jcjeant: is there a link to an English rendition of that declaration?

It's about the EASA director who would not answer questions of the judge (in charge of the AF447 case) .. citing the (his) European immunity
He finally answered after insistence of the judge
In his testimony we learn that the EASA considered only the information provided by the manufacturers without check or question
Thus incidents implicants pitot tube have been underestimated by the manufacturer
They were ignored and that at no time without the agency deems appropriate to investigate further then that is his mission
The Union notes that the testimony of the director of EASA confirms the doubts and suspicions which had already accumulated on the agency
This situation is very worrying for the institutional management of aviation safety in Europe

OCR and Google Translate
 

SNPL Roissy, May 15, 2013
France ALPA
Press release
Survey AF447: the European Agency
seriously defective air safety
The testimony of the Director of EASA shows the total absence
independence of the regulatory agency vis-à-vis manufacturers.
The SNPL France ALPA questioned since the beginning of the judicial inquiry into the role played by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in this painful case. During many months of August 2010 to April 2013, the Executive Director of the agency clung to its European immunity to avoid testifying. At the request of its board of directors and by the obstinacy of the instruction judge Zimmermann, he finally explained to justice. The SNPL France ALPA civil party had access to the evidence.
We discover that EASA has seriously failed in its duty of continuing airworthiness of aircraft considering only the information provided by the manufacturers, but never verify or challenge.
It is in this way that the incidents prior to the crash of the AF447 and precursors thereof, caused by icing of pitot probes, were underestimated by the manufacturer. They have been ignored, but that at no time the Agency considers it appropriate to investigate further, as this is where the heart of its mission.
This seems incomprehensible inversion prerogatives reduce EASA a simple transmission belt very bad quality.
The SNPL France ALPA said that in addition to finding a damning report of the Court of Auditors of the European Union in late 2012 involving the deplorable management of conflicts of interest within the EASA.
It is clear that the testimony of the director of EASA reinforces the doubts and suspicions which had already accumulated on the European Agency.
Put into perspective with the development of new FTL, in which the upper hand of airlines is well established, this situation is very worrying about the institutional management of aviation safety in Europe.
The Executive Office of SNPL France ALPA
For 1: SUV enformations. you izomys
Yves DESHAYES, President of ALPA SNPL France: 06 31 06 06 98
Carole Arnaud-BATTANDIER, Media Relations Manager SNPL France ALPA: 0686 709 702
NATIONAL UNION OF DRIVERS LINE FRANCE ALPA
AFFILIATE ACE IFALPA - SFtET N 785 743 246 0003 1 COOE APE 4420Z
Roissypéle The Dome - 5 denies the Hague-BP 19955-95733 Roissy CDG CEDEX
Tel (33) 01 49 89 24 00 - Fax (33) 01 49 89 24 10 - e-mail @ SNPL SNPL oom

What the SNPL doesn't say (important in my opinion) ..
 

If they had followed Air France procedures they wouldn't have crashed.

Through incompetence they flew a plane into a stall then into the Atlantic.
.

Thank you, jc, and thank you Mac. :ok:

Thank you, one and all!

Also....A-HA!

@toffeez:
Yes indeed, but the training was clearly deficient.

Is that an "Airbus" design or an "Industry" design, i.e. same situation or comparable airliners (Boeings, Bombardier, Embraer...) ?
This is, I think, a question that was never answered.

As Mac the Knife's translation shows, it says that EASA failed in its duty of assessing airworthiness of aircraft under its juridiction.
Sadly, it remind me of the FAA and the 787 certification (batteries...)
Could agencies do their job? They seems to have neither the competences nor the will (or power, budget...) to do so. Meanwhile, the aircraft become more complex...
Systemic issue?

AZR:
 

It is a ADIRU issue, no airliner is supposed to be capable of flying! at 60 kt or less.
ADIRU ARINC Air data output is set to AoA NCD(No Computed Data) to the subsystems (e.g. FWC) at 60 kt or less and air speed output NCD below 30 kt or less.

