Looks like a few of the hamsterwheel sub-topics are spinning again. I'd not comment but I think a few points are being missed. At the risk of making this all worse ...

MickJoeBill
1. No, I don't think A330 needs another attitude indicator. There are already three. If the flying pilot had a scan breakdown with the attitude indicators already equipped, then adding another indicator that he won't scan fixes nothing.

2. There has been ample discussion in previous threads why Mr Robert and Mr Bonin didn't call out and execute the UAS procedures of the time. Training and malfunction recognition issue.

3. As to the other two pilots not knowing what Mr Bonin was doing:

I can see how Captain Dubois had quite the challenge with catching up to what his two FO's had wrought in his absence, but it does not make sense to blame the side stick for this. To assess what the aircraft is doing, he too has to scan the performance instruments and figure out what the aircraft is doing and then give commands to get the aircraft doing what it is supposed to be doing, or at least stop what it shouldn't be doing. (Falling versus flying).

From the CVR excerpt, in re "side stick is a problem" line of thinking:

early on in the event Mr Robert mentions more than once to Mr Bonin that he was going up, and that he needed to go down. He also made mention of "according to the three you are going up." He had something of a scan going at one point.

I thus answer in objection to those who assert that the other pilot didn't know what Bonin was doing. He saw something wrong, and made an initial effort to correct the error via voice input. For whatever CRM reason involved, he was unable to persuade Bonin to resolve the error by his input. (i.e.: get the nose back down and get back on altitude!)

As I mentioned a few years ago, I would hope that a pilot assisting a flying pilot get the scan back into gear and the plane back to its correct orientation would say things like

"Nose is 15 degrees up, lower your nose."
or
"You are climbing, Descend to FL350"

or some such parameter based corrective input.

That isn't what was presented in CVR extracts as the correction style provided.

The "call the Captain" move was good: Mr Robert realized that what they were doing wasn't working, but it also indicates to me that he ran out of SA and ideas early in the game.

The common thread in the above is CRM methods and training, and a core competency of professional pilots -- Instrument flying. Blaming the side stick seems to miss basic issues of flying at night on instruments.

What is the primary reference instrument when flying in Night IMC? Proceed from there.

With respect, glenbrook ... I EDIT to add this, maybe I should not have.
That does not follow. The other two professional pilots know/knew how to interpret flight instruments. Where the nose was, per the FDR info we hashed over in numerous threads, was reflected by at least two primary attitude indicators. (And most likely all three). This from data provided by BEA.

If gums wants to explain, so much the better, but ...

How do you think, in a two seat F-16 trainer jet, the Instructor (who cannot see what the student is doing with his stick in the other part of the tandem cockpit, since it's FBW and not conventional controls), is able to correct a Student's flying errors.
He can't see the stick move, right? ;)
But he can see what the aircraft if doing, on the performance instruments. Since he knows how to fly it, he can advise the student what to do correctly.

I'll STFU now.

The loss of airspeed indications or disagreement event due to icing in the tops of cumulonimbus clouds in the tropics was very common in the Airbus A330 and A340 series prior to this accident, as many reported and many more unreported events, have shown. But why in this instance did it lead to a crash?

In essence:

1. In response to the loss of airspeed indication the RH pilot pulled the aircraft nose up...why?

2. The aircraft then zoom climbed some thousands of feet and lost flying speed to the point of stall.

3. The LH pilot did not identify this critical pitch attitude change with the consequent performance loss or correctly call or otherwise respond to it.

4. Approximately half way through the recorder trace shown above (Capn Bloggs), the Stabilizer auto-trimmed to full nose up in response to the RH pilot's aft stick commands.

5. With the subsequent control law reversion, the aircraft was then doomed to a no-stall-recovery situation with the Stabilizer stuck full up (as the Stab autotrim feature was lost with control law reversion). One of the pilots should have re-trimmed the Stabilizer sufficiently nose down with manual inputs using the pitch trim wheel to allow recovery. This did not happen...why?

I have seen similar situations many times during simulator training when teaching high-altitude jet-upset and unusual attitude recovery training modules on the Airbus series. Sometimes, intervention by the simulator instructor is required to grab the PF's hand and place it on the trim wheel to reveal (voila!) the ever so simple solution to manually retrim the stabilizer enough to to enable sufficient elevator authority for stall recovery. The trainee never forgets this lesson.

Putting aside the problems of stabilizers vs elevator authority (incidentally, problems that affect most airliners) for a moment...

...what troubles me is the question...What is deficient in Air France's Cadet and FO pilot training that allowed this situation to develop without recognition by at least one of the pilots of the power/attitude/performance incompatibility event that was consequent to the initial loss of airspeed fault?

A very sad situation and one that I hope Air France and possibly other affected Airlines will rectify...

