It is easy to point fingers on others – often happening in this forum.
We all know an approach must be stabilized – there might be minor different criteria for each company, but the rule is: An approach must be stabilized.
Therefore it is actually very simple: Not stabilized = Go around.
But where is the limit?
Do we all respect the limit?
I have been thereL – one parameter (flaps) was missing, at the limit point, but my reaction was a correction and then becoming stabilized BELOW the stabilized limit. That was not good. I should have prompted a Go around.
Look at you self: Have you ever been even just slightly unstabilize without going around?
The difficult task is to realize the need for go around in the actual situation, because if we just are slightly unstabilized we might know we are able to be stabilized prior landing and then we might choose to continue as I did.
BUT!!!: If we pass the limit where is the limit then?
So if we all want to be safe – stay within limits!

The limit is not: We did not crash……

http://news.aviation-safety.net/2012/02/17/report-b737-off-runway-in-spain-following-unstabilized-approach-and-high-speed-landing/

That's why most respected Airlines have stabilized approach criteria that usually require a mandatory go around if not complied with. Also they specify the touchdown zone ( 1000' to 2000' ) and if on a field limited landing situation you must go around.

However good Airmanship,plain common sense and some aviation ability should have told these guys to go around!!:eek:

Crazy........:=

British Airways has had for over 20 years a program called SESMA.

SESMA monitors pre-set parameters e.g. unstick speed high, excessive bank below a certain height. The pre-sets are fleet specific and can be added, removed or changed. The standalone SESMA tapes are ALL automatically analysed and if a tape has any exceedances it is automatically placed aside for human analysis.

The analysis team (which includes a pilot) examine the exceedance and if, for example, it was a very windy day the exceedance cause might be obvious and the investigation binned. If they want further information the team contact the fleet SEMA rep. who in turn is the only person who can access the crew details and he will call the crew to seek that information. He cannot reveal the crew names to anyone and the chat is strictly confidential.

If the matter involves, say, a deep landing on a very long runway, the matter would be discussed with any mitigating circumstances also discussed and the matter ends but the crew will have been given some food for thought and made aware of transgression in a suitably adult and non-penal way.

If the matter is very serious the rep. would do their utmost to encourage the crew to file an ASR when the matter and crew names would then become known to the powers that be and discussion, review and suitable re-training would ensue.

In reality the crew could refuse, and it has happened, so no further action can be taken but this rarely happens. What does normally happen is the crew are aware at the time of a serious exceedance, realise it will be flagged and file an ASR immediately anyway!

BA has a very open safety culture and providing, as crew, you hold your hand up and admit a mis-judgement you may receive further training but certainly not any disciplinary action.

It may sound a little 'big brother' but the program is readily accepted by all BA pilots that I have ever known (with the anonymity safeguards as above) and I doubt any would say it has anything other than a positive effect on flight safety.

One thing it most certainly achieves is that unwelcome trends will be picked up and newletter articles as well as simulator training focus will address those trends. Fleet SESMA events (disidentified) are published and discussed leading to good fleet awareness.

I know that a some years back there was great opposition from a US airline to the introduction of a similar program, that may have changed now, and I would guess that (natural) opposition would have been based on a mistrust of how the information would be used. In BA the system has been in place for well over 20 years and is probably little known outside BA but its positive worth has been shown many times over. While not eliminating misjudgement and error it goes a long way in trying to prevent landings such as witnessed at the beginning of this thread.

A strong and effective safety culture is difficult to engender and maintain and that is without taking into account cultural and financial issues!

OFDM (operational flight data monitoring) or whichever name companies call it, is , I believe, mandatory under JAR/EASA these days, & not just a BA thing, although I believe they were certainly one of the first to introduce it.
Certainly all companies of the European persuasion I have flown for recently have it.
Wholly agree with your assessment , if used wisely & in a non-punitive way it is a major + in ensuring compliance within sensible guidelines.

You may "know" it will be OK, but the need to subsequently justify it in the cold light of day, has the desired effect of making you think twice.

Yes OFDM used a lot now - certain big loco states capture for the data (immediate after landing via mobile phone system) is circa 95% - all data to a separate (non company) agency etc.

Also, a signed letter from the CEO to all pilots a few years ago stating that if an approach was continued when stabilisation criteria not met at 500 ft agl , both pilots would be immediately suspensed pending investigations which may lead to dismissal!

The AB v Boing post was a JOKE people...... Jeezus H Christ on a bicycle.....

Hey, there are people on here who don't even understand that when the videographer said "nice landing" as the airplane ran onto the grass, he was kidding. If it doesn't have a smiley-face, they don't get it.

Maybe the pilot delayed the touchdown to give the CC member time to finish her announcement! :p

Don't judge too quick...
 

...in this frugal day and age maybe these guys also do grounds maintenance -

- no need to cut the grass now :ok:

seriously - glad no one was hurt.

Amazing.


Every time I see the video of the 737 landing in Toncontin I am squirming in my seat reaching for brake pedals that are not there. I cannot believe they got it
stopped, it says a lot for the Aeroplane.


The overrun in Spain shown a few posts back showed a similar lack of care.
I do note, like in many similar incidents the crew did not use full reverse until too late.


Another example of the negative training implications in teaching idle reverse.

Agreed, poor planning here they were lucky to get it stopped unscathed,I would expect a change of trousers at the very least here.

The "saving ones face" thing needs to be dragged into the 21st century. With the latest in smartphone technology, ones astonishingly foolish decisions (even if they resulted in zero injury or damage) can be broadcast all around the world within minutes allowing the whole world to see. To save ones own face, simply go around!

Either way in the 21st century you will be second guessed ad nauseum.

Forget about saving face, it's all about decision making under pressure and at least the professionals will understand and politely point out their opinions on alternative actions.

http://www.caap.gov.ph/images/aaiib/...c/RP-C3227.pdf

Final report is out. Not very long reading.

Great to read such an extensive report - that which can only be produced after 4.5 years of solid investigation. Well done, I highly recommend all aviators read and digest this report.

On the pax video, page 1, I didn't hear engine reverse, nor did the hand held camera suggest aggressive braking. So what were the crew thinking, and doing? There seemed a little float, but the touchdown caused a little hand shake, so maybe not an absolute greaser. After that it all seemed very relaxed until the 'oops' moment.

report link not working
 

After many attempts I still get the message
"www.caap.gov.ph’s server DNS address could not be found." from the link... does anyone have a copy of the PDF available please?
Steve

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board
Aircraft Accident Report

BASIC INFORMATION

Aircraft Registration No. : RP-C3227

Make and Model : Airbus S.A.S., A320-214

Name of Operator : Air Philippines Corp.

Date/Time of Accident : February 13, 2012 at 0233 UTC

Type of Operation : Scheduled Commercial

Phase of Operation : Landing

Type of Occurrence : Runway overrun

Place of Accident : Runway 23, Kalibo International Airport (RPVK)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At about 0233Z on Monday, February 13, 2012, Airphil Express Flight 969, an Airbus A320-214 (RP-C3227) inbound from Ninoy Aquino International Airport, overran runway 23 in fair weather conditions while landing at Kalibo International Airport. No injuries were reported among the 142 passengers and crew on board. The aircraft came to rest at a grassy portion of the stopway about 56 meters from the end of runway 23. The aircraft did not sustain significant damage.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was:

 CAUSE FACTOR

 Primary Cause Factor

a. Failure of the flight crew to discontinue the approach even though prevailing conditions suggest that a missed approach should have been more appropriate.
(Human Factor)

 Contributory Factor

a. The decision of the Pilot Flying to take runway 23 at less than 4 DME putting them at a high work load that resulted to late configuration of the aircraft. (Human Factor)

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

As a result of this investigation, the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board made the following safety recommendation:

 CAAP-FSIS to re-examine the operator’s initial and re-current pilot training program, putting strong emphasis on the importance of MISSED APPROACHES when stabilized approach and landing criteria set forth in the company’s Operations Manual are not met.




Investigation Report RP-3227 Page 1 of 1

Thanks A-M,
I was about to ask if you actually had the whole thing, then tried again, only to realise that you HAD given me the entire thing! Monumentally useless report.
Thanks anyway!

More like a negligent and incompetent report! It is a useless and pathetic attempt at 'investigation'! :rolleyes: