My unsaid assumption was trainer craft time being cheaper than sim time.

Not true? I don't know.

Have you seen the price of oil lately?

And no airline is going to pay for any more training than they have to.

Then perhaps, if the airline has the route structure, "long haul" crew members should be given short haul assignments on a regular and continuing basis? 2 months long, one month short?

And before a debate on the complexities of such an approach (pun intended) begins, if the skill in visual approaches is perishable, but necessary, then a bit of effort overcoming "complexity" might be worthwhile. Otherwise, it's an exercise in "you can't get there from here", which solves nothing.

In an occupational field where high flying hours is regularly touted as a badge of high skill and experience, isn't it a bit embarrassing to admit that the long haul folks, usually very high hour crew, have the least recent and refreshed skill in a very basic maneuver that is a requirement for even a Sport Pilot License - a visual approach?

Capt Kremlins earlier comment on the approach lighting:

As far as I know, the approach lighting structures are arranged so the that the whole lighting array is coplanar with the runway surface. Hence if you hit the lighting, you are already at or below the runway surface level.

That's not their goal and its not what they want. They want pilots who fly profiles and nothing more.

The aircraft they're on are long haul aircraft and moving to short haul means a different aircraft. You can't hop aircraft types and routes are bid on by seniority which you don't violate.

Does it cost more to accomplish? Yes? Not going to happen. Not unless its mandated.

Ironic, isn't it.

I'm no expert, but I doubt that.

no more nits to pick for now
 

I guess if we have gone from why a 777 appears to have been flown into the ground to pointing out details of landing gear configs on GA aircraft and gliders, maybe the thread may have run its course until more real info becomes available.

I was thinking of that too!

Maybe, instead of 10,000 hour pilot we ought to be taking of 2000-landing-pilot etc.

Ross m:

The ICAO Annex 14 states "The system shall lie as nearly as practicable in the horizontal plane passing through the threshold..."

hence the reason for seeing approach lights on sometimes quite tall structures where the terrain (ocean) lies below the runway level.

Having flown with "high time" pilots who have exhibited the skill level of 500 hours experience simply repeated 10 or twenty times, yes, there is more than total hours logged in the equation.

Junebug:

Simply debating "complexity" to arrive at "you can't get there from here". Perhaps "seniority" is a causal factor? They don't have to fly PIC in the short haul aircraft, do they? They would be placed in them to maintain hands on skills. They weren't born qualified in the long haul bird, but typically flew the carrier's short haul aircraft to gain the seniority to get a posh slot that allows their skills to deteriorate.

In short, perhaps the current model doesn't work in more ways than one. Supplemental training is "too expensive" and "violating seniority" can't be done. Seems like the status quo is more important than raising skill levels.

Hours and Landings might measure experience but so what, I guarantee you pretty much all pilots that have crashed airliners have hours, landings and experience.

What is needed is:
1. Aptitude!
2. Great Training!
3. A worthwhile check where the pilot demonstrates appropriate Capability and Skill!

On all checks a pass is a coat of paint from a failure and typically many airlines and regulators set the bar too low. In the present regulatory regime you can repeat pretty much everything and partial pass some items before retraining and retesting to get a minimal pass. How would you fancy being operated on by a surgeon with this sort of record.

Around the world pilots buy licenses, in some places more so than in others. It isn't in a Training Organisation's interests to fail their customers; they will just flee to their competitors. Some airlines don't allow their First Oficers to land the plane or Captains to do anything but an Autoland, yet they still count as recent. Until the industry wakes up and requires airlines to select pilots well and then pay the cash to train them/keep them current; these types of events will continue it is as simple as that.

The Industry views crashes as a cost of doing business but not paying for the training of pilots; how sad can that be?

Here's an empirical question: From past crash / accident / incident data or FAA / NTSB stats. (or equivalent foreign stats) is there any correlation between the number of hours flown versus likelihood of these events?

I don't know but I am indeed curious to find if anyone knows the answer.

A note to all those who believe that automation is somehow a serious factor in this accident. Go to the accident websites and research how many accidents there were in the 'good old days' when we didn't have automation - particularly undershoots. As others have stated there is a lot of misinformation floating around.

Then do some research on the number of engine failures per 100,000 hrs flown, the likelihood of other technical difficulties, the accuracy of weather forecasts, the absence of airborne radar, TCAS, EGPWS, the limitations of communications at the time etc etc etc that existed in the good ole days.
It's not so much the existence of automation that pilots worldwide are pointing to as an issue, but the absence of the skills the automation automates.
Ie.....we need to practice flying airliners.

Amen to that!

A quick halfway fix would also be to avoid rookies to fly together. As displayed here with Asiana, a rookie on the LHS and a rookie on the RHS as TRE, is a recipe for disaster, even if both can produce impressive records on other seats/types/functions, you can also add destinations/regions to this list.

I know it would take a few dollars more to implement a function in the rostering automations, but experience should always be paired with a trainee or a regional newcomer. But at the same time i guess these few bucks would give too many little grey, wobbling hairs to the bean counters that seem to be in charge of safety today, so even here we have to forget about common sense.

And by the way i would greatly appreciate a general freeze period for rookies to become trainers. It takes time to get used to a seat/function and a good trainer should be able to transmit experience, not only preach the sops and company bs.

- indeed, as already exists in many operators for 'new' Captains and line F/Os.

The whole training side, as I have previously said, needs a close inspection. Some airlines 'allow' an LTC to move to a new type and begin training straight-away. Do we know the LTC's experience on the 777 here? I agree the combination presented on 214 was bad.

Not-with-standing, of course, that as far as we know the LTC's 'omission' was a very basic one here, and not really type dependent.

About 20 years ago, I left the RAF and got a job instructing baby airline pilots in the US. I was contemplating future career options, and discussed the airlines with a 747 Training Captain. He told me not to bother, as the airlines no longer cared about having good pilots. "They only want 'good enough', and that won't last long either". He reckoned the beancounters had figured that as long as the accident rate stayed below 1 per 10 million flight hours (which is about what it is now for commuter airlines), the increasing safety of the aircraft meant that money could be saved by hiring dumber pilots (and not training them, etc). The public/media seem to accept a an accident rate of 1 in 10 million, i.e. this rate does not cause people not to fly in significant numbers.
So events like AF447 and Asiana 214 will continue to happen.
There is no shortage of good pilots. There are thousands of guys like me could join the airlines with a six-month refresher, except I won't be leaving my current profession to be paid peanuts, get over-worked, given no stick time or get treated with no respect by the company.
The good guys are not as good as they could be if they had proper training and currency on manual flying, and there are an ever increasing number of bozos I wouldn't trust with a paper aeroplane.

But an this incident like Asiana, does it not have a fairly lasting effect on the bottom line? Compensations apart, does it hurt operating revenues?

Or not? Maybe, the flying public is forgetful enough and price sensitive enough that a few $$ shaved off the ticket price will still get Asiana full planes?

Wonder how deep are the effects of a crash on an airlines revenues?

Beancounters may not fund safety for safety's sake, but they will respond to bleeding bottomlines like a hornet bit 'em. What gives?