Considering that about half of the passengers were residents of Las Palmas and at least a few others were non-tourist residents of Madrid/Mainland, I would certainly not classify this flight as "loaded with tourists heading on a holiday".

But, of course, news reporters usually know more (and better) than we do. And that's not to say that Las Palmas receives some 5 million visitors a year, so indeed many of those passengers were likely tourists.

If the sources quoted had real access to FDR CVR they would know for sure if the TO alarm went off or not.

To me it looks like a lot of press has been reading these threads and reporting.

I, for that matter, have found an article in a major spanish newspaper that quoted MY OWN EXACT WORDS from this thread. About 60% of that article I would consider my own words. Didn't even bother to change them.

And I didn't get paid for the article. Some woman reporter did.

While I guess we all understand the need for the press to come up with news items, it's them who have to feed forums like this, were we just especulate and try to come up with likely causes so that others can learn and hopefully find ways to avoid it.

But until those with access to the real data speak, that's all we do. Speculate and learn from other's "wild" ideas.

The press shouldn't feed FROM this forum. Totally on the contrary, the press should feed this forum.

Can we rely upon the Wall Street Journal publishing an accurate report not available from a formal source?

Another set of pictures of the accident, some are new:

Los restos del avión de la tragedia de Barajas - 20minutos.es

GPWS and flaps
 

Maybe I'm wrong here but, if the ground/air-logic would have been in air-mode, and therefor they didn't get a config-warning, wouldn't the GPWS still be shouting 'TOO LOW FLAPS' (aircraft 'airborne' with gear down but no landing-flaps set)?:ooh:

It seems to me the signs have been pointing pretty obviously to a flapless take-off since the earliest, but some were getting hung up on stalling engines and alleged engine fires, which were secondary factors, not primary. A very sobering set of pictures- awful to think 160 odd people were left mangled in that wreckage. One must spare a thought for the rescuers who had to trawl through it desperately looking for signs of life and how deeply this sort of thing must affect any human. I don't know how they can do it.

False Reporting
 

If a reporter submitted a story that says the flight recorders revealed certain information and it turns out that that is false, the reporter should be fired.:mad:

Which is why they don't write that. They write things like "sources... say... the flight recorders revealed". As long as a source did say that, you can get away with a lot, allegedly.

And sources can of course be "somone on the internet" these days...:\

Air/Ground shift sensor
 

On the MD80 (and all DC9's) the aircraft shifts to air mode with nose strut extension.

In fact, just the other day we had a MD80 that had several strange symptoms (inappropriate probes being heated, ART not arming, etc.) and when I performed the external preflight the nose strut was overserviced to the point the scissors was almost completely extended. Therefore the aircraft thought it was in the air and activated some systems not on the main gear switch.

It would be difficult to load a MD80 aft enough to get the nose light with a 160 seat configuration, when I flew charter MD80's we were almost always nose heavy if we had anything besides the aft cargo bin loaded.

doodah:(

I don't know how it is handled in Spain. In Germany firefighters, paramedics, policemen and other rescuers learned (and frequently repeat) how to handle big crash or crime scenes and there is a general structure of how to organize themselves and their work.
So training is the first step not to feel helpless and lost, everyone knows his duties and has to concentrate on that.

The uniform provides some protection because it is not "you", the human beeing, it is the firemen, the paramedic, "your function" which takes part in that scene. And don't forget that no one fights alone, you are sourrounded by a team of other specialists.

Rescuers should be taken out of the scene early, "fresh" collegues should send in frequently. That was one of the biggest problems of 9/11 when NYFD could not change folks in time, they just lost so much firefighters...

Nevertheless there also is a lot of general education regarding psychic reactions before you start working as rescuer, everyone gets instructed once again after returning from the crash scene. Specialists take the rescuers immediately to a quiet place without public or media, but to eat and drink something, and to talk about what happens. Again everyone is instructed what could happen to him, what feelings, thoughts and dreams could occur. They were told that everything is a quite normal reaction to an absolut unnatural experience.

There are always psychologists who can be contacted 24/7 on the following days, everyone is invited not to hesitate to contact them, and some moore meetings for every rescue team take place in the followings days. People can talk about their thinking, how they feel, the "instructors" also check who needs special assistance.

