the video seems to show alot of sand being kicked up


I offer this theory.

we all know that wake turbulence is at its worst when you are slow, heavy, clean.

it seems to me that there is indirect proof that the flaps/slats are up as the wake seems to be making more sand kick up than usual.

follow my thought?

This other video, perhaps, shows the details a bit better:

LiveLeak.com - Spanair Madrid barajas Accident 2008 JK5022 airport camera video show actual crash 2ND version

Any (subjective) comments on the attitude of the plane at that time? Does it seem a bit excessive to any of you for the last part of the rotation on those conditions?

What use is a 'config' button if it simply stays silent when you press it?

In my present type we do a config check at the start of each taxi.

Press the button- no sound- announce "Flap x config check"

The config could easily have failed!

On my last type (Embraer 145) She (the aircraft config aural)used to say
" take off- OK"

So you knew:

1. Config system working.
2. Take off config OK.

On my present type you press the button- hear nothing _so you know:

EITHER:

1. Configured or
2. Config system gone tits up!

When people talk a bout 'lining up the holes in the cheese'- this is one hole that could easily be filled in- permanently!

Below about 1 span altitude - vortex buildup is significantly less than
in free air due to ground obstructing the movement of air. This is why you get an induced drag reduction - or span dominated ground effect as it's called.

XPM

No more speculations. The accident is an exact copy of this. Even the weight is almost the same. I would pay special attention at a couple of things.
First at page 40 says:

Second.
Moving to pages 73. At chapter 3.-Conclusions, subchapter 3.1.-findings.
Point 7 confirms the roll inestability of the MD when close to the stall.
Points 8,9 & 10 talks about TOWS of the CAWS and at the next page, under chapter 4.-Recomendations:

I don't think at this point we can be accused of being "wildly speculating" any more. I think this thread is just analyzing, discussing, and expanding on the topic surrounding this accident, including using ficticious or unproven similar scenarios as part of these discussions. Each of us share his own opinions, views and experiences.

The outcome, hopefully, is a better understanding of these issues that may even contribute to avoid fatal events in the future.

I think we all greatly respect the victims and their families, and I don't think our discussion is in any way disrespecful. Others may think otherwise, of course, but my conscience is clear.

Boeing did react to the NTSB recommendations after the Detroit accident by issuing a recommendation to all operators of similar planes to test the TOWS prior to each take off. I also have the feeling they could've done a bit more given the somewhat "fragile" nature of the TOWS (i.e. little redundancy, hard troubleshooting diagnosis, subtle failure warnings, etc), but, realistically, if the TOWS system operation is tested prior to each take-off, the safety improves exponentially and is probably adequate.

I believe that, if Spanair had "known and interpreted" the recomendation clearly, it would've been a non-issue for them to comply with it. No operator wants to ignore simple-to-implement, almost "free", safety recommendations by manufacturers.

The "blame" is gonna go back and forth. Boeing is going to say that they were never "required" by a formal FAA order to implement the measures recommended by the NTSB and that they "fixed it more than adequately" by warning people to test TOWS more often.

Spanair is going to say they knew nothing about it and their procedures are approved by spanish authorities. I won't even go into how, even if the FAA would've made the recommendation mandatory, which it didn't, it wouldn't have had authority in Spain.

Civil prossecutors are going to say that Spanair should've known what the current manufacturer's recommendations were.

Spanish civil aviation authorities are gonna say that they leave on the hands of operators to implement whatever procedures they feel appropiate and basically just stamp an approval on them with little review on their side.

European authorities are going to say that the recommendations weren't mandatory.

And around in circles we go.

Lesson learned: from now on, probably, civil air regulations bodies in most countries are going to demand that the TOWS in airplanes with similar designs undergo a mandatory operational check prior to each takeoff, resulting in somewhat higher safety.

As we saw in LAPA accident, having a working TOWS doesn't prevent the accident, of course, but hopefully would help tilt the decissions of most pilots to abort the TO/correct the configuration under such circunstances.

Alas, the TOWS could fail from the time it is tested til the time the actual take-off happens. Testing it 10 minutes before TO doesn't guarantee they'll work during TO.

And if a pilot forgets to configure wings and doesn't follow checklist (Northwest), then chances of them skipping the TOWS test are also high.

