"Punishing people for making mistakes doesn't stop mistakes being made, it just stops people telling you about them."

Bingo. Score a big one for ASAP.

The point raised in #250 is valid and well worth considering.
In the mid 1990's an RAF C-130 (heavy) was mid taxi towards the active when the Loadmaster comes up on the intercom and requests they return to the stand. When challenged why, he honestly could not give a definite reason, he had checked the W+B calcs and "on paper" all was well. However, to this aviator the palletised load just ”did not look right"........
Thankfully, his highly professional capt took him at his word and went back to sort out whatever was "the problem" Cue lots of ****e from ops and the movers in particular as he had dared to challenge a fairly large empire, but he stood his ground.
After an independent W+B recheck, the ac was 40 index units out of trim (fwd) with a corresponding MAC of about 9% (the limits are 15 - 30%). There then followed a particularly unpleasant round of buck passing form various factions with a view of putting it all on the LM as he had the final check. The who and why of the screw up are to a certain point irrelevant. The fact that this LM's intuition was disturbed enough to make a pretty ballsy call ( and respect to the BA mgr and engineer for doing the same thing ) was all that mattered and what would have been a pretty scary departure was avoided. The movers concerned got an interview without tea and biscuits (for the buck passing mainly) and the LM got a flight safety award.
Unfortunately it also said lots about the safety culture at Lyneham at the time that the movers felt the need to try and dump the cr@p onto somebody else who was just doing their job. But now it is much better, thankfully.
Take from that what you will, but my concern is that somebody was reduced from his position because of an event that could have caught most people out. Nobody made any attempt to hide anything, nobody was negligent (411A get real please) and was his call for the brakes a result of that professional instinct he had spent his whole flying career working towards. Yes this was an incident that required investigation but what has the final result done to promote an open culture at BA?

No perhaps to it, I am more than happy. During my RAF career I flew with several people in various positions who in your (twisted) view had been grossly negligent. Everybody gets it wrong sometimes and if I were to walk into the Sqn with a list of guys I would not fly with because they had "screwed up" then (rightly) I would be viewed as the one with the problem.
After an incident during Gulf War 1, I was found negligent in my duties by a board of enquiry and I honestly did not know what I had done until the ac returned to base and the damage was found. What saved me, was my lack of experience on type and the fact that when presented with the evidence, I accepted full responsibility for my actions and I was heartbroken at having”screwed up". My willingness to accept blame even at the risk of my career said more about me than anything else and when I went on to become a leader in my own right, my mantra was " do your best, if you screw up, don't worry but come forward".

So 411A, go right ahead and lambast :ok:

- may I also enrol in your English class along with TC?

c130jbloke - here an aeroplane was placed at significant risk under the command of a Captain. You have to allow BA to judge from their enquiry (which may have other contributory inputs) what is the best course of action. On many occasions yes, 're-training' might be appropriate, in others not.

411A would obviously advocate the 'hang 'em high' principle (would he still be around?) but in a more reasoned world other actions might be called for.

"but busting him seems harsh"

I can't believe I'm reading this. Another poster, two or three on, suggests we all hold hands, go back to stand, walk around, and perhaps even ask the flight attendants what they think...???

Where the hell is aviation going?

I am shamelessly with the hang-em-high mob. So was the company, it seems. And rightly bloody so. The rest of you fembots can pontificate all you like, but if a south east asian carrier or an african crew did this you'd be on their case like the plague.

Shame on you weaners who think punishment is passe.

Aviation is not a kindergarden. What went on with this incident is not hearsay. Nor is it minor stuff. The Captain has been demoted for endangering not just the safety of the airplane, passengers and crew but for bringing the company's name into disrepute; not to mention tarnishing the majority of professional, well trained and disciplined crews in 'Big Airline', and many others.

But we'd all be talking about a different story if the aircraft had suffered an engine failure, or other malfunction. There but for the grace of God go I, and indeed, them, on that day.

So, the commander has been demoted. I don't know him, or his training record, but BA felt this was an appropriate sanction, taking into account all the factors, many of which none of us know anything about. He wasn't the first, and won't be the last, and it is not deemed "punishment", much as it might appear, but BA's way of managing operational performance.

I prefer this way to many others - I believe the Emirates pilots, who tail-scraped out of MEL were greeted with resignation acceptances as soon as they got back to Dubai - that'll stop it happening again!

The simple fact is that we wouldn't all be chewing the cud over this, if it had happened in many other airlines. I bet many have used the wrong intersection at SKB, and many other airports, with the pilots being blissfully unaware. And with your resignation already accepted before you'd landed, would you own up?

I take your point, but you have to balance the long term benefits of crews not being terrified to own up to mistakes, or turning up to their sim check, for fear of the sack. Very few people wilfully go out of their way to endanger an aircraft they're sitting at the front of.

Us "fembots" would probably never have heard about this incident, unless it had ended in a smoking hole, by one of your African or SE Asian carriers.

Re post #256: Return to stand
 

So the highly hierarchical military has a culture where the loadmaster can say he requests a return to stand.

As SLF I can understand that controlled flights into terrain are an unavoidable consequence of human pilots, but bad takeoffs, surely, should be avoidable by procedure?

