From the BEA report on AF 447:

"When there are no protections left, the aeroplane no longer possesses positive longitudinal static stability even on approach to stall. This absence specifically results in the fact that it is not necessary to make or increase a nose-up input to compensate for a loss of speed while maintaining aeroplane altitude. This behaviour, even if it may appear contrary to some provisions in the basic regulations, was judged to be acceptable by the certification authorities by taking into account special conditions and interpretation material. Indeed, the presence of flight envelope protections makes neutral longitudinal static stability acceptable.
However, positive longitudinal static stability on an aeroplane can be useful since it allows the pilot to have a sensory return (via the position of the stick) on the situation of his aeroplane in terms of speed in relation to its point of equilibrium (trim) at constant thrust. Specifically, the approach to stall on a classic aeroplane is always associated with a more or less pronounced nose-up input. This is not the case on the A330 in alternate law. The specific consequence is that in this control law the aeroplane, placed in a configuration where the thrust is not sufficient to maintain speed on the flight path, would end up by stalling without any inputs on the sidestick. It appears that this absence of positive static stability could have contributed to the PF not identifying the approach to stall."

Work together
 

Sorry but even as a non pilot, all this talk about 'push the stick forward and you're saved' is bit insensitive on this thread without knowing what happened.

It certainly didn't help 2 very respectable pilots on D-AXLA A320-232 over Perpignan when THS stayed nose up, with the combination of the AOA sensors freezing and normal law dropping out they were unable to save it with the above aforementioned method. After reading the report, i was worried by the lack of notification to the pilots, in that moment id expect 'USE MAN PITCH TRIM' to be slapping me round the face.
Or a clear indication:

Warning - Normal law FAIL STATUS NOW MANUAL
Cause - AOA/ADIR mismatch(or the like)
Result - USE MAN PITCH TRIM(?(perhaps added flashing if stick forward/backward exceeds Xseconds)) or AUTO PITCH TRIM DISABLED!

Would of been even nicer. (In this instance above i believe the PITCH TRIM warning dropped off the display shortly after ie changing flight law.) i stand to be corrected.

Then again what if the warning is wrong and all of it is sending you up the garden path?

If something similar had happened here im not sure id want to be on-board with ANY pilot at FL25(risky i know) or FL370, in that moment attempting to recover a stall. IMHO the transition from 'automated' to 'manual' and not in 'neutral trim' in the wrong moment without any clear reason is a worry, using any automated transportation.
As we have learnt even the most simple things in that moment to react can go undetected (flaps not extended on takeoff due to FB pulled on warning circuit muting the reminder to pilots they're not extended). Whilst not automated, had there been a clear warning, reaction should/could of saved the day.

I'm also shocked to read about lack of stall training due to lack of capability to do so for some aircraft. And still we have not put more pressure on all airlines to enforce real time streaming on capable aircraft with the rest to follow. MH370 whilst is rare, it needs to be answered it cannot be swiped aside as a statistic as some have mentioned here.

On the plus, I salute the many informative posters on here who clearly are outstanding professionals in their field and appreciate their fascinating analysis and input. I hope all of this debate can be focused on making our airways safer, negating the swiss cheese effect ever happening. Hoping no more families suffer this loss of professionals doing their job and PAX in this way, once we have the ACTUAL cause from the experts.

Anyway what do i know, i can barely fly a quadcopter!

Are they cutting the wreckage up so it can be transported by road? Wouldn't it have been better to sail it, intact, to Jakarta?

No disagreement at all. An interesting discussion would be how deep into the stall one ends up during power on, 3kts/per second, approaches.

capt log

NB for Perpignan, the BEA said:In short, any pilot, with full power, full forward stick yet nose high and getting higher should not need (and will not notice) a small "Use Man Pitch Trim" message. They should be trained to know that Pitch Trim may be needed, but in both cases, IIRC, the Pitch Trim was not the whole issue, but the high power as well?

We do need to remember they ignored numerous signs that the AoAs were incorrect, they failed to follow every safety procedure in the test they were doing. I am afraid there gets a point when the crew have to be "accountable" (even if it their training or management the ultimate cause), rather than just blaming the systems / manufacturers because their aircraft are not "uncrashable" :ugh:

@zzuf


OK, I guess I misread your intent. You obviously meant others than Gysbreght!. I spent some time with Nick also.