From experience we know that some people, confronted with the most horrible scenes, do not develop any kind of problems, whereas other ones encounter heavy disturbance even if they had easy jobs obviously.

And now that the WSJ dared to "print" such an article, all the press in Spain is quoting them adding their own little "twists" to the story to make it fit better a "mechanical" (electrical) malfunction and downplay the pilots (potentially) forgetting to set wing configuration correctly for take-off.

So it's now "An electrical malfunction caused the accident".

I have the gut feeling that a lot of what's been said in the press lately originates here, distorted to their own agendas, and not the other way around ... :uhoh:

Many even point to stuff like "according to the WSJ, the ailerons didn't deploy because of an electrical malfunction..."

How horribly can the "truth" be distorted? (And in this case, it's not even the truth ... it's just some potential truth given by the WSJ article).

Of course, accidents like this, where there is not a single major cause such as a big explosion, must usually have more than "one cause".

If the scenario is "bad wing configuration by the pilots", usually there is another minor cause(s) on why they didn't notice on time or why they weren't able to recover on time. This secondary minor cause can be anything in this case. From a blown warning horn (unlikely), to having the alarms disconnected on purpose by the crew, to having them inavertedly disconnected by maintenance technicians, to having any other malfunction on the plane that made them not go-off (ground sensors, front geat maintenance, etc).

But that's, obviously, something nobody should rely on. Anything electrical can break at any time. 99% of the cause of an accident like that (and I'm not saying the Spanair one was, this is just theoretical) would be the failure of both pilots to check and double check, as they are required to do, the main two or three configuration parameters vitals to achieving take-off.

As many have pointed out here, until humans are removed from that process, these kind of accidents WILL CONTINUE TO HAPPEN. Because no matter how many alarms, etc, one designs, they can always be bypassed (disconnected or even ignored) by the human part of the equation. They can also malfunction and the malfunction be ignored, MEL, or just not noticed. Also, they could happen to fail exactly at the time they were needed (nothing sensible can be done in that case).

And as someone mentioned before, we have all gone through situations where we could've sworn over our dead bodies that we did something we simply forgot to do.

It's "nobody's fault". It happens to everyone. Obviously nobody is going to blame you for forgetting to flip a switch once in 20 years. But hopefully, you are not working on a nuclear plant and your mistake can be corrected on time if everybody else is alert.

We can make extremely redundant warning systems that will make these accidents unlikely. But once, every say 30 years, someone will find a way to (not fully aware, of course) try to complete a take-off with the wrong wing configuration one way or another ... Think Chernobyl.

Re post No. 1458 (new set of pictures)
 

The creek on pic No.8 looks pretty deep so it could be both the life saviour and killer for those unconscious...

justme69, with all due respect for the excellent job you are doing providing us with diligent translation of Spanish press reports, I have following remarks:

You have begun by saying that you have no aviation background and you are only translating what the Spanish media reports about the accident but eventually you ended up inserting your personal evaluations of what is “likely” and what is “unlikely” and what is “highly unlikely” into your translations and making pretty bold statements like "99% of the cause of an accident like that.. [].. would be the failure of both pilots to check and double check..[]..the main two or three configuration parameters vitals to achieving take-off" and “until humans are removed from that process, these kind of accidents WILL CONTINUE TO HAPPEN” though making it look like it is not you who is saying this but “As many have pointed out here” (I’ve been reading this thread from post No.1 and never saw anybody implying that), all of which finally culminated in a bringing in Chernobyl as a comparison, which is not quite relevant, to say the least (I'd been living in Kiev, a city some 100 km odd from Chernobyl so we know all there is to know about that tragedy, trust me on my word).

It would be perfectly OK since many folks here are making statements and evaluations without having “aviation background” behind them had it not been for the fact that you have been viewed here as the valuable first-hand renderer of Spanish media reports, which are not accessible to most of us here since few here know English and Spanish equally good as you do. So my perception of your posts is now sort of messed up because I now have difficulty telling “media words” from “justme69’s words” (the former at least being an attempt to look authoritative ‘coz they cite some insider sources close to the investigation and the latter just being a personal opinion of a person who “is not a pilot, not a traffic controller, not an aviation engineer” as you said yourself in the beginning).


Again, with all due respect and thanks for your huge effort to provide us with accurate translation of the Spanish media reports.

