Here is a google translate

very tricky as a low weight -400/-500 run out of elevator at low speed during landing, this is pretty well known unlike the -300 (and -200), don't know about any other later variants.

what MAK states is pretty much what I expected, and the final report I reckon will mirror exactly this.

still, that was pretty damned fast.

Which converts to 243 knots.

The committee noted there is no tape in the CVR.
:confused:

I'm with Gobonastick.

Somatogravic.

Not quite. Upon opening the CVR container they did not find the crash container w tape module inside. Still looking.

UWKD 171600Z 24008G12MPS 5000 -RASN OVC008 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0978
UWKD 171530Z 23008G11MPS 5000 -RASN OVC007 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0979

Which on Rwy 29, means a Xw comp.= c.ca 8G12 Kts. Not a big deal.

From 700 m (2200 ft) to zero in 20 secs, means 6600 ft/min???

Given that the stabilizer was almost for sure, as usual in that phase of flight, toward the final end of ANU, as soon as the plane had regained a bit of speed would also have had a strong pitch up moment.
The only maneuvers I can imagine for a plane to assume such an attitude are:
- A spin (to which would favor the low speed and the high rate of descent)
- An Hammerhead
- A loop
And since the last two above mentioned manoeuvre have to be excluded, only one possibility remains:
The loss of the elevator or the whole tail separation.
My two cents

do they have a chance?

I am not sure, but I suppose that better translation could be:

"When CVR was found the protected container with tape transport mechanism was absent."

It could be detached by impact so MAK search for it at crash site.



CPT - 2.500hr on type, 3 years ago retrainig from navigator
FE - 1.900hr, 2 years ago retrainig from FE

Their first GA in real conditions

seems to me that the pilots didn't properly control the plane either in the approach or the go around.

and folks, if you go to max thrust on a go around and the nose comes up and the yoke doesn't make it go down

try reducing thrust.

but, the 737 has done thousands of go arounds and a normally competent crew can handle it.

as to illusions...use instruments.

http://russian.rt.com/data/7/a/6/7a6...9b3b496e13.jpg

I suppose they do - it's a pretty big debris field to comb through. The outer container which was shown is a flimsy looking orange box which they pried open with the help of some cutters and a hammer. The inner container is a much more serious looking smaller box and this is what they need to find.

Does it matter? If the casual observer is to believe the videos on Youtube we already know what it says:

Pilot: Cuss word.
PNF: What are you doing?
PF: Cuss word. Here, you take it!
PNF: I don't want it! I have no idea what to do.
PF: Cuss word.
PNF: (operates some random object that has nothing to do with anything)
PF: Cuss word.
PNF: Cuss word.
PF: Cuss word.

tape ends

@MountainBear

It's very tragicomical, but very likely...

maybe boeing should now consider an automatic go around with one AP engaged rather than full AP disconnect.

we have had a lot of guys come off the 756 with that automation onto the 738 and a lot of training focus on manual G/As.

Oh! I forgot the gem:
What about MANUAL REVERSION?
Yes I know the Landing gear was ordered to be retracted, but...was it?
I left the B73 more than 6 years ago and was sim checked on such an Emergency Proc only once.
I remember that it was very difficult to obtain a minimal excursion of Flt Controls (elev, aileron & rudder) although both of us made a considerable effort.

What is 756?:rolleyes:

In all Boeings go-arounds are initiated manually though you can engage A/P soon after. The go-around is such a basic air manoeuvre that if you can't do manually you have no business getting even close to a cockpit.

Your original speed estimate was spot on.

Possible uncommanded rudder deployment
 

The video footage shows vertical high speed dive into solid terra firma. So reminiscent of the 1991 UA 585 at Colarado Springs. Could this be another PCU failure.

Discussed before, post #85 and before.

Dove: the position of the trim could be much dependent upon whether they were using a dual auto-pilot (coupled) approach and were also below 400ft Rad Alt (or not) when they pressed the TOGA button (which is assuming they did indeed press the TOGA button), as that 'auto land' scenario can dramatically effect the position of the stabiliser trim, depending upon ones height above the ground.

And / or in the event of a go-around, what of Power / Attitude / Trim, along with appropriate & timely selection of flap & landing gear? And was the Auto-Throttle selected 'Off' or was it in the (non-approved, by Boeing) 'Speed-Off' mode? And what of FMA mode awareness? And following (or not) of ones Flight Director (all aside from potential somatogravic illusions,... err, what about follow your instruments, etc)?
All of these can play their part in setting an aircraft up for an 'unusual attitude' event.

