A4

Not from any of my sources, no. Might just be a rumour.

Buuuuuut, we have some successful landings from FOs when manure hit the AC (like the aforementioned LHR 777) and we have some very unsuccessful landings from when Capt took over late in the landing sequence (Southwest noseplant comes to mind).

Hindsight is always the best thing, right?

Of course - hindsight is 20/20! And I agree that there are a few instances of where the LHS has got it wrong. Looking at the TAF's and the Wx for the whole area, I would have carried 60 minutes extra - minimum. I don't say that with hindsight - that would have been my decision. I think occasionally people are a little simplistic in their planning. They assume they'll go-around and get vectored downwind for a second approach with 2 minutes......on a day like that?

SPL ATC are good (been there 100's of times over the last 20+ years) but they can't work miracles.

What about others on here? How much would you have carried.

A4

You're responsible for a safe flight, which doesn't mean doing the landing.
Although at transavia it probably will not be the case, at airlines with multiple types of aircraft, it is very well possible that you might have more hours/overall experience, the FO might have a lot more hours on type.

It might be totally explainable to let a more experienced (on type) FO land in my opinion.

I found a video that might give you an idea what the Transavia crew had been facing for some time (and already tried to land in at another airport).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2J9CaIicsBA

Take a close look around 06:00 to 06:20 and you'll see some harrowing action.

BTW, the_stranger I kind of agree with you. Capt is there to make sure you (and I on occasion) get down and alive. If that means the FO needs to hold the yoke/stick so be it.

From the ATC youtube: the intercom calls in the G/A come from a female and advise speed and altitude need more control. All ATC calls on approach come from her. It would suggest she was PNF. About EIN's refusal: a declaration of a fuel emergency would shake them up and open many doors and runways. Heads would roll if you were still refused for some BS reason. Sometimes it's time to confirm who needs help and priority: usually it's the guy in the air not on the ground. I remember a BA flight into AMS when the wind was strong WSW and gusting. He was given 19L (old days). Firstly he was approaching that runway direct from London, and RW27 was not in use due noise allocation ratios. He asked if the wind was veering as it gusted. Affirmative from ATC. It was a strong nasty day. He asked for RW27. This was refused as not in use. He asked if it was closed as unserviceable or serviceable. Yes it was serviceable. He requested it again. Refused. He then said he refused 19L and said if he had to divert to BRS there would be a report and strong complaint made about AMS ATC and perhaps they would get the bill for the diversion. RW27 was opened. The captain retained and exercised responsibility for the safety of the a/c.
I once was an F/O on a biz-jet. We wanted to land at a remote airfield for our pax. It was a few seconds after official closure, but all facilities were present. ATC said we would have to divert unless an emergency was declared. Guess what happened. Local security inspected the a/c on arrival and we declared fuel load as the reason for emergency. They said we still had fuel in the tanks. We asked how much is enough and how much is too little for this a/c? Silence, and they left with a beer each for the onboard bar. Captain's call, but pax were happy.
Sometimes a bit of push is required to get what you need/want. I agree one is more serious than the other, but.......

RAT 5

You just summed up the most important part for most transportation professions. Understanding of your vehicle and confidence in that knowledge.

If more car drivers would adopt this simple sentence to heart, there would be fewer accidents right off the bat.

What I do nog onderstand is why EIN refused landing whilst a mayday was issued.This was an extreme Barrow escape. Another thing I thoughtbto have de en is some short orange flashes at the location of the wheel-wells. Did they blow up thevtyres?

60 mins of extra fuel and an alternate outside the stormy area would have made the situation a lot less stressful.
I wonder what the Transavia fuel policy is.

Giolla, the emergency did not get declared until with AMS ATC already.

I'm supporting the crew on this one:
- Missed Approach RTM due "obvious reasons" aka winds;
- Holding in RTM awaiting ATC clearance to be allowed to proceed towards AMS;
- During hold EIN requested as holding delay meant lower fuel state;
- EIN declined flight diversion, holding time reduced by ATC for AMS diversion;
- Next approach is in AMS, worse weather then RTM and another Missed Approach, this time with severe windshear reported as reason;
- Due all the above getting into a low fuel state and having had a flap exceedance;
- Declared Emergency and Flaps Up landing.

