Let´s give a thought to the poor Station Engineer who probably sat down in Row 4 and considered that maybe just maybe, things would end in absolute disaster and he could do nothing but sit there.

I shudder to think!

Like that post Centaurus
I am all for the modern CRM as I fly early generation jets under trying conditions at times and we need to work together, but never forget who signs all the paperwork, and who receives the phone calls from the boss!

Regarding this incident
I am always surprised that these sort of things happen as frequently as they do in large major airlines with so much available to them in the way of training resources etc.

Yet us flicking around in an early generation jet are perceived by many in the recognised major airlines to be unsafe operators.
We have to check and double check all the time due to the "sophistication" of our old bus!
yambat

Well the airline accountants will be overjoyed to hear that. Think of all the money they will save on those pesky little CRM courses.

Have you checked the accident statistics since CRM was introduced.

Centaurus;

You have a badly twisted view of CRM.

CRM doesn't "empower" anyone.

CRM does not challenge the authority and command responsibility of the captain. CRM is not a "manners" course for captains nor a licence to take over for F/O's. CRM does not disrespect the law which assigns responsibility for the flight solely to the captain. CRM is the requirement to speak up if one sees something unfolding that raises the risk to the flight, period.

CRM does not require that the F/O take over in immanent danger.

Such an action belongs elsewhere in training and responsibility, differing, obviously, with cultural differences. (One wonders, for example, what would have happened to the F/O on the Airblue A321 if he had taken over from the captain and successfuly cleared the hills...fired?, reprimanded? Anyone?)

The requirement to speak up and not remain silent while risk heightens is formalized so that a risk is identified, assessed, a response formulated and then actioned.

Such a process (a mini-intervention) can take hours or seconds..."Captain, should we be at this altitude?"..."Captain, the flight plan shows us burning into our alternate fuel"... , etc.

Those statements don't challenge authority, they bring information to the surface so the crew is aware of risk and can deal with it, even if it is only to dismiss the threat as it is being handled correctly.

The final decision is always the captain's. The FD is not a democracy.

In CRM, no F/O "takes over" the airplane and runs it unless the captain allows it, but that's not CRM; - like viewing statements about risk to the flight as "challenges to one's authority", permitting anyone to take over the FD is a far more serious operational and personal problem and well beyond CRM issues.

Because the "discourse" is about one's "authority" and not the "operational safety" of the flight, those that resist the notion of CRM and dismiss it as so much new-age psychobabble, are generally those who need it the most.

PJ2

Role/Roll reversal.

The F4 used to (still does - any still flying?) have a rudder shaker to remind you to roll the aircraft with rudder to prevent roll reversal at low speed. Perhaps airliners should have a rudder shaker to warn you are not taking off at the right intersection!



But seriously, a wrong intersection / runway incursion warning system should be a priority for the next life saving aviation gadget. It's not rocket science - the infrastructure is alreadt there. It's just software.

PJ2 - brilliant post! That's exactly how it is meant to be!

So the tower controller REALISED but failed to pass it on that the aircraft was at the incorrect point.....:confused:

Well said, Sir.

It would be well for First Officers to actually realise just whom is in charge of the airplane...and for those slightly challanged, a hint....it ain't them.

Sorry for perpetuating the thread creep but I believe the real problem is perceived authority by the first officers.

It is kind of sad that yet another thread has degenerated into a weenie waving contest into the percieved dimunition of an airline captains authority.

There is a lesson here. The FO had over 6000 hrs and the Captain over 12,000 hrs, in other words senior guys with lots of experience flying long haul on the airlines biggest equipment. The FO was probably senior enough to hold a narrow body short haul Command if he wanted it. Frankly I think it is rather silly to imply htat this individual was not up to the task of taxing the aircraft, lining up and then doing the takeoff, it is not rocket science. The reason why many airlines do not allow this is because they are too cheap to pay for a tiller on the right side. This was not a case of a 250 hr new hire screwing up.

IN any case it IMO has no bearing on the central question, they had only two taxways to choose from yet chose the wrong one........why.

Yes there was a bunch of related factors (poor markings/signage, a missed opportunity by ATC to alert the crew) but ultimately the crew (that means both Captain and FO !) had completely lost airport situational awareness.

Personally I think the take away is the ease one can fall into complacency on the "easy" tasks. I look back at the screwups in my career and and many are similar to this incident...falling into the trap that "this is straight forward so I got it and I can start thinking about the next step".

BTW my company SOP is that the "ready" call includes the taxiway where the aircraft is holding short, something that we did not use to do untill the new Director of Flight ops insisted this procedure be adopted.

He was very wise...we have the same in our company.
Also, we have another....intersection takeoff are not allowed, except in the case of part of the runway being closed.
Perhaps BA should adopt a similar policy?

411,

Loved the "copilot is a copilot period" comment. You must be a treat to fly with.

Some day, a lowly copilot may save your bacon, heaven forbid you make a mistake.

From what I've read 411A is far too good to make mistakes :)

You might be surprised, 412SP...several F/O's request just that.
;)

411A, you old dinosaur, I always find your posts, shall we say, interesting, reminiscent of Captain O P Jones of Imperial Airways:
"Pass me the silver tongs, Mr Hoskins, I wish to retract the flap."
Margaret Thatcher was correct in stating:
"Consensus is a lack of leadership."
However, when I attained my first command, my boss told me that a large part of my job was to help train my co-pilot to become a captain, and that was 40 years ago, long before anyone could spell CRM!

411A, my dear sir, whilst I realise that a lot of your comments are tongue in cheek, why not come clean and tell us how you educate your F/Os to become competent future captains?

I would suggest that is fine in an ideal world, but it is not a really practical proposition. The important thing is to have in place the procedures and checks to try to ensure that the holes in the cheese don't line up. Clearly in this case all the holes bar one (the aircraft was light) lined up. That is clearly regretable and the procedures will have been modified as a result.

You can bet your shirt that those pilots will never make that mistake again!

To suggest that you should use full length of 31L at JFK, as an example, rather than KK intersection, is frankly ludicrous, but undoubtedly that is what 411A would do.

Taxing an aircraft is easy. Knowing where to go is the difficult part. What must be understood is that taxing an aircraft is a two man job, it makes no difference who is taxing the aircraft at all. Your primary role as PNF/PM on the ground is to monitor the track of the aircraft, as it is in the air. As PM you should be telling the PF when to turn and what holding points should we expecting to see. With PF looking at his chart as well this is a good error check. Having your head down doing control checks or before take off checks while letting the PF blindly taxi on his own, before establishing that both of you are happy with the intended route, would seem to me to be poor airmanship.

Hmmm, I do fly a Cessna Citation with RAAS. Apart from other things, if I`d try to takeoff from a runway less (rather TODA) than 4000 ft it yells at me ("short runway"). 777 hasn´t got that thingy?
Next, we have the Jepp plate on the MFD with a little airplane on it showing our position. 777 hasn´t got that?

I disagree with your wording above, although the principles are correct in part!

As PM and/or PF, you should be 'asking' open questions as to what you expect to see/where you think you are, rather than 'telling' someone what to do. It is the 'telling' that results in confirmation bias which is what you want to avoid. What you want is independent confirmation of a shared mental model, imho.

How about a TomTom with an airfield database?
"At the next junction, keep right" ....... "Recalculating" ...... "At the next junction, turn around"
Add in the John Cleese voice with witticisms and you're in for a fun time.:ok: