less likely to be the initial cause (and within 3 minutes would you expect that such a message should have been generated?).

What messages would you expect to see if a fire started in avionics? Etc. Just looking for other opportunities to extrapolate upon what we know.

I would hold my breath on the validity of the ACARS data. It has neither been confirmed by Egyptair or Airbus, the two parties who surely must have been aware of its existence were it genuine for two days now. There is nothing damning for either party in the contents, and releasing or at least acknowledging it would have given a credibility boost to other official statements, indicating that they really tell what they know. I see no good reason why especially Egyptair would want to reject this relatively positive PR opportunity at this very difficult time. Unless of course there is no such ACARS data, and somebody made it up... It is now all over the mainstream press, quoting AVH (though CNN seems to have obtained it independently from same unnamed source, which if genuine can only be from MS or AB).

The Egyptian authorities were quite quick to point to the likelihood of a terrorist (or criminal) cause stating it was not likely to have been a technical aircraft issue with the EgyptAir plane. Too quick, to my simple but cynical mind.
Metrojet 9268 -despite the fact that by early November American and British authorities suspected a bomb and in mid November the Russian Security Services were certain it was a terrorist attack (not to mention Daesh (ISIL) in the Sinai claimed responsibility) the Egyptian investigative team, headed by one Ayman al-Muqaddam (who will lead the investigation of EgyptAir 804) issued a preliminary report in December stating: "no evidence that there is an act of terror or illegal intervention"
:ugh:

All those talking about fire - can you name one incident where a fire on board a passenger jet aircraft was never relayed onto ATC or even other aircraft in the area?

Simple answer, Bobman: "There is a first time for everything."

Since there is no fire suppression in the avionics Bay of an A320, is there a procedure when the avionics bay smoke detector goes into alarm?

No, it could just as easily have originated from whichever ACARS datalink service provider Egyptair use - if so, most likely ARINC/GLOBALink or SITA.

gulfairs

A difference that jumps out at me is the fact that you had the "aviate" part under control; this doesn't seem to be the case with MS804. It appears that the flight crew was already overtasked, and in any event, a turn in MS 804's case would have taken him away from the nearest runway. Straight ahead, he surely knew that he was almost close enough to see the lights of Alexandria. Also, the sky was all his at that time on that night, afik there was only one other aircraft even within VHF distance.

But some are more procedure bound than others; under the Dryfus model, an "expert" has the ability to: "Transcend reliance on rules, guidelines, and maxims" if the situation calls for it. This guy had 6,000 hours as a commercial pilot, he certainly wasn't a novice.

But you may be right, as the problem began he may have thought he had it under control and was just beginning to go through a checklist. So he cleared his airspace first.

Agreed, though perhaps a bit less easily, as these organisations have stricter protocols & controls on who/how can access such data. The origin seems to be a screencap photo, probably taken with a phone.

@ Pace :ugh: What a ridiculous statement.

On that basis, presumably you're similarly "not convinced" 9/11 happened because "the implications for aviation" would be too great.

This sort of nonsense - along with "why don't we find a way to discretely pass our coordinates instead of flying the plane when things get tough" - is why most have simply given up hoping to find any serious contributions here.

BBC
 

BBC World Service quoting AVHerald about ACARS messaging on MS804.

MS 804
 

On May 20th 2016 The Aviation Herald received information from three independent channels, that ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System) messages with following content were received from the aircraft:

00:26Z 3044 ANTI ICE R WINDOW
00:26Z 561200 R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
00:26Z 2600 SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
00:27Z 2600 AVIONICS SMOKE
00:28Z 561100 R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
00:29Z 2200 AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
00:29Z 2700 F/CTL SEC 3

As far as I understand the R sliding window electrical power comes from DC Bus 2 and since there is no sliding window position sensor presumably the right sliding window messages are due to loss of electrical power to the window.


Any Airbus people out there want to comment?

BEA confirmed that the messages are genuine.

I believe the messages ANTI ICE R WINDOW, R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR, R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR are all messages you would expect with failure of the WHC 2. That along with SEC 3 and FCU 2 would suggest a partial failure of the DC Bus 2. (DC Bus 2 also powers CIDS 2 - poss link with toilet smoke?)

