Quotes from the TWA Report (stick shaker on liftoff): Related to this accident, "awareness of ... flap configuration" might be the key... However, in a system that is designed to check Takeoff Flap is correctly set on more than 1 occasion (? with us there is a check prior Taxi, and 2 checks in the "Pre-Takeoff checks") the crew cannot really be of any other mindset than the Flaps are correctly set...

Therefore the logic of the TWA Report, applied to this accident (and assuming the stick shaker did go off?) would be that the crew may well have, even should have, assumed it to be false.

NoD

Who said that :ugh: If this takeoff was Slat/Flapless, read the NW report - hardly able to climb, and very hard to control in roll...

Sorry - cannot recall it, so either not read it, or dismissed in my mind as not really relevant, or too MD-80/DC-9 specific for me...

NoD

Many posts ago, there were comments about the military method of timing the take off against distance travelled.

Sorry, just a humble Piper/Cessna type, but if the aircraft was clean, would it not have accelerated abnormally fast, and in an extra 500 metres ground roll it should have been well past Vr or even V2.

No... why whould it accelerate more quickly clean, than with minimal drag devices deployed in an unloaded condition :ooh:

NoD

Wow/tocw
 

NOD:

As Follows:

Flapless T/O
 

I tried timing and measuring the ground roll to 150 kts both flapless and with T/O flap/slat (we take-off in mid flap/full slat, which is also one of our landing configurations and is actually quite high drag - theory is to minimise ground roll and rely on reasonable excess power, and option to jettison in the event of engine failure, for initial climb) in the Tornado sim last week. The result support NoD's statement - there was negligible difference. Admittedly not an airliner, but operating using the same laws of physics!

Re I did reply in fact In short, if the takeoff was Flap/Slatless and the TOCW was not working, the accident was not "caused by" the TOCW, IMHO. It might be a "contributory cause" but if you have to reject a takeoff because the TOCW stops you, there should be a form of inquriy into just this... because the TOCW likely saved a lot of lives, and the rest of the "system" had failed.

Not too sure about that - an airliner can get above 20,000' :D

NoD

Very true...but our wings would probably stay attached for longer at 600kts, 100ft!

Sorry if this has already been asked but let us assume that the TOW was inop would it not be in the T/O checklist to check the flap position indicator? the reason I ask is because some years ago I was the flight mech aboard an American trans air L1011 out of Philadelphia the check were down to the line and the check of the posn indicator was called and the flaps were set at 0 deg. we discovered that the hyd lock-out had activated and the flaps did not deploy even though the handle had been correctly positioned.

@ justme69
I am sorry but I have never heard of that. As far as I know, the only TOWS check performed was at the first flight BCN-MAD.

@sevenstrokeroll
That is what I believe the more relevant to the accident.
The famous P40 breaker at Detroit was pulled out due to "unknown reasons"
The same cause wings1011 is talking about at the Lanzarote's "almost accident" and I believe something has to see at Madrid. Seems to me the P40 "the hand that rocks the cradle" is still ignored by the authorities.

History might also teach one to trust it, it's a system designed for a purpose... and at least one 'All Souls Lost' accident resulted from just that, ignoring it and even fighting the resulting 50lb stick push... Trident/LHR/Staines reservoir

Unless it is common knowledge specific to an aircraft type and situation that spurious s/s action can occur, aircraft mfrs and certificating authorities would take a very dim view of ignoring it. More so on 'T' tailed aircraft.

In this case, we could propose the following, admittedly hypothetical (as we don't know crew control inputs yet for sure) and assuming the most +ve outcome imaginable...

Stick-shaker noticed > Immediate reduction of stick back-pressure > Reduces AoA > Returns better roll-control > Prevents (2nd) bad roll to starboard > Aircraft stays more nearly on runway centreline > Crew have more options due less panic (compared to a/c diverging off-heading into unknown territory)

>> Possibly, whatever the outcome >> more people survive!

Because if the aircraft does prove to be correctly configured, and airspeed is correct, an immediate 'trial' reduction in AOA would not necessarily produce ground contact - and would increase margin speed over stick-shaker sensor speed, whether erroneous or not.