Edmund

Procedures don't trap all errors. There are plenty of procedures to prevent CFIT but it still happens, there are plenty of procedures to avoid take off errors but they still happen. As long as humans are in the loop there will be errors, of omission or commision.

Edmund,

Obviously yes if the procedure is designed correctly. Sometimes though, the very people designing and approving procedures for varied airports on the line like this are the last people that should be designing operational line procedures since they tend to reside in office buildings and when they fly, it's a somewhat "fun" event like a private pilot getting out to fly on the weekend.

I've also seen others get so bogged down with procedures that they literally miss "the elephant" walking right in front of them. Once when I was FO flying the aircraft on a reasonably complicated departure, I had the pilot-not-flying Captain hell bent on watching every transition speed and turn, and with great overkill, calling them out even though I was flying it correctly while watching for outside traffic. With all his attention drawn to the speeds and turns, mainly noise abatement, I was the one who glanced inside to catch the number one EGT breaking redline which I cured immediately with a slight power reduction. I had to interrupt another "procedure" comment to point this out.

Fill in one gopher hole and another one always seems to pop open somewhere else. ;)

Re: Why was the captain demoted
 

None of us will know what other evidence (if any) was available to the internal enquiry but there is an important principle involved here.

Since the first days of sailing ships the captain has been ultimately responsible for his vessel. Command is not just a promotion with better pay, it is a position of great authority and responsibility and the place where the buck stops. If a lowly seaman fails to let go one rope and the departure uproots a bollard on the quayside guess who gets to face the enquiry.

Aviation has rightly inherited the naval culture - the real question lies in an individual's suitability for command. So in this case was the airline confident to allow this captain to remain in command. It is their judgement call and they clearly had doubts.

Anyone offered the LH seat should ask himself honestly if he is prepared to accept total and unconditional responsibility for any eventuality regardless of cause or blame. Your career is on the line. Are you really
ready ?.

Similarly airlines should be asking some very searching questions about the suitability of command candidates.

The buck stops here. Harsh maybe but the buck still stops here.
End of story.

While I admit I agree with 411A's views on many things, I find his statement that BA are already directly responsible for one 777 accident quite astounding:ugh: Thank goodness the airline he flys for (L1011's in worldwide arenas????) is perfect in every way.

In 19 years of flying I have never posted on Pprune though looked at it many times.

As a LH Skipper with BA I am simply disgusted by 411A 's attitude, quite shocked infact that he knows very little about dynamics on a BA flight deck. I'm also quite happy that he doesn't fly with myself or my company.

I know many many more BA Captains than he will ever meet in his entire life and first officers, and apart from the odd one or two, they are all excellent operators, like most companies.

Is he privy to BA's safety data, I think he'd be surprised to hear how good the SESMA monitoring in the airline is. Blaming the airline for the 777 accident is just plain stupid, what a thoroughly grotesque statement, from an unlikable person.

I probably won't post again but thanks 411A for making me register, not much winds me up, sadly you do.

All the best,

James

411A May also be interested to know just how many LH FO's in BA had commands before joining BA! Did they lose their competence by moving airline and seat?

Whether in the military or in other companies very many direct entrant pilots to LH have considerable previous experience. We are very capable of controlling a large aircraft on the ground and have been doing so for many years!

Rather than ignore this experience BA utilises it in it's procedures by encouraging the Captain to manage and the FO to operate the aircraft should the situation warrant it and an abnormal situation arise.

In this unfortunate situation unlike 411's one 'armed paper hanger' command style better use of resources (REAL CRM) would dictate that the skipper give control of the aircraft to the FO to taxi and study the chart and aircraft position him/herself! A distinct advantage of having two tillers and BA SOP's.

This however would firstly require the crew to realise they MAY not be where they think they are. I can't imagine any aviator anywhere who has not a some point become a little unsure of their taxi position. The question is how you regain SA.

The failing in this case was that they did not realise their incorrect position and as a result did not think their was a need to regain any awareness. The holes in the famous 'swiss cheese' lined up. They were not helped by many outside factors as the report states. However having been to St Kitts and seeing what they saw they must as the final arbiters of safety carry the responsibility. The runway IS short, but clearly all this nonsense being talked about not using intersections for TO is coming from those with zero understanding of Perf A. Either the figures are good or they are not! Or do these same people advocate stopping post V1? Not being at the correct intersection does not mean the performance was wrong. I assume also then that the advocates of full length TO everywhere also use full power everywhere!

A mistake was made DESPITE well thought through SOP's (from someone who was anti many of them before joining the company and having the reasoning explained). The open safety culture allowed the information regarding the mistake to be disseminated amongst other crews operating there. As a result the taxi charts have been improved the airfield given the respect it deserves in briefing. That the company decided to demote the skipper (temporarily) is a decision they feel justified. It does not entirely fit with the completely open culture but is nonetheless the sanction they agreed upon given much greater information than we do.

It could have been much worse despite all the best intentions, and procedures. These I'm sure will be scrutinised and amended if it is considered they would have affected they incident.

Despite 411A being a dinosaur in his attitude to modern aviation it does not mean ALL his views are invalid. Their is no harm in questioning procedures when necessary. However to assume that returning to the man and boy cockpit which have been shown with more research than I could quote to reduce the likely positive outcome of aircraft incidents, is probably not the wisest direction!

Jazzy

An interresting question, and one for which I have a definite answer....IF it is during taxi, you stop right where you are, and positively ascertain your position, either by reference to the taxi chart, query ATC, or...ask for progressive taxi instructions from the air traffic controller.
(Another option, electronic taxi charts....EFB, if you have them).
What you definitely do not do is...guess, and press on regardless.

Recently, whilst taxiing for departure at EZE, the ground controller issued us three different taxi instructions, for three different departure runways, within the time frame of three minutes.
A trifecta of nonsense!
I stopped where I was (and so did Iberia, behind...and American behind him) and we all asked for progressive taxi instructions.
EZE ground control got the message, pronto, and taxi resumed.

It's not rocket science, folks, although some might think otherwise...:rolleyes:

By the way, two of our departures from EZE were to MVD...ferry, a very short flight.
When asked if we wanted an intersection takeoff, we declined.
We simply do not do takeoffs from runway intersections, unless...we have to because of runway closure/construction.
Company policy.

BOAC: Point accepted - perhaps there was a trend with said pilot or other causes for concern. I am only going on what's on this thread and having read ( twice - I am interested in the SA / CRM / rear crew interface aspects ) the AAIB report so hence the bias in my posts.

Big White Bird: Mate, if you think that my example implies the mil types are touchy feely wimps, I can arrange a visit to Lyneham where C-130 CREWS have been slugging it out for 9 years in both AFG and Iraq. I would give your viewpoint about 45 seconds on a good day and they would even let you pick the window to leave by :ok:

Today ( the RAF at least ) works on a linear crew structure. Absolutely the guy/girl in the LHS makes the final call but the good ones take the crew input and work from there.

If you want an example of gross negligence, then I suggest you read : RAF pilot 'in deadly game of chicken' - News - The Independent

Appreciate it’s a military application and nowhere the commercial world, but if you want a good case study on CRM / SA failings….

The failing in this case was that they did not realise their incorrect position and as a result did not think their was a need to regain any awareness

And therein lies the crux of the issue. You've got to know you've got it wrong to make it right. If, despite crosschecks and taking extra care, you've still got managed to get it wrong you're even less likely to notice your error, as you're now sure you've taken every precaution and therefore your mental model must be right! It has crossed my mind that the instruction to power up against the brakes may have been a result of them being sure they'd already taken the required precautions. Was it the extra piece of string they tied round their waist after they thought they'd done up the belt and braces? Unfortunately if you think you've put the belt and braces on but you've done it wrong you end up embarassed with your pants down.

I wonder if BA did a Safety/Risk analysis of operating from St Kitts. Also is it wise to allow intersection take offs at shorter airstrips?.

No...but don't try to tell that to BA, as they (collectively) apparently don't want to know.:rolleyes:
All this 'safety', 'togetherness' and mutual admiration the BA guys (and gals) apparently have, and yet...the concerned crew could not bother to taxi the airplane to the end of the runway.
I say...baloney, BA is simply not what it's cracked up to be, safety-wise
And, for that matter, neither is AirFrance.
IF this flight had been operated by other than a large Euroland aircarrier, the pro-BA guys here would have been all over the crew, for safety deficiencies, poor airmanship, etc.
Without a doubt.

All,

I'm am sure BA analyzed the performance issues at SKB. It does have a turn around pad, but I am unfamilar if there is an engineering trade off with making tight turns to use the full length for takeoff. It doesn't look like that much to a 737, but similar to Port-au-Prince where 747's and C5's made 180's recently.

Full length is about 7700', from the intersection, 6600'. Typically there is 15-20 kt seabreeze straight down the runway. The field elevation is 160' with a clear departure path that is quickly over the ocean.

From my experience on the 777 and looking at the BA route, a rough guess is that they were somewhere around 380k-400K for takeoff. total possible engine thrust is 180K. That thrust/weight ratio is nearly .5 to 1 and is similar to a Lear 24 and probably better than a 1950's F86. V1 on the departure is around 120Kts and will happen very quickly after TO thrust is set. for landing, the VREF might be somewhere near 130kts with a stall speed near 100-110 (rough guesses). Landing is surely not an issue, I don't have the takeoff data from the intersection, but I suspect it's well within acceptable parameters.

I fly into SKB in a 737. For contrast, while the widebody 777 is approaching around 130 kts, my overextended "pig" is screaming in at 150Kts with just 4 braking wheels compared to their 12. On departure, my V2 typically is around 150Kts+, and only gets airborne after touring across half the island like a drunk Albatross before deciding flight is better than driving.

Let me put the criticism of using the intersection to bed for good. I would much rather fly a lightly loaded B777 into and out (intersection) of SKB any day of the year before before my standard fully loaded 737 using the full length.

There are far more better discussions on situational awareness and crew briefings and responsibilites than imagining in our heads what the real performance numbers our for the runway at SKB.