And let me be so bold as to provide just ONE scenario of a poorly flown go-around in a B737....

With dual autopilots engaged in ILS Approach Mode, and captured to the ILS. A go-around is actioned when below 400ft Rad Alt. The autopilot(s) have at that point wound in nose-up stabiliser (i.e. ready for the autopilot to either flare the aircraft as part of the landing, or else primed for a go-around), and the Flight Directors are still switched on. Then, instead of pressing the TOGA button (and therein letting the 'automatics' fly the go-around), the Pilot Flying disconnects both the Autopilot & Auto-Throttle, and shoves the thrust levers fully to the firewall, i.e. electing to fly the go-around fully manually.

A likely outcome is those actions - at that point in time - would be that the aircraft would pitch dramatically nose-up... that said, if the TOGA button is not pressed then the Flight Director guidance is still to follow the ILS (and indeed the aircraft is not 'aware' that TOGA mode and all associated acceleration & combined flap retraction modes are to be utilised)... and, assuming that they are following a split-axis (cross hairs) based Flight Director, then the pitch bar of the FD will be fully 'fly down' (the queue to the active mode is being given by the FMA). Now go figure what happens next?!

And that just one example of a f-up to be had in a 737 during a go-around that I can think of... and there are lots more !

olasek: wrt .... yes, that's ostensibly true, but what happens next very much depends upon the point in space when the TOGA button was pressed (and which assumes that the TOGA was indeed pressed... see explanation above), and / or was one utilising either a single or dual auto-pilot approach prior to initiating the go-around (either manually and / or via TOGA)?!

Also, if one initiates a go-around (via a press of the TOGA button) when utilising a single autopilot based ILS approach, the first thing that happens is that the autopilot disconnects, if one then (re-)engages an autopilot (i.e. when now in TOGA mode) it then cancels the TOGA mode, and does a number of other things too, which I'll trust you are aware of ?!

You are confused with VP-BKO I'm afraid, and you do this crew no justice.

756 = 757/767

It can be, but it doesn't have to be. If we fly a autoflight ILS it is always dual channel and therefore the go around is flown by the autopilot. Of course one could argue that it is initiated manually by manually pressing the TOGA switches. Automatic go around while nice is not the main reason for dual channel approaches though, it is a fix for some very nasty aileron hardovers flown by one faulty autopilot on one of our early classics, dual channel approaches will prevent that.

However, if already in manual flight that is of course a moot point, still not a difficult procedure if the training department does now how to do its job.

Trim
 

I'd suspect an out of trim condition during G/A. G/A-Thrust might lead to STAB-Trim ending up full-nose-down (esp since flaps extended, trim moves quickly), which may lead to this type of "descend" when Thrust is reduced during "level-off" after the G/A due to the resulting nose-down moment. Difficult to solve without applying thrust.... Happend before.

G/As
 

Our Training Dept has recently been putting out internationally collated info about the high number of mis-handled GA's.
Its all very well saying its a basic manouvre, but it is one I do for real, on average, once a year. Often there is the 'startle factor' where a perfectly normal day turns into an unexpected flurry of action during an unexpected GA.
Added to that the Boeing can be a bit of a handful if the GA is not executed well.
Terrible video to watch, thoughts to the crew,pax etc.

OKG
I'll give you my most sincere congratulations. You are really good at beating around the bush.
Let me ask you a question: are you a professional pilot or a lawyer?
You claim that they had dual autopilots engaged in ILS Approach Mode.
The first exception that comes to my mind is that given the windy conditions that was not the best option.
I have perhaps some other objection that better demolish your thesis, but before formulating them, I have to study more about what you say and the current conditions of efficiency of the airport.
As to the position of the stabilizer in the various phases of flight, I encourage you to check your stab trim ind which while during cruise is close to zero, and it could only be like that for drag reasons, while during the approach, in landing configuration, at the correct speed it is very much ANU.
Regards

As already mentioned, 3 years ago none of the guys in the cockpit was a pilot - one was a Tu 154 navigator and the other a Tu 154 Flight engineer.

Where do you think they could have manual flying skills, if they actually started to fly at the age of 45?