Hi

I've seen landing gear marks at the right of he runway, in the ILS rwy 18R GP restricted area. After that, the plane smashed two small perimeter road fences and .... I couldn't see far away !.
I couldn't see also marks of a tail hit, but the tail cone was found in that area near the runway ( see or identify, maybe I can't identify ptroperly ).

But, I can remember that I've seen also photos here, related about what I'm speaking for.

And yes, in the CIAIAC web page there is only the reference of the accident, but in about fifteen days we'll have a preliminary report, they said.

BR

The evolution of this case is typical of many aircraft incidents. Everybody is rushing to point fingers (Media in the first place) without letting the course of the investigation reach it's end.

It started with engine fire/explosion then with reversers and finally wrong take-off configuration.

It's understandable that everyone want answers, know. But, the pilots in this forum should know better how these things work. I know that I'm wrong assuming that everyone who writes in here is a professional pilot, but I tend to assume it is or at least has a profound knowledge about aviation subjects.

I believe this accident is going to give us even more surprises...


Check Six , krueger...:ok:

Chinese Whispers!
 

Virgin Media have lifted the Wall streets journals story for their news website and are now saying that the FDR "confirms" that the flaps were not set!! Well glad they have cleared that one up for us!!! :ugh:

John Farley,

Thank you for your excellent reply

SevenStrokeRoll

Yes, I completed the shampoo checklist again. I also usually check the door at least twice.

TM

zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

Last year there was a similar incident, almost an accident as this one, at Lanzarote in Canary Islands with a MD-83 involved. Aircraft took off from Lanzarote and suddenly lost altitude, came close to the only highway on the island by 5-10 meters of the ground and finally got enough speed to climb. Would be a similarity in both cases due to a fail in Take off warning configuration system? should all MD´s world fleet be inspected and grounded meanwhile? it´s already been done in the past with other aircrafts.

saying the crash was because the takeoff warning systems wasn't working is not quite right.

it is whether or not the slats/flaps were set

if the system were broken and the pilots set the slats/flaps everything would be ok

teachme, above, checks his door lock twice before going to sleep.

pilots should check slats/flaps alot more.

anyone here ever read "thirty seconds over tokyo", or see the movie? B25 bombers, taking off from the carrier USS Hornet? The author of the book, ted lawson, FORGOT to set his flaps for takeoff...he was the only one of 16 bombers (which were never designed for carrier use) and his plane almost crashed.

this was in 1942.

when I was a boy of about 12, I read this book and even then I understood how important flaps were. (especially ironic, as lawson helped design the wing flaps for the b19 experimental bomber)

First lawsuit, against Boeing:

Families sue Boeing over Madrid air crash (1st Lead)

If the take off configuration warning works properly the crew will have taken action, ergo... although the AC were not correctly configured for TO is obvious, in my opinion, that the accident occurs because the CWAS failure, any other way the crew will abort TO.

Acc spanish media:
Video: La caja negra del JK 5022 demuestra que los pilotos chequearon el avión antes del despegue : Vídeos en ELPAÍS.com

Captain checked flaps / Slats : 'slats flaps ok'. Data obtained from CVR.

Investigation team are focusing on two different items:

1.- TR failure
2.- Flaps FAILURE

It seem GPWS and STALL warnings were audible, why not wrong TO config?

Green dot,

I'm not sure but from you rlast post regarding the reverser unlocked lights and ART fire lights I get the feeling you are trying to say that the ART fire light is bright but the TR unlock lights aren't. But here's the quote once more.....

It says here that the ART and slat lights are visible when looking directly at them, but not as bright as the TR unlock lights which are much brighter and (might I add) more than twice as big.

If that is the same message you were trying to convey, my apologies.


Xander

EDIT: I feel the need to make myself clear about the "glow in the corner of your eye" term. By that I mean that they are bright enough to let you know they are illuminated even though you aren't looking at them. In other words pretty bright.

Crew Checked Slats / Flaps for TO
 

Video: La caja negra del JK 5022 demuestra que los pilotos chequearon el avión antes del despegue : Vídeos en ELPAÍS.com

According this media, as data obtaneid from CVR crew did the before take off checklist was completed by the crew. The captain said: "'slats flaps ok."

