Bet my last dollar the A/T was in hold mode and the thrust levers where being used as what they are always used as - hand rests. And I say this with out spite of venom - 8000 hrs in an Asian carrier gave me this observation.

Yes, the lights were on
 

@nigegilb, who wishes to confirm whether PAPIs were operational...

...apart from public announcements (from NTSB, I think?) that they were functioning, we have a first-person account from Locked_door on this forum (following link goes to his post, presently #442):

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post7927159

who despite using the word "departed" describes a landing on SFO 28L "in a heavy jet", which if I understood correctly occurred "few hours before this tragic accident." Locked_door's account includes seeing the PAPI lights (and indeed, noting that they indicated that his/her ship was too high).

Perhaps Locked_door will provide more information to clarify approximately what time his/her approach and landing took place, with the aid of visual guidance from the PAPIs.

To all of you saying it is very basic to keep the speed, I agree. Now I ask those who did the STAR conversion from the B744 to the B777, like I recently did.
Do you think you had enough visual app and overall training in the SIM?
The colleague in the controls most likely did the STAR, and for those who do not know, it is very condensed and rushed. I only did 6 visual circuits. And it is different to turn base at 45'' and to fly a long visual final. That was not trained.
Industry is also to blame as very limited and condensed training is the norm.
B744 and T7 are very different to hand fly and takes some time to feel comfortable with the fly by wire, trimming (almost none in the T7), siting position, cockpit hight, and most important, the use of Autothrotle all the way to touchdown on the T7. This alone feels very strange in the beginning.

Someone mentioned a few pages back that Lufthansa pilots would not make similar mistakes. The Riyadh 2010 LH MD11F crash would likely have resulted in fatalities if PAX had been on board. We pilots, "even the best" can make mistakes.

Now who said a proper rest on a long training flight is evenly divided with relief pilots? have you had this experience? I had, and I say not most of the time, as there is a lot to cover and talk about, not always proper rest is taken. The pilot in question, coming from the B744, was likely having his first ETOPS training flight and had to be in seat to see and discuss all there is to it. In my recent training flights, I barely had time to eat and visit the toilet, as a lot had to be ticked from an expense list of topics. You get really exhausted.

AF447 and OZ214 pilot error
 

Now we have 2 examples where the PF didn't recognize that they were clearly in trouble, and didn't take appropriate action to remediate. Both flights had very experienced and well trained crews. Both aircraft are lavishly equipped with many tools specifically designed with keeping the aircraft and passengers safe.
Despite all this, these aircraft crashed.

Is it really that the aircrews are over saturated with information during these operations?
How do the other members of the flight deck crew keep quiet or refrain from acting when their lives are at risk?

Is the answer to really put the computers in charge of everything? That isn't an idea that makes me comfortable either.

That is aviations greatest challenge for the next decade summed up beautifully in one short post . A real obstacle to overcoming the current situation is that the people making the safety critical decisions don't understand what flying an airliner is about. They think they do, but unless they've done it, all but a few won't get it.
Airline bosses used to be pilots, then when business folk stepped up Chief Pilots had clout and backbone and their decisions were respected. Now days they are hand picked to be compliant. So the people making the decisions aren't aware of what is required to fly an airliner day in, day out for thirty years and avoid having an incident. They are normally unaware of the frailties / limitations and biases of their own brains, the number of errors they make while driving their car or typing a letter, or how any of that applies to consistently providing safe air transport in all weather conditions.
As long as we have people at the helm with zero flying experience the problem will persist and accidents ( crashes is a more appropriate word) like Lion Air, Air France, and Asiana will increase dramatically as the older , well trained generation of pilots retire.
That's my take on it anyway.

CAT 1 , racism is rife in overseas Airlines , in your face , you cant sweep it under the carpet .
The sad thing is the guy who speaks up will maybe avoid a disaster , so you wont read about it , but mysteriously will fail his next medical and be looking for a job .
Theres no excuse for this 777 disaster but its obvious why and I dont think it will improve anything.

I'm no expert, just an aircraft enthusiast & plane crashes interest me on a technical basis as to why they happen, but with all this automation why is there no audible &/or visual warning of low speed....

apparently this flight was below 137kts for 35 seconds.....

I can only assume the entire crew was either worried about other parameters or enjoying the view! But a warning at 10kts below a normal approach speed (determined by aircraft weight) would have brought them back into focus real quick & with plenty of time & altitude to react!

Was it only when the stick shaker acted they realized they were too slow?

Also this does not seem to be a stable approach....speed was being washed off all the way down, shouldn't it be constant throughout the final stages of landing?

Is it possible the pilot tried to fly the B777 like an A320 & there is a significant difference in flight aerodynamics in the landing configuration? i.e the 777 has more drag?

:ok: Thumbs up to the NTSB for getting the facts out very quickly & regularly.

Cheers

Stormy knight

My understanding from a friend who flies Boeing, there is an EICAS AIRSPEED LOW message. Along with amber and red airspeed numbers to alert pilots of the low speed condition. At some point, we have to assume that the operator put sentient pilots in the seats.

Lorimer, Post 1007 says:

"There's one important thing I need to add which is this. The reason I'm in this left-hand seat is because I've been doing this job longer than you. It doesn't mean that I'm incapable of making mistakes. So if you see or hear anything which you don't understand or appears to be not right, please speak up and tell me."