Yes. On the bus there is NO window open sensor/indication.

These messages are purely relating to window heat which operates at all times engines are running.

But don't let facts get in the way of a load of drivel here!

mover625. Looking at the FCOM, there are a lot of systems that will go INOP when DC Bus 2 fails, but they also note that failure could happen on a sub bus, which obviously would take out less.
As a list of equipment (not complete) dependent on Bus 2 (which includes all the ACARS warnings):
INOP SYS
SPLR 1+2+5, ELAC 2(1), SEC 2+3
VHF 2, CTR TK PUMP 2, LGCIU 2
REVERSER 2, CAB PR 2,
FAC 2, L TK PUMP 2, R TK PUMP 2
ENG 1 LOOP B, ENG 2 LOOP A, PACK 2 REGUL
FCDC 2, MAIN GALLEY, Y ELEC PUMP (if selected ON)
BRAKES SYS 2, F/O STAT, R WSLHD HEAT
R WNDW HEAT, AP 2, FCU 2
LGCIU 1 (2)

Other INOP SYS
SFCC 2, R cabin fan, F/O wiper
F/O rain rplnt, Eng 1 and 2 fire ext btl 2, Autobrake (due to loss of 2 SECs)
BMC 2 Bleed, X feed auto control, RMP 2
FQI channel 2 zone controller, sec channel SDCU 2
Brake fan, Eng 2 oil low press and qty ind, R loudspeaker
rudder trim ind, FMGC 2 CDLS

The speculation might be drivel but OTOH (and as paulmoscow has mentioned) the BEA ( French Accident Investigation Bureau) do now seem to be verifying the information that the likes of CNN have been putting out in the last day or so.

I'll see if I can track down an official BEA statement but in the meantime French media report from this morning here:

Des fumées détectées dans l'avion d'EgyptAir juste avant sa disparition

In short the report says the BEA is confirming there were ACARS transmissions indicating smoke in the cabin before communications were lost, but they are still not willing to speculate on the cause of the accident, waiting for the recorders, etc.

I think the drivel refers to the rampant speculation and, frankly BS written on here by people who have no idea about the A320 or indeed aviation in general. Not the ACARS messages themselves.

Heading after KUMBI
 

Propduffer wrote:
Because of the very few traffics at this time, it looks like MSR804 got direct clearances until KUMBI. The Heading is 139 untill KUMBI. Just after KUMBI the aircraft turns right heading 147. This is not the correct heading towards BLT VORDME on the UL612. The normal one on this track is 134 deg.
The heading 147 looks like a short cut manually initiated and can only be on ATC request/order or the crew decision. We know that the Greek ATC lost the voice contact but not the radar one at the FIR handover. The Greek ATC could not have allowed this direct because they are not in charge after KUMBI. What about the Egyptian ATC? If the MSR804 modified his heading at the FIR boundary with an nonstandard track, it might be because the voice contact was established with Cairo? But the squawk remains 1455. Normally the squawk code changes at the FIR but not for the MSR804 although it may be a FR24 bug. Can we imagine that the MS804 contacted Cairo Center and got a direct to clearance? Another possibility is that just after KUMBI something wrong happened and the crew decided to take a short way.

The last reliable FR24 contact from the F-LGPR2 station is at N 33.2037 E 29.1597. After the FR24 shows "EST" as estimated. It means that the latest station able to receive the ADS-B signals lost contact and FR24 calculates the track with the latest available data.

KUMBI N33.7139 E28.7500
F-LGRP2 Squawk 1455 N 33.3093 E 29.0776
F-LGRP2 Squawk 1455 N 33.2037 E 29.1597
EST N33.0868 E29.2503...

French media now announce that the BEA confirms that smoke was detected in the cabin (ACARS)

http://i67.tinypic.com/6znbd2.jpg

Wiggly I don't think the ACARS report is drivel.

Just too many of the other assumptions and hypotheses here.

