Errmmm... what do most pilots do when visual reference is lost after descending below the MDA?

Separation of RH Stabilizer, and fuselage break between Sections 46 & 48 may indicate that pitch up exceeded standard procedure.

Just a thought - and from a non-pilot at that, but from looking at the Google image here Accident: Lionair B738 at Denpasar on Apr 13th 2013, landed short of runway and came to stop in sea is it possible the crew were victims of an optical illusion? With poor visibility (i.e. a downpour), might it just be possible to mistake the outer edge of the coral reef with the actual coastline further back, at least from a distance? In some photos there are clearly waves breaking at the edge of the reef, and I can imagine that once you've convinced yourself that it is the coastline, it may take time to realise your mistake. I'm not suggesting that this could be the sole cause of the accident, but wonder if it might possibly be a contributing factor?

Wait, is someone suggesting that they might have accidentally flown in to the water due to "poor visibility", through no fault of their own? God, I love the Internet.

Sure, it may have been a contributing factor, but you would hope that a professional would not continue the approach and landing once they have lost all visual references. Basic airmanship 101 which you learn back in flight school.

It is a non precision approach at published MDA of 470ft. It was a VMC by the time METAR in WADD indicated. However, I am not sure that either heavy rain on final restricted their view after the MDA caused
undershoot.

The wipers on B738 (9) gives very limited view and doesn't work well under the heavy rain.

If windsher was indicated in ATIS, then it's clear sign of TS adjacent to the airport.

The pictuere taken just after the accident shows grey rainy cloud just west of the airport assumed that there was rain maybe on the final approach path for Rwy 09.

B738 (9) has both Windshear and Predective Windshear Warnings to notify pilots and we have procedures to follow so unless intentionally ignored by the crewmembers, I would not think that this is a major factor for the accident.

I speculate that the crew reached the MDA after the VOR/DME appraoch but heavy rain on short final affect their judgement to deviate form correct path to the runway. Nither any of crew members called go-around after the successful landing could not be made due to the loss of visual with runway caused airplane to undershoot but the actual cause is unknown at the moment. I am looking forward to read the investigation report as we fly often this approach and fly the same aircraft type.

TRF4EVR, I'm suggesting no such thing. All I'm saying is that maybe it could have been a contributing factor, perhaps explaining (at least partially) why they were lower than procedure would require on the approach. And yes, the internet is a wonderful thing - you only have to look at the military aircrew threads on this forum to see descriptions of pilots mistaking roads for runways - are you going to make dismissive comments about that too?. Most of the time, this sort of thing results in nothing more than embarrassment. But most accidents have more than one cause - and a misreading of ones distance from the coastline, on its own, isn't going to cause the plane to land short. On its own. As yet, we don't know what else was going on. If visibility wasn't an issue, my suggestion is irrelevant - but if it was, why ignore the possibility that the pilots 'saw' what they expected to see - this is a common enough error. Obviously, they couldn't have carried on to intentionally 'touch down' on the reef without realising - but then we know that they'd declared an emergency anyway. If they had other issues, and the stress that would go with them, misreading their distance from the runway threshold, even if only for a few moments, might possibly help explain what occurred.

Yes, that is true. Apparently, their 'boss' decided this after a few FOs slammed their 73's tails onto the ground.

There was a thread about this somewhere on these forums but now I can't find it.

EDIT: The post I quoted has disappeared???

Having a S/O that can't operate below 5000 is one thing but an F/O , this is a problem .
F/O would be stressed enough dealing with a cpt incapacitated then to be PF and get it on the ground with no landing currency .
If some of these rumors are even %50 true then cpts who may be P2F themselves are doing every app and ldg , short sectors , over 100+ hours a month in atrocious wx .
Maybe cpt was arguing about fuel uplift before the flight ? If the whole truth comes out it will be interesting reading .

With at least 6 accidents (including several write off's) since start up, you can now understand part of the reason for the large aircraft orders :E

At least someone is thinking ahead. Perhaps the business model allows for a hull loss every year or 2 as the savings in not paying for quality training and for a competent work force far outweigh this loss. :confused:

Lion Air too big to fail ? (they hope)

Well, we Yanks aren't real good at Readin (or Ritin, or Rithmetic), but it sort of looked like you were. Apologies all around. You can maybe understand my confusion if you go back and read your original post. In any case, in my general, paltry experience, when aircraft get flown in to the firma they're either broken or the pilots are fools. I have a hard time (in my tiny septic brain) conceiving of this circumstance in which, woops, we did everything right, nothing is broken, and we're rapidly becoming submerged! But that's just me bein ole Cousin Jethro again, I suspect. Shucks!