My company had excellent CRM training, but I still felt that it was important to give a new and maybe nervous young F/O full permission and encouragement to say something if they weren't comfortable. There is absolutely no room for pride in the flight deck; the important thing is that the day's flying is accomplished safely, and hopefully enjoyably as well.

This should be standard practice with all airlines. I don't like to use the work 'Rank", as it has caused many cockpit issues with the PNF being "Barked" at by the PF for making any remarks/suggestions/observations. The Stains Trident one springs to mind, but theres many others.

Each aircraft is now fitted with a CVR. If ANY crew member at the pointy end has been barked at for making an observation/suggestion, a report should be filed with the airline of the incident. It should be investigated THOUROGHLY and the offending PF/PNF should be reprimanded.. IMHO, there is NO room for rank in a cockpit. YOU WORK AS A TEAM.

I think that flight sim enthusiasts who produce silly cartoons with no basis in actual FDR data are a waste of bandwidth, that's what I think. You did ask.

Pax reported a change in engine tone before impact with the sea wall, I wonder whether that was an Autothrottle wakeup or a attempt to go around. Looking at the FDR speeds with a vref of 137 the Autothrottle should have come out of hold (if for some reason it was there) and automatically applied thrust at 122kts. I think the EICAS AIRSPEED LOW would have been less than this; 1/2 way between Min Manouver and Stick Shaker.

Pardon me if this has already been mentioned, but who amongst you inserts the RW28L (or RWXX for that matter) into the fix page/s on approach to either non-precision rwys or when slop guidance unavailable (or for cross-checks) etc?? Just seems to come in handy for dist in nm x 300' for reasonable slope guidance i find... Maybe it was was in the fix page in the above-mentioned accident but not given enough credence?? Anyway, just a thought....

Oh the naivety of it all...

Asiana approach path
 

Approach path taken by Asiana using Google Earth data...
Flightradar24-OZ214.kml

I'm not yet convinced that I "don't get it", Bloggs. I'm not sure what the regs say in Korea, but in the US the PIC is the "final authority" for the safe conduct of the flight. If I'm insufficiently trained to land the aircraft on a huge patch of runway in near-perfect weather, it's up to me to refuse the flight, isn't it? I agree that there must be huge, systemic problems that contributed to this almost literally unbelievable failure on the part of the flight crew, and I'm 100% in favor of those problems being corrected in a rapid and draconian fashion. But the buck stops with the PIC...or he's no longer the PIC. Down that road (IMHO) lies chaos and MORE carnage, not less.

By all means, if the company culture is poisonous to turning out capable pilots, fix it, yes! But when the camel of "not my fault" finger-pointing gets its nose under the tent, where does it end? The simple fact appears to be that these guys crashed a perfectly functional aircraft trying to execute a maneuver that I used to sign off 10 hour student pilots to do solo. So, maybe there's enough blame to go around?

You miss the point. We could all very easily say " idiots....I wouldn't do that" and walk away. But the reality is ( most likely) that the pilots were not idiots and that they had good intentions and were trying very hard to do a good job. If they were put in a different environment they would most likely be as capable and competent as the next airline pilot.
So what do we need to change about the environment they were operating in? If you can answer that question you actually make an impact on flight safety rather than just on your own ego.

It's not just airspeed, centerline, and approach.

Aimpoint(trend?), alignment(trend?), airspeed(trend?), variation from projected descend path(GS,VASI,PAPI,VTI, FMC deviation from path)(trend?), sink rate(trend?), power(trend?).

Any adjustments made? Verify the trends changing due to the adjustments made. And one adjustment often changes at least one, and possibly several of the performance criteria you're monitoring.

Cycle through the scan again and again and again and again until touchdown.

I find it interesting (from various media accounts) that the pilot of the United flight that was waiting to take off, an 8 yr old passenger, and various spectators on the ground all thought the plane was too low - yet no one in the cockpit seemed to notice.

Why on earth would the pilot not order an immediate evacuation as soon as the plane came to rest? They crashed. Planes that have crashed tend to catch fire. So get off the plane!!! I can (maybe) understand if the order had been given to get all the uninjured people off, but to wait until help arrived for the injured - but even that doesn't seem to be the case.

Given the lack of urgency regarding an evacuation, it's hard to blame the passengers for taking their luggage with them.

If, indeed, one of the fatalities resulted from being hit by a vehicle - is there any evidence that the girl was thrown from the aircraft? Could she have gone down the slide and then been overcome by injuries/smoke/emotion and sat or laid down and then been struck?

Looks like the centreline may have been on the pilots mind looking at the approach path plot...

He's right of the centerline till about 30 seconds out where he moves to the line but then back to the right. At the same time during this period the speed is continuing to drop below vref presumably unnoticed.

I'm really concerned that this is going to turn out to be "first landing must be perfect" itis. Especially a need to prove that you can capably fly any aircraft to your close seated peers....

After all why shouldn't the landing have been perfect given the weather conditions....this may have internally elevated the landing standard regarded as a pass/fail in his eyes....it may have delayed the TOGA too!

When did you last do a pax evac in the SIM?