Birgenair 301 and Northwest 6231 show that's not true.


Agreed, and nicely put.

Actually I'd say his SA always appeared pretty good, at least at first - I've always had a suspicion that like the Birgenair case, he was hesitant to intervene directly because he was unsure of his remit to do so (Dubois having left the command gradient somewhat vague). Unfortunately it's a human trait to start second-guessing yourself and allow doubt to creep in the longer one has to wait.

Well, to be more precise it was somewhat common in those airframes which had the optional Thales AA pitot tube fit (the default was still Goodrich).

No it wasn't - autotrim is still active in Alternate (2B) control law.

What came out of the industry discussion was that it wasn't just AF. The industry as a whole had become fixated on Stall Avoidance training at the expense of recognition and recovery. That's why Boeing and Airbus collaborated on new guidelines for recurrent stall training at ATPL level.

Even with that new training, I believe the wildcard is recognising and countering the phenomenon known as "Startle Response"

Hm...ten threads on AF447 in Tech Log, every question asked and point made known to man covered ad infinitum by known experts and punters alike and this is still being argued with the self-same questions and points?

If all this is about researching, learning and understanding what really happened in this tragic accident, there are ten threads, plus an excellent search tool created by one of the known experts who has contributed greatly to these threads from the beginning. At the beginning of each of the threads here, there is placed by John Tullamarine a thorough summary with links to all threads, to various documents including the 4 BEA Reports and to other bits of value).

Rather than reiterate, re-argue or regurgitate old work and old theory that has been thoroughly discussed, may I respectfully suggest that this treasure-trove of discussions be reviewed which may then trigger new insights and imaginative theories which in turn may truly shed real light on why this accident occurred and why it continues to haunt and otherwise re-inform our imaginations.

These guys didn't set out to have an accident so what explains this in a way that helps others come to terms with the very real, and tragic aspect of the human factors involved? What is the pattern that connects?

@PJ2:

Agreed. I think (at least I'm hoping) that the recent posts are simply an attempt to summarise things rather than get the hamster-wheel spinning again. I know that's the case for me!

Hi DW - yes, there is so much valuable and informed writing in those threads. Yes, it takes effort and time to research, but this isn't an idle discussion about any accident - this is a watershed event in a number of ways, some seen and predicted, many, though, not.

As just one of many observers and part-time contributors who has learnt tremendously from others, I would invite those truly interested by this accident, especially those who manage, train and / or fly transport equipment, to visit or return to those threads and read them from start to finish.

To make best sense of the threads, keep the "long line" in view. Despite meanderings and some rabbit trails, many of which are worth careful thought in themselves, there is a main "story" here and it is really worth pondering.

BTW, I have not set aside the "virtual reality" discussion! Time, and perennial commitments . . . !

Capn Bloggs;

The parameters labeled as such do seem illogical but they are labeled conventionally in flight data work, by their direct result at the point of action, so to speak. So, it isn't Nose-up, it is Tail-down, and the parameter is labeled with a "minus" value; the same is true with the THS, the sidestick parameters and so on.

Regarding the sidestick not spending much time in the NU position, by the data, the sidestick spends most of the 4 minutes from event to impact in the "minus", tail-down, (NU) position, and the elevator spends almost all its time NU:

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-GRhj...GRhjsb6-XL.jpg

mick, there is already a device available to the pilots. Under the centre pedestal, there is a big red button. If you press this, a string with a weight on the end drops from the ceiling. At the same time a small piece of chalk rolls out of a slot. The Pilot Not Flying then marks the floor under the weight's mid point of travel, and, hey presto, back in business.

Did you guys read the BEA report all the way through. I have.

Do you guys know how to recover from a stall in a transport cat jet in Alternate law at FL370??

It doesn't involve BACK STICK.

Now sod off until you are educated....

A7 really? Who cares about a 1950's carrier fighter jet in this case!!!

What caused the accident was

1/ iced Pitots
2/ the crews inability to recognize the state the aircraft was in and the fact they applied incorrect side stick inputs during the event exacerbating the problem massively.

END OF STORY FULL STOP----DEAD

Now read the report....

nitpicker330
 

Between your 1/ and 2/ there should be their failure to execute (disregard for) AFR's established procedures for Unreliable Airspeed.

Yes that would be in the detail, I just gave a broad brush summary in a nutshell...

I'm sorry but that's just wrong. The Stab autotrim feature was never lost in AF447.

Training
 

Agree with PJ and Dozy but here's my two-penneth on training;

As a PuT in '83 I was taught spin recovery. Shortly after I qualified it was removed from the syllabus and only incipient spin recovery taught, reasoning: climbing repeatedly to a safe altitude used up too much time.

