Just to clarify a point about the Monitored Approach.
The technique, as developed by BEA, is extremely useful in aircraft which do not have autoland. IMHO it is less advantageous on those which have a good auto-coupled and/or autoland capability.
One spin-off is that, until the sector pilot takes control, (s)he is doing the RT and does not have to refer to the other pilot for a decision. As a company SOP it works well.
Once had a captain who joined us from a subsiduary and, like some posters here, was determined to demonstrate how wrong BEA was by flying his own approach on a dark and dirty night. He totally screwed it up and burst all the maingear tyres. Before anyone asks what the FO was doing, I warned him and he still continued. I've given that one some thought and really, the only other thing I could have done with this nitwit was to physically fight him for control and that seemed to be the greater of the two weevils.

I've flown six different SOPs and can't get worked up about the detail. As a chief pilot dear to some on another forum said: "Just do it!" . . and thereafter was known as JDI.
Others get paid to argue over the Flying Manual detail so why bother?


ExSp33db1rd,
OK, sorry you had to get the monitored approach which wasn't your SOP but, in exchange, we had to stop using intercom and shout at each other which is probably why my hearing's nearly as bad as that of an ex Shack crewman I was shouting to last week :)

Let's not get too bogged down in who's SOPs are better than others, with regards to monitored approaches etc. I think the important thing is that everyone is singing from the same hymn sheet, and secondly the right hymn sheet.

BA (BEA really) brought in the monitored approach after a nasty accident, involving a CAT 1 break out, with the pilot doing it all himself. It's a very hard thing to do, to go off instruments, and transition visually at 200 odd feet, in lousy weather, unless you're 411a of course.....

The monitored approach is less relevant now, as most aircraft and airports are more sophisticated, when bad weather hits, but I believe BA still thinks it has relevance, as regardless of the conditions, both pilots are more involved in the outcome of the approach - one briefs the other on how it should be flown, and then a discussion about potential threats might well develop, even from the lowliest low timer. Of course, 411a no doubt just informs his lackey what is required of him, and the outcome is always a complete success, due to his pure brilliance. The rest of us are happy to listen to any points made by other people, and act on them if necessary.

None of this detracts from the captain's overall responsibility for the flight - something 411a appears to cling to with terrified determination, afraid to let his FO drive the aeroplane, even when on the ground. As mentioned earlier in this thread, the captains who intervene on the most trivial of issues, are usually the under confident ones, or incompetent ones. I wonder which category Tristar Warrior falls into?!

Incidentally, I did an intersection departure from an Italian airport today. The alternative was a 400m backtrack, thus, further delaying my passengers, whilst waiting for someone else to land. What a foolhardy bozo am I.......:hmm: I fly to Jersey regularly, which is shorter than any intersection available to me at LGW. Should I never take an intersection at LGW, or demand Jersey build a bigger runway, else I'm not taking off.:ugh: Be practical people.

This is all a bit of thread creep. I'm pretty sure the incident above did not happen due to BA "giving sectors" to FOs - the captain is still supervising, and I'm sure it didn't because the FO was taxiing. In most modern airlines, you are team, and whilst someone is still in charge, everyone else from the dispatcher to engineers to cabin crew have safety critical responsibilities.

The "why" is more important, so that everyone else learns (apart from 411a, who knows everything anyway). So, is it how/why did it happen, let's look into it and learn from it, or the 411a answer - 3200 BA pilots are all "bozos", poorly trained, with ingrained personality defects? That is almost half of all British commercial pilots BTW......

I particularly like the emphasis on co-pilot. I would agree with with you, if the first officer was a monkey, simply there to do as he was told (tellingly obvious, in the position of the gear lever, flap lever, and speedbrake lever in Boeings), but the World has moved on from "Atlantic Barons", and monkeys in the RHS, as Boeing intended. We have First Officers and Captains in BA, and either will act as co-pilot on a day to day basis. This does not detract from the Captain being in charge one iota - at least, not my flights.

And this is priceless:

Gee, thanks for your magnanimity, 411a, but I somehow doubt you'll be at the centre of any BA investigation, or involved in any subsequent disciplinary or training matters. I'm sure we'll manage fine without you. We'll all learn from it, but clearly you won't - there's nothing for you to learn, after all, is there?