In Spanair case, it looks at this point like they did follow the checklist, but missed/missread the flaps. They could've, just as well (but realistically less likely) have missed a TOWS inop test also.

So what is the "real" solution? How do we make sure the pilots read the flaps indicators and settings very carefully before each take off w/o significantly re-designing older planes to include near-infallible alarms or devices the inhibit the acceleration unless flaps are deployed during take-off or flaps that open automatically (and reliably) at certain speeds/etc?

Video
 

To PPPPilot and the rest
 

Well, a very cheap and cheerful but extremely useful modification would be one or two vidcams around the plane, with the ability to flip a screen from one to t'other; a wide-angle view from top of fin, and along the belly (and possibly looking inwards from both winglets, if fitted)...
Not only could a glance at a fin-top camera image before TO have provided a quick backup check of config, but in this day and age (mad rush to get loaded, leave gate and get airborne), be useful in other contexts as well... e.g. engine trouble, there'd be little doubt which one had surged.or taken a bird, looking straight into jet-pipe (and I believe that has been mistaken before with tragic consequences, equivalent to a surgeon cutting off the wrong (good) leg!)

I believe there's still concern in some NTSB quarters that some of their recommendations are not taken seriously enough by the FAA; one example being those after the post 9/11 Airbus vortex wake/fin failure incident..

Rananim post 1867
I'm retired a while now, and a long way back to McDiesels, but was not the windshear/loss of performance after V1 procedure along the lines you mentioned?
I seem to remember part of the procedure was to ensure that the flat/slat handle was actually physically in the 15 degree detent. ( Good hard rattle of the handle and lock)
Also, not sure about DC-9 30 series, but MD-80 series does have auto-slat as I recall, (except in up-retract mode?) Oh dear its been a long time!

The unfortunate thing is that it sounds cheap and cheerful in theory, but then you have to factor in the number of DC-9/MD-80/90/717s currently in service, of which a significant number are well past their median service life. It's not just a case of fitting cameras too - you'd have to retrofit a sturdy area to the airframe to attach them, they'd have to be reliable enough to deal with the rigors of extreme temperatures and moisture levels, and you'd still have to plumb the camera output back to the flight deck and affix a suitable display.

These costs add up, and on this particular model there's a perfectly good gauge telling you the surfaces are deployed - and it seems like there's an equally good 'killer items' check that should be performed before the take-off roll that should maybe considered mandatory on this, if not all types. At the end of the day, a pilot under sufficient pressure could still miss the camera as a final check, so really you'd just be providing another backstop.

Having said that, the ease of switching some aircraft systems into 'air mode' does trouble me, and I wonder if a non-functioning configuration warning system ought to be a no-go item. However, as an admitted non-pilot I wonder how practical that would be.

there are a couple of things to think about...ZAGORFLY

IT IS A HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK THAT CAUSES A STALL (exceeding the critical angle of attack = stall)

AND YOU CAN'T SEE ANGLE OF ATTACK...what you are seeing is pitch attitude. (naval aviators might even say "deck angle")

I encourage all you non pilots to read: "Stick and Rudder" by wolfgang langweische. And all of you pilots who haven't read this book, why not?

You will learn about angle of attack and relative wind and all sorts of nifty things.

There was nothing wrong with the engines that caused this plane to crash...a multitude of things came together...including IMHO:

poor training of mx people (by this I mean not understanding that the RAT probe being heated on the ground was a symptom of plane being in "air mode")

poor cockpit discipline (checklist, concept of killer items...and my favorite, muscle memory...holding flap handle until gauge reads properly and not letting go until then)

hiring a copilot with very low flying time

not following boeing procedures (to check takeoff warning system prior to each takeoff)

and it all comes down to NOT SPENDING ENOUGH MONEY TO FLY RIGHT. (right as in correct, as in "straighten up and fly right")

The big problem is all of these things came together on the same day, same flight and a tragedy resulted.

Those who do not remember the past are destined to repeat it.

(by the way, if you want to "see" the slats/flaps, just stick your head out of the DV window prior to takeoff and look back at the wings)

Since the flightpath relative to the ground is visible in the video, it is possible to construct a flight-path vector (at least approximately) for each frame. So one can make a pretty good estimate of the angle of attack, based on the video images and some simple geometry.

E.g. this picture taken from the video shows the aircraft shortly before impact, with the aircraft slowly descending:

http://www.flightglobal.com/assets/g...x?ItemID=25191

The angle of attack shown in that frame would have been slightly larger than the pitch angle.

sevenstrokeroll;

Excellent summary of the real truth; - thanks for posting.

Contrary to almost every opinion and speculation here, it wasn't "slats" or a failed TOCW system that "caused" this accident.

"No slats" was the result of an earlier series of commissions/ommisions, some with antecdents that were years in the making, most occurred in the hours and minutes before the accident. I agree with you that we cannot discount low-time/inexperience. Whether it is a factor may or may not be determined by the investigation; it depends on how far the judges are willing to go I guess but it would be both a shame and wrong to stop at the cockpit door.

Any other attributed "cause" is a form of tautology and not a solution to why this aircraft crashed. The key is, why did this crew not extend the high lift devices? The rest are details. The pilots failed. Why?

.
The fuselage angle relative to the runway is 23 degrees.

.

Because I was issued a copy of "Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators" by H.H. Hurt.:) It was also good gouge for the (recently bankrupt) Delta interview.

Sadly, as you speculated a couple of weeks ago, it does look like the Northwest Romulus crash has been repeated.

@zagorfly

Most take offs on A300 are slats only.

Because I was issued a copy of "Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators" by H.H. Hurt.

Airbubba, though not a pilot nor even an aspiring one, I have read Stick and Rudder and consider it a classic for any literate person, right up there with Hound of the Baskervilles and Wind in the Willows. Nathless I must inquire if Aerodynamics is better, supercedes, improves upon, or was just there first, or what? If better than Stick and Rudder, how do you know if you didn't read it?

Not wanting to argue, just to inquire.

To bounce off the ground, the wing Lift has to be close to the acf Weight.
(or the gear needs a high spring constant). None of these were the case here.

My interpretation the information given;

They did not rotate late, according to the FDR/CVR they rotated at the correct Vr.
Having no slats/flap, the acf was not able to lift off, so they continued
the TO roll (in a pitch) for about 10 sec and gained enough speed to lift off.
Chord dominated ground effect helped them lift off, but this effect will disappear of around 20' AGL on the MD80. Also there will be an increase in induced drag (span dominated). So, after about 4 sec, the acf entered a stall. The rest is in the video.

XPM

Well, now the CIAIAC, with one of its member's resignation (it was not accepted), two advisors also leaving and a more complicated job ahead as just about nobody agrees with their preliminary report, is now saying that it will take them more time to complete it.

Not to mention the report is rather short, doesn't include a lot of fundamental data that they already have, etc. We could probably write a better one from the pages of this forum, and we don't even have access to the data :ugh:

So no longer are they expected to publish it today or monday. They now say it's going to take longer (surprise). I just hope it doesn't take over a year as it has taken the INCIDENT in Lanzarote of OE-LMM, to which it had devoted 1 paragraph explaining ... nothing.

The media is gone into "full circus mode" with all kinds of contradictory and convoluted, unlikely, (if not directly false) interpretations of facts, etc.

Oh, well.

It is quite obvious, to me at least, that the CIAIAC is not up to the task ...

They know the media sucks, so they need to produce a report that, whatever it states, states it clearly. Taking 2 pages about a relay (which actually may end up having nothing to do with it, although it likely does, but there is no proof) understandably makes a lay person think that there must be a "technical culprit".

And then not mentioning anything at all about slats, airspeeds, CVR, etc (even if only to say "we don't know yet") ... makes it look like they are "hiding" something.

Yawn.

Thankfully the judiciary investigation will have access to just about all the data and it will become public at the end.

sevenstrokeroll

You have issued your final report of the accident.

Incredible how someone can affirm at this time so many things without all the information. Maybe you are right, maybe not, but what is extremly clear is that you can NOT AFFIRM AT THIS POINT the reasons why the AC crash.

LiveLeak.com - New video released from planecrash Madrid

Here's the video

When do spanair select the flaps - as part of the after start checks or during the taxi out? Most 737 operators now do it as part of the after starts as this gives 2 check lists / opportunities to catch the error.

Do spanair MD80 crews fly different cockpits on the fleet ie) some EFIS / some non EFIS or different variants? Is the flap gauge the same on all?

On the 737 it's level with the N1 gauges which means I tend to glance at the flap indicator as we set power as a final check they're down. I also look at the ailerons out the window as I do the full and free check and can see the slats are down too - not sure you can see wingtip on Md80 though.