The first left-wing drop here was of course, a very strong indication that aircraft had been over-rotated (for speed/configuration) and needed flying 'gingerly' to retain control...

HarryMann It's a balance. Read the NTSB L1011 report, it was fairly harsh on the crew for believing it and clearly stated (as above) they should have realised it was false.

First Officer was pretty well slated for doing exactly that. First Officer was not permitted to initiate an abort, but by relaxing on the back pressure he was deemed to have effectively aborted the takeoff after liftoff :ooh:

It just about did in their case - certainly led to the illusion the aircraft would not fly... and the resulting overrun and hull loss.

It's a difficult call, as the report states... but as quoted above, there is no training in stall recoveries on liftoff, and very difficult to devise a drill that covers all situations...

NoD

DEAR NIGEL ON DRAFT:

My airline trained for takeoff departure stalls to recognize the stall and apply firewall power / flaps 15

my airline is a very large airline and you may e mail me for more details.

I still recall performing this as part of my checkride in the sim.

Facts: zero flaps/slats take off attempt. Cnfig Warning did not work. Question: can FDR determine if the flap/slat lever was moved out of the "up" position? In other words has the possibility been ruled out already that the crew in fact could have set the flaps/slats correctly but that the flaps failed to operate followed by forgetting to check the FPI. In our company (I fly Avro) it is customary to check the correct setting by calling: FLAPS (NUMBER) (points to T/O datacard), SET (points to flap lever position) AND CHECKED (points to FPI).

Maybe slat deployment should be made fully automatic below some defined speed and/or above a certain AoA. The Tiger Moths I've flown have such slats over which the pilot has no control. I believe this design feature was included to protect student pilots from themselves.

selected or not
 

If the slats were in the up position you can with the most certainly say the lever were in up position.This aircraft slat is controlled by a single drum dual actuator mechanism mounted in the aft center wing box section.This unit the is linked to each slat section with VERY thick control cables that via a simple solution with wires and pulleys from both sides actually pulling the the slat either in or out and they are all linked together unlike say a 737. Thats why no separate slat section indicator is needed like the 737.If one is going out ALL is going out if not a catastriophic failure accured to the cotrolcable system. That is highly highly unlikely though, basicly non existant if looking on how its constructed. The good thing of an old wires and pulley aircraft is that you can be very sure of the inputs done from cockpit actually is gonna happen in the back no matter what.It weighs but sure as hell.
And that the wires from the leaver to the mid section of the aircraft should be broken off without any notice in feeling of flap handle is even that highly unlikly-Just basicly never happens

Regards

Wings 1011

@wings1011
Someone told me that the MD in air mode doesn't have steering, neumatic from the APU neither TO mode. Is that correct?

The judge in charge of the judiciary investigation will hear personally the CVR recordings tomorrow at CIAIAC's facilities.

He is not going to call any more witnesses or experts until the commissions preliminary report is finalized and becomes public, probably monday.

It is natural for pilots to try to think up a way to salvage a bad situation.

One suggestion in this accident thread is that perhaps lowering the nose to build airspeed in ground effect and/or select flaps might just have saved the day. Simulator trials by the investigation may well address that tactic, but achievable climb gradient is a major factor. Hitting an obstacle at high speed is a bad thing whether in the ground or in the air.

The bigger question is how a presumably well trained and conscientious crew missed this one.

First world air carriers do extremely well. That record perhaps breeds an expectation that you and your crew mates don't make mistakes while in fact you and they are people like anybody else who can screw up at unpredictable moments.


Errare humanum est never goes away.

In this post, and others. pichu17 talked about some aspects of air/ground sensing on the MD-80.

It appears that different functions that change behaviour between air and ground are controlled by individual relays triggered by nosegear (un)compression. So if one or more of them fail, there is no global "in the air"-condition, but some functions behave in their air mode, and others in their ground mode.

So, given that, as per above post,

- ground sensing for both RAT probe heating and Take-off configuration warning is controlled by the same relay,
- Takeoff-configuration warning is inhibited in the air,
- and IF failure-in-air-mode of this relay was the reason for RAT probe heating on the ground
- and the relay as such was not fixed, but only the circuit breaker for RAT probe heating was pulled,

it follows that Takeoff configuration warning was inhibited.

