Spanair accident at Madrid
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"It is possible that someone familiar with this aircraft could tell by the photo (even without the markings) what the Stab Trim might have been."
That's between 8 and 10 degrees ANU.
That's between 8 and 10 degrees ANU.
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I am just wondering...
In these pictures
Lavanguardia.es=
That big green vertical part of the plane, isn't it the left semi plane of the wing? The square at the bottom I think is a vent for the fuel and the big hole under that... Is the Gear receptacle or for the flap? Cause it seems that the flaps are broken lying down that part.
In these pictures
Lavanguardia.es=
That big green vertical part of the plane, isn't it the left semi plane of the wing? The square at the bottom I think is a vent for the fuel and the big hole under that... Is the Gear receptacle or for the flap? Cause it seems that the flaps are broken lying down that part.
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beechnut
if even one young pilot learns to double check the flaps before takeoff and it saves one person 10 years from now, our posts have done their job.
I hope you will tell us who is the chaff and who isn't
if even one young pilot learns to double check the flaps before takeoff and it saves one person 10 years from now, our posts have done their job.
I hope you will tell us who is the chaff and who isn't
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Thanks Seven. There are other important items on my Beech besides flaps. Two critical ones are which fuel tank you are on for take-off (there must be a minimum of 8 gal. in the tank for take-off or go-around to avoid unporting the tank), and the boost pump. The manual does not recommend the use flaps for takeoff on my beast, but a post touch-and-go takeoff with full flaps still deployed will certainly bite (though not as bad as in a C150).
I will admit to being distracted and forgetting the boost pump. It's that sort of thing I want to improve on by a last minute go/no go check as one lines up, and that check is the most essential bit of info that I have learned in reading this thread; I had always stuck to the checklist, and the "last check for the wife and kids" idea never occurrred to me, sad to say. I've got around 600 hours which is IMHO the dangerous "complacency" zone.
Last week I was flying with my buddy to another field 20 min. away for fuel, with low but legal fuel reserves. One tank was just around 12 gal, the other below 8 gal (total capacity is 58 gal). I asked my friend what his procedure would be for a low-fuel takeoff and arrival. I had to walk him through it: takeoff on the fuller tank, climb to 1500, switch to the low tank for the short cruise, and leave the fuller tank available for a go-around at destination. He was just going to fly along on the fullest tank until destination. I'm trying to get him to work on procedure more (his stick-and-rudder flying is fine), and to think analytically and ahead of the airplane.
Anyway back to our regularly scheduled speculating.
I will admit to being distracted and forgetting the boost pump. It's that sort of thing I want to improve on by a last minute go/no go check as one lines up, and that check is the most essential bit of info that I have learned in reading this thread; I had always stuck to the checklist, and the "last check for the wife and kids" idea never occurrred to me, sad to say. I've got around 600 hours which is IMHO the dangerous "complacency" zone.
Last week I was flying with my buddy to another field 20 min. away for fuel, with low but legal fuel reserves. One tank was just around 12 gal, the other below 8 gal (total capacity is 58 gal). I asked my friend what his procedure would be for a low-fuel takeoff and arrival. I had to walk him through it: takeoff on the fuller tank, climb to 1500, switch to the low tank for the short cruise, and leave the fuller tank available for a go-around at destination. He was just going to fly along on the fullest tank until destination. I'm trying to get him to work on procedure more (his stick-and-rudder flying is fine), and to think analytically and ahead of the airplane.
Anyway back to our regularly scheduled speculating.
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Just like to clarify something more......
You have position lights, strobe lights and anti collision lights.
POS/STROBE (Strobes are the white flickering lights in the wingtips.)
OFF - Position lights are off, and the strobes will not activate when airborne.
POS - Position lights on, but no strobes after airborne. (used on some early model MD's not having this system connected to the ground shift.
BOTH - Position lights on and strobes on after airborne.
ANTI COLLISION ( Red lights on roof and belly of the plane) So this is what the fueler talked about.
