Qatar 77W at MIA
 

Er....


Accident: Qatar B773 at Miami on Sep 15th 2015, struck approach lights on departure

By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Sep 17th 2015 14:02Z, last updated Thursday, Sep 17th 2015 14:02Z
A Qatar Airlines Boeing 777-300, registration A7-BAC performing flight QR-778 from Miami,FL (USA) to Doha (Qatar), departed Miami's runway 09 but struck the approach lights runway 27 during departure. Both tower, departure controllers as well as crew maintained routine communication. The aircraft continued to destination for a landing without further incident about 13.5 hours later.

On Sep 17th 2015 the FAA reported the aircraft struck approach lights on departure from Miami and continued to destination. The aircraft received substantial damage to its belly, the occurrence was rated an accident.

Related NOTAMs:
09/160 (A3018/15) - RWY 27 ALS U/S. 16 SEP 18:28 2015 UNTIL 16 OCT 20:00 2015 ESTIMATED. CREATED: 16 SEP 18:28 2015

09/159 (A3017/15) - RWY 27 ALS U/S. 16 SEP 17:55 2015 UNTIL 16 OCT 20:00 2015. CREATED: 16 SEP 17:55 2015

Metars:
KMIA 160353Z COR 09008KT 10SM FEW025 BKN200 28/26 A3009 RMK AO2 RAE06 SLP189 OCNL LTGIC DSNT NE CB DSNT NE P0008 T02830256
KMIA 160253Z 07016G23KT 3SM +RA SCT028CB BKN033 OVC080 28/25 A3010 RMK AO2 RAB53 SLP192 CB OHD MOV NW P0000 60000 T02830250 51014
KMIA 160153Z 10009KT 10SM FEW025 FEW045 SCT150 OVC200 28/25 A3009 RMK AO2 SLP190 T02830250
KMIA 160053Z 04005KT 10SM SCT029 SCT045 SCT150 OVC200 27/24 A3009 RMK AO2 RAE23 SLP188 OCNL LTGIC DSNT NW CB DSNT NW MOV NW P0000 T02720239
KMIA 152353Z 00000KT 7SM +RA SCT025CB BKN085 BKN180 OVC250 27/23 A3006 RMK AO2 RAB34 SLP178 CB NE-SE-SW-W MOV NW P0006 60006 T02670228 10317 20267 58001
KMIA 152253Z 05009G19KT 10SM SCT025 SCT055 BKN180 OVC250 29/22 A3006 RMK AO2 SLP179 CB DSNT SE-SW AND NW-N MOV NW T02890217
KMIA 152153Z 09008KT 10SM SCT033 SCT180 OVC250 31/24 A3006 RMK AO2 SLP179 CB DSNT SE AND W MOV NW T03060239

That sounds a bit scary, obviously the damage wasn't severe enough to breach the pressure vessel but they didn't necessarily know that at the time.

That sounds a bit scary
 

I wonder how they assured themselves that the pressure hull or tailplane structure had not been compromised?

Were they simply unaware that they had hit anything and only realized it when they arrived at their destination? It seems a bit reckless to proceed with a transatlantic flight knowing that they had struck something and not knowing how much damage it did.

The collision report was issued two days after the incident, which suggests that the actual collision wasn't noted at the time - a sort of hit-and-run . . .

I wonder when the airport became aware of the broken approach lights. I guess even if that was spotted within the hour, there's still the job of deducing which aircraft hit the structure.

Apparently they found a note on the outer marker "I bumped your runway lights, please call me if you notice anything. .."

2 engine a/c are massively over powered for obvious reasons. MIA-Doha is a long way = heavy a/c, but the performance is calculated assuming losing 50% of thrust, which they did not. Therefore one would expect the a/c to lift off and clear the approach lights of the opposite runway by considerable more than 35'. So what happened & why? To suggest they did not know is one thing, but I'm sure there were more than sweaty palms as they hurtled towards the end of the runway. There is more to this than is being reported here.
Remember the Russian freighter in Aus that cut the grass in the stop-way? ATC were encouraging it to fly. This must have looked something similar. I'm amazed if ATC didn't call for a light inspection and inform the crew. Surely they have tell-tale monitors in the tower for the lights status?
There are also lots of spotters at airports such as MIA. I'm sure there is a video somewhere that will burst on to the scene.

Takeoff was on RWY09 from intersection T1 (not full length). That leaves a TODA (Takeoff Distance Available) of ~2600m/8500ft, no way that is sufficient for a -300ER near/at MTOW.