Now if, for whatever reason, the flight crew did not select slats for take-off (others have calculated that flaps were probably not vital, a typical V2 being above slats-only stall speed), they would have been unaware of it during take-off.


Bernd

tiger Moth slats

other planes including some earlier jets had automatic slats. north american rockwell sabreliner 40 and 60...F86, A4

many planes had this nice feature...airspeed increased, slats retracted...based on springs!

ps

nigel, boeing flaps are really slow...douglas slats come out really fast. perhaps one reason boeing bought douglas. 2 seconds seems long for slats in this type.

Good - if it forms part of the airline's / State's training it can only help the crews.

Problem as I said above is where Airline / Manufacturer / State positively discourage some actions.

Out of interest, which type do you refer to? After all, if you planned a F20 takeoff (?) presumably you would not want to select F15?

The problem comes if, say, SOP is a F15 takeoff, then any "drill" that calls for F15 makes a presumption the crew may have omitted to select Flaps. In this case, if lack of Flaps/Slats was a factor, what if a F15 takeoff was planned? Would they even think to "select F15" since in their minds F15 was already set... etc.

I am unaware, in commercial aviation, of too many drills etc. designed around "coping" with serious crew / SOP errors. The "system" seems designed to prevent these in the first place - which has patently failed in the past, and may have again?

NoD

Nigel

I take it you don't fly douglas. to the best of my knowledge , flaps 20 takeoff can't be done. I don't think there is even a flaps 20 position.

I even checked and stalls in the clean configuration below FL250 may use slats for recovery.

To PPPilot
 

Sorry for not really understand you questions, but im trying to answer them as I understood them. Yes the APU bleed is not for flight use only for ground use-APU electrical power can be utilized in flight and also as an extra source of power (electrical) if needed. And yes the steering does not work in flight (if you were refering to nose wheel steering) but that is pure mechanical protected nothing electrical. That is for preventing the nose wheels turning inside the bay when up selected and then get stuck by structure inside.When the strut oleo springs out the planet gear is removed from gearsprockets making the steering cylinders move without bringing the gear strut with it (if I.e rudderinputs are made in flight, or steering tiller turned) -It all cames back to normal when gear is compressed again.Simple solution.
The T.O mode what you are asking about im not sure what you mean though ?? only thing I could think of were the T.O mode of the TRP (thrust rating pnl) and that is just working fine in Airmode.
Maybe You were suggesting how they could start the engines if the aircraft were in partly FLT mode ?? well simple as the APU bleed valve does not go under the same ground/fight relay as the other stuff mentioned earlier in this thread.

Regards

Wings 1011

No Springs
 

The A-4 and T-34 (Sabreliner) slats are purely aerodynamic. No springs.

Thanks Bernd. Gracie mile wings1011 I understand now the way it works

Ref post 1818 by wings1011, if you are referring to post #919, the notorious c/b was in, the fault was in the throttle position sensing as I recall.
Aircraft did not return to ramp, only turned off runway, then turned back on to runway. The checks were already completed "down to the line". The only problem was habit... turn off runway, retract flaps. Action not noticed by PF, who thought checks were still uncompromised.

I have heard the saying "habit can kill you" and I could not agree more.
Any time anything, however small, interrupts the expected flow of a procedure it is necessary to raise mental antenna immediately.

Classic example is a go-around.. I have seen myriad errors on go-around because two or three checklists follow in rapid fire ( especially engine-out), and things are not positioned where they normally would be. People tend to "see" what they expect or are accustomed to see, despite clear visual evidence to the contrary. Ask any trainer.

It seems the copilot was the one performing the take off.

He was 31, 2 years working at Spanair, as July 31st he had 1.276 hours of flying experience, 1.054 on the MD aircraft.

Pilot (38) had 5.776 hours on the MD-82. (over 10.000 h total flying experience). 9 years in Spanair, 10 years military rescue squad pilot.