Investigation team is dealing with two different options:

- TR failure
- Flaps FAILURE

Agreed.The TOCW functional check is done during preflight and checked in the BEFORE START checklist.I am guessing the FIRST OFFICER does the initial cockpit set-up.The BEFORE START checklist is then read by the FIRST OFFICER with the CAPTAIN responding.Here is a generic MD80 BEFORE START checklist.

BEFORE START

Preflight Check COMPLETED
FDR Entry SET
Cabin Press SET
Fuel __ Kgs / PUMPS SET
No Smoke ON
Seat Belts ON
Pitot Heat CAPTAIN
Position, Logo & Wing Lights SET
VHF Nav Radios SET
DFGS PILOT FLYING & SET
Fuel Used RESET
Engine Instruments CHECKED
Fire Warning System CHECKED
Gear Door Open Light OFF
GPS SET
Nav / Radio Switch RADIO
Takeoff Warning Throttles CHECKED / IDLE
ADF & Comm Radios SET
Rudder & Aileron Trims ZERO
Takeoff Briefing COMPLETED
--------PAPERS ON BOARD-----------
PMS SET
CG & Flap Wheels ___ / ___, SET
Stabilizer Trim ____, SET
Flap Takeoff Selector ____ SET or STOWED
Zero Fuel Weight _____ Kgs / SET
ART, TRP & Assumed Temperature SET
Speed Bugs & Acceleration Altitude SET
Auxiliary Hydraulic Pump ON for Push back



Two possible scenarios to consider:
A)TOCW functional check performed with aircraft in ground mode(ie prior boarding/loading=no aft CG=weight on wheels).Check is satis.
B)TOCW check omitted.Captain assumes pre-flight items completed and answers "CHECKED,IDLE" based on this assumption.Captain performs subsequent "nuisance" TOCW check(his way of x-checking the functional check) during taxi but aircraft is now in air mode so it remains silent which is what he is looking for.Trap is set.

LUALBA;
IF - I repeat IF - what the media has reported is true, I have the following remarks on your post:

To say that the TWAS failure is the primary cause of the accident is not true; if the pilots had selected the right flaps there wouldn't have been an accident - regardless of wether the TWAS was functioning or not. Please keep in mind that 99,99% (or there about) of all TO with the MD-80 are done without any TWAS warning and in most cases the pilots would not know if the system is working or not - because they've set the right configuration. I do agree that the absens of a TWAS warning might be a contributing factor in this becoming an accident.

Regarding GPWS and Stall they are designed so give warnings to the pilots in the air - not on ground (I don't know the MD-80 systems enough to know if the warnings are inhibited on ground or not).
The TWAS is configured to only give a warning when the plane is on ground, and thus a faulty ground/air switch in the nose gear (as has been suggested and explained in this thread elequantly) and the plane "belived" it was in the air the TWAS would be inhibited.

I would strongly recommend that you read through the thread - there is a bundle of accurate information from professionals to learn from.

Regards,

MjA

In response to post 1475:

Your source:
The MD-82 has a speech system. The warning would be "CONFIG SLATS, CONFIG FLAPS", if they'd forgotten to set them at all.

If the slats were set but not the flaps, you get "CONFIG FLAPS" on it's own. This would be very apparent in the CVR, too.

This looks like second-hand information. Here we have a guy unconnected to the investigation commenting on second-hand reports coming out of the WSJ? This isn't news!


ECAM Actions.

xkoote,

This goes to show how written text can be subject to interpretation. I honestly read "the glow in the corner of your eye . . ." to mean less brilliant than the ART fire light and the slat takeoff light as you explained they are clearly visible in daylight (when you are looking at them).

Thanks for clearing the issue, at least i have learned now that the TR unlock lights on the MD8x aircraft won't go unnoticed when they illuminate.


Regards,
Green-dot

Hi,

I think it is important to realize that it doesn´t matter how long one is flying an aircraft type and how experienced one is - the checklist should always be used, even if you memorized it completely and do the procedures for years.

Bernie

MAYOR ATTACH wrote:

"To say that the TWAS failure is the primary cause of the accident is not true; if the pilots had selected the right flaps there wouldn't have been an accident - regardless of wether the TWAS was functioning or not."


I'm completly agree, I never said "primary cause". If flaps/slats are not properly set for TO is under crew functions. So you have to addmit also that it's true that if the take off congifuration warning warns ( Terrain Awareness and Warning System ) then the crew will abbort TO.