On - Lights on
Off - Lights off
So the fueler just noted that the anti collision light switch was left in the on position, meaning that the after parking checklist was not performed either.
Somone asked regarding the reduction of thrust to idle if a reverser inadvertently deploys. This is not so on an MD, hence it is a memory item checklist. It is performed by heart. All you wil see is the yellow (and blue) reverser inter(lock) lights staring you in the face. Probably accompanied with some pretty nasty yawing and banking.
Xander
You have position lights, strobe lights and anti collision lights.
POS/STROBE (Strobes are the white flickering lights in the wingtips.)
OFF - Position lights are off, and the strobes will not activate when airborne.
POS - Position lights on, but no strobes after airborne. (used on some early model MD's not having this system connected to the ground shift.
BOTH - Position lights on and strobes on after airborne.
ANTI COLLISION ( Red lights on roof and belly of the plane) So this is what the fueler talked about.
On - Lights on
Off - Lights off
So the fueler just noted that the anti collision light switch was left in the on position, meaning that the after parking checklist was not performed either.
Somone asked regarding the reduction of thrust to idle if a reverser inadvertently deploys. This is not so on an MD, hence it is a memory item checklist. It is performed by heart. All you wil see is the yellow (and blue) reverser inter(lock) lights staring you in the face. Probably accompanied with some pretty nasty yawing and banking.
Xander
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Well don't give up PJ2, this PPL is finding the discussion enormously informative in my humble attempt to try to operate my spam can as professionally as possible.
If the media can't separate the wheat from the chaff and quote an eejit on here as the basis of their report it'll be them who ends up with egg on their face, not you or the vast majority of erudite contributors on here. I consider it a wonderful privilege to be able to take part and try not to make an arse of myself too often!
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Checklist discipline
Now here is an SOP that really is worthwhile,one of the very few.Good checklist discipline.
-Never rush a checklist.
-Never mumble your way through one.Annunciate.
-Stop the checklist if a procedure has to be performed.
-Wait for the response.Dont carry on until you hear it.
-Know the names of the checklists(NNC).
-Try not to continually prompt the skipper or PF for the checklist.Overtime,it can weaken their own self-discipline.They then rely on the prompt.Dallas crash.
-Announce checklist completion and any checklists that have to be subsequently performed.
-Know when to forego a NNC.There are situations where this is applicable.
-Know all memory items.Know SMOKE REMOVAL in its entirety.
-Never rush a checklist.
-Never mumble your way through one.Annunciate.
-Stop the checklist if a procedure has to be performed.
-Wait for the response.Dont carry on until you hear it.
-Know the names of the checklists(NNC).
-Try not to continually prompt the skipper or PF for the checklist.Overtime,it can weaken their own self-discipline.They then rely on the prompt.Dallas crash.
-Announce checklist completion and any checklists that have to be subsequently performed.
-Know when to forego a NNC.There are situations where this is applicable.
-Know all memory items.Know SMOKE REMOVAL in its entirety.
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C'mon agusaleale...the river is SO small
Beechnut;
Good handle...like it.
LOL...!
One post in the thousands can be worth much.
Like other airmen and aviation professionals here, my entire focus is learning, which, at once acknowledges another professional, while trying for the highest possible standards in actions. There is nothing unique about this: it is what aviation people do every day. Millions upon millions of unremarkable, safe departures every year speaks to this quiet commitment.
This fact is what naive, single-issue entries here like FSLF's fail utterly to respect and appreciate. This industry is indeed focussed on safety but must do it in a way that permits business to continue under the present de-regulated, political and economic environment. 'nuff said.