As stated before, ****ty day in office, but rewards for crew to get it down after all that. Many episodes of Air Crash Investigation have less reasons not having made it safely down.

Giolla: I'm not sure a Mayday was called; a low fuel call was made to AMS ATC after the G/A. Slightly tongue in cheek: EIN is ostensively a transport military airbase paid for by the tax-payer. HV is a civil dutch airline and the pax are mostly dutch tax-payers. The military are there to defend and improve the security of its citizens from whom they receive their funds. By refusing a local civilian airliner in distress I wonder if they are fulfilling their side of the deal.
But, again, I wonder if they were given the full facts.

It's probably the same as the vast majority of other airlines these days, which 'encourage' you to take the minimum legal amount.

There are days when this is ok and days when it definitely is not. I think too many Captains nowadays are scared of their managements, but my advice to them is 'take the amount that YOU feel happy taking, not what you think your manager wants' when the **** hits the fan you'll be held responsible, no-one else.

Having had the pleasure, and I really mean that, of working for Transavia for 18 years, I can tell you what the fuel policy is. ......take as much as you like, as long as it's for a good reason.....and looking at the conditions, I think no one would have even questioned taking full tanks. In the 18 happy years I spent there, no one ever, not once, asked me about how much fuel I carried.

There's some confusion on the facts.

1. The "so-called 'mayday' transcript" (post #17): I first saw this Monday afternoon on avherald). That person called it "Some transcript of the EHRD Approach ATC". Now it's come here as the "Discrete Emergency Frequency". I have seen no indication that this transcription is authentic, especially because what we do have is from EHAM tower up to the point that the controller instructs to tune to "126.675, the Discrete Frequency" (and not "right frequency" as the Youtube transcription has it). 126.675 won't show up on your plates, but the scanner crowd calls it the "Arrival BackUp / Discrete Frequency", as distinct from 120.875, the "Discrete Emergency Frequency", which is what this transcript is claiming to be. In any case, it ain't Rotterdam Approach. Also, the Captain shows a distinct preference for communicating anything half-complicated in Dutch. Finally, whatever they may have said, it looks like once the controller realized that the flight was low on fuel, having control problems, AND was unable to change frequencies, he treated it as an emergency, even if the flight crew didn't want to declare it.

As far as I know, there are three possible sources for such a transcript: A. The official ATC tapes, which have not been made available, nor which would likely have been leaked. To be honest, I wouldn't expect those tasked with making a transcription would be required to come in on a weekend to do it. B. The CVR, likewise. C. Other listeners on frequency.
In category C there's anyone in the area with €15 Euro USB dongle, but also two websites: ATCBOX and LiveATC. ATCBOX has practically all Schiphol frequencies (including 126.675, as well as 120.825 ), but does not (as far as I know) archive them, so someone would have to be listening to/tuning to them in real time. This being the internet, there are some who claim to have been doing exactly that, and to have heard no such calls. LiveAtc has archives - indeed, it is the source of the traffic posted on youtube and on ED.nl -, but it does not archive 126.675 at Schiphol.

So it's been posted under dodgy circumstances, with patently false attributions, and no clear path back to any reliable source. Unless someone tells me where it comes from and how it was made, I'm calling fake.


2. As stated, Eindhoven does not accept alternates, only emergencies. Transavia operates most of their flights out of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Eindhoven (with maybe a couple flights from Maastricht and Groningen), so the interest not to go to Brussels or Weeze (where other LoCos run, but not Transavia), or further afield.

3. The Dutch weather service issues a Summer Storm Warning once every five years or so. This was the worst such storm on record. It's not usual weather for the region, so plan accordingly.

From what we know now, this flight may very well be used as a TR in the simulator. I certainly would come out with a wet back.

Imho the crew was very unlucky with the sequence of events. The Captain managed the emergency well. Te FO and PF made a very good flapless landing under adverse wx conditions and a lot of stress. I admire the way he arrested the sink rate just before touch down.

I also admire the way SPL ATC handled things , as they were close to losing their only operational runway, with lot's of inbound traffic.

Good Flying !

Good memories.

Lot's of folks seem to be 'admiring' the crew on their decisions. However I would like to point out a few 'minor things':


-It is generally known, and notamed, that EIN is not available as an alternate, except an emergency, so it was certainly not their planned alternate.
-So what was the alternate of this flight?most probably AMS,(convenient for company) but not a good one as the wx there was even worse than RTM
-If AMS was not the alternate,but let's say BRU, this means that they wasted fuel in the holding and made them becoming committed to land in either RTM or AMS due to less then minimum diversion fuel, that would be an even worse decison making than the previous option of having AMS as an alternate.


In the end they dug the hole themselves and they were fortunate it all worked out well in the end.


The decision which alternate to take and how much fuel is one which should not be taken lightly : a diversion is basically an emergency. You are committed to land. Therefore the wx has to be reasonable good,not marginal.
The decision to divert must be made on the ground or latest a 100 miles out, and you should stick to that. You should have a clear plan made what you do if you cannot land , how many approaches you can make , where to go and when to divert knowing exactly your 'bingo' fuel.


In 30 years of flying I have diverted many times but never had any stress while doing it as all was well worked out and planned and we stuck to it.


If you base your decisions on luck, taking a bad wx alternate-(but 'good' for your company) and just taking a lot of xtra fuel 'hoping' you will make it in, you are willingly risking the lives of your passengers and yourselves...

No it was not and was also not requested by the crew, if you lesten to the audio I poster earlier, it is ATC RTM who suggested EIN , giving the better wind /visbility situation there.

Lastly for the non professionals in here , it the crew and the crew only that can declare if a flight is in emergency , not ATC.

The FO and PF made a very good flapless landing under adverse wx conditions and a lot of stress.

I still say IMHO this is not the way it should have happened. Let F/O be PF so captain can manage the situation and communicate with all parties & agencies, but ultimately the captain should be responsible for the landing, both due weather & especially the non-normal configuration. Otherwise we may as well fly around with SFO's & F/O's. Who needs a captain?

At least in the US, ATC, dispatch, and even an "Airline Representative" (=Management) can declare an emergency for an aircraft.

For example, here's a page with a transcript and a recording of a controller doing just that.

As for management-declared emergencies, I haven't been able to find any recordings, but that's no doubt due to the cabin crew's ability to keep the Champagne at the proper temperature. There's still some debate about whether improperly served nuts constitute an emergency.

Of course, I didn't say that Schiphol tower declared an emergency; just that he treated it "as an emergency", handing off to a discrete channel and stopping all arrivals and departures.

Thanks for that info Dinger X, I did not know that a controller could do this in the US, we definitively can't do that here. You can suggest it but it is always the PIC who declares it.

The US military also have strange rules for that, I had once a C141 declaring an emergency, it was very busy, took a lots of efforts to clear the airspace below him, but he just continued his flight to planned destination and refused to descend. After investigation he just lost one engine, and it is ( was at the time at least) mandatory for USAF to declare an emergency in this case.

All this shows once again that despite ICAO everybody still uses its own rules.

I am a captain. It does not mean I am a better pilot than all my copilots. Some of my copilots I trust to fly any non normal situation/configuration, others I don't. CRM.
I would personally have flown this landing myself. That way I could only blame myself if it turmed into an accident. I doesn't mean the captain in this situation made the wrong decision.
This was a very stressful situation with weather, go around, overspeed, low fuel and a non normal configuration to sort out on top of everything.

Slightly off topic; does the NG have a flap lock out feature if you overspeed the flap by a certain amount? I have never heard about this. You overspeed the flap, it allows you to retract to up, then shuts down?

I now fly on an airbus for a couple of years and recently flew with a captain doing his 2nd trip after linetraining, so he had about 6 flights "under his belt".

While I accept he has more experience in aviation, therefor is better to carry ultimate responsibility, do you really think he can handle the plane better?

The only reason there are captains is there needs to be a "boss" to make judgements and decide actions, when there is a difference of opinion. At least in "my" company, FO's (and even SFO's) are selected, trained and used exactly the same as capt's, with the sole difference the last is the deciding factor when there is a difference of opinions.

When I used to be captain on a previous type, I never had "big things" happen, but when the FO would have more experience/handling qualities, I would not have hesitated to let him fly the whole thing.