Finally, we're taught to check the top of the PFD as we line up to check a V of A/T, 'eyebrows' (or PLI's) are displayed and then FD on the top right FMA.

Forgetting the flaps is one of the few single omission that will kill you. (I don't if the Spanair crew did forget or whether the flaps didn't deploy).

737 flapless take-off successful in sim.
 

I am not an aerodynamics expert, just a line capt.
Had some time left on our 737-800 simulator session the other day and tried a few take-offs with clean wing:
High TOW, appropriate deration for a long runway.
With normal rotation technique (for an next generation 737 that is), and rotating to approx 14deg attitude, pitch stays just below the PLI.
The roll must be longer, but the take-off was successful. Not even a stick-shaker.
Rotating too fast and further than normal triggered the stick-shaker for a second, but was easily recovered by lowering a degree or two.

I do not know whether the software or behavior of the simulator is accurate, but considering its generally very realistic behaviour, I assume it is.

Surely severalMD-80 pilots must have tried the same experiment in their simulators since the likely cause of the Madrid accident emerged. I may have missed an earlier posting, but it would be interesting to hear the results of their tests.

Perhaps the 15 years of development between the MD-80 and the 737-NG make a difference?

HarryMann;
Absolutely. The diagrams and explanations are sufficient for understanding by most, so back to "why?"

sevenstrokeroll;
Yes, it is, isn't it? I applaud your efforts none the less. As you see, most professionals who contributed earlier and tried to provide insight for earnest and serious non-professionals, have left. This is a very thorough thread with answers to most questions. All it takes is a little patience and respectful effort.

It's not so much "giving up" as spending one's time in more productive and less redundant endeavours. Your efforts are inspiring and well worth reading but the dialog is essentially over for most. Johnny-come-lately elementary questions which clearly reflect lack of effort and the basic courtesy of reading before writing, have thorough, detailed answers which are in the thread already and unless one has the time and inclination, do not warrant further effort.

LUALBA, in reference to your post to sevenstrokeroll:
Regardless of intent, you gain no ground by shouting, (bolding), which is how your post comes across in print. However, it's a free forum and to each his own.

Second, sevenstrokeroll has made comments which, to aviation safety professionals and many airline crews, ring true and which have a long and interesting history within the safety community and which many believe apply to this accident. The comments made are nowhere near a "report", but are familiar observations which should, but likely won't, form part of the investigative work and formal report, in this accident. You are right that we cannot affirm without all doubt removed, that these factors played a role in this accident, but that was not the intent - rather, they are "sign-posts" which point to the way this accident will likely have unfolded.

737 flapless takeoff "succesful" in actual flight
 

@PH-OY-73:

These guys did an actual flapless take-off in a 737 and survived (barely):
ASRS - Aviation Safety Reporting System

'Aerodynamics' was required reading for a rather Prussian style government sponsored flying course I took years ago at Saufley Field. My Drill Instructor whispered gentle words of encouragement to help me study.

'Stick and Rudder' is undoubtedly a great book but I've usually been too busy flying for a living to read much about how to do it. The Brits always love 'Handling the Big Jets' by Davies. All of these texts are decades old but the basics don't change much.

It seems that, these guys did a brave flapless/slatless take off on an MD-83 and (barely) survived.

The official CIAIAC preliminary report (over a year old), though, still doesn't mention these (presumed) facts.

05-06-2007. OE-LMM. McDonnell-Douglas MD83. Aeropuerto de Lanzarote (Las Palmas) - CIAIAC - Ministerio de Fomento

We will patienly wait for the final report, although I'm not sure what's taking so long in a case where the airplane was intact and the crew available for investigation. Gravevine is that crew found the famous c/b pulled, thus TOWS was inop, thus they took off w/o realizing the flaps weren't out ...

This close to another accident like this, I heard. Luckily, some of the flight conditions, crew response (and shear luck) were more in their favor ...

The 737-800 has about 5% lower wing loading then the MD-82, not considering the winglets, so that may cause a small difference.

However, your text implies the simulated rotation was at a Vr appropriate for the flapless configuration, whereas JK5022 in all probablity rotated at the Vr for the intended, flapped, configuration. Big difference I'd say.