IIRC Boeing T7 ADIRU sets NCD <30Kt and SAARU <50 kt-

"Airbus" design offered several options like analog AoA indicators and/or BUSS (AoA output thru IR part of ADIRU i.s.o. Air Data part).

It is up to the operator(pilots?) to select such an option or not!

Link to AF BUSS

Absolutely correct. The rest of the :mad: on this thread is simply a distraction from the core issue.

They had a problem. They didn't follow the QRH. They killed their passengers and themselves....

Perhaps a little emotive or tactless to word that last sentence so, for they were not willful acts of negligence.

would ' which incompetence was the root cause of this horrific disaster' be an improvement?

With respect to you and your many followers here:

QRHs were around about 1969-72 for me (Hunter then F4). Airbus aircraft are a lot more sophisticated and, as you are doubtless aware, are not used these days.

Am I the first to admit I would have been severely challenged and, probably, overcome by the situation?

Mind you, I have only twenty years Airbus and extensive examiner experience.

What, in your opinion, is the core issue?

BEA - Final Report
So the BEA did get it wrong??

The lesson I take home from all this is that very complex systems generate very complex and confusing failure modes that software engineers and designers cannot possibly discover.

This means that:

1. Automation must never be totally trusted.

2. It must be possible for the crew to revert to basic mechanical instruments and hand fly the aircraft from first principles.

3. Modifications and upgrades are going to become a nightmare for Airbus because it is impossible to completely understand if new failure modes have been created.

I make exception for the basic fly by wire automatics, but nothing else, and if you are going to use side sticks they had better have a mechanical connection so it is patently obvious to blind freddy what control inputs are being applied.

I expect more of these type of accidents.

but simply following your points 1 and 2 could prevent a lot more happening.

or stop calling them pilots - Digital Device Programmed Anomaly Corrective Operatives - seems more appropriate these days. Pilots fly aeroplanes.

I recall a cartoon in Punch, after the first, much publicised, auto-land event, drawn by a very well known Punch cartoonist - so well known that I've forgotten his name ! - it showed a uniformed pilot in a glass cage at the back of the flight deck, with a hammer hanging on the front bearing the notice " In Case of Emergency Break the Glass "

'course - the decision than would be when to break the glass - or call the Captain back from the bunk ?

Thanks A33Zab :)

OK, and does that NCD prevent the stall warning to work, as in the A33x?

NB : This post is intended as summary only - as PJ2 says, the arguments were exhaustively played out over 11 threads in Tech Log.

@Sunfish - This was not a complex or unforeseen failure mode. Unreliable Airspeed Indication causes a drop to Alternate Law, which has no hard protections. This was well-understood by all the engineers, and if it was not communicated to line pilots, it should have been. We know Airbus sent out a bulletin describing a workaround procedure while the problematic pitot tubes were being replaced. How well this was disseminated by airlines amongst their crews is less certain, but we do know that over 30 UAS incidents occurred before AF447, and all of them were successfully resolved by their crews.

@AZR - I don't know for certain, but an educated guess says that NCD on a T7 will cause stall warning to cut out, because with no valid data, the stall warning subsystem has nothing to work with.

For Gods sake what harm could be done by linking the sidesticks so they move together?

Anyone?

@AtomKraft - see the Tech Log threads. There are several pros and cons that go both ways regarding connected versus unconnected primary flight controls.

I have read all these AF447 threads. I can only recall one airline pilot who was opposed to connected side sticks. A few thought it would make no difference to the outcome. The vast magority thought connected side sticks would have contributed to a better outcome.

This is just another generalised summary. I dont wish to infame another polarised debate.

@Cool Guys - I think you'll find that the "pro-connection" folks were the same people posting repeatedly. Additionally, I don't think it's a case of pro vs. anti - it's just that objectively there's no evidence that one is superior to the other.