Transavia (HV5068/TRA3K) emergency landing
A Transavia B738 (flight HV5068 / TRA3K) made an emergency landing in high winds at Amsterdam Schiphol yesterday.
Its destination was Rotterdam - The Hague Airport, Netherlands, but it diverted to Amsterdam Schiphol, after a requested diversion to its alternate Eindhoven was refused by Eindhoven ATC, for reasons yet unknown. Wind conditions at Eindhoven were far less extreme. Flight track: HV5068 - Flights list - Flightradar24 Details on the incident: Incident: Transavia B738 at Amsterdam on Jul 25th 2015, severe windshear on final and go around, pilot comment "scary", control problems, low fuel, no flaps Comms with TWR before, during and after the go-around at EHAM: https://youtu.be/F9LruOa-hzA Final approach and landing: http://youtu.be/Nio38kxye-I Filmed inside the cabin: Transavia: vliegtuig volgde noodlandingsprocedures | NOS (cabin attendant repeating: "Head against the backrest in front of you!") The aircraft is showing flaps up during landing. Is this normal procedure in high (cross)wind conditions? Could someone shed some light on this please? Thanks. |
It is quite extraordinary that an airport with 6 runways can be reduced to being almost a single runway when mother nature doesn't cooperate. The worst storm winds are NW and that is between the runway directions. With sever cross winds several runways are not an option.
There are not many runways aligned NW in the Benelux. RTM is 24; thus 300 is nasty. RW27 at AMS is better, but then the winds were stronger. EIN is RW22/04 so even worse; not a good choice of alternate. It would seem to me the EDDK Cologne with 32L/R would be the best fuel choice. As one correspondent on the story in AV said, extra fuel for diversion needs to be for a place where you have a solid guarantee to land. If destination is dodgy you must have an escape route or full tanks. No ideas about the flaps; F25/30 would be more normal for gusty X-winds. The landing seems to have been well controlled and RW27 is well long enough for the higher speed. Yesterday was nasty for Benelux; choice of runways limited. |
Flaps up not standard.
Anything other than flaps,30 or 40 requires the use of the ground proximity flap inhibit switch. I don't know why you would use flaps up. Landing distance is almost totally dependant on landing speed. The qrh, nor other manuals indicate that flaps up is a good idea in any situation other than the flaps not actually working. |
Bloody good landing at high speed.
Congratulations. |
The qrh, nor other manuals indicate that flaps up is a good idea in any situation other than the flaps not actually working. |
Transavia is saying there was no technical problem with the aircraft, that would suggest the crew decided to do a flapless landing.
Listening to the atc recordings it seems atc told them to expect vectors after being rejected by Eindhoven for a diversion. Sounds a bit like the crew did not choose to go Amsterdam, and after the Go-Around in AMS the pilot asks for a more suitable runway. Seems they were channelled into going for Schiphol and lost situational awareness. |
Seems they were channelled into going for Schiphol and lost situational awareness |
Transavia is saying there was no technical problem with the aircraft, that would suggest the crew decided to do a flapless landing.
That would suggest insider knowledge, or friend of a friend. It would be interesting to know the individual experience/qualifications of the 2 pilots and to hear the CVR prior to deciding this non-normal landing configuration. Was there a step cockpit experience gradient? It's not common these days in the LoCo's to have old fart RHS guys. Equally it's quite common not to have old farts in LHS, but I expect not too much in HV. |
I'm a little lost on the lack of TR deployment as well.
Perhaps the wind shear experienced left some stains on the seats and they thought a flapless approach would allow them more energy to power out of it? Or were they really that low on fuel that the pilots were planning for flameout? Neat to see a high-speed landing like that but this one leaves me scratching me head a bit... |
No flap landing: Giving the pilots the benefit of doubt, maybe they were concerned about low fuel and wanted less drag or a different deck angle to avoid seeing the fuel pickup becoming uncovered. Or .. the extra speed afforded more speed and thus greater rudder authority that he felt was needed. If any of this were the case, his decision was using his emergency authority. I have no way to know without talking to the Captain. Just trying to give some credit until we know otherwise.
