No use. Unlike A330, my current steed is truly deep stalling, so no stall recovery procedure for us. Just approach to stall.

Correct, which doesn't prove approach to stall recovery was nonsensical, just that in the search for simplification we now have single procedure, which is a compromise between the two.

Now I see what you meant by "control might be compromised". Could be so if trim movement is slow. However, incidents where strong pitch-power coupling caused aeroplane to pitch up seem to be either involving crews forgetting to trim (Thomsonfly at Bournemouth), trimming the wrong way (TAROM at Orly), or not realizing autotrim is no longer available (Perpignan).

EDIT:

So you are comparing 30+ cases of uneventful end of UAS to jumping with the parachute closed and survivng? What would be the single case where UAS resulted in hull loss and 228 deaths? :confused:

I can see the issue that shoving the nose down is counter- intuitive close to the ground but when you have 38,000 ft to play with it's surely worth a try when all else is confusion?

I'll try again from post #1062 - anyone?

Such particularity of the stall warning is not in the FCOM, therefore any change made to it would be most probably transparent to us.
But A33Zab would be the guy to answer the question as he seems more aware on those things.

It seems that MR Kaminski-Morrow has a clue about this matter.

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...-af447-374484/

Yes, but that was July and 'is to examine'. I guess we need A33Zab.

I think he meant "re-examine". In the biz, that means, "we"ll get back to you..."

Don't bet the rent....

CVR Transcripts
 

The PIC reportedly says that he had only one hour of sleep... getting a lot of attention.

Captain of Air France plane that crashed into Atlantic Ocean killing everyone on board was running on one hour of sleep - NY Daily News

He was probably asleep before his head hit the pillow on his rest break. No wonder it took so long to get him back into the cockpit.....

"Where is he..."

He take exactly one minute between the first call and his entry in the cockpit
Very short time in a normal situation
But seen as long time when we know the event was less than 4 minutes from the beginning to the end .. so chronometer seems to run fast ...

I think when he showed up in the cockpit it was too late. All mistakes were made and he had never seen such a mess before. Nobody deepstalls any airliner at altitude. They did. When he got there not seeing the beginning of the fiasco, he couldn't fix it.

Knowing how to fly an airplane is very important as we all know. If you are taught which buttons to push and it doesn't work you just need to go back to basic flying as always. We all did it with no problem.

More thorough treatment here: Crash du Rio-Paris, la fatigue des pilotes a été cachée - Le Point

This article notes that it took the PIC over 90 seconds to get back to the cockpit; also that the rest of the crew was not at the top of their game. However I do not know if they consulted CVR tapes of other flights on that route at that time.

Maybe if just one of the crew was on the ball, the a/c could have been saved. That said I have been right seat in a sim crash from 16,000' where the left seat rolled inverted and left it there in spite of my shouting in his ear. Maybe training should include having the PF unexpectedly do something stupid.

Even if the PNF fails to intervene in time a valuable lesson will be learned.

I can't remember the times I was so dead tired and sleeping in the bunk and needed 3 calls to get me back on earth. Especially if You are in your first (REM) sleep, You might miss a call. You cannot blame someone who is sound asleep for that.

The relief crew system is based upon the fact that all normal and abnormal issues are handled well by the crew on duty. So short term problems and that includes a circumnavigation of weather and handling erroneous indicated air speeds. If that cannot be dealt with adequately, the problem does not lie in the amount of people in the cockpit.
If as a result of some failure or situation on board deems long term decisions necessary, it is time to get the boss out.

Reminds me of an old company story from the Constellation era that the relief crew ordered the captain to be awakened as a result of an engine shut down.
When entering the cockpit and assessing the situation he got furious, and while stumbling back to his sleeping quarters he was overheard grumbling G&*^%$ wake me F&*^%$^ up when another one $%^^# shuts down".

Only one hour sleep before the flight? Check today how much sleep right before the flight the crews have had when doing the early morning return flight from Asia back to Europe after a 24hr layover. It might be 7 hours. In total for the whole heavy crew.

stall warning 'inhibit' below 60kts
 

Actually it is not - stall warning 'inhibit' below 60 kts - but an AoA NCD status (No Calculated Data) below 60 kts.

IMO this was already resolved with BUSS option:

Flight Safety #05 dd december 2007:

"In order to decrease the crew workload in case of
unreliable speed, Airbus has developed the Back-
Up Speed Scale (BUSS) that replaces the pitch
and thrust tables. The BUSS is optional on
A320/A330/A340. It is basic on A380, being part
of the ADR Monitoring functions.
This indication is based on angle of attack(AOA)
sensor information, and is therefore not affected
by erroneous pressure measurements.

The BUSS comes with a new ADIRU standard
(among other new system standards), where the
AOA information is provided through the IRs and
not through the ADRs. This enables selecting all
ADRs off without loosing the Stall Warning
Protection.
......"

Not with a direct reference to this 60 kt value but from this information AoA sensing is not thru ADR and therefore not affected by any airspeed.
(apart from stall warning reference tables which depends on Mach in Alternate/Direct and solely on S/F setting during BUSS operation)

I am not aware of other system modifications e.g. when an airliner will not opt. for the BUSS (wouldn't that be stupid?)

Latest system enhancement to the BUSS is that FPV is available when BUSS is active.

But the STALL warning stopped already passing 350 on the way down and BUSS is not to be used above 250.
Also, if the BUSS is the solution, why is it not basic, or made mandatory, for all except the 380 ?

Interesting

When will some bright manufacturer come up with a flight data "computed airspeed". We fly for thousands of hours at different heights, temps. and weights, with today's computer power it should be possible to take the raw EPR or N1 settings of the OPS Manuals, refine them with saved actual data and get a very accurate computed power setting that would make IAS almost a secondary indication of speed. Add to that the angle of attack indications and I suspect that what you would have would be comparable with today's IAS/Mach No but without the external data derived from pitot and static pressure.

That is after all what simulator systems actually do on a more basic level.

A33Zab
 

Some comments are made in the judiciary report on the BUSS and they're not that positive ... It is also said that its activation is definitive. You said otherwise here. Do you have more info ? I can't find anything in the documentation.

@ CONF
 

The AoA data connection with IR part of ADIRU (aside the normal data connection with ADR part) is definitive and doesn't need the BUSS to be selected on.
it requires also the FWC to be modified to filter and handle the IR AoA stall warning.
IIRC the highest ADR AoA is taken to trigger the stall warning and for IR AoA the median value is the one to trigger a stall warning.

For the BUSS option more related computers needs to be modified (e.g. SDAC, DMU).
A certain EIS 'CRT' mod level is also required to be able to display the BUSS image (EIS2 'LCD' is capable).

In fact you have the see both issues apart, BUSS requires the IR AoA but one can have IR AoA without the BUSS option.

@ sky9
 

as already used in GE FADEC......

In some (not all) failure cases missing parameters are replaced by database values indexed by other available parameters.
This database is populated with values experienced during normal operation of the world wide fleet.