Most of us who fly it, know the 737 can stop on occasion in under 1000 metres if you try hard, so I agree with andrasz about the most probable areas to be looking. As safety pilot I would be asking:
. did they use flaps 40
. was autobrake 3 or max selected
. was speed within limits, with appropriate vref
. was the approach fully stable
. did they touch down firmly in the touchdown zone
. did they immediately select full reverse
. was there any premature use of the steering tiller
Going around when it is still possible is with hindsight normally the best option and strongly recommended everywhere, but still pretty rare. Fortunately nobody got hurt on this occasion. But there have been quite a few 737 overruns with perfectly serviceable aircraft recently and the Air India Express accident demonstrates what can happen in the worst case. If we all decided we could not land on wet 2000 metre runways we would be out of a job pretty quick!

With reference to post #45, judging Lon More's linked photograph: this aircraft departed nowhere near the end of runway 22 but rather beyond the halfway point at or near the intersection of the third taxiway (one intersection farther than the old perpendicular runway which is the second intersection out of a total of four along rwy 22). If you'll notice the hangar in the background, that is KLM Hangar 14, approximately 1/3 along rwy 22's length. If the aircraft departed at the end of rwy 22, Hangar 14 would not have been in the picture when taken from this angle. Perhaps this was an attempt to turn on to this taxiway which, for whatever reason, left them digging in the dirt?

Rgds,

Green-dot

- apologies for joining the fray late, but 2000m is nowhere near enough for a 737-400 with poor braking action. It would use all of that - and about 4-10m more, I would guess.:) Have we had any BA reports on the thread?

I cannot fathom how people are quoting "3310ft " etc for this landing. Piltdown man asked for an LDA a while back - no-one has answered. It is certainly in excess of 2000m with 'poor' BA. You just cannot do it, even at F40 and full reverse. I would hazard two guesses:
1) Either the crew did not plan for a 'poor' BA
2) The crew did not know about a 'poor' BA

The fact that the Captain is reported to be 'angry' points me at 2)

EDIT: Thanks to Green-dot I now wish to reserve judgement - I had a nagging question about the 'exit point' before.

Mountain Bear re#43, (my #42); this is not so much ‘muddled thinking’ as poor or incomplete communication with my use of the word ‘outcome’.
I was referring to the severity of an unacceptable outcome; and 12 ft beyond the end of a paved surface (or even off the side) is an unacceptable outcome for whatever reason.

Re ‘… negative outcomes are important …’ My view involves both negative and positive outcomes.
Negative outcomes, accidents and incidents, are rare events usually involving several contributing factors, amalgamated and triggered by circumstance, and often human behaviour is a central element. These aspects are investigated and the industry has to apply the lessons to be learnt to a wider range of operations.

The positive outcomes are the everyday successes of operations where humans contribute to safety. These operations contain much more information about how safety is achieved. Unfortunately this information is rarely gathered and analysed, reducing the availability of the lessons to be learnt. However, individuals and crews can reflect on their performance and learn from ‘good’ or ‘not so good’ performance in daily operations by debriefing and thus reconsidering their behaviour.
------ ------ ------
A positive aspect of the statistics of runway excursion accidents is that there are relatively few fatalities with respect to other scenarios. Whilst this is good news for some of areas of operations and airport design, it often hides the actual risks and reasoning involved. This is not helped by using safety statistics based solely on fatalities which may have evolved from the public (human) interest which directs the general perception of safety.

Unfortunately modern media focuses on the sensational; this aspect has evolved with culture and technology, and possibly reflects a poor understanding of aviation operations.
We have to live with this and where possible ‘manage’ it. Remember, public perception can be swayed by media sensationalism and our industry might suffer the result (recall the turboprop ‘vendetta’ in the 1990s).
Many threads in this forum offer good advice – don’t feed the trolls, but the media are not trolls (some sciolists, maybe). The attention seekers will wane – get use to it, the others require education, knowledge, awareness, - an explanation of the operational context – an understanding of our (industry’s) point of view.

Public forums such as Pprune offer a unique opportunity to demonstrate how safe and successful our industry is, but to maintain this position we need to provide balanced and well judged view of events and occurrences, most of which we may not understand due to lack of fact.
This requires all of us to consider our perceptions of events carefully, to think about what we know (or don’t know), and how or why we apply these thoughts – biases or false belief.
Thus, everything we should be doing ourselves, and would wish for the media (education, awareness, and application), probably applies to us in daily flight operations, less we over-sensationalise our capabilities as operators.

Re posts 65 and 66; one of the newspapers mentioned a Schiphol spokeswoman as stating that it was not a landing incident but a taxiing incident. It seemed like a bit of journalese at the time so I didn't mention it but maybe it's closer to the mark than I thought

Poor braking action
 

The runway was most likely wet. With normal runway maintenance in place this would mean a braking action of good in Boeing terms. Poor braking action in Boeing terms means an icy runway.

previous post suggest RWY22 is used rarely but is an option when conditions are suitable and some pilots have landed when a strong S/W wind blowing.