@Mountainbear

I'll put my money on the following tape:

PNF: Where are we supposed to go now?
PF: Dunno. Did you program the go around into the computer?
PNF: No. Did you?
PF: No. Cuss word. Where is the expletive map?
(sound of rummaging around)
PNF: BTW, we are on autopilot right?
PF: Cuss word!
PNF: Cuss word!
PF: Cuss word!

tape ends

Cut and paste from MAK statement on Avherald:

On Nov 19th 2013 the MAK reported that first read outs of the flight data recorder revealed that the crew did not follow the standard approach profile, went around due to considering the approach as unstable (attitude not within stable approach parameters), the engine thrust levers were moved to TOGA and the autopilot disconnected, the aircraft was under manual control for the remainder of the flight. While the engines accelerated to near takeoff thrust, the flaps were reduced from 30 to 15 degrees, the gear was retracted and the aircraft pitched up to about 25 degrees nose up, the indicated airspeed began to decay. Only after the airspeed had decreased from about 150 KIAS to 125 KIAS the crew began to issue control inputs to counter the nose up, the climb was stopped while the nose was lowered by control inputs. The aircraft reached a maximum height of 700 meters (2300 feet and began to rapidly descend until the aircraft impacted ground at a nose down attitude of 75 degrees at a speed of 450 kph (242 knots) about 20 seconds after reaching the maximum height of 700 meters. The engines were operating nominally until impact, the flight data recorders did not reveal any system malfunction. The cockpit voice recorder was not found inside its container, the assembly is missing and a search is under way.

I am not sure of my facts here but I doubt if the 400 ft wind back of the stabiliser trim on a dual autopilot ILS is to specifically aid the go-around as such. The application of high thrust at the initiation of the go-around produces a strong pitch up. You don't need additional back trim which has already occurred at 400 ft on a dual channel approach.

Interestingly in the simulator at least, a single channel autopilot autoland does a quite smooth touchdown. On single channel the 400 ft wind back of the stabiliser trim does not occur. Again from observations in the simulator a well executed (in other words, safe) manual go-around on all engines in IMC in the 737 varies greatly with pilot skill and competence. Some really botch it up while other pilots know exactly what they are doing.

What does sometimes happen on a go-around in IMC and which has caused grief in the simulator, is inadvertent premature flap retraction by the PNF without being asked. The PF is busy flying on instruments and not keeping a close eye on monitoring the flap position indicator. For example the PNF selecting Flap 1 inadvertently rather than flap 15 at the instant of power application on an all engines GA.

Now pitch up to 15-25 degrees caused by the strong nose up trim change with underslung engines at high power, and couple that with some pilots blind adherence to the flight director needles instead of proper cross reference to airspeed, attitude, altimeter and IVSI. Believe me with an incompetent instrument pilot it doesn't take long for things to rapidly get out of hand.
I have seen that happen countless times during simulator training to the point of stick shaker application. When that happens an incompetent pilot can make grossly over-controlled pitch down movements in fright and next minute the aircraft is seriously diving. It is all to do with lack of instrument flying skill in manual IMC flight. Surprisingly common. Thank goodness for flight simulators:ok:

Interesting comment in ampclamp's linked article above:

Aksan Giniyatullin, chief executive officers of Tatarstan airlines, which operated the jet, told a news conference: "The lead pilot had never made a second landing attempt under real flight conditions."

I'm not sure that 9 out of 10 successes is any better than 0 out of 1. The idea is to train for 10 out of 10 (or some such) in a simulator before trying out under real flight conditions.

Let's see what the investigation turns up in this regard

Don't know who told you that one but you can certainly leave the autopilot on for a go-around on the 757 and all later Boeing models. It is the recommended procedure for a low-vis missed autoflight approach in my experience.

Doves: that statement alone shows in inherent lack of understanding of the B737.

Aside from considerations for it being 'windy', as you put it, on the matter of using a dual-channel approach mode (i.e. both autopilots engaged). There is nothing to stop one from using that mode (see: Boeing FCOM1 / Amplified Procedures / Landing Procedure ILS) even if ones intention might ultimately be to make 'manual landing' (i.e. to disconnect the autopilot(s) at some point during the approach) but wherein (prior to an autopilot disconnect) one then has the facility for an auto-pilot flown go-around (which one does not with a single-channel approach) and / or, putting it in simple terms, just because one engages both autopilots does not mean that one will necessarily be letting the autopilot(s) do the landing, but if one then elects to initiate a go-around (by disconnecting the autopilot and flying it yourself) and doing so when below 400ft Rad Alt, you can expect the said same (dual-)autopilots to have wound in nose-up stabiliser, and which you'd better be ready for when the autopilots relinquish control to the yolk.