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Does anyone knows or can explain why the absence of TR upon touchdown and was only activated on the last sector of the landing roll?
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The introduction of reverse may have been a thrust vector they did not want as it could pull them off the centre line.
OR being so thankful to be down and safe, didn't get it done. My big windy days in Europe were in and out of Antwerp, NOT ANY FUN at all. Well done to that and other crews caught out in all that weather :D:ok: |
Assuming no mechanical fault with the aircraft.....I guess doing a no flap landing will save fuel over flaps 30/40. Perhaps they were really low on fuel.
But would a flaps 1 landing be a better option to get the slats out. I don't think it would burn any more. But why no thrust reversers on a landing that is very fast. |
A higher approach speed would also reduce the drift angle, but I can't believe anyone would plan a flapless landing with that in mind. The real danger is that the a/c would tend to float. There was significant headwind and therefore an additive wind correction speed increment. This extra speed should be bled off to touchdown at Vref (+gust, perhaps). With no flap drag bleeding off the speed would be extremely difficult and thus floating would be a real danger. Equally, on a wet runway, you want the a/c to squat and break through the water to avoid hydroplaning. Reduced flaps will make this difficult. You could 'plant it' to break through the water ands it bounces due lack of drag. Hm! Making a difficult job even more so.
There must be more to this than meets the eye. |
I heard that the second approach (the first one in AMS) resulted in a go-around because of a windshear warning. Firewalled the engines, and they ended up with a speed of 250 kts. With flaps extended. Don't know what flap setting. They retracted the flaps, but upon re-extension, everything refused to come out. (FSEU sensed an asymmetry or similar? -my guess) Since by then they had a low fuel emergency, there was no more time to do a proper all flaps up checklist, they went in with everything retracted. They had another few warnings (windshear) (sinkrate)upon their third approach and set it down. Committed to land, therefore gave the "brace for impact" command.
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Ok, but why no thrust reverse?
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Below transcription of comms on the Discrete Emergency Frequency has surfaced. Source unknown, but it looks genuine to me.
TRA3K was handed off to the DEF by EHAM TWR, shortly after the go-around on EHAM RWY27. Transavia 3K: We have er... Mayday, mayday, mayday, Transavia 3K, we have less than minimal fuel, and would like to return as soon as possible to Amsterdam to try it again. ATC: Transavia 3K copy mayday cleared to two thousand. Transavia 3K: Two thousand Transavia 3K. For your information, we had a very serious windshear at, I think about one thousand feet and we had trouble to control the aircraft. It was really severe. ATC: [unreadable] right one eight zero. Transavia 3K: Right one eight zero. ATC: The speed is all yours [unreadable] and the only runway is two seven. Transavia 3K: Ok, runway two seven, we'll do that, and eh was there any landing [unreadable]? ATC: Affirm. Transavia 3K: And we have another problem because our flaps are not working anymore due to the wind shear so we have to make a flapless landing. ATC: [unreadable] no flaps. Do you need assistance on the runway? Transavia 3K: Yes please. |
Here's another YT link from AMS ATC:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9Lr...ature=youtu.be Sounds pretty chaotic in the cockpit, mixing up PTT buttons with the intercom, no real plan for a go-around, requesting that ATC give them vectors around weather instead of telling them what vectors you need by looking at your WX radar etc. Oh, en then there is of course always the Air France 116T...not being able to keep his mouth shut, only concerned about lining up 27 and blocking the frequency when you OBVIOUSLY see and hear that another aircraft is in serious trouble. := :ugh: |
Air France.....same old same....