QR has Boeing Class 3 EFBs (electronic flight bags) fitted in all of their 777s, used for takeoff/landing performance, charts etc.

Question is was full length 09 not available? Did they base their numbers off full length and then end up departing from T1??? (Full length 09 is no problem for the -300ER at MTOW).

I doubt they accidentally took off from the wrong intersection (ATC would notice) but most likely they had incorrect performance numbers.

The Boeing OPT tool (used for takeoff/landing perf calcs.) within the EFB, allows crews to enter the intersection and thus knows the distances available from that point for takeoff performance calculations.

However, if they accidentally forgot to enter the intersection T1 during their calculations (big Nono because each crew member is to do a separate calculation and then cross-check, they each have their own EFB)

In any case, near/at MTOW there is no way the OPT would output takeoff data for a RWY09 T1 intersection departure. Instead it would show the maximum takeoff weight from that intersection and the crew would have to re-calculate using that weight to receive the relevant speeds etc.

This could easily have ended a lot worse. I am curious to know if the crew fire walled the thrust levers when they saw the end of the runway approaching.

Note: The first three orange light structures should all be cross shaped and of equal size. They passed over the freeway at barely 100'.

https://farm1.staticflickr.com/754/2...a130ab8a_o.jpg

Sounds very plausible. I wonder what speed they rotated at? It couldn't have been much over V1. It would have been daylight, yes, so surely they must have realised that the far end was getting closer than normal. Oh wait, that's what we said about the G-1V over-run crash.

If it's going to take them a month (NOTAM) to repair the approach lights, it must have been a bit more than a scratch!

Transport aircraft rarely use their full thrust for takeoff. To save wear and tear on the the aircraft a takeoff thrust setting is computed to just meet the performance requirements. At structural weight with a long runway there is often a large reduction in the takeoff thrust setting because full thrust wasn't needed.

Indeed that would have been the case with a full length departure off RWY09.

However, they departed from RWY09 intersection T1. Leaving a TODA of ~2600m/8500ft in which case with APU to Pack, and TOGA, under the prevailing conditions would have allowed for ~325,000kgs. A good 25,000kgs under MTOW and QR778 is consistently going out near/at MTOW.

Im going to say they calculated full length RWY09 with ~3900m TODA available. And ended up taking off with from T1 (fact) ~2600m of pavement available.

Qatar 77W at MIA
 

A G IV (I think) took out the ILS at STN 2 years ago in thick fog with its mains gear, they claimed not to have noticed either. Closed runway 22 for quite a while I seem to remember until it was ILS capable again

Sunset at MIA on 15th was 19:25 with nautical Twilight @ 20:15.
Was it cloudy?
Scheduled departure time was 20:20.
Actual departure time was 20:37 - was it already dark?

This Emirates mishap and the Jo'berg BA 747 Slat Retract incidents are the 2 'closest to disaster' accidents i can recall for a long time.
I'm sure the NTSB report will be a fun read, but the Aussies did a great job too..

I think it will turn out not to be an issue with wrong weights but an issue with the intersection take off versus the selection in the OPT.

Hopefully we will find out in due course.

Firstly I am thankful that this was not more serious, and secondly I feel for all the guys involved. They are not the first and will not be the last to have this sort of incident. Thomson, Thomas Cook, Emirates, BA but to name a few. I just hope lessons can be learned and all 4 stay employed.

Regards

From a comment in Aviation Herald
Accident: Qatar B773 at Miami on Sep 15th 2015, struck approach lights on departure

Looks like an EFB software Human Factors issue. No symbol used in the software should match real world runway symbology or intersection signage. Asking for a Murphy with that :=

Pilot knew where he was....he reported at T1. He was cleared to line up at T1. [This assumes flight was Sep 16 0029-UTC etc.] You can delete this if the time/date/flight are wrong! Tapes available on liveATC.net

PS & SAFETY LIGHTING-COLLISION QATAR 777 CONDUCTED INTERSECTION DEPARTURE
Lighting-collision Qatar 777 conducted intersection departure

18 SEPTEMBER, 2015 BY: DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW
Investigations into a Qatar Airways Boeing 777-300ER’s collision with lighting during departure from Miami will examine whether the intersection take-off played a role in the accident.

The seven-year old aircraft (A7-BAC) struck approach lights while taking off from Miami’s runway 9 at around 20:30 local time on 15 September.

It had been conducting a departure to Doha, as flight QR778, from the T1 intersection which would have reduced the runway length by around 30% to some 2,800m (9,190ft).

The aircraft travelled along taxiway S, running parallel to the runway, before being cleared to line up at the intersection.

This clearance was acknowledged by the 777’s crew, according to air-ground communications from Miami tower.

Investigators have not released any details of the weight and performance calculations, or the thrust settings, used for the departure.

All 777-300ERs are powered by General Electric GE90 engines.

There is no immediate evidence that the crew was aware of the lighting collision with the lighting to air traffic control after the departure.

The US FAA says the aircraft continued to its destination without further incident but that subsequent inspection revealed “substantial” damage to the underside of the fuselage.

Meteorological data for Miami at the time of the departure – which would have taken place after sunset – indicates only light winds, and good visibility, although there was rain in the vicinity.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...ection-416895/

To me is seems very strange such accident can apparently go unnoticed for some time.

Shouldn't the pilots know they went outside the "envelope" of the runway and report this such that a runway inspection is initiated?

Do the ground structures not have electronic status checks such that airport authorities immediately know something is very wrong?

I do not know the system MIA has but in all the airports I know you will only get a warning when you put the lights on . On this direction for take off those lights will have been off. It was night, so most probably nobody noticed until next morning during runway inspection I would say. ( or/unless if they changed QFU in the meantime)

Originally posted by 1978Very strange indeed, as you'd expect an experienced crew to know where a normal (even at max de-rate/assumed temperature) rotation point lies on a runway.

The bold METARs out of the inevitable list (:rolleyes:) seem to suggest a take-off between 23:53Z and 00:53Z, which would be 19:53LT and 20:53LT. So it would have been nighttime in MIA.

T1 = temporary runway in the OPT

Amazing. The provider of this EFB probably had a committee deciding what codings to use for what situation. How does anyone come up with T1 = temporary? What has '1' got to do with it, or was this 'phase 1' of runway maintenance? Isn't "Temp" a better coding?

The aircraft travelled along taxiway S, running parallel to the runway, before being cleared to line up at the intersection.
This clearance was acknowledged by the 777’s crew,

This would suggest the crew requested T1. It would not be for ATC to offer it. I wonder if anyone in ATC thought, "that's odd, they've never done that before." It's not for ATC to 2nd guess the crew. It would have been unusual for ATC to ask, "are you sure about T1." but it might have closed the holes, except the crew might have said, "yes."

Back to a discussion there was a while ago about an AF trying to rotate a heavy a/c many kts too slow. Naturally it was the wrong weight in the EFB. The discussion brought up the point about having a 'feel' and 'mental gross error check' for performance calculations & takeoff speeds. Surely the same could be said for this case about TORA/TODA. I assume the crew knew the TODA from T1. With a little thought about past operations I would have expected there to be a "seems a little short to me. What do you think?" moment, before punching numbers into a computer and accepting the results willy nilly.
Sadly that is what the modern human has become. In all my cadet teachings, as an old fart, I gave examples of various gross error checks and mental estimates for different scenarios, both on grounded in the air, aligned with stories about the consequences of those who didn't make them. I don't think too many airlines, even on command courses, educate their crews in this time aged technique. It is disappointing, in cadet training, to see load sheet figures added up with a calculator. What ever happened to brain power? Even worse considering that cadet pilots are usually required to have a maths/science orientated education.
It was still quite common to see low hour F/O's blindly follow VNAV PTH and not consider Distance v Height. Often VNAV was rubbish and they then asked why it was adding thrust and suddenly changed to 'below path' or dived, accelerated now being 'above path'. The answer had been staring at them for a few minutes, if they had cared to observe.
I have some nervousness that EFB's, though great in paper saving and perhaps allowing higher TOW's, might also lead to more erroneous takeoffs. The gross error checks is perhaps one defence. Having both pilots use their own EFB's to cross check the performance result doesn't help if the basic data that is entered is duff gen. Rubbish into both EFB = same rubbish out of both.

As has been mentioned and I alluded to. I would put money on this being confusion between T1 and #T1.

The chap who is PNF certainly doesn't sound like he knew he had run out of runway and hit something, at least to my untrained ear.

Another unnecessary "close call"?
 

Thank goodness for the decision to use frangible light post designs many decades ago (an idea that was once even strongly resisted by some facilities advocates due to higher costs at the time, thus precluding adding more lighting installations elsewhere).

Is this perhaps another case underscoring the need for human factors review the designs of supporting systems like EFBs? as well as the administrative aspects of denoting performance/V speed calculation methods used by flight crews?

