I read elsewhere that a flight check aircraft arrived there yesterday.

They were pretty quick doing their job because the ILS U/S NOTAM has already been canceled. The ILS is now serviceable.




The survivor testimony seems to suggest that they did not do an ILS/DME 35T circling for 17T. That would have required an increase in power to level off, and then at least two turns to get lined up 1 mile downwind where they crashed.

It does sound more like they did a straight in approach and then hit the hill. That could support the theories of them accidentally approaching on the VOR instead of the ILS.

I am still puzzled by reports that they reported 3 miles final and then hit the hill 10 minutes later.

But given that the aircraft wasn't seen until the fog bank rolled off the hill to the east, we don't really know when the accident actually occurred yet.

aterpster There is a temporary class D and temporary tower set up due to the military exercises going on in the area at the time. NOTAM below:

I hesitate to add a further two cents to this discussion but because BOAC and others have referred to my remark that pilots in the Canadian Arctic tend to 'push the envelope', all I meant was - as an example - that if one of these pilots was approaching to land at Resolute in a 737 - the manual for which specified a maximum allowable tailwind of 10 knots for landing - and was advised to expect a tailwind of 13 knots, he would have no hesitation in landing.
Some pilots push harder. I've landed on a remote gravel strip in a Twin Otter on big wheels in a crosswind gusting up to 37 knots but that was with a highly experienced, highly skilled bush pilot at the controls, who knew his limits and knew exactly what he was doing. That was an exceptional case of 'pushing the envelope' and by no means representative of Canadian Arctic aviating.
I will now hold my peace and wait for the NTSB report.

I certainly hope the pilots were on the correct frequency but if they had tuned the VOR instead of the ILS, and then decided to changed to a LOC-only instead of an ILS approach when they couldn't get a G/S signal, that should have set off alarm bells in their heads. I can only say that if it happened in future to any of us flying IMC, we should not hesitate to initiate a go-around immediately.

It still does not explain why they might have ignored an anomaly on the ADF if the NDB was tuned. The frequencies tuned will be the most important aspect in resolving this most puzzling accident. I do hope the preliminary investigation report will be released soon.

Instrument transfer switch
 

Some B737-200 Gravel equiped AC of that vintage had instrument transfer capability. it will be interesting to know the position of that switch and the frequency of nav 1 and nav2.

737 reported down in Canada
 

ROCKHOUND

I hear you!

I remember, thirty-six plus years ago (can't believe I said that) sitting on the ramp in Resolute waiting for Aeradio to allow me on to the runway (wintertime . . . ya, dark). There was a PWA Herc on final so I had to wait (you probably remember PWA Stretch-Hercs?). Blowing snow conditions were at best "marginal". I heard the Herc call "down" on the radio. I saw blasts of snow go by in front of me. Couldn't really tell it was an A/C until they passed me on the (very short) taxi. These folks were in/out a couple of times a day . . . and we made a point of keeping everything on the A/P as much the same as we could. I dare say that the "regular scheduled" jockeys anywhere are surprised by sudden changes in the topography and such? And ya, I do remember landing on the tundra in the middle of nowhere . . . always in daylight . . . and after a few low passes to check it out. Also however, never in anything bigger than a DC-3 . . . when your stall speed is like 50 MPH it make a BIG difference!

I do wonder if the recent decommissioning of the RU/Martyr NDB (2.1 N.M. on centreline and before threshold) didn't remove a possible chance for this flight to realize their deviation.


REVERSEFLIGHT

F.Y.I. The locator NDB (2.1 N.M. on centreline and before threshold) . . . which I assume you are referring to, was recently decommissioned by Canada’s privately owned air navigational operator . . . I can only assume it was for a cost savings initiative? The only remaining NDB is the YRB (RB) which is located 1.5 N.M. past the stop-end of the ILS runway approach of 35T.

hartly:


Interesting point. The 727s I flew of the same vintage had those transfer switches. I understand they were a customer option that my airline ordered. Those switches in the 727 were very rigid and took deliberate action to move. I doubt a crash where the panel survives mostly intact would disturb the crash postion of those switches.