ACARS are broadcast on open frequencies and receivable by anyone with correct equipment, so not intended confidential in any way.

Regarding the ACARS messages, if they are genuine. The window sensor messages refer to sensors which detect the temperature of the window and are required in order for the WHC to control the amount of current required to maintain the window at optimum temperature for anti ice and/or defog. The messages do not indicate that power is lost to the windows or the WHC, although failure of the sensor will result in the WHC removing power from the affected window. For whatever reason the RH sliding and fixed windows lost the sensor signal.

The WHCs live quite far forward on the aircraft with WHC 2 on the RHS. Certainly not below the lavs or even the FWD galley to be honest.

While I don't want to speculate. I believe that the Egyptian authorities have been a little quick to state that terror is the most likely cause. It's looking more like an uncontained event. As to why there was no communication? Has anyone considered that the second flight crew member wasn't in the flight deck at the time (rest break a little before TOD?) or was somehow incapacitated?

The more I look at the supposed facts it seems to me that this is a loss of conceinceness event. Lot of cyanide given off by burning parts of aircraft. 90ish turn decent then some bank applied then pilots pass out completely.
However speculation only.
Fire in flight pilots worst nightmare.

I had already mentioned possibilities of Crew incapacitation during emergency descent earlier.CVR will reveal.Lets just wait and see shall we.

I still think there was an explosion either man made or accidental which could have caused a rapid decompression
Smoke having experienced it myself in a private corporate jet 12 years ago tends to be more gradual in build up
Obviously there are procedures for that including dumping cabin pressure
With a rapid decompression that alone would dump cabin pressure to the extreme so would itself evacuate smoke

The ACARS messages are genuine, per BEA.

Somebody mentioned all ACARS messages, those systems involved are powered by DC bus 2.
Can anybody confirm that?
If so, what else is powered by DC bus 2?
Anyone able to copy/paste the QRH items for a DC bus 2?

If the aircraft was put into emergency elec config would the CVR and FDR still work?

It's incredible that nobody knows where the plane is 2 days later. Even a simple device could fix this.

For those interested in the Electrical Systems of an A320. Continue to read here
Plane Airbus A320

Although outdated, certainly still valid for reference only.

No, it isn't.

No, it couldn't.

ACARS messages: You mean this may have been a fire under the f/o's side window, just like this one in an Egyptair 777 ??

And this was not an electrical fire. The reason for this fire and others like it in the region is likely to be linked to the way crews operate. But I cannot tell you the reason why this happens, because nobody will talk about it. Not even the NTSB or AAIB.


http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2014/...67_634x478.jpg

@MartinM

any chance for a link to a A320 AMM ?


*** seems I found it ! all shorts of AB manuals at :

Where is the crew oxygen bottle on the 320?

#MartinM
The electrical pages on the A320 are interesting but it would nice to see a FMECA of the various systems. I did a FMECA on an A350 WIPS, so I know someone must have a copy.

Egyptian navy findings so far, click on the image for a higher resolution


http://s32.postimg.org/ruaqnfgch/image.jpg

http://s32.postimg.org/hvps0y6wx/image.jpg

http://s32.postimg.org/apy0yhxtt/image.jpg

http://s32.postimg.org/8wv4a6cn5/image.jpg

http://s32.postimg.org/6n2eloebl/image.jpg

Thanks Mo!


That was clearly a high-energy impact with sea.

Re Egypt Air 777 fire posted by Tatelyle:
Probable causes for the accident can be reached through:
1. Electrical fault or short circuit resulted in electrical heating of flexible hoses in the flight crew oxygen system. (Electrical Short Circuits; contact between aircraft wiring and oxygen system components may be possible if multiple wire clamps are missing or fractured or if wires are incorrectly installed).
2. Exposure to Electrical Current.
ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 777-266ER SU-GBP Cairo International Airport (CAI)

O2 bottle is FWD LHS by the NLG dog box.

Rule
Special Conditions: Airbus A318, A319, A320, and A321 Series Airplanes; Astronautics Electronic Flight Bags With Lithium Battery Installations
A Rule by the Federal Aviation Administration on 12/05/2008