This kind of event has happened a lot over jet transport history. Is it also time to again push for implementing readily technically addressable acceleration prediction advisory methods, giving much earlier advisories to the crew if an error in acceleration versus available runway distance is detected?? Let's hope and advocate that those efforts now may again advance?

Thank goodness for the robust damage tolerant design of recent modern jets and especially the T7. This event also may perhaps be shown to underscore the utility of a FADEC's ability to quickly and accurately re-set thrust at the max limit, if and when needed, and if commanded. It also again points out the inherent advantage of twins to have more robust runway distance remaining margin to a safe liftoff and initial climb, to accommodate either unexpected adverse met conditions, or performance calculation weight errors, ...for the all-engine takeoff case.

As to the earlier comment about wheel height versus aft fuselage height, and what part of the aircraft hits light stanchions first,...I's suggest the comment author watch the pictures of a T7 Vmu test liftoff. The wheels may not necessarily or always be the lowest point of the aircraft for some period (distance during climb away) after liftoff, depending on T/W, theta dot after liftoff as a result of the aircraft's center of rotation changing, acceleration rate, and liftoff speed above stall margin.

2020 Local dep Miami what's that on Crews local Doha time 0320 Local.
How long is the slip @ MIA?
:\

Some similarity to Emirates 407 although that was a ZFW entry problem rather than an inappropriate intersection. The result was not much different, though.

It shouldn’t be beyond the wit of man to have a simple, autonomous check from the aircraft’s point-of-view that it can actually take off on the runway and/or intersection that has been selected. When you line up, it knows the TORA, OAT, thrust setting, wind component, flap, weight, etc. A master caution like RAAS “CAUTION, SHORT RUNWAY” could prevent accidents like this happening in the first place.

EFB OPT
 

The potential for error with the OPT is substantial. A latent risk factor within a defined process is difficult to detect. SOPs may provide for the flight crew independently working all of the calculations out, but operational expediency tends to result in short circuiting of such protocols. A takeoff chart gives some level of awareness of the overall situation, but it still is open to errors, in fact, more error opportunities exist.

The good news is that indeed two engine aircraft tend to perform well, on two engines, but 8500' at heavy weight is a tough deal for a 773ER, at sea level at warm temperatures. If the engines work, you are doing OK, the same error on a B747 A380 would be catastrophic, AEO liftoff is not much earlier than OEI case, and so normally happens well beyond mid field and towards the DER.

Part 25.113(a)(2) requires a 115% margin for distance to attain 35' for the TODA. So for say a 12,500' runway+clearway, the 35' point is at 1630' before the end of TODA. For a large aircraft, the aircraft is also assumed to be at V2 plus a maximum margin, but more importantly a minimum margin of V2 (25.111(c)(2)) ... which is going to be around 90m/sec ~ 300FPS. That means about 5.3 seconds after getting to 35' you should be passing the end of the clearway. On all engines, the 4 engine aircraft, and 2 engine aircraft as well have climb rates of around 2000FPM or greater, (minimum 2nd segment gradients apply for OEI, 25.121(b)(1)... all is better...), which gives about... 210' above the departure end of the TODA (35'+175'). In the real world, the speed is allowed and does rise above V2, and the outcome is that there is an initial reduction in the climb gradient until establishing a constant target speed, but the rate of climb once established is higher than V2's rate of climb. Overall, the crossing altitude is slightly lower, around 180'... So... when you look out the window and see the neat takeoffs that just get over the fence, know that if the aircraft had done a reject, that probably would end badly, and if the aircraft isnt getting to the types of heights that the all engine case shows, (and which are noted as information in every Boeing FCTM) then you do well not to have an engine failure. If you want to take the analysis a step further, the FCTM also indicates the time to achieve liftoff after commencing rotation, and that gives you a simple spot on the runway where the rotation should occur. The same manual, the FCTM also gives pretty simple analysis of the visual cutoff from the cockpit, and that gives a simple indication as to what should and what should not be observable in front of the aircraft as you reach Vr. As an example, for a B744, that is around 3800' from the end of the TODA if you are on a limiting 12,500' runway, with maximum clearway. Rotate gets to be done around 2 seconds before you lose sight of the first of the TDZ markings for the opposite end of the runway. For the B777, and other twins, you get much more runway in front at that time... should not be exciting at all on all engines, just gets more interesting with the failure case.