You have a terrific attitude and approach to aviation. Aviation rewards "recursive" behaviours..."did I do what I just did, correctly and was the action right?", repeated over and over again after each single action - done with a deliberate, paced approach. Never touch or action anything that is irreversible, without confirming with the other crew member - if alone, STOP - look again, then act. Revisit actions isn't doubting oneself - it is building a havit that will serve you well when you're absolutely beat or in a hurry and still have another trip. Be decisive and don't be talked out of something without good reasons - that's partly what CRM is about - the other part is being open until all crew members have know of, and have decided on a course of action when dealing with "the unusual". Be prepared, on strong evidence gained through experience and listening to others, to change decisions but don't change without knowing why and actually saying why (out loud, if alone) to yourself. The moment you are comfortable, look around...there is always something waiting. Trust your senses and belly but never, ever vary or abandon good standard operating procedures for something "ad-hoc" because of "special circumstances". When something goes wrong, immediately slow your thinking, your actions and your perceptions down as much as possible, especially in single-pilot work. Always have the courage of your sense of safety and do not be afraid to speak up when that sense tells you to. It may cost you a job or two but such an operator is not worth working for. I really meant it and wasn't being coy or flippant when I said "airline pilots earn a hundred-thousand dollars a minute but you'll never know which one"...while the salary's different to start, (most passengers would be astonished and dismayed at what the two guys up front are now paid...try "less than starting nurses and teachers" for an Embraer 190 job at a major carrier and not even a connector...), the words are the truth. I have had exactly four of those moments in 35 years and have had to make about 3, maybe four fundamentally-critical decisions each of those years - the rest is routine work, again, and I KNOW this is really nothing unusual or special...it's what everyone does who flies profesionally. It is certainly no more "dramatic" or other such fluffy crap that fills magazines and forums, than any other profession with similar responsibilities and requirements. The difference in aviation is, there is no place to park, light up a pipe and think, and, too many times, unlike other professions that succumb to human error, ours can cost us and our many charges, dearly. It is a fabulous, wonderful profession - the career is a roller-coaster ride today, but you know, it always has been. Today is no different than when I joined in '73. Always check six....
PJ2
Good handle...like it.
Anyway back to our regularly scheduled speculating.
One post in the thousands can be worth much.
Like other airmen and aviation professionals here, my entire focus is learning, which, at once acknowledges another professional, while trying for the highest possible standards in actions. There is nothing unique about this: it is what aviation people do every day. Millions upon millions of unremarkable, safe departures every year speaks to this quiet commitment.
This fact is what naive, single-issue entries here like FSLF's fail utterly to respect and appreciate. This industry is indeed focussed on safety but must do it in a way that permits business to continue under the present de-regulated, political and economic environment. 'nuff said.
You have a terrific attitude and approach to aviation. Aviation rewards "recursive" behaviours..."did I do what I just did, correctly and was the action right?", repeated over and over again after each single action - done with a deliberate, paced approach. Never touch or action anything that is irreversible, without confirming with the other crew member - if alone, STOP - look again, then act. Revisit actions isn't doubting oneself - it is building a havit that will serve you well when you're absolutely beat or in a hurry and still have another trip. Be decisive and don't be talked out of something without good reasons - that's partly what CRM is about - the other part is being open until all crew members have know of, and have decided on a course of action when dealing with "the unusual". Be prepared, on strong evidence gained through experience and listening to others, to change decisions but don't change without knowing why and actually saying why (out loud, if alone) to yourself. The moment you are comfortable, look around...there is always something waiting. Trust your senses and belly but never, ever vary or abandon good standard operating procedures for something "ad-hoc" because of "special circumstances". When something goes wrong, immediately slow your thinking, your actions and your perceptions down as much as possible, especially in single-pilot work. Always have the courage of your sense of safety and do not be afraid to speak up when that sense tells you to. It may cost you a job or two but such an operator is not worth working for. I really meant it and wasn't being coy or flippant when I said "airline pilots earn a hundred-thousand dollars a minute but you'll never know which one"...while the salary's different to start, (most passengers would be astonished and dismayed at what the two guys up front are now paid...try "less than starting nurses and teachers" for an Embraer 190 job at a major carrier and not even a connector...), the words are the truth. I have had exactly four of those moments in 35 years and have had to make about 3, maybe four fundamentally-critical decisions each of those years - the rest is routine work, again, and I KNOW this is really nothing unusual or special...it's what everyone does who flies profesionally. It is certainly no more "dramatic" or other such fluffy crap that fills magazines and forums, than any other profession with similar responsibilities and requirements. The difference in aviation is, there is no place to park, light up a pipe and think, and, too many times, unlike other professions that succumb to human error, ours can cost us and our many charges, dearly. It is a fabulous, wonderful profession - the career is a roller-coaster ride today, but you know, it always has been. Today is no different than when I joined in '73. Always check six....