Slickster

Good post. You said all I would have wanted to say.

regards

BBK

Not very much, no....especially from still wet behind the ears co-pilots.:E

Might I urge retirement in that case?

At least that way your arrogance won't be a factor in an accident.

For some reason, I know not why, I'm reminded of the Jasper Carrott one-liner about the elderly motorist who "had never had an accident but seen thousands".

Negative, still have work to do, training new Captains.:)

Speaking with my moderators hat off....

I've worked for several years to BA's SOP's. Prior to that, I worked in the PF/PNF environment. Both work admirably well. If anything, BA is one of the few airlines that empowers copilots, unlike others that neuter them. That leads, in my experience, to a more rounded level of command; we can all make mistakes, we can all learn. Couple that with a learning, no-blame, open culture, and you see this incident, which was not picked up by any monitoring system, but revealed and owned up to by the operating crew. After all, if they'd STFU'd, then nothing would probably ever have come out.

I would rather work within THAT culture, than any other. That is perhaps the hidden message behind this; they screwed up, they got away with it, they owned up. In a culture where the Captain is God, would this have been revealed? Given such a culture, how do you then continue in the same manner when found so wanting?

I am having trouble recognising the stereotype image of BA and BA Captains perpetrated here by 411A. I certainly flew with commanders with the attitude he describes, however, unfortunately, it was in my previous company. BA is far more relaxed and open in all manners whilst still maintaining a very professional operation, than people realise from the outside.

The word on the street is that all BA fleets are to be fitted with the system that tells you how much runway you have available, and warns if it less than acceptable. Is that not a fair and reasonable outcome from an incident where there was a mistake made, owned up-to within the positive safety culture, and lessons learned by all? To limit this discussion to the merits or demerits of empowering FO's or having a monitored approach system in place is missing the main point. I'd rather have the culture I work within, though some who prefer to rule-the-roost OPENLY may differ with that preference.

Squid

Oddly enough, BA was one of the first to have this equipment, long ago...and yes, on L1011 aircraft.
Having used it at other airlines (leased BA aircraft) it worked just fine, thank you....IF operated and set properly, for each takeoff.
Many times..a very big IF.

4!!A, I think you'll find it now works from an independent GPS feed, therefore not reliant on any prior input, but that is a good point.

Out of curiosity 411a are you talking about the GRM?

I believe so, yes...the correct term.
As I recall, it worked very well, indeed.

One of my 'co-pilot' colleagues was once flying with one of BOAC's North Atlantic Barons, a breed apart, and after three calls - inserting the word Sir, but without first being spoken to ! - that the speed on short finals was low and dropping, finally advanced the throttles.

After landing said N.Atl B. said " MR xxxx, if you ever touch MY throttles again they will be the last throttles you touch in BOAC. "

Them were the days ! ( are you listening, 411A ? )

names witheld to protect the innocent.

If you think it's difficult to line up at the wrong intersection, how about the closed but parallel RUNWAY, as happened to a well known S.E.airline with a previously good safety record and flight deck culture ( I worked for them ! ) at Taipei one dark and dirty night. ( and Lexington, of course )

We can all make mistakes and to deny that possibility is sheer folly.

411a: The GRM ( ground roll monitor) was only ever used in 'British Airways' by one of its predecessor airlines, BEA ( British European Airways). BEA took delivery of the L1011 2 years ahead of the merger with BOAC, (this merger creating British Airways.)
BEA had pioneered autoland operations with the DH121 Trident many years before, using a triplex autopilot system. Many of the features of that system were incorporated directly onto the L1011, although moving to a 'dual-dual' autopilot system, rather than triplex. BEA were keen to maintain their lead in low vis operations with the L1011 and were intending to work towards CAT3C regularity, i.e operating in virtually zero visibility. The GRM was designed to get the aircraft from the gate to the runway by a strictly defined route at a limited number of airfields, via distance run and heading information. We used to practise the technique in good visibilty and occasionally as a back up in CAT 2/3 conditions. It was never fully operationally approved and the ideal of CAT3C was dropped as being completely impractical at a time when there was no airfield ground movement radar and because fire services would never find you in an emergency. Also, the general environmental clean up in the UK post 60's meant that the UK rarely went below 100m vis, at worst, from mid 70's on. It used to go below 50m in the smoggy old days.
The GRM was an interesting toy, but would never have had a use at basic airfields in the Caribbean in preventing an erroneous line up. The GRM preload data would not have been available.
The GRM never provided information on the takeoff run available, it was just a tool to get you to the correct runway threshold.
The best technology available to pilots to prevent these erroneous line-ups is now the active airfield map in the electronic flight bag.. Its the newest kit on the latest B777s.