Bottom line is that awareness of the performance of the aircraft is worth the effort, even if you don't get comfort from the outcome. Lets see... B773ER, 6700nm GC route right hand down... making money... TOW will be over 725,000lbs, and need over 9200 ft of runway, (still air, 300 pax, 12T cgo... ). still air, 490K ZFW would need 10,500' ISA +15 SL, 0WC, packs off... Stated as a ZFW limit, the T1 taxiway would need a 440K ZFW in still air, and that would increase by around 15K per hour of flight time reduction from still air.... i.e., +390 lbs per knot of TWC overall on the flight plan... None of these
calculations are hard, and they can be done by the system easily, and provide the flight crew a choice of acceptable options which they confirm with the OPT.



Final point, this latest event is more or less a rerun of an event that I personally experienced from the cabin of a B777 once while dead heading. Being aware that the runway being used is too short is pretty unpleasant to experience. luckily on the day, the workers on the runway ducked. Crew even took a derate... The company involved eventually examined the issue, and held the pilots accountable, for known deficiencies in the processes and practices of the system; hardly a global solution and barely surprising management behaviour for a pathological flight operations department.

Short runways and big airplanes on long flights don't mix, and if the computer says they do, then checking the assumptions is probably what your family and customers may appreciate. Big picture prior to walking to the jet is worth the effort, there is a relatively simple correlation between weights and runways that can be considered before leaving the hotel or the despatch office...

The crew of this flight should not be beaten up by the management for a latent error, however, the flight crew are the guys and girls at the pointy end of the spear, and they have a vested interest in keeping the blue side up, they are the first to the scene of the accident. Punitive response by management would be adverse to flight safety, but is pretty much a standard industry response; shooting the messenger is untidy and hardly improves outcome reliability.

Will QR and the QCAA improve operational flight safety? Always interesting to see.

This is the legacy codebreaking stuff where the user interface is designed by engineers to 1960's IBM command line standards (back when people were cheap and computers were expensive).

Remember all the FMS route mods and 'you forgot to enter the leading zero on the 610 foot crossing restriction in the box'?

I've also ranted here before about the cryptic flight plan paperwork and the obscure NOTAM format suited to 1930's teleprinters.

We've come a long way in trapping errors and closing the holes in the cheese. However, we need to streamline the user interface more so these idiotic gotchas with the slant and hashtag (as the symbol is now called by some) never make it into the cockpit.

The Sky-God era where some folks bragged proudly about how complicated the departure and preflight procedures were and how they would never make the same mistake as a mishap crew is over, here in the U.S. at least. On the other hand, the era of playing video games on a phone while PF in metric RVSM airspace has arrived, I'm afraid.

The tablet EFB's are far from a mature product with their own quirks but adding more graphics to the interface sure helps me see when I'm looking at the wrong data.

I get the same numbers, actually, nautical twilight ended at 20:15 local so they were in astronomical twilight which is, for takeoff in an urban area, already quite dark. The sun would have been 16.8 degrees below the horizon at 20:37 EDT from what I see on Heavens-Above.

GPS Confirmation
 

Would it be crazy (or even supported by hardware) for the EFB to know the long/lat for the entered intersection takeoff point and make bad noises if the GPS does not agree? Simple automatic check of the entry?

Nice couple of posts, guys.
I still think many see the solution as adding more automated internal system checks; i.e. the computer will say "entry error" or some such. I've noticed over the past 30 years that the more 'safeguards' are put in place the more they become relied upon; and that was before Microsoft & Apple took over the world. Pilots were told that there were inbuilt safety guards so they could not make a mistake. Guess what, sometimes they didn't work e.g. the G-IV crash in another thread. The auto throttle inhibition didn't work. The Spanair (MAD) takeoff config didn't work. etc. etc. And let's not get into FBW stuff. In human factor terms this is dulling to the educated brain, and we pilots are all supposed to have one of those. It has been said so many times that one problem with modern a/c is the human has become a monitor; our educated brains are acting at too low a level of activity. We are lulled into complacency and blind trust. It's almost as if there is no more fear about aviating. It's as if we think, arrogantly, that we belong aloft. It is our world. It is not.
Even the AA Cali crash was lack of X-check in a rush, and by todays standards that was a simple a/c. What will be the pitfalls of the future? Engineers will be trying to eliminate pilot screw ups with technology. I wonder if we are reaching the point of diminishing returns?
One thing is already happening: the level of education and ability to be sitting up front has been diluted. It is now seen as a basic job. Follow the SOP's, QRH, EFB and you'll be fine. T's & C's have reduced accordingly. MPA, MPL, self funded jet training with 150hrs etc. etc. See the thread on robots & pilot replacement. Project forward 100years.
However, we are here today. I think technology is progressing at the pace of the design engineers and not at the pace of pilot (human) adaptation. I see all the reports from the human factor professors about the change from command pilot to monitoring pilot. Where were they at the design phase? It seems a lot of hind sight; meanwhile the basic training/checking remains the same as yonks ago. There is a lack of coordination in the whole process.