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 29th Aug 2008 at 23:14.
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PJ2,
Thank you for your postings that not only come with an orderly way of thinking, but also show your ability (and professional task I guess) to see things from a wider point of view.
Do not worry too much as about the constant whining about "speculations", these are part of an accident thread just like, speculations are.
Keep the good work, again I appreciate your contributions as well as from many others in this thread.
Thank you for your postings that not only come with an orderly way of thinking, but also show your ability (and professional task I guess) to see things from a wider point of view.
Do not worry too much as about the constant whining about "speculations", these are part of an accident thread just like, speculations are.
Keep the good work, again I appreciate your contributions as well as from many others in this thread.
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Posted by P2J,
I am not sure about which question and by whom you refer to, but if it is mine (ref. post # 1228, P62), I will repeat it here:
"On the MD82, with ATS engaged and TOGA or FLEX selected, in the event of a reverser unlock during takeoff, is the thrust lever automatically retarded to idle by the reverser mechanical interlock system and the ATS disconnected? If such an event occurred after passing 80kt or during rotation would an alert be inhibited until an altitude of 1000ft?"
What you are explaining is that on the MD82, in case of a TR unlocked/deployed during take off, the affected thrust lever will not retard to idle, will not disengage auto-throttle (if applicable) and there is no alert inhibit above 80kt upto 1000ft AGL? In other words if i understand you correctly, the thrust lever will remain in the position as commanded and there is no alert inhibit any time during any of the take off phases?
If that is the case, could glare on a sunny day have made the yellow/blue lights to be overlooked by the crew? You did not mention an aural alert. Is there no aural alert on the MD82 accompanied by a master caution light under such conditions?
As I mentioned before, the aircraft type i worked on (no MD8x models) alerts (aural and visual on the MFDU/master caution light) will only be presented during takeoff below 80kt and above 1000ft AGL. Between those 2 parameters, alerts are inhibited.
Regards,
Green-dot
Somone asked regarding the reduction of thrust to idle if a reverser inadvertently deploys. This is not so on an MD, hence it is a memory item checklist. It is performed by heart. All you wil see is the yellow (and blue) reverser inter(lock) lights staring you in the face. Probably accompanied with some pretty nasty yawing and banking.
"On the MD82, with ATS engaged and TOGA or FLEX selected, in the event of a reverser unlock during takeoff, is the thrust lever automatically retarded to idle by the reverser mechanical interlock system and the ATS disconnected? If such an event occurred after passing 80kt or during rotation would an alert be inhibited until an altitude of 1000ft?"
What you are explaining is that on the MD82, in case of a TR unlocked/deployed during take off, the affected thrust lever will not retard to idle, will not disengage auto-throttle (if applicable) and there is no alert inhibit above 80kt upto 1000ft AGL? In other words if i understand you correctly, the thrust lever will remain in the position as commanded and there is no alert inhibit any time during any of the take off phases?
If that is the case, could glare on a sunny day have made the yellow/blue lights to be overlooked by the crew? You did not mention an aural alert. Is there no aural alert on the MD82 accompanied by a master caution light under such conditions?
As I mentioned before, the aircraft type i worked on (no MD8x models) alerts (aural and visual on the MFDU/master caution light) will only be presented during takeoff below 80kt and above 1000ft AGL. Between those 2 parameters, alerts are inhibited.