It does seem like flaps overspeed on GA and then no longer any flaps available. Never flew Boeing aircraft, do get slat / flap lock or similar after an overspeed? CP |
Sounds pretty chaotic in the cockpit, mixing up PTT buttons with the intercom, no real plan for a go-around, requesting that ATC give them vectors around weather instead of telling them what vectors you need by looking at your WX radar etc. And the PTT.. again sh!t happens but if you hear the coaching and good CRM in such situation I can only compliment them :cool: |
And the PTT.. again sh!t happens |
Tower still trying to hand them over when she reports she is in heavy winshear. Unless a separation loss is imminent just leave them alone for a minute
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...and ATC giving you go around instructions that are different than briefed Luciffer??? ATC did NOT give them different go around instructions, but only gave them a heading after they requested to vectored around weather. Sorry, but that seems a bit strange to me, as normally you have a quick look on the WX radar once established on the approach, to see if the go around path is also clear of weather, and if not, tell (not ask!) ATC what you need in case of a go around. If you'd bothered to listen to the whole thing, then you can hear the KLM 958 doing exactly that: "in case of go around, we would like an early right turn." That's the only correct way to do it in my opinion, YOU tell ATC what you need because you have a WR radar. After all, AMS is not located in China, and Dutch ATC is usually excellent in providing any heading or any diversion around weather that you need! As for the PTT buttons, I think it's beyond incredible, that Boeing still has these silly rocker switches on the yoke! They are a recipe for totally unnecessary additional workload (as you unfortunately see in this case), additional confusion and a loss of situational awareness between pilots and ATC. No, I'm definitely NOT blaming the crew, but add weather, low fuel and wind shear to that, and the recipe for disaster is complete! Completely insane that aircraft can be certified like that, only to save $10 on some wires and a decent switch! :ugh: :mad: The Airbus system (a toggle switch that can be firmly locked in intercom position) located on the central pedestal on the radio panel, whilst still having a PTT switch on the Side Stick, is a much better thought-out solution IMO. |
......resulted in a go-around because of a windshear warning. Firewalled the engines, and they ended up with a speed of 250 kts. With flaps extended. Don't know what flap setting. They retracted the flaps, but upon re-extension, everything refused to come out.
Not sure in which topic, perhaps crunched landing by SWA, but there was some discussion about the lack of practice with all engine G/A and the subsequent cock ups when it is done. Here is another example of that, with some critical consequences. (what if they had been at a rwy that was too short for flapless?) Firstly I would hope, especially on a day like this, that the G/A procedure was reviewed AGAIN just before G/S capture; even touch drilled. That plus a suitable routing was planned. W/S at 1000' might require full power initially, but could then be adjusted as necessary: if it had been anticipated. If it was a W/S G/A from reasonable height and ground contact not a factor would you go F15? Now, with full power and TOGA the pitch bar is in speed and it could have been high. Imagine what the attitude would be. Then with lowish MAA the ALT ACQ comes very quickly and the subsequent push-over would be stomach churning. With A/T's in manual and you forget to pull back the levers it's easy to see how this scenario could develop. Sometimes power can be your friend, other times not. A calm cockpit can avoid many problems. Oh for more sim time to practice such scenarios. I wish, I wish. It should be an annual sim event, surely: a menage of G/A's. For the technical guys: I suspect the overspeed is more critical for the LED's. If they do overspeed, with no damage, do they behave like this and lock out? If not, then the the ALT system might have been available. However, it's nice to have RW27 underneath you in such a landing config. Let us learn please. |
AMS ATC is equipped with a wx radar I believe so they would probably be able to vector you out of the storm cells, in fact the ATC wx radar gives probably a better general view from above.
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Hmm can't really see how some folks say they did a great job....
Tunnel vision, no clear diversion plan, huge max flap speed exceedance, no clear view how to circumnavigate TSRA, so nervous that she transmitted on ATC instead of intercom, letting the FO land in this kind of wx and then the remark after landing that "she had never saw this kind of wx in 25 years of flying" ?? what has she been doing in those 25 years ? this is not exceptional wx in many places in europe year round... do not forget there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around.... I would say that this captain was not in command of the situation and there is more to this one than meets the eye and I sincerely hope that this will be thoroughly investigated by the Dutch |
I've replayed the full comms recording of EHAM TWR on the afternoon of July 25. Between 11:20 UTC and 14:10 UTC, I counted 20 go-arounds on RWY27.
At around 12:15 UTC, the vast majority of approaching aircraft made a go-around because of windshear. View EHAM traffic, starting at 11:30 UTC: http://www.flightradar24.com/2015-07...x/52.3,4.74/12 There were single-runway operations on RWY27. PIREPs from aircraft on approach to RWY27 reported windshear of 20 knots at 200 ft and moderate turbulence. There were no windshear reports from aircraft departing from RWY27. Some aircraft cancelled take-off from RWY27 because gusting exceeded 50 kn (from 290 - 310 deg). |
Hmm can't really see how some folks say they did a great job.... Tunnel vision, no clear diversion plan, huge max flap speed exceedance, no clear view how to circumnavigate TSRA, so nervous that she transmitted on ATC instead of intercom, letting the FO land in this kind of wx and then the remark after landing that "she had never saw this kind of wx in 25 years of flying" ?? what has she been doing in those 25 years ? this is not exceptional wx in many places in europe year round... do not forget there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around.... I would say that this captain was not in command of the situation and there is more to this one than meets the eye and I sincerely hope that this will be thoroughly investigated by the Dutch |
One thing, the Transavia PR department deserves a big bonus at the end the year :)
'No danger whatsoever at any time'. |
Never had a **** day in the office? When I was instructing I have seen too many great crew totally **** up in the sim on the windshear exercise and have since a more humble approach to what you should have done.... With windshear you will f@ck up some day, I will f@ck up some day and let's make sure that we both appreciate that and do our best to avoid it. This flight had all the swiss cheese issues written all over it: confused diversion, low fuel, shaken about for a while in ****ty weather...how sharp would you be? Not how sharp should you have been.... So I am with the crew on this one. Could they have done better? absolutely. Can I understand that they did what they did: yep, absolutely! there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around.... As for the PTT buttons, I think it's beyond incredible, that Boeing still has these silly rocker switches on the yoke! |
Now that is something we do agree on :ok: But let's face it Boeing got scr3w3d over by South West when they designing the NG and created the most outdated cockpit with the most outdated features to allow SW a common type rating. Even the 757 is more advanced imho... :hmm: Especially on a mixed fleet it's a big problem even when things are running smoothly, with pilots constantly forgetting to flick the rocker switch back to intercom, or using the chrono button (same colour, same design as the PTT, roughly same location on the glare shield) when 'transmitting.' And all that so that they can save a few $ for a PTT button and a little wire weighing maybe 100-200 grams...on an airplane that costs >$150 million and has a MTOW of close to 400 metric tons. :ugh: And the authorities approve this... :mad: :ugh: |
As for the PTT buttons, I think it's beyond incredible, that Boeing still has these silly rocker switches on the yoke! They are a recipe for totally unnecessary additional workload (as you unfortunately see in this case), additional confusion and a loss of situational awareness between pilots and ATC. No, I'm definitely NOT blaming the crew, but add weather, low fuel and wind shear to that, and the recipe for disaster is complete! Completely insane that aircraft can be certified like that, only to save $10 on some wires and a decent switch! The Airbus system (a toggle switch that can be firmly locked in intercom position) located on the central pedestal on the radio panel, whilst still having a PTT switch on the Side Stick, is a much better thought-out solution IMO. |
Originally Posted by LLuCCiFeR
(Post 9061177)
Some 744s don't even have a PTT button on the glare shield, so you either have to reach down to the radio panel, and thus effectively not being able to use that arm for anything else and taking your eyes off the PFD and ND, or you have to use the PTT switch on the yoke with the possibility of interfering in the controls of the PF.
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With A/T's in manual and you forget to pull back the levers Also, it will be most interesting to see the reason why an all flaps up landing was conducted; especially with approach and landing speeds around the 185 knots. That is a serious speed indeed and rarely practiced in the simulator. If, according to reports, the captain elected to direct the co-pilot to conduct the all flaps up landing under such critical circumstances, it would indeed be a courageous decision (as Sir Humphrey would surely attest), that speaks volumes of the touching faith in the co-pilot's competency. In any case, unless there was a technical problem that prevented flaps and leading edge devices from not operating, there should be no reason that a normal Flap 30/40 should not be used up to the maximum crosswind component - whether windshear/turbulence was present or not. . |
If, according to reports, the captain elected to direct the co-pilot to conduct ta he all flaps up landing under such critical circumstances, it would indeed be a courageous decision.