If the CO was a newbie I doubt he/she would have made the return flight anyway. Lots of them have years under their belt already and this kind of weather occurs more often in the autumn period so nothing new. It wasn't the wind that gave them problems it was the many wind shears on final and even close to the rwy itself.

From what I've heard they declared an emergency on the discrete channel but don't know how reliable that source is. About the fuel, they took extra fuel with them but the GA at EHRD and the holding time there gave them less opportunities and therefore EHAM was their last resort. If they didn't had to make the another GA at AMS this topic wouldn't even exist because not being low on fuel and not having a flap problem which probably occurred when raising them during the GA.

This was the know chain of events but with al the stress they had they made a beauty of a landing. Maybe mistakes have been made, they've solved them well!

I do not think we know at this point who flew the successfull no flap landing. We know that a female pilot, thought to be the Capt, was handling comms and was PNF in Rotterdam and during the first approach and go around at Schiphol. There is no issue with a Capt letting an experienced FO with many hours on type fly a difficult approach. Whoever has flown it, the landing was clearly performed in a very skillful manner and thus by the right person. I do not think the PF/PNF decision is one that deserves criticism.

Many year ago, my first airline, had a clear captain's landing policy in their Ops manual. Many years later, and via a circuitous career route, I arrived at a fledgling airline, but with many years in existence of permanent survival. I was a TRE DEC. During a sim recurrency LOFT exercise with SFO as PF we had an engine failure on departure with no option for return, but a 150nm diversion to a not overly long 'suitable runway' in rainy low cloud with CAT 1. I let the SFO continue as PF while I completed QRH and completed all the necessary communications with all necessary and relevant agencies and parties. This was after deciding on our further course of action and choice of airfield.
I told the SFO to continue with the arrival set up and brief for a standard STAR & ILS to a familiar diversion field. I then said that after all management issues were completed I would become PF at FL100 and land the a/c. This caused a raised eyebrow and a hesitant question, why. "Because it's my responsibility."
The TRE was H.O.T. In the debrief he and the SFO asked about my decisions. The SFO was trained to the same standard and was capable. I suggested that they had 3 years experience & I had 25. I explained that IMHO I was responsible for a/c in such a scenario. The XAA, pax & insurance company would expect it. The H.O.T did admit they had never thought about the issue.
A few months later the Ops manual contained a list of Captain's only landings. It included any reason that affected thrust, handling or significant extension in landing distance. Captains should use good judgement regarding weather. The consideration of a G/A in non-normal configuration should also be a consideration.
Every airline I've flown with had X-wind landing limits for F/O's. They were all less than max demonstrated. Common was newbies 15kts and experienced F/O's 2/3rds of any runway limitations including gusts. Any more and it was the captain's.
I understand the thoughts about new captains on type relative to more type experienced on type F/O's. There are merits in it, but ultimately there will be the debate of final responsibility should anything go wrong. I do not know if that argument has been tested by any XAA or insurance company. Should there be any pax injury I wonder what compensation lawyers would do about such a question in their claim against the airline. Has that ever been tested?
The whole issue may not be quite so simple as many think.
However, in a single type airline with a seniority list and little expansion (i.e. no non-type DEC's) it is a given that the captain will have much more experience than any F/O. Thus any argument about experience needs to be relevant to the airline & incident involved.
Sully is not the answer to everything non-normal, but who here, if F/O was PF, would have allowed them to ditch the a/c and not taken over?
To those who think otherwise about this whole issue I guess we'll have to agree to disagree. But it is an interesting industry-wide debate topic. I suspect there will be very different opinions in different cultural areas.

I have noooo idea how the lawsuits regarding BA38 handled the fact that the FO was flying. Maybe that will clear things up a bit?

Except for the newbie restriction, we have no x-wind restrictions for our experienced first officers. And rightly so. Our first officers are selected and trained to be captains. If I have a heart attack, should my first officer not be able to land if the x-wind is inside the recommended aircraft limit?
When he changes to the left seat, do you expect him to suddenly be able to perform max x-wind landings after years of not doing any?

I agree completely with Rat5.

I think (in general) that the guy who's signature is in the tech log should land the aeroplane in events such as these. I could be convinced to change my mind if I really believed I had good reason to let the other guy fly. For example if he was experienced and I was a brand new DECaptain on type.