Rain showers can, of course, be localised but I was swimming in my pool in Sanur at the time of the accident and there were a few low clouds around and perhaps local showers but nothing heavy. No thunderstorms in the vicinity. Subject to detailed met reports, I would be very surprised if Short Finals were impeded in any way by rain and/or poor visibility.

Message from the Cheif Chimp
 

Dear Colleagues,
As we heard a news that today one of our colleague got serious accident at Bali.
JT 904 / PK LKS / B 737-800 NG
Stretch : BDO-DPS
PIC : Capt. Mahlup Gozali (Local)
SIC : FO . Chirag Kalra (Indian)

Everyone onboard include active crew has been evacuate and no fatalities.
We highly appreciate with their good job and excellent professionalism.
Now we need all colleague to keep focus on your job and give service excellent to all passenger by giving a flight announcement with warm greetings. We need to keep all passenger feel safe to fly with Lion Air.
Last time kindly to remind you that always be aware of sudden windshear or any kind of weather phenomena that would result on speed drop and even worse aircraft sink especially on very short final position. Don't hesitate to put more additional thrust to disseminate this event and if abnormal thrust position reach it means the stabilized approach criteria has been breach and this is the alert for us to commence immediate GO AROUND. At this time REJECT LANDING Go Around procedure must be comply accordingly.
Finally my colleague I would like to say SAFETY IS COMES FROM OUR DICIPLINE. Always Keep alert and Have a safe flight.
God bless us.
Sincerely yours,

A miracle outcome.
 

Yesterday afternoons weather at the western end of the runway at 3.30pm was terrible. It wasn't grey, it was black, and pissing pickhandles all over the approach area. It certainly landed straight onto the water above the reef. Lucky it was a highish tide. Went out this morning to the airport reefs and there she was. In the drink with a cleanly broken back. How they ended up in this predicament is beyond me, though to not have it break up on impact is a pure miracle. Lots people don't know. What I know, the pilots were flying, they ended up in trouble, and with there butts welded shut, pulled of the perfect landing given the circumstances. Time for another book. Has anyone called Oprah?

Well, indeed a Swiming pool in Sanur is not close to the met station in the airport :
if you look at the METARs published by the AvHerald ( same link as mentioned a few post earlier) they tell a different story ;
accident occurred at 07:10 according to them
WADD 130730Z 15006KT 110V270 9999 FEW017CB SCT017 30/25 Q1007 NOSIG
So CBs were reported .
Interestingly the preceding METAR was :
WADD 130700Z 09006KT 9999 BKN017 30/26 Q1007 NOSIG
which tell you all about the validity of a NOSIG in tropical areas....

ATC Watcher, it's still NOSIG... CB does not equal TS.

Is it true that the f/o can't be PF below 5000ft? I find that insane. At my company we only have 17 737's but we have had two complete incapacitations of Captains within the last year. Both stressful for the f/o's but no major safety issue as they all fly every second sector.
If someone can confirm it is true I will be sure never to fly with them again on my leave breaks.

I'm not an air accident investigator nor am I in Bali nor am I an armchair expert like so many who come to grace these halls with their wisdom but...

Reading through all the posts and separating the innuendo and utter speculative crap from the known facts, it seems most likely that they were short on power on final, that's why they were below the glideslope and marginal for speed. Probably trying deperately to coax it to the runway, but when that was in doubt made the choice to land on the water rather than risk ploughing into the seawall.

Speculation about safety records, crew status etc is just pure pointlessness until some real facts are released by the investigation. Makes it a real pain to try and glean some sense from these threads :-(

A few other things about the WADD VOR/DME09,
On Airbus, the final waypoint on the FMS for VOR/DME rwy 09, "WADD09" is actually the missed approach point, not the threshold. If you try to fly 3x on that you will end up low as it is still a fair way (edit 1.5nm from chart below) to the actual threshold, which is normally the last waypoint on your FMS (not in this case though). I don't know if this is the same for this particular approach on a Boeing FMS.

ATC is not very forthcoming with a QNH when you first transition from FL to Alt. You often need to ask for it. This QNH will often be different tomATIS. Then on short final the tower may give you a QNH again. This often varies from the one you were given 5 minutes ago.

Winds at WADD can be 180 degrees different at both thresholds. With Light/variable winds it is not uncommon to have 5kt tailwind at both thresholds, with >5kt tailwind midfield (FMS/IAS/GS check)

The approach slope is 2.8 degrees, whilst the PAPI is 3 degrees.

The PAPIs are occasionally coated by dried salt from sea spray, this makes the reds more difficult to discern.

Lasers on approach are par for the course in WADD, however more so at night.

The waters look very warm and inviting for a swim?