DATA recorder has been found to have reliability problems registering data coming from one of the two on board flight computers. The cause of these problems is unkown yet.

WOW problem versus C/B or same?
 

NOD:

Thanks for the patience. I do fully understand that this was the actual cause and that the TOCW is a secondary hole in the cheese. I was just trying to understand WHY the TOCW failed.

As discussed already, the RAT probe temperature was a SYMPTOM and disconnecting the heating circuit would not solve the CAUSE. That appears to be that the A/C thought it was in flight mode, presumably because of a failure in the WOW switch?

My question was if the problem was with the WOW circuit, then the infamous C/B would appear to be a red herring. Unless it also is connected in the same circuit.

If simply the WOW switch it seem incredible that such a small failure can result in the loss of a critical system (TOCW).

Sorry if I am not making myself clear.

Though I have read almost the entire thread I am still confused:

Is it it either R2-5 closed or is it CB P40 opened that diables the TOCW.

Or is it that both can disable the TOCW?

As I read it R2-5 remained closed and left this particular line in flight mode. This heated the RAT probe and disabled the TOCW. Then P-40 was pulled that disabled the heater. But there are some references (DTW accident) that this would also have disabled the TOCW directly.

So the TOCW was disabled "twice" because of the flight mode AND the CB pulled?

Thanks for clarification.

Yawn.........

Good thread folks!
 

Just stepping back for a moment at page 93, I'd like to say that I'm very impressed with the way this thread has developed. Sure there's a lot of noise on it from people apparently following Farrell's guide and others flaming them, but in amongst that there's been a very intelligent and informed debate that has found its way to what looks like the same conclusion as the investigation impressively quickly. So well done PPRUNERs! :ok:

Yawn indeed... :=

But 3miles makes the point, inadvertantly maybe, that a system whose effects are possibly interconnected like this, is a system likely to be misunderstood... let us hope this was not such a case by a professional on the day.

The "political" "blaming" BS game keeps on going.

Seems Boeing did a "Flight Operations Support" to Spanair between Nov 5 and 14th 2007, and declared Spanair procedures "excellent" as well as the degree of compliance by their crews, pointing out that the degree of coordination (CRM) between crew within Spanair "exceeded world standards".

Some CIAIAC members have resigned after what they consider is excesive "blaming" of Spanair for not following Boeing's recommendation of TOWS alarm verification prior to each flight issued 21 year ago after Detroit's accident, which, let's remember again, was neither mandatory anywhere in the world nor was ever made known to Spanair.

Those members feel that more "blame" (another way to say "more important in the circunstances leading to the accident") was the de-energizing of the TOWS system itself (i.e. why the TOWS didn't work to begin with).

In another words, they feel that, after the pilots themselves, Boeing is next contributor to the cause of the accident for the TOWS failure itself (not easy to detect without specific testing) and the failure to warn Spanair to update their testing procedures (where TOWS would've been found inoperative and the plane not fit to fly, as it's MEL).

You Mad Dogs out there: did/do you have to check TOWS before each flight by you companie's procedures?

For almost 5 hours the judge in charge of the judiciary investigation (and a judicial secretary and the general attorney) have been listening to the CVR recordings, in a process more difficult than anticipated. Within a few days, the relevant transcripts will be once again checked against the actual recordings by a judicial secretary and then will be incorporated to the judiciary investigation. No more actions are expected from the judge until he receives a copy of the preliminary CIAIAC's report, probably on Monday.

This finalised preliminary report will include any new proven facts / clarifications plus alegations to the draft made by parties involved (manufacturers, safety regulation bodies, operators, ...) to which the draft was made available a couple of days ago.

So far it seems that at some point somehow, the copilot, who is the one that performed the take-off, does call the flaps and slats to be in place (i.e. "slats ok, flaps ok" ... exact wording not known by me yet).

Quality of the voice on the recording (crew's channels) is quite low (I don't know why, but pbbly will be blamed on post-accident damage). Other channels have better audio quality.

So it seems it was either a rotten checklist challenge response or some malfunction that made him think the flaps were out, but they didn't deploy (less likely, of course).