All very interesting, however...I never worked for BOAC/BEA/BA, so, does not apply.;)

'Oddly enough, BA was one of the first to have this equipment, long ago...and yes, on L1011 aircraft.
Having used it at other airlines (leased BA aircraft) it worked just fine, thank you....IF operated and set properly, for each takeoff.
Many times..a very big IF'




' Quote:
Out of curiosity 411a are you talking about the GRM?



I believe so, yes...the correct term.
As I recall, it worked very well, indeed'



'The GRM never provided information on the takeoff run available, it was just a tool to get you to the correct runway threshold.
The best technology available to pilots to prevent these erroneous line-ups is now the active airfield map in the electronic flight bag.. Its the newest kit on the latest B777s'





( are you listening, 411A ? )

All very interesting, however...I never worked for BOAC/BEA/BA, so, does not apply'





Oh dear another case in which 411a seems not to know what he is talking about. The BS flag has been well and truly raised on you here old chap.



His schizophrenic views on his First Officers are well known here as are increasingly, his ignorance of anything other than the L1011 and whatever third world country he is buzzing around in these days :p

Poor 'ole stilton, his reading comprehension has gone south, once again.:rolleyes:
777fly.
We used it for distance remaining during the takeoff roll, seemed to work OK for us.

Prior to BA I worked for a UK Charter outfit that had the man and dog approach to the Flight Deck. The usual stuff, FO never taxis, never makes a fuel decision, never handles the thrust levers on take off, right down to having to ask for the captain to deploy the spoilers on his behalf. As I say, man and dog... not unsurprisingly they had a huge chop rate on command courses.

On my initial conversion into BA, on the 747-100/200 on about detail four the instructor stops the sim, turns up the lights, leans forward and says to me.. "do you not like your sim partner?" A little confused, I replied that we got on just fine, and had survived the carrel together, so no conflict at all. He then asked, "then why do you not help him? you can see what he needs... give it to him." My reply was that he had not asked for it, so I would not dream of doing anything unless asked first." The trainer replied... "That is not how we do things here in BA. We work as a team, and if you can see he needs help, or a frequency, or whatever, you help him." With that out the way, I realised I had arrived into a very different world.

BA expects a FO to make decisions, run the sector, own the sector if you will. BA assumes that an FO is an adult, and a Captain in waiting. The buck always stops in the left hand seat, as ever. However because of this Captains need to step up to the plate. It requires line captains to have the ability and capacity to supervise, and teach, and pass on attained knowledge.

It makes for a happier, more adult, and ultimately it makes for a much safer operation.

My vision of the First Officer was first created in the Mercantile Marine where the First Mate runs the ship on behalf of the captain. His is an important and respected appointment.
It was a vision which, upon arrival in the world of aviation, required rapid and drastic revision.

Why certainly.

Let's see...
1. Continual role reversal on the FD, IE, non-standardized duties at a critical time, whilst entering the runway.

2. The 'oh, let's all be friends' attitude that seems to permeate the BA flight deck culture, such as it is.

3. Quite possibly the presence of a non-authorized crew member on the FD at the time of this incident (which could well have been a very serious accident, as most would agree) leading to distraction of the FD crew at rather critical time IE: entering the runway prior to takeoff.

4. Poor signage at the affected airport, a definite airport management liability.

From the above list, we can clearly see several major deficiencies in the way BA manages their FD operations, and last but not least, improper/incomplete survey of intended destination airports, to ascertain the quite obvious runway/taxiway signage deficiency problem.

In conclusion, clearly to an outside observer, BA urgently needs to reorganise their FD operations policies, and further, to remedy the other deficiencies noted.

And yet, we have some contributors here who proudly proclaim that 'the BA way is the only way' and 'our policies are the best in the business' etc.

As British Airways has been, to date, the only airline to have crashed a B777, one wonders if they are trying to enter the record books as the only airline to do so...multiple times.