When you know how to listen to your aircraft, it will talk to you, but you have to be ready to listen and to ask questions such as, "Why am I holding so much aft pressure? or Why aren't the throttles moving?

It takes exposure to manually handling the aircraft to get this ability to sense when things are not right but it is one of the life saving skills that old timers developed that prevented many accidents.

Too bad the guy flying the Asiana had not developed the 'touch'. To my mind, a pilot who doesn't know how to sense and react to the cues is a cripple.

I just watched the Nat Geo reconstruction of the THY AMS stall crash. There was a comment from an eminent lady in USA who is an expert on human behaviour in automated environments. She declared that humans are very bad monitors of automation yet that is what a modern airline pilot needs to be. The solution is that NASA is researching new designs of automation to make the human interface more intuitive and easy. Better displays that are easier to understand; more accessible data/info, i.e. not having to page through CDU's to find the piece of info you want, but at a single touch of a button; voice activated equipment etc. etc.
This was in response to "why did the crew not realise their airspeed was decaying?" They did not know that the RA fault would cause the thrust levers to go to idle and they expected them to do that anyway as they were attacking the G.S. from above and trying to slow down. They were in monitoring mode, but not on top of it.

Well. if I'm attacking the G.S. from above and close to the runway, and trying to configure I can assure you that I am not passive and relaxed watching the needles & dials do their thing, but I am in a heightened state of alertness and making damn sure the autos are doing what I want and the a/c following suit. If it ain't then I know what to do about it and if all else fails I will disconnect and fly the sucker.

Once again the solution from the technocrats is to try and make a better human automatic interface; introduce more warning systems; make the automatics more intuitive etc. etc. No-one has suggested better flying training; better understanding of the a/c envelope; better understanding the capabilities of the automatics - their limitations and traps; better hands on skills to put the pilot back in touch with the a/c. The solution to pilots being lousy monitors and watching the automatics crash the a/c is to address the automatics rather than the pilot.
I'm sure the solution lies in a combination of both. What is certain is that there should be a lot more training of how to best use the automatics then we have now. The understanding of them which I witnessed on the line in many companies was very scant. The TQ courses and LT is focused on using the automatics to stay well inside the SOP envelope. "If you do that you are safe," is the mantra preached every prof check. Incidents happen when people are outside their comfort zone which is bounded by their knowledge envelope. A survivable incident can become an accident because the human intervened in the wrong way due to ignorance. Either ignorance of what is going on, or ignorance of what to do about it. You can make all the fancy gizmos you want to give the pilot lots of info, but they still have to know what is going on and what to do about it. SOP's can not cover all eventualities. Back to basics has to be an option.
We are debating this due to a few well published crashes. A disturbing number in such a short period; and from various cultures in various different airlines and on different types. In other words the common thread is the behaviour of the pilot. What needs to be known, to assess the extent of the problem, is how many similar incidents have been near misses and we never hear about them. Just how deep is the problem? I suspect worse than we dare imagine.
With regard to THY stall at AMS. The program said Boeing had received >2000 incident reports of faulty RA's. Numerous reports of a sudden thrust to idle. No other crashes; the pilots intervened and took over. There was no comment about why the difference. Could it have been different training qualities? Whatever; should it really mean that 1 accident out of 100's of incidents needs a rethink the whole automatic/human interface rather than address the issue purely from the human angle? The technocrats love to do it that way, perhaps a few 'old farts' in the training departments could achieve what is desired.

Rat 5 " no-0ne has suggested better training" : I think, many have. I did but my post was deleted. Proper airline funded training with the result of proper airline pilot training selection will help a lot. The actual ab-initio training should include lots of handling and stick & rudder emphasis as the levels of automation and benefits are slowly introduced. Airline pilot managers should stop being brow-beaten by the bean counters and encourage handflying. We all know the level of automation we are in. Some enjoy split mode, full auto or pure manual. Doesn't matter a stuff but because of system anomoly or failure , pilots might become unsure of what George is doing. Full encouragement to knock out the autopilot, auto thrust & FLY the aircraft and then quizing the event is always the safe option.

How do you get a feeling for an aircraft by out-of-trim when you never get out of trim?
How do you expect pilots to practice manual thrust approaches when you provide them with tiny little useless sticky levers that are horrible to use (and make the SOP auto thrust every time)?
How do you expect a pilot to be cautious about the serviceability of a system when he is told it will always fail with a ding and an ECAM?
Why should a pilot be concerned about stalling, when the manufacturer states the aircraft cannot be stalled?

This accident is a demonstration of what happens when you put an Airbus pilot into a cruder machine, coupled with a few other lined up holes. I fear that the authorities will focus on those other holes (new LTC failing to do his job) and leave the problem unsolved.

In the mean time, pilots on highly automated and protected aircraft had better make it their personal responsibility to practice their basic skills. Because the SOP writers and accountants will do their best to stop you.

Since my earlier reply has been deleted: that is not correct.

Posts ghw78 (#1820) and Carlsberg (#2388) correctly state that Vref cannot be less than 1.3 Vs0.

That is in accordance with the certification basis as detailed in the B777 Type Certification Data Sheet on the FAA website.

Automation vs Seat-of-the-pants-flying
 

talking as devil's advocate - so no abuse please.

Occasionally the pilot has to intervene because the automation is not doing what the pilot expects.

How many times does the automation intervene because the pilot is not doing what the automation philosophy demands? It is probably under reported.

From my perspective the automation has lead to increased safety in the last decade and the odd exceptions do not invalidate this perception.

Most car enthusiasts have had to acknowledge that they can't repair an engine problem on the side of the road any longer due to the sheer amount of electronics under the bonnet (hood, for the cousins) even on my diesel Land Rover. But, you have to admit, modern cars are incredibly reliable, so it is a worthwhile trade.

That planes will fly without pilots within 20 years is indisputable. Driverless cars will come within ten years. And safety will improve.

I wondered this too. Perhaps the dust that looks to be coming from the nose as the plane pirouettes is actually coming from the nose-gear?

Hampster wheeling at max revs. Standing by for new, actual facts. Themes presently discussed can be addressed in Tech Log and Safety forums as they are now general and not specific.

Rob