Over years C/B modified
 

Several slots prior, question about CB#'s alluding to the P-40 C/B cited in the DTW AAR:
In the past decades, several customers have modified circuit breaker panels, and in some cases that old # P40 CB is now elsewhere (various systems have had CB mod's).

Video Now Available
 

Not much to see really.

Video: Así fue el accidente de Barajas : Vídeos en ELPAÍS.com

Sound is, apparently, from ATC calling (nervously; she confuses the runway where it happened) Security to see if they can pick it up on their cameras.

(I checked the last 3 pages of this thread to see if it had already been posted and found nothing. If it has been posted earlier, I apologize).

Video of the accident

"¡Ha habido un accidente en la cabecera de la 33 izquierda, creemos que de aviación!" · ELPAÍS.com

wings 1011
The DC10 has the same idea, the cable is nearly one inch diam.
Anyway one day in about 1982, a KLM DC10 turned up on our hangar ramp in BAH. Went out to see why and it had a Nbr 1 eng failure. I could put my head up in the hole and look into the combustion chamber. One of the HPT blades had sheared the main slat cable in two! Sort of auto slats with engine failure I suppose

Already in youtube and liveleak if anyone has trouble watching it from the source. The clip is from the airport security camera with audio from some airport ground personel close to the site that witnessed the accident and comunicated to airport security, I think.

In the audio, the person calling says they think there's been an accident, and are trying to relay what runaway they think it happened at. They are asked if they know if it was an airplane. She asks somebody else that seems to be the "real" witness, and answers that she is not sure but she thinks so and all they can really see is the smoke and flames. The person at the airport asks security to patch in a video feed from 36R urgently, and then she sees the smoke and goes: "Jeezz". It looks to her to be off the actual runaway. She says she'll call the fire squad. Meanwhile it's heard on the background how other worker's cars, tower, etc are also being called on in.

"Fortunately", the accident seemed to have happened very close to one of the firefighter's station. Two firefighters arrived within 4 minutes of the accident and pulled two survivors out of the water, one summerged to chin level with one arm trapped and unable to unbuckle and one unconcius (she wakes up, first thing she remembers she was being pulled up by her hair to keep her above water).

YouTube - Imagenes del accidente de Madrid "¡Ha habido un accidente en la cabecera de la 33 izquierda, creemos que de aviación!"

LiveLeak.com - SPANAIR ACCIDENT MADRID 2008 JK 5022

Got this from someone going by the name of Dogma.

I tire of this whole site sometimes but persevere because flight safety is so important..Whos been moderating this thread,...the human factors is the key to this accident but you can bet that the Spanish will focus a good part of the report on factors affecting possible pilot recovery(the stage after Vr)..Dogma suggests an abort which goes against the V1 go/nogo rule..however,I agree an abort would have been better than what was tried ..the rwy at MAD is exceptionally long..however,what on earth is wrong with lowering the nose,selecting flap(any flap,just to get you some slats),firewalling the engines,and then trying the rotation again...far better to use that long runway for that than a high-speed abort after Vr...

What can we learn...if you dont unstick at normal BA,check config..if config is okay,suspect perf miscalc..simply abort,youre below real V1/Vr..if config is not okay,firewall and get some slats out(any flap setting!!!)..if rwy permits,stay on it and delay rotation!

This can be demonstrated and taught in the sim so that it becomes a trained maneuver..the Lanzarote incident proves that instinct is part of the equation..pilots instinctively keep the nose just below stick-shaker and firewall thrust..if the cross-check at failure to unstick becomes part of our training,there is not so much dependency on instinct..From Vr + 3secs on,the Spanair pilots were simply relying on instinct..thats all they had in the bank..this scenario has played out in 2 major accidents and one incident(afaik) prior to the Spanair..why was the data not disseminated,why was the TOCW check not mandatory for every flight(airmanship),why was stall recovery after rotation not trained,why was training not given on reasons for failure to unstick,why was the MD/s unreliable/vulnerable air-ground system not emphasized to crews and engineers alike..if the relay cb was pulled disabling the TOCW,where is the AD warning crews of this hazard...