agreed.

Hi Lyman,

Do not forget the transient part of the response of the dynamic system.
Airbus is silent on this subject :E and speaks only of the steady state (edit : for memory, if the system is not stable it is never steady...).
In the case of an oscillation, we lack the essentials...:}

As pilots are ignorant of automation they get only a shared information of the limits of the envelop.

We shall have PIO on any axes on any aircraft so long that we decide to ignore the transient part of the response of dynamic systems :ouch: , or let it only in the office on ground :\.

No - even on the later FBW models, the rudder is independent from the systems that govern thrust and PFC settings, probably because in aircraft of the low-tail, podded design it can exert too much authority. If there's a yaw aspect to the commanded flightpath then the system will use rudder trim and thrust to maintain it.

It's telling that in over two decades of FBW Airbus models in service, not once has there been an attempt to couple full rudder control into the system. This suggests a technical, rather than cost-driven, challenge to do so.

God I Trust, the rest please bring data
 

http://www.ukintpress-conferences.co...2/cusimano.pdf

Research flights with telemetry were perfromed to understand the stress on verical stabs. And specifically hard over to hard over.

It's a good read as presentations go.

My take away was that one needs be very careful what the certification test really is certifying.:ugh:

There turns out to be a very significant aerodynamic and structural stress difference between a single hard over and a hard over reversal.

"Don't do it!" please. Apparently even fighters are not designed to take that manuevering input.:E

You shouldn't be wondering. I'd suggest anyone to concentrate on what I am talking, not who I am talking to.

Those unable to take subtle hints that what they "know" about airline training is somewhat wrong.

No, you can't train for every darn eventuality in the air. I have listed just a small fraction of the airmen who were faced with unprecedented occurrences and managed to bring their steed back safely to the ground through quick and correct assessment of the situation and devising the correct solution - all of it based on their thorough knowledge of the flight in general and their machines in particular.

What AF447 crew went through has happened many times before and is bound to happen again as clogging of the pitot probes with freak ice is not sole cause of UAS. There was procedure to be followed. It wasn't. There were ways out without referring to procedure. None was followed.

There is no reason to believe that training received by AF447 crews was not typical of almost any airline. That is to say before AF447 there was no UAS training involving ALT2 in cruise. If we pinpoint this "lack of training" to be the cause of AF447 demise, how on earth are we supposed to explain that all other 330/340 crews survived the ordeal unscathed? By letting our imagination run wild and fantasizing that circumstances of other incidents were radically different from AF447 therefore proclaiming BEA's failure of explaining it at long (instead of just giving it a couple of pages in final report, without details given at press briefings and in interim 2) is cover-up?

Please, read the CVR transcript. Read it in French, if it helps you. Scan was all right, both of the pilots quickly verbalized recognition of speed indication loss. What they did afterwards is completely at odds with what they said at first.

Because autopilot failures anywhere in the world happen on hourly basis and many a pilot who started flying multi-pilot passenger aeroplanes at the tender hours of 300 or less handles it safely. Surprise, surprise.

At what wing loading?

What you are saying is at odds with NTSB. They made some tests and documented the way they reached the conclusion that fin failed above maximum design load so no weakening at all was a factor. Now, it is possible that you know something NTSB doesn't but it's hard to judge whether it's true if we are not presented with method of reaching the conclusion.

Oh, the usual entertaining stuff about folks unable to understand basic concepts of dynamic stability and APC turning to Advanced composite strength theory to compensate for their shortcomings in basic aerodynamics. Most of AA587 thread was made of it.

Should draw hrs of endless criticism.

Fatal Flight 447: Chaos in the Cockpit

8pm - 9pm
Channel 4 16/Sept

The story of what really happened on June 1, 2009, when Air France Flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris mysteriously plummeted into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 passengers and crew. It remained a mystery how one of the world's most technologically advanced planes could seemingly just drop out of the sky, until a two-year search finally located the black-box recorders. This documentary reveals what happened on board the doomed airliner as the pilots struggled to understand the catastrophe unfolding before them, and asks what lessons have been learnt from the disaster.

Channel 4.........where???

UK, OF. Let's hope they have solved the accident and Dozy and Lyman can relax..

I show NFL football....and it's not even the Jets. :}

Google sez: Only in the UK. OK then.

BOAC:
Wait a moment...Dozy thinks the crash actually happened???

:O

Ah! I had missed that....................

England, UK
and FWIW I don't think it has added anything that hasn't already been covered here.
Pilot in charge when speed readings were lost and autopilot disengaged apparently reacted immediately by pulling back into a climb, something he continued to do for a long time until control was lost. Senior pilot on break called back to cabin took too long to realise what was happening and by the time he had, there was insufficient time left to recover from the stall.
Can't understand why plane was not left to fly in level, straight flight until the pilots had worked out what was wrong. It was stated that from the noise of external airflow the crew should have realised that they were falling out of the sky fast, yet even so the pilot in charge at the time continued with nose up attitude

About that C4 programme
 

I was appalled at most of what Learmount spouted. The only valid comment he made was about the training requirements foisted upon us by bureaucratic regulatory pilots within regulatory authorities.

As for the lawyer - his arrogant comments only serve to confirm the widely held views about that profession.

C4 - I expected better! With such a great track record with C4 News I was expecting something candid, accurate, an account with a great sense of proportion and intellectual analysis. The only person to make sense in the whole programme was Tony Wride.

Disappointed

- ah - another illusion shattered.:mad:

What evidence do you have for that statement? Both NOAA and NASA state there is no evidence that such weather phenomena is on the increase.

I thought it was an excellent programme.
Even though we more or less already had been informed what happened it was still quite staggering to observe such apparent incompetence in action. It was like as if the crew had become incapacitated and some of the passengers were trying to fly it instead of a professionally trained crew.

The only failure in the programme was that it didn't mention that the slack, ill-disciplined AF flight deck culture was clearly obvious from the CVR long before the unreliable airspeed event.

The captain couldn't even acknowledge a simple position report direction correctly.... Let alone give the handover brief properly.

Air France killed 228 people in this wholly avoidable accident. Primarily because the 2 co-pilots were completely incompetent and the captain failed to exercise captaincy.



No doubt this thread's usual hillbilly gibberish will now follow.......:rolleyes:

I have not read through the whole thread so forgive me if I am repeating something.
As a lapsed PPL holder (due to lack of money) I am obviously short on experience but I can't understand a couple of things.

The aircraft lost its speed indications due to ice build up in the pitot tubes.
Don't these have heaters ? The basic PA28 that I learnt on had pitot heat.

I presume that these aeroplanes have a GPS readout, so why did they not just look at their speed on that.

I really find it hard to understand how pilots with thousands of hours when faced with a stall warner, pulls back on the stick. Isn't it just really basic stuff that if your aeroplane is in a stall situation, without hesitation, push the nose down and apply power ?

Baffled.

Bernie,

They must certainy do have heaters. Although at cruise they are flying at -56c and if mosisture/ice is present they can get overwhelmed. This happened on 447, once the a/c began losing height, the ice actually melted and atleast one of the pitots started to function again. If the crew avtually noticed this, they unfortunetly did not believe its now valid indications.

With regards to stalling. The F/O (PIC) beleived they were going too fast, and losing height, and hence started pulling back. No-one can be sure why he continued to hold the pull back once the stall warner went off. It is possible that the 2 more experience pilots were not aware that the F/O was continuing to pull back on the stick. The program said ozone was present in the cockpit, and maybe this had some incapaciting effect. Just maybe.