It seems other automatic security cameras captured part of the accident:

telecinco.es MiTele - Informativos - Sociedad - Imágenes exclusivas del accidente aéreo de Barajas

Soon after the accident, security was notified and they started to manually point many cameras to the area, it seems.

Those that prefer the copy of the DRAFT of the preliminary CIAIAC report in pdf format, can fetch it from here:

http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/200...or_barajas.pdf

One more survivor has left the hospital and another was sent to a different, local hospital a few days ago.

Only five survivors remain with medical issues of importance. One remains in very serious condition, but doing better.

@ snowfalcon2

The simulation was done, of course, with speeds for normal take-off -in this case flaps 5.
Otherwise the simulation would indeed be irrelevant.

Simulation
 

I think simulation is irrelevant if:
1. the pilot knows what's coming
2. the pilot knows he's not going to die.
It's another story when you rotate, the plane is not behaving as expected, and you find yourself fighting for your life.
I've flown 'heavy metal' for 35 years, including 5 years on MD-80.
I've always appreciated [U]mechanical[U] checklists; when conscientiously used by all crew members they can prevent embarrassing moments.

Hurry up syndrome: Flapless TO
 

Forgive me if this was posted but I gave up reading this thread as there appear to be a lot of **&&*(^(&* threads


The Errors are in the System[B][/B]

1) Has anyone performed a flapless TO in the MD-80 at MTOW with a tailwind with a co-pilot with about 1000 hours epxerience who was not briefed on it ? Out of curiosity ?

Interesting how the Chief investigator and two pilots have resigned from the Investigation, something is cooking.

Amongst the items that may be discussed The Error producing conditions include the regulations, time pressure, SOP's, Human factors, situational awarendThe civil aviation authority,financial pressure on the people, maintenance, Boeing, SB's . What else ?

You know what the people who know the most will say ?
Nothing.

Anyone know about the NTSB and Boeing peoples input into the investigation.

Lets let the PROS do their jobs out of respect to the dead.
We must be very patient. A good investigation can take years.

Look at Dryden.

So that means wait years to hear what the readout was on the FDR and CVR? Meanwhile no attempts are made to prevent a repeat of this crash? Someone has to come forward soon with the data. Remember this is not the first time this has happened so it won't be the last. Keeping everything secret does not promote safe operations.

Killer Items Checklist
 

May I suggest a placard in a conspicuous location:

Killer Items

• Flaps
• Trim
• Spoilers
• Runway Heading
• Controls Full and Free

The title could be Line up Check for squeamish managements.

All of these items have figured in takeoff accidents, but this is a list that should be kept deliberately short even though many SOPs specify additional pre-takeoff items such as lights, transponder, time, radar...

PJ2
You are quite right, most serious professionals ceased contributions to his thread some time ago. I despair of the constant theorising and the rehashing of poorly understood aircraft aerodynamics. Well done seven stroke roll and others for sticking with it.
Way, way back it was clearly suggested that this was an attempted takeoff without slat and/or flap, all the evidence points to that. The task now is to identify the critical path of events which resulted in the accident and find a way to prevent a recurrence. There has obviously been a worldwide failure to do that so far.

Absolutely :D FDR & CVR readouts take a long time to interpret, and need to experts to do so, after assistance from outside agencies etc. Each parameter needs to be validated and cross referenced before drawing conclusions. The only benefit for a "quick" readout is for the pPrune speculators :ooh:

I for one do not like the "steady" leak of info here, I think legitimately from the Spanish media, in turn from the judicial inquiry (?) NB it is only that - a judicial inquiry for prosection purposes (if appropriate). It is not seemingly an "accident investigation" i.e. to draw lessons for prevention of future accidents.

From my own hunches, if you are really anxious to read a full report and FDR / CVR download, I should read the NW report... I suspect this will eventually be chillingly similar :{

NoD

Yes, the NW report will probably be chillingly simular. Are you concluding then with no facts that is what happened? I guess we can just put everything away and go home then. They must know with FDR and CVR readouts what happened. Where were the flaps, what power setting they used and what they said has been available for quite some time now. Keeping that information secret serves no purpose in the interest of safety.
What purpose does it serve?

At least one of the flap actuators (screw jacks) was stated as being extended 12cm. The nice thing about screw jacks is they maintain the same state after hydraulic pressure/flow is removed. There is zero chance an impact can cause one to move.