I apologise if I've missed it, but is this confirmed as true? There have been various criticisms of certain apparent command decisions, but this would be most serious one. The a/c had a handling problem = flapless; there was a landing distance problem = higher speed: On their own these should be a 'captain's landing' in any airline. Add the severe weather and it only enforces the fact the the 'accountable manger' = the 4 striper in LHS should take responsibility for completing the task. It's what we are trained & paid for. If it had not gone well, and the F/O was PF, I hate to think what the insurance company would make of it and the resultant court case brought by pax. Is it true EIN refused them? Why? There, RW22, the X-wind would have been worse, unless the speed was much reduced. RTM & AMS were close to the storm. Weeze RW27 is the same distance as EIN and may have had less wind and a better direction. It is a well facilitated airport and HV have operated from there. It was a day for lots of extra fuel in tanks on departure. I hope the F/O on the day learnt a powerful lesson before their own upgrade process. That's what the RHS apprenticeship is all about. |
Rat5, FOs and captains have the exact same training in simulators and they both have equale practice on line (except in china:}). If the FO Is not crap in handling an aircraft then why wouldn't the captain let him fly? After all the pilot in command has to make some crucial decision at any time and in some difficult situation like this it is probably better to let the FO fly so the commander has a general view and is not focused in just one thing (speed and glide path-speed and glide path-speed and glide path). The captain can also take control at any time and he/she was probably damn ready to do so.
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Is it true EIN refused them? Why? Later, it emerged that there is a NOTAM in force saying that EHEH is unavailable as alternate for civil traffic, except (medical) emergencies. M0681/15 - EINDHOVEN AIRPORT (CIVIL) NOT AVBL AS ALTN, EXCEPT (MEDICAL) EMERGENCIES. 08 APR 00:00 2015 UNTIL 31 DEC 23:00 2015. CREATED: 07 APR 12:51 2015 The NOTAM was put in place for noise mitigation purposes in the Eindhoven area. News item on this (Dutch): http://nos.nl/artikel/2049294-stormt...eindhoven.html |
1) The 777 in LHR was flewn by the FO while Capt was making the brave move to rise the flaps. Both did an excellent job
2) In the same accident, the Capt made an EVACUATE over ATC comms instead of PA*. **** happens. It's how you deal with it to get everyone down and alive that matters. This is true for many many occupations out there. *Boeing design again? Never was in a 777. |
RAT 5 :
Is it true EIN refused them? Why? here : Transavia-toestel dat zaterdag op Schiphol noodlanding maakte, werd geweigerd op Eindhoven Airport Most of it is in Dutch unfortunately for some here, but from the audio, after go around in RTM it was ATC who suggested EIN, as wind there was "only" 260/ 19 Kts G 30 and vis > 10 Km , and there was holding in SPL , the controller then contacted EIN ( a military airbase) who for some unknown reason refused, the controller came back to the HV and said " this is becoming crazy, apparently EIN is refusing you " an then offers a better EAT for SPL then HV decided to divert to SPL . the whole audio gives a good indication of the situation from initial APP to RTM to final landing , and how she got trapped. I feel sorry for her, and seen the final landing/outcome , I think she did quite well and I am glad I was not in her shoes that day. Now as usual the Capt Hindsinght(s) can enter the game . |
Sure, let the FO fly whilst you manage.....but when it comes to the landing in 99% of cases it should be the LHS that does it. You're in that seat through experience and are ultimately responsible. If it all went wrong on touchdown that's too late to intervene.
How would you justify your decision to let 2nd in Command carry out the most critical task? Could the Commander be sued personally under such circumstance through dereliction of duty? @MrSnuggles - not really like for like. The BA 777 only presented its issue at about 400' on final - hardly a planned non normal landing. As situations go that's about as dynamic as it gets! A4 PS Do we actually know for sure it was the FO who landed? |
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