I only flew as a co-pilot in an airline with a very long time to Command, and would have been amazed if the Captain had deferred to me in such a situation.

There is such a thing as lack of confidence even among Captains, as hard as it is for some here to accept.

The practice of letting an FO land in limiting weather, especially dynamic weather as stormy crosswinds, is flawed in my opinion. In limiting weather the handling pilot must continually make a decision: can I continue to land or is this all getting too much?

If you hand over control to the FO, either because you lack experience on type or because the FO is a better handling pilot than you, you effectively hand over your command. Who is going to make that crucial split second go/no go decision?

If the captain is not comfortable with the weather, he should divert, even if the FO thinks he can get it in. Otherwise he is a effectively passenger on his own ship.


But then again, once we are in the mindset that 'our FO's are future captains' and that diverting to a stormy alternate with limited fuel is acceptable, well, then all bets are off.

Why don't you make all your co-pilots captains then, and rotate final responsibility each leg? Lower your salary, raise his..

No, I expect him to build up his own comfort zone gradually. I expect him to divert if he's not comfortable with the weather.

PENKO, I don't think I agree. In many airlines it's an established principle that in poor weather the pilots conduct a monitored approach or autoland. Certainly in my airline, in both cases the Captain is the PM until minima. This gives the more experienced and ultimately responsibile pilot the luxury of an overall perspective on the unfolding scenario.

Furthermore, in high pressure stages of flight it is quite common for pilots to suffer tunnel vision. If the pilot battling the wind and rain is also the Captain, what chance has the FO of comprehending impending doom and, more importantly, alerting the Captain and ensuring a safe outcome?

But you're right in so far as any Captain who feels that he or she is personally incapable of completing a safe landing should be diverting rather than shirking responsibility and delogating the task to a colleague. Nevertheless, where a Captain is confident that either they or the FO could complete the safe landing, that's when handing over controls is reasonable.

I will usually choose to be PM on sectors to new destinations or where conditions are such that I will need to retain overall spatial awareness and coordinate the flight with ATC rather than concentrate on the flight path. However, where a landing is likely to be tricky and I either don't know or don't have complete faith in the FO, for the sake of the aircraft's safety, and because I will carry ultimate responsibility anyhow, I will take the controls at the outset or for the approach.

But there have to be occasions when inexperienced pilots are allowed to gain experience in tricky conditions and it's the Captain's judgment call on when this takes place. If you don't do this you may end with a situation where new Captains are flying approaches in bad weather for the first time when the person in the other seat is fresh from training and represents a fairly frail safety net.

Who knows the dynamics of that Transavia cockpit?

Mikehotel, in what way do you disagree then?
:ok:


And more on topic, I am not saying that the FO should not have been PF on this day, I am purely reacting to the notion that the FO should be allowed to land in any weather condition or when the captain himself is not comfortable.

No!
The NG does how ever have "Flap Load Relief" , retracting the flaps from 40->30 at trigger speed of 176 kias, and 30->25 at 163 (800-900)

In many airlines it's an established principle that in poor weather the pilots conduct a monitored approach or autoland.

I think you will find this is when the weather is close to minima and within autoland limits; and it is a excellent policy. I have used in many times, both in airlines where it was SOP and also where it was not but I deemed it the safest manner to execute a successful approach & landing. In this scenario it was not the case.
However, back to Apples & Apples. Poor weather that gives control issues and demands above average skill: captain's judgement if there is no SOP restriction. I would be hesitant to negate responsibility. A/c system failures that induce handling issues and incur extra landing distance. I would be very hesitant to negate responsibility. Add the 2 together and no way. The sim is the place to practice this not a live a/c with live pax on board.

Didn't think there was/is any monitored approaches using Airbus SOP not sure about Boeing.

PENKO,

Generally, yes, it looks like we agree. :) However, I was specifically referring to your comment and suggested that perhaps it's often better for the Captain to be PM in dynamic situations where the legal and practical merits of continuing an approach are best assessed by the more experienced pilot without the added burden of flying the plane.

RAT5,

By I was indeed referring to weather close to visibility limits. This was in the context of the general argument that it is preferable for the Captain to be pilot monitoring in certain situations. This wasn't one of them.

Sorry to confuse you lot! I should have been more clear.

PSEU the reason for the lockout of the TRs?