Serious question, and to be clear I only fly small stuff (as my handle indicates), but why would any crew elect to take off from an intersection with a 777 fueled for a LH flight and - presumably - full pax/cargo?

Bravo - RAT5 - spot on!

"I've noticed over the past 30 years that the more 'safeguards' are put in place the more they become relied upon"

I think there's another aspect of this reliance - less attention to the issue, since "George" has it. The automation may work well, within its limitations, engendering "blind trust" as you put it, but inattention born of honest experience that the automation "always works" is hard to overcome. Help Captain Sullenburger!

Cali was also a case that since the pilots were not giving position reports, the actual progress of the flight was not readily on their minds in any detail. Again the navigation system doing its (limited) job very well and when the unanticipated change of plan occurred, the fact that the pilots were not had its sad consequences. This is real human factors, I'm afraid, and we need to design flight deck automation with that in mind.

So, perhaps the automation, where it can really help, should be used, but we need to design it so the pilot's head and hand must still be engaged.

Is this trip crewed with 3 or 4 pilots? 24 hour layover/3 day trip?


As a side note, the above picture appears to be taken from the fence looking west. The road is airport service road inside the fence. Just outside the fence is Perimeter Road, running around the east and south side of the airport.


Just east of perimeter road is a canal, 80' or so wide, some vegetation and trees followed by the large MIA Employee parking lot just east. My estimation from driving the road and parking for two decades is the tail cleared the west lot boundary trees by 100' or less.


Always thought I stood a chance getting wiped out by the overloaded old corrosion corner, straight pipe DC-8's clawing for altitude off RW09.


It was always humorous with the old car alarms. 3000+ cars wailing and flashing at once for 5+ minutes after those max power pipes thundered and crackled by overhead..


The entry error does make a lot of sense if the verbiage is accurate. Once we read something electronic as true, it's tough to realize it's BS.

Fine Air had a DC-8-61F in 1997 that load shifted on takeoff and plowed into the area off the end of 27R:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine_Air

And I remember going the other way off runway 9R on a hot afternoon to the islands with Caribbean hand luggage (televisions and heavy boxes that don't show on the weight and balance). In a 727 with the smaller engines you could read license plates on Le Jeune Road as you got airborne. :eek:

I also remember Sarkis and Pan Aviation and the Jetstar...

For the same rerason we use derated power... to save time and money. If there is no need to spend another 10 minutes taxiing, especially if you're running late, going from the intersection is a sound idea. You just have to get the numbers right... :ouch:

Intersection takeoffs
 

RAT 5: good posts, but......

This would suggest the crew requested T1. It would not be for ATC to offer it. I wonder if anyone in ATC thought, "that's odd, they've never done that before." It's not for ATC to 2nd guess the crew. It would have been unusual for ATC to ask, "are you sure about T1." but it might have closed the holes, except the crew might have said, "yes."

Not at all sure that was the case. At my airport, you hardly ever hear a crew asking for an intersection takeoff; 95% of the time it's ATC asking "can you accept an intersection X takeoff?" followed by "we'll run the numbers and let you know". Besides, why would a heavy like a 773 going all the way to Doha want an intesection takeoff? That does not sound right to me.

Again, at my airport (KLAS which is hot and high - 2200'AMSL) the daily KAL 773 always takes the LONGEST runway and sometimes even the OPPOSITE direction (which is slightly downhill) taking sometimes an hour delay in doing this while ATC traffic management clear the airspace. Nothing in my previous life as a pilot rated on a half dozen Boeings and one Airbus and 4+ years airport operations experience working with ATC, would make sense for this type of departure.

Having said as much, I have to wonder if ATC did not think it unusual. Did this flight/aircraft type previously takeoff from T1?

I think there might be more to the story and certainly the nomenclature T1 and #T1 needs to be looked at closely. That, to me, sounds like a big no-no but I can only speak from an Airbus EFB, not Boeing......

Airbubba, minor point, but Fine Air went down off the west end of 27R on the north side, now known as 26L.


Terrible things happen from the simplest mistakes, not much different from those done daily in office cubicles around the world where nobody dies.