Concerning the GPWS and stall warnings: According spanish media those warnings are audible ( from data from CVR ). IF ( I repeat IF ) tha take off configuration warning did not sound and the stall and GPWS did, maybe, just maybe, means that the system was "working" properly...

On AIB, TO Warnings:

CONFIG
. SLATS/FLAPS NOT IN T.O CONFIG: Aural warning ( CRC ), master light - MASTER WARNING

When?

A/C not in TO configuration when thrust levers are set at TO, or Flex TO, or when pressing TO CONFIG. pb.

True, but.....
That "works" in the perfect-pilot-world, and there is no.

All SLF want/expect to fly in a perfect maintained a/c. and normally they are well maintained! SLF have no clue about MEL-items and so on.
They, SLF, are the first to complain and sue BUT ALSO THE FIRST AND LAST TO SWITCH THEIR MOBILES ON AND OFF!

And yes, I have seen pilots operate without using their checklist........:*

Predictably this thead is going to swing back over to a single cause/blame whether it be engines, reversers or now taking off with the wrong configuration.

The professionals on this forum recognize the concept of the layers of swiss cheese between a single cause and an accident. albeit some want to always argue the primary cause is the first layer and that's all she wrote.

Again, the purpose of accident investigation is prevention, so of course the most important thing in all this is what is going to be done now along those lines.

I learned a long time ago that all one can do is minimize, you really can't eliminate many causal factors. Crew error like configuration botches have been with us for a long time and will remain with us forever. The issue then is to look at the various layers of cheese to find out what assumption under the regulations were made in the statistical error rate (including latent or hidden failures) in any of these layers. My tendancy is to identify that layer that is furthest out of wack with the design/certification assumptions as the one that needs the most attention.

So I will sit back and read this thread to see if anybody has identified failure rates of all the parts of the system (including crew) in this accident.

As usual, some of this report on the spanish press doesn't seem, well, all the accurate one would want. Whenever there is a comment on my side, I will write in in parenthesis. Otherwise, is a verbatim translation. When it doesn't quite make sense or it is ambigous, it's because it was also so in the original text.

"The commander checked the equipment with his copilot and expressly said: 'slats flaps, ok' That means that he did check the position on the sustaining devices on the wings was the correct one for take off. The investigating commision has paid much attention to this fragment of the conversation extracted from the black box to find out if the pilot correctly configured the airplane.(Can't they figure this out cathegorically from the FDR?) The degree of inclination on the flaps requires a specific speed to take-off. Assuming the pilots didn't forget something as essential, investigators are wondering if the flaps could've failed. The mechanism activates from a switch (lever), if it fails there is a 'watch' (gauge) that indicates its real possition. A redundant system fires an alamr sound if the configuration is wrong. It would've whistled even before take-off and the pilot would've aborted the operation.

¿Could then the alarm system have also failed? It would be rare because when the plane took off it did work; two sound alarms warned on the impact against the ground and the lack of sustenability. (That's what it says)

It was 15 terrible seconds (previously reported as 7 seconds) that the comission is trying to bring light to. So far, the only evident thing is that the airplane didn't have the neccesary speed for take-off.

One research team in checking the possibility that the flaps failed and another failure on the engine reverser (singular but ambigous) that could've activated taking away thrust from the engines."


(This last sentence doesn't make perfect grammatical sense in spanish, it was probably meant to be that two different teams are looking into each scenario, rather than one team looking into both "failures")

And that's it for the translation. Now, on my own words, I'm just wondering who exactly wrote that piece of news, since if they were so close to the investigation's commision they would've certainly know by now, through the FDR, if the reverser deployed or not, what speed/thrust settings they were using, how long rotation took, etc.

Edit: It seems the information comes from a news piece by news agency atlas/efe, possibly from insights from the official college of pilots of Spain.

Also, FWIW, some more reviewed "wild" estimates by the press on the airplane height before going down: 10m

Some more tidbits:

-The maintenance technician that did the probe's heater "repair" went back in front of the judge to answer questions about the reverser (indeed locked out of service) and "some other even smaller malfunctions" that the plane had, all of them compatible with the fit-to-fly status.

-The only "direct" witness of the whole accident, a ground worker (those "follow me" car drivers) declares the usual "airplane taking a long time to take off", "briefly airborne rolling steeply left and right", "falling to the ground nearby losing its course", "dissapearing from his sight" (into terrain levels). He doesn't mention any "flashes" or "fires" or excessive yaw, etc on this news piece. But previously, he is quoted as saying (to the police, rather than to the judge) "I was next to Terminal 4S and saw the white MD rolling steeply, first to the right. The left engine caught in fire, spitting out some flashes. Then the airplane did some yaw, nose went up and fell down. Then some dust and finally an explosion."

This last piece of news goes on saying that the newspaper (La Razón) consulted specialist sources that wanted to say that those "flames" or "flashes" that the worker claims to have seen can be considered normal in this type of airplane during take-off with the engines working at high throttle.

-Police also wants to interview a truck driver that possibly witnessed the fall as well (he is outside of Spain for the time being).

el # wrote:
QUOTE
How on earth can anyone know? These things are usually decided after lengthy trials in court, do you realize that? Or you was just so curious and bored at the same time that went to the extreme of reading 1500 posts and register just for asking that ?
UNQUOTE
I hope you may read more carefully other kind of papers...
Although I have never posted any comments I joined the forum half a year before yourself.:ugh:
What is really awkward is to place a non-based opinion as a fact, trying to teach everyone and at the same time to belittle someone´s comment on a main issue :=
I wonder if you are so well-informed and familiar to insurance procedures as to briefly justify what you say about compensations, just for the sake of illuminating all of us, poor ignorants...

possible scenario of accident
 

Hi

I just wrote a long story of something that could be interesting but it disappeared somehow. Just to make it shorter, Our company did have an simailar incident last year at Lanzarote canary island while taking off with an MD83. After rotation experienced stall and 50 deg bank left and then recovering and then right 50 deg. This whent on for a few times back and fwd and somehow manage to get the aircraft stable with selecting gear up and just continue towards the slow hill at about 100 ft of altitude. Crew then found out flap handle in up position. How was that possibe ?? This is an officilal NTSB report and they found c/b -L/H GND CTRL RLY OUT when landed safely. What did cause that ??
Due to engineer performing their daily check and pulling this c/b to be able to check the strobe lights working on GND. A Std procedure since decades on the type among engineers worldwide.
This C/B does a few things it does:Put the aircraft partly artificially in FLT mode and does put the RAT sensor heating on and turn the avionic FAN off and the cabin recirculation fan off. This is normally easliy spotted is inside cockpit when turning systems off but potentially could be missed if systems already off ( i.e c/b already pulled when entering cockpit).
Going back to the accident aircraft they reported to have had problems with RAT probe heating and came back first time. And the engineer on duty just HIL the item without understaning why it actually had broken. Its by no coincident that just that probe is broken, thats the only one controlled by WOW (weight on wheels) and heating is turned on when a/c is airborne or the famous L/H GND CTL RLY c/b is pulled. The probe will soon go to ovht then fail. At the end of the day it could have been on for hours depending on when the last daily were performed prior flight.
Second thing they reported thrust rating problems, that is also no coincidence since the RAT probe is sensning current OAT and is controlling thrust setting in FLEX and other modes and if probe heat is on it will soon go to a 100 deg celcius and the the thrust management system will think all is crazy since it it sensing a 100 deg outside and the TRP will for sure go to "NO MODE" without anybody understanding why.
The famous C/B L/H GND CTRL RLY also does controll the take off warnig system of the MD80 aircraft that ofcourse means if it is pulled the take off warning system will NOT work. Then It is ofcourse possible to takeoff without flap and slap extended and NO warning will be coming on. I hope you do understabd my plaussable scenariao.
Just one of those flights when all went terrible wrong crashing with a almost perfectly working aircraft in almost perfect weather.Very sad !
What saved our aircraft compared to the Spanair one is the the MD83 is smoking the JT8D-219 and not the -217 mounted on most of the 82s and with less weight of the day and some slope ahead keeping the GND effect for a few moments and everybody alive.
Fellow guys-reading checklist properly and always and less complacancy with proper system knowlege saves LOTS of life.