Nigel, that flight amongst other incidents and accidents (the upset to G-EZJK comes to mind) was why the procedures, discipline and training requirements for post-maintenance check flights have been substantially changed.

Scorch marks ...
 

After the fuselage was lifted from Crest Onyx to shore, at some stage, there was a guy using a torch. He was cutting at at least two places.

Have not seen that before. Will be clear though during reassembly that it was not from the crash.



Picture 1 -Torch is handled by a man with a medium dark blue shirt with logo “ST” on it. He is closely observed by another man in civvies (@ I found later that this man is from KNKT). Cutting is vertical on the side of the first frame between the last window and the lavatory section, on the'inside' of the lavatory section.

Picture 2 –Cutting itself not observed. But ashore, 10 guys putting the structure up, you can see a very long horizontal scorch mark. Running from the door to the fuselage painted word “Fly”. Part that was cut away was a strip with 5 windows and PK-AXC registration letters. That part was still there in daylight when Crest Onyx was already in Kumai port in daylight. That same (lefthand aft part of fuselage – watch out, it is lying upside down) strip was hinged about 135 degrees outside when still on deck.

Picture 3 –The man with the long crowbar. You can see torch marks on the longitudinal stiffener just below his torso.

Picture 4 –The man making the vertical cut, view from outside, ... have seen the picture.. (@ later -same torch operator as in Picture 1)

CVR type
 

I found one good picture of the QZ8501 CVR after recovery.

Cockpit Voice Recorder = Model FA2100, L3communications
CVR carried Emergency Locating Beacon = TELEDYNE BENTHOS

Other CVR configuration information like serial, manufacturing number, and HW and SW config nrs were clear for parts. I wait till I get a better picture before posting that.

Appreciated, but I do not understand the point?

Any pilot conducting any test flight should be aware of some basic principles, well documented well before this accident, and probably before WW2. There is no point in testing something if you are betting your life on the test succeeding? Surely you test "High AoA protection" on the assumption it might not work?

As the BEA report stated, another crew had done a similar profile and: and next flight:Somewhat nearer ideal :ok:

Funny my recollection was, despite the time stamps, Gysbreght's post was not on my browser when I selected reply. So, yes, lots of others!

Nigel, sorry, the point I was trying to make as simply that those undertaking that type of flight were not properly prepared, briefed or understanding the consequences of what they were doing, which is something for which I agree they must bear responsibility.

That will definitively be individual for every aircraft, and even depending on actual weight (the lighter you are, the steeper you climb and the longer the nose needs to come down). It also depends on how quickly you reduce thrust, which may significantly help to get the nose down quickly.
It also very much depends on how and when you would define the airplane to be stalled.

Dismantling techniques
 

I presume that the investigators have authorised the somewhat barbarous dismantling that is shown in the pictures.

The assumption must be that they do not expect to learn a great deal from the wreckage. ie they already have a pretty clear idea of the cause of the incident.

A more apt user name there isn't. Ian W's response hopefully shed some light. In a competitive industry, and an industry wherein to remain in service one must earn revenue in excess of expenses or not exist, the cost of everything matters. Therefore, the bean counters are directed to analyze cost. The problem is for beancounters, not everthing pertaining to safe and effective ops can be numerically quantified to three decimal places. Sadly, between management and number crunches, that leaves Safety Critical issues like training underfunded and under-resourced. Politics have nothing to do with it. Your point on regulation being lax also is a matter of cost, in terms of how many tax dollars are allocated to that function. That's another group of bean counters at work, right?

I'm surprised to see this dismembering too. It looks more like disposal than careful dismantling.

A previous poster mentioned that Airbus had advised on the breaking up of the tail section, and I believe this was before the DFDR was found. So I think they decided on the sawing-up before they had any other evidence. Why would this be?

they decided on the sawing-up before they had any other evidence. Why would this be?
 

It could be that Airbus has been passed information that has not yet been (and may never be) released to the media. That's not a conspiracy, that's normal.

Chains?
 

Look further on the tail pic to the left of the guy with no crowbar is - looks like a chain in that crease from the "balloon" that raised the tail - if you zoom/enhance?

After MH370 I think everyone is looking for a mystery... This looks to be straightforward with little room for conspiracy theories.

This Getty Images photo shows a torch being used... An Indonesian worker cuts the tail of the AirAsia flight QZ8501 in... News Photo 461419122 | Getty Images