Two years later as a trainee flying instructor I had to demonstrate spin recovery from the right hand seat. Somehow the sight of the ground rotating towards me ensured I never allowed an A/C to get into a situation whereby I might need that skill.

I believe it's called imprint memory.

As have I.
Wrong question. The question is: do you know how to fly a transport jet well enough to prevent stalling at FL 350 ~ 380 when you are hand flying it?
Utterly agree. I don't think anyone in this thread will disagree with you. You are preaching to the choir.
It is part of explaining how to help another pilot fix his error in flying without seeing his stick position. This is a follow on element of refuting the argument that "seeing the other guy's stick position" would have prevented this crash: gums pointed out that this is a red herring.

You agree with him.

Why the attitude? :confused:

From personal experience, knowing what a fighter pilot in another aircraft is doing with his controls by watching his aircraft bears no resemblance to this scenario. It is far easier to work what is going to happen by watching the controls first. There is no way the PM could have known what the PF was doing with his stick by watching the motion of the aircraft; all he would have been able to see was rapid rolling and pitching with the stall warning blaring on and off. A 200+ tonne, totally stalled airliner does not behave or react like your standard fighter being flown at normal speeds and it is naive to think that the other crew members could ascertain the PF's control inputs with any degree of confidence.

I have no doubt that if AF447 had had conventional control columns, there would have been much better SA amoungst the crew, which includes the captain when he re-appeared, about what was actually being done on the flight controls and so the possibility that one or the other would have taken over much earlier or at least increased the intensity of criticism.

Captain Bloggs, with due regard to your experiences, the performance problem began well before stall, in terms of aircraft performance and sustained pitch error. I think you switched topics in the middle of your point there. Correcting the initial pitch error, and the 3000 foot altitude error is well within reason using performance instruments to detect and call for correction of a flying out of desired parameters.

To address the second part, post stall pitch error: once again, the performance seen by the PM would again be manifested by what was displayed on the attitude indicator. (Based on the report identifying the pitch at various times via the FDR data). Granted, since neither seems to have registered "we are stalled" and latched on to "hmm, nose up, yet we are falling" as an indicator of that condition, any error correction for what is an untrained (recover from actual stall) flight condition relies on putting a number of pieces of the puzzle together. That didn't occur for whatever reason. If you feel lack of seeing the flight control position contributed to that, OK, I'll stop arguing, since most of what I flew was conventional controls, not FBW.

In defense of the PM, and in support of your point, once stalled:

the lack of confidence in airspeed display and possiblly lack of training in stall recovery (rather than the stall prevention) puts the PM behind the aircraft, catching up, and in a night/IMC stall recovery situation that the PF has put him into, and that their collective CRM mis-steps have allowed to happen. The errors are crew errors, not just PF errors.

As PM, even when he realized he is over his head and called the captain, isn't his attitude indicator still showing him pitch errors?

"Lower your nose. Your pitch is too high."
Those are inputs/commands used to advise a PF to correct a pitch error. Even if you don't know what the other stick is doing, you can see what is wrong with the pitch and call for a correction. Is that not pretty basic CRM?

The related topic in re your second point -- why the audio stall warning (a secondary indication of pitch still being wrong) was apparently not factored into his correction inputs to the PF. My original guess was that A/S being whack (both seem to have acknowledged that) leads either or both pilots in the seat discounting mentally a stall warning as spurious ... again, I am guessing on that, but it does fit the SA problem. It gets compounded when they report to the Captain when he arrives. Seems to have provided a bit of misdirection as he tried to make sense of what they were doing, or not doing.

Fair enough but... What input would be required for the stab to start trimming forward? Does the stick need to be put in a sustained foward position for a set amount of time or amount to get the stab to start trimming nose down?

It was a nice design touch to make life easy when everything is going normally, but when the sh1t hits the fan, the first thing that is forgotten is...the thing that you never touch in normal operation. Great idea that...

I wonder, had there been no autotrim, if the PF would have manually trimmed all the way back into the stall... I somehow doubt it.

What's not true? The CVRs indicate that the PNFs may well have been basing their comments on that they saw the control column doing.

Read page 30 and 31 of the CVR transcript of 447. It's pretty obvious there was confusion ("Get the wings horizontal", "I’m at the limit… with the roll"; "Climb climb climb climb", "But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while") that would not have existed had the PNF and captain been able to see the "control columns" moving in unison.

john_smith said:
John, I see that this misapprehension has been roundly ignored, probably because it was covered at length in the old threads. So I'll jump in, since I remember it and I wanna make myself useful around here.

What the OP is likely referring to is that, in NORMAL LAW and @ TAKEOFF, this was the published the Airbus procedure, and was taught thus. Please correct me if I'm wrong, everybody.

Not as a 'correct response to stall', or was it?