021725Z 14007KT 110V170 3200 RADZ FEW003 SCT005 BKN007 16/15 Q1007 RERADZ BECMG 6000=
021655Z 14009KT 2500 DZ FEW004 SCT007 BKN011 16/15 Q1007 REDZ TEMPO BKN007
021625Z 13009KT 100V160 4500 DZ FEW006 BKN011 BKN025 16/15 Q1007 TEMPO 2500 BKN008=

Wind for RWY22 is 80o off the nose and with 110V170 could have given a tailwind.
Wind for RWY18R/C is 40o off the nose with no chance of tailwind.
Ok so its operational but posts suggest 'when conditions are suitable' RWY22 is used. So what makes the use of RWY22 more suitable than RWY18R/C which is used frequently. METAR reports before this time and perhaps when the crew got a report suggest the weather was a little better than at the time the A/C approached the runway. Now bear in mind a cloud base of 300FT or below makes RWY22 unusable as its not CATII rated due to lighting (no centreline lighting). So now RWY22 is on operating limits at the time of landing - 1705Z. I ask again given the amount of runways avaliable in those conditions - why would conditions be suitable for the use of RWY22?

- decurion -we obviously have different interpretations of 'good' braking action? I'll stick with mine, if that is ok?

puzzled by '300ft'/'CATII' where on earth do you get that from?

22 well within cloud/wind and vis limits, BA permitting - it is, of course, possible the crew elected to use it to avoid the cross-country taxy from The Hague

I didnt mean to suggest 300ft is CATII, RWY22 is not CATII.
plate 10-1P1 (general) Schiphol. LVP Low visibility proc are in force with cloudbase = to or less than 300FT. Phases A & B LVP dictate a CATII landing which if you look at the plates for Schiphol, RWY22 is not certified for CATII landings which I believe is due to the absence of certain lighting. (Centre line). You will not find CATII plate for rwy22.
Yes wind is within limits - a 4 knot tailwind is within limits but if you had a choice of good runways to use and better judging by the wind, why would airport use 22.

Potcake - I can see no mention of a CATII requirement for LVP A. Can you give me the page reference please? It seems odd, does it not, that the DH is 200ft when you are saying you cannot use it below 300ft?

My mistake LVP are in force with CB 300FT or below (you can see that from the plate), however you can continue until 200ft DA if stable and visual. As low visibility proc's dont necessary mean you are into CATII - so in this case effectively you can proceed down another 100ft, but its still pretty tight and I think the origional point I was trying to raise is of all the Runways to use in Schiphol its strange to choose this one. Some people were suggesting when conditions are suitable, but infact conditions were more favourable for the lenghty Runways 18C or 18R. Ive operated into Schiphol many times and had RWY22 once - also with a strong SW wind but this was not the case here.

Braking action
 

There is a lot of confusion about braking action amongst pilots and others. There are activities underway that will hopefully solve these problems (TALPA ARC initiative). If you maintain a runway to the friction levels cited by ICAO, a wet runway will perform like braking action good as defined in the QRH. I know that AMS does runway maintenance friction tests. Braking action poor typically occurs on wet melting ice runways and during special cases like revered rubber hydroplaning. Under normal hydroplaning you will have very low friction levels only at the higher speeds above the full dynamic hydroplaning speed.

Check out the following presentation: http://www.pilots.or.kr/upfile/aip/9AAAA_StoppingonSlipperyRwys2.ppt

Potcake, I am afraid your perception of LVP and CatII is wrong.

4 pages but we don't really know what actually happened, never mind why.

Well, with my 'armchair quarterback' baseball hat firmly put backwards on my head, and armed with Green-dot's post, I feel pretty sure that I can guess what 'happened', and I would say on that basis there are lessons to be learned by Corendon and the crew, and the only thing hurt, fortunately, was pride, company image and budget.

As they say "Not a single Corendon passenger was harmed in the making of this production".

No, I'm not going to 'publish' my 'findings'.:) I suspect most 'professionals' could guess too.

Nice one, BOAC :ok:

Something similar happened in BUD a couple of years ago to a 73', they were asked to vacate runway asap with following a/c on short final, made the 90 deg turnoff at the rwy end at a tad higher speed than normal, forgetting in the process that the piano keys are slippery when wet...

I know what happend! they landed too far in the touchdown zone like a lot of 737 drivers do

babe - have you read the thread - it says not?.

Do we know by now which way the a/c went off the rwy? I mean there are three ways to go off at the piano keys and many other before you even get there.

Read green-dot #65 and look at the pics?