Are these the infamous "Killer switches" to the side of the MCP as shown here?

geoheath...

I remember the CP 737 incident very well. And I also remember a (US registered) Piper Seneca that descended directly into the YXS VOR (on Tabor Mt, as you say) while on approach a few years prior to the 737 incident. He too thought he was on final for rwy 33, but in his case the mistake was fatal.

Beechnut:

In that case the temporary tower could have issued circle to land instructions.

I wonder if temporary towers have recorders? Those could provide a wealth of information independent of the airplane's recorders.

There are TWO NOTAMS regarding Class D airspace at CYRB. The first one only established a Control Zone. The second NOTAM established a Military Terminal Control Area with Tower, Ground, Terminal Control, etc.

You can have a Class D Control Zone without a tower. I believe the Temporary Tower was only fully operational during the period of the second NOTAM which began Aug 22.

While the Temporary Tower Facilities may have been in place at the time of the accident, I bet they were only giving advisories. This would possibly explain how the Borek flight was able to do an approach while First Air was still un-accounted for.

110102 CYRB RESULUTE BAY
CYRB DAH IS AMENDED AS FLW:
CLASS D RESOLUTE CTL ZONE IS ESTABLISHED AS FLW:
THE AIRSPACE WITHIN 10 NM RADIUS 744301N 945810W
SFC TO 6000 FT MSL. FOR OPS NANOOK
1108101300 TIL 1108280100


110124 CYRB RESOLUTE BAY
CYRB DAH IS AMENDED AS FLW:
CLASS D RESOLUTE MTCA IS ESTABLISHED AS FLW:
THE AIRSPACE WITHIN 80 NM RADIUS 744301N 945810W
700 FT AGL TO FL200. FOR OPS NANOOK.
FREQ FOR OPS NANOOK:
RESOLUTE TML: 228.5000 MHZ
: 123.075 MHZ
GLOWWORM(MIL PAR): 243.4000 MHZ
: 128.850 MHZ
RESOLUTE TWR: 236.5 MHZ
: 122.1 MHZ
RESOLUTE GND: 122.6 MHZ
: 149.15 MHZ
1108221200 TIL 1108280100

Are these the infamous "Killer switches" to the side of the MCP as shown here?


In the 737-200 that we used to operate these switches were on the overhead panel. Not killer switches, but had to be used with caution.

Further to what Lost in Saigon just said (he must type faster and probably wasn't eating his lunch at the same time), Resolute Bay is in Northern Domestic Airspace and the closest controlled airspace is normally overhead at FL270. The first NOTAM created a Class D Control Zone but since there isn't an operating control tower, it automatically reverts to Class E airspace. The only operational impact this has is to increase the VFR Weather Minima within the zone. The MTCA, control tower and radar were not due to be operational until 3 days after this accident occurred. So on that day, the flight would have been cleared out of controlled airspace as it descended below FL270 and would have just needed to report intentions and postion as required for operating in the Mandatory Frequency (MF) area. No positive or radar control would have been available on the approach.
Canadian AIM - Airspace

If I recall correctly from the investigation report at the time, the Canadian Airlines airplane that had the close call with Tabor Mountain was also equipped with those nav transfer switches. The crew that was flying it were unfamiliar with this feature as they had only flown 737s that were not so equipped prior to the CP - PWA merger. There was no documentation of the differences provided to the pilots until after that incident occurred. If the crew really were fired, then an injustice was done, IMHO.

J.O.

Your recollection of the circumstances and the report (re CP and descending on the VOR instead of the localizer) is spot on re the switches. And yes the crew were fired, and yes an injustice was done.

RESA, thanks for your comment. I was in fact referring to the existing NDB RB (freq 350) on the extended centreline track of 347M at the northern end of R35T. Good airmanship would dictate this to be tuned on the ADF for better SA but the report will indicate whether that was the case.

- far more to the point it is part of the procedure! However, I suspect that at those latitudes determining you were a few degrees off a QDM would be very difficult.

As a part of the missed approach profile, I would think the NDB 'relative' bearing would be something I would incorporate in my overall assessment of how things were proceeding.

edit: although with any east crosswind component you get the same effect on relative bearing.