A quote from the МАК site (boeing 737-500 investigation): Sorry for my lame English (especially when it comes to aviation terms), but it should be pretty clear that they were using only one of the autopilots during the approach, or else how would disengaging one of them put the aircraft into manual flight mode?

I understand almost nothing about aviation, but I am Russian. The МАК site says that "one of the autopilots that was used during approach was disengaged and the rest of the flight was being carried manually" (задействованный в процессе захода на посадку один из двух автопилотов, был отключён и дальнейший полёт осуществлялся в ручном режиме). So why all the talk about dual autopilots?

Reuters reporting Pilot pushed the steering column...
 

From airwise.com..

Russian Crash Pilot Pushed Plane Into Nosedive

The pilot of an airliner that crashed near the Russian city of Kazan killing 50 people had pushed the steering column to pitch it into a nosedive, crash investigators said on Tuesday, citing data recorder analysis.
The Interstate Aviation Committee, which oversees civil aviation in the former Soviet Union, offered no explanation why the pilot of the Boeing 737 might have performed the maneuver, at a height of 700 meters, after aborting a first attempt to land.
Aksan Giniyatullin, chief executive of Tatarstan Airlines which operated the jet, told a news conference: "The lead pilot had never made a second landing attempt under real flight conditions."
Video of the crash showed the aircraft, approaching Kazan in the region of Tatarstan on a flight from Moscow, plummeting headlong into the tarmac and exploding.
"After a speed decrease from 150 to 125 knots (144 mph) the crew started maneuvering activities with the steering column to put the plane into a nose-down pitch, which resulted in the end of altitude gain and the start of descent," the committee said in a statement.
Both engines were running and no malfunctions were detected by the flight data recorder. The tape from the voice recorder could not be recovered at the crash site, the committee said.
RUSSIAN SAFETY RECORD
Sunday's crash raised new concerns about Russia's poor safety record as it prepares to host the Winter Olympics in the southern city of Sochi in February.
Russia and the Soviet republics combined have one of the world's worst air traffic safety records, with a total accident rate almost three times the world average in 2011, according to the International Air Transport Association.
"I know lots of people who don't fly with these small airlines in Russia anymore, they're scared..." said Leila Sibgatullina, who came to place flowers at the site of the crash.
"This kind of thing just shouldn't be happening. What a tragedy."
Mourners paid respects at a makeshift memorial set up at the gate to the runway. Candles burned around a table piled with red and white flowers and teddy bears.
The son of the president of the oil-rich province of Tatarstan and the regional head of the FSB intelligence service were named among those killed. The dead also included two foreigners, a Briton and a Ukrainian.
The committee said investigators were studying the level of crew training and technical condition of the jet among other aspects.
An independent aviation expert who did not want to be named suggested the decline in speed might itself have caused the plane to stall and nosedive.
"The abrupt transition from ascent to descent can signify that the crew, possibly, failed to keep track of the speed decrease, which resulted in the jet losing controllability and falling," he said.
(Reuters)

about the dual ch autopilot and nose up trim


since the plane didn't go below 400', why even mention it?

Don't fly any other airline in Russia except for Aeroflot, Transaero and S7 and you will be fine.

Huge lack of pilots in Russia is causing these "backwater" operators to turn to "converting" flight engineers and navigators. Their training will consist of going up in a light aircraft and the instructor signing them off saying "You guys are pretty much pilots you already know all this basic stuff"

These "pilots" cocked up a go around, then failed to save a recoverable aircraft and not only killed themselves but took 50 innocent lives with them.

Pushing TOGA on the 737 with a single AP engaged automatically disengages it and you're into a hand flown go around. Equally, a single push of TOGA will not give you full beans GA thrust, but reduced thrust that will give you around 1000-2000ft fpm roc to avoid this kind of situation, and the FMA will reflect that, indicating GA not N1. You have to push TOGA twice to get full GA N1.

As for the NU stab trim, I thought it was part of the fail passive protections - ie if the autopilot chucks it at 100ft the aircraft will tend to pitch up and away from the ground?