My story anyway and I do think the MD 80 is an absolutely fantastic aircraft-most people killed in it did not for some reason follow the rules. By NO means saying that the Spanair guys didnt since no officilal report is made. This is just my own conclution and a possible scenario based on 17 years of experience on type and hopefully just some good analyzing

Ps. for you guys in the left seat of the MD80 pls have a closer look just behind your left shoulder if that famous C/B is pushed in, it could potentially have the different of coming down in one pice or in millions...
and you cold bet you sweet ass on that this particular C/B is pulled every single day on every MD 80 operator aound the globe so just make sure its IN before ju start !!!

Fly high


L1011

Using Circuit Breakers as Switches. HERE.

“One thing I note continuously throughout Apollo is the way they cycled circuit breakers, often as a matter of routine operations. In my experience with aircraft systems, circuit breakers are considered as protective devices that should not be used as a switch to turn systems on and off. While it may be acceptable for maintainers to open breakers to make a system safe for maintenance, it is not standard practice for pilots to cycle breakers. We would only put it into a checklist reluctantly, and only if no other way exists to turn off a system. Since the circuit breaker plunger is held in mechanically, repeatedly cycling it can wear it out. For a system or component that is required to be turned on and off, a Power switch should be used, with a circuit breaker also in the circuit for protection".

Also - From SR111 Canadian Report. HERE.

1.18.5.4 Circuit Breakers Used as Switches

The use of CBs as switches, either by design, or as a consequence of the system's in-service performance, is not recommended. The FAA guidance on this issue is contained in AC 43.13-1B and states "Circuit breakers...are not recommended for use as switches. Use of the circuit breaker as a switch will decrease the life of the circuit breaker."

Report late
 

05-06-2007. OE-LMM. McDonnell-Douglas MD83. Aeropuerto de Lanzarote (Las Palmas) - CIAIAC - Ministerio de Fomento

wings1011 - thx for the insight on OE-LMM. Had the final official report been out every MD driver would have been much more alert about the critical relevance of the CB and the necessity to check it's pushed. This comes back to critical deficiency and human factor training derived from incidents/accidents. The report not being out by now gives only few hope that the investigation on Spanair will be fast.

Btw and OT - anybody ever heard back from Kenya 737-800 in Douala?

@wings1011


Good research! Sounds very logical....

When I flew the MD83 one of our setup procedures was to advance the thrust levers prior to engine start and test the CAWS (Central Aural Warning System). If it worked properly, we would hear a "BEEP BEEP FLAPS, BEEP BEEP SLATS, etc". At the time, I thought of it as a rather rudimentary test procedure but I can't help but think it may have broken the chain here.

WSJ
 

I am making no comment as to causes probable or otherwise. But in relation to the WSJ I can state that one is dealing with a completely different kind of newspaper from any of the papers in either Spain or the UK. The WSJ even now it is owned by the Dirty Digger is a very serious operation.

If the Journal writes a story with this degree of certainty it is true. They will have talked to someone connected with the investigation, the fact checkers will have confirmed that the individual concerned was in a position to know and was not some wannabe. The conversation will either have been taped or contemporaneously noted.

At a rough thought I would guess the source is in the US part of the team but purely hypothesis on my part

Thank you wings1011. That clears up a lot of questions I had related to my post:

http://www.pprune.org/4370893-post1443.html

Again, warning everyone that this is just "rumors" I'm talking about here and that I have NO specific knowledge on the aviation industry, it seems that another sign of these types of WOW sensor related malfunctions is, as described, automated flight control systems ("computers") may "act weird" when they receive grossly (over the limit) temperature readings from the outside air temperature sensor (due, i.e., to the heater being on while on ground for a long time on a hot day).

The first reports that I heard is that the pilots "felt" like the engines were "accelerating and deccelerating" erratically-quickly during take off (a real bad time for this to happen). At first, it was thought it could've been some malfunction with the autothrottler, it was rumored.

Wings1011 explanations makes it all look much clearer now. Is there a way to check what the probe's reading is in the cabin? If so, a sanity check could also be a good idea?

Obvioulsy the Spanair pilots noticed either the "impossible" temperature reading or some other sign that made them know there was something wrong with the "heat probe".

In other, more automated airplanes, like I think some airbusses may be, what would happen if an automation-assisted take off is attempted and an air temperature probe gives, due to a malfunction, a temperature reading of say 8º when the actual temperature is 28º?