Regards,
Green-dot
Green-dot;
Xander posted that comment at #1280 - I haven't flown the MD80 series, just the DC9-10 and 30 series. I don't want to answer for him but I think the following comments you made are correct:
I agree with these statements and I think xander's comments are correct.
The MD80 fleet-type is not a FADEC-equipped engine installation. FADEC controls the reverse deployment on the 320/340 fleet types, (CFM56 installation) and has the capability to reduce the engine to IDLE if it senses an unlocked reverser. The drill is necessarily then, a memory item which must be done "crisply"...to use a term, as full-reverse is a serious control issue...Xander's comments are correct here. On some types, a reverse-deployment, especially on a go-around from the runway after reverse has been selected, there is an AOM warning that "safe flight is not possible" after such deployment.
The FADEC system doesn't retract the reverser (if fully deployed) but the N1 is reduced to idle thrust, reducing the serious control issues involved in such a deployment. On the 320 at takeoff it is quite controllable with ample rudder; the drill is the standard engine shutdown drill done, for the 320, above 1500ft as all emergency/abnormal drills are done, (I say this because many types start drills and checklists at/above 400').
I can't answer the question about sunlight interfering with warning/caution lights etc - but in this case it was a northerly takeoff. That said, I haven't seen any situation where lights can't be seen in bright light but the damn screens on the 320 & 340/330 fleet types are sometimes too dim to see.
Xander posted that comment at #1280 - I haven't flown the MD80 series, just the DC9-10 and 30 series. I don't want to answer for him but I think the following comments you made are correct:
What you are explaining is that on the MD82, in case of a TR unlocked/deployed during take off, the affected thrust lever will not retard to idle, will not disengage auto-throttle (if applicable) and there is no alert inhibit above 80kt upto 1000ft AGL? In other words if i understand you correctly, the thrust lever will remain in the position as commanded and there is no alert inhibit any time during any of the take off phases?
The MD80 fleet-type is not a FADEC-equipped engine installation. FADEC controls the reverse deployment on the 320/340 fleet types, (CFM56 installation) and has the capability to reduce the engine to IDLE if it senses an unlocked reverser. The drill is necessarily then, a memory item which must be done "crisply"...to use a term, as full-reverse is a serious control issue...Xander's comments are correct here. On some types, a reverse-deployment, especially on a go-around from the runway after reverse has been selected, there is an AOM warning that "safe flight is not possible" after such deployment.
The FADEC system doesn't retract the reverser (if fully deployed) but the N1 is reduced to idle thrust, reducing the serious control issues involved in such a deployment. On the 320 at takeoff it is quite controllable with ample rudder; the drill is the standard engine shutdown drill done, for the 320, above 1500ft as all emergency/abnormal drills are done, (I say this because many types start drills and checklists at/above 400').
I can't answer the question about sunlight interfering with warning/caution lights etc - but in this case it was a northerly takeoff. That said, I haven't seen any situation where lights can't be seen in bright light but the damn screens on the 320 & 340/330 fleet types are sometimes too dim to see.
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You can drown in as little as 3" of water if you're unconscious and face down in it.
Last edited by katya1971; 30th Aug 2008 at 00:57. Reason: forget to cite
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Save Trees
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Since somebody asked, the civil air accident commission in charge of the technical investigation for the accident (a judge is directing a parallel judiciary investigation) is required, by their own regulations, to make public a preliminary, FACTUAL (i.e. no conclusions or theories, only a list of all the facts which have been CONTRASTED to date) in about a month.
Their definition of "contrasted facts" is sort-of like this: If they find that there are say 4 ways to measure the airplane speed, say from ground radar data, FDR recorder, timing of video images and physical evidence in rests of some instrument found, they will NOT state the speed of the plane until ALL THE POSSIBLE SOURCES TO OBTAIN SUCH INFORMATION have been investigated. Once all possible sources are "done with", then they know they can not obtain any more information about that matter in any other way and publish the "fact" as to "the best of their knowledge".
If a specific event has only one source of possible information, they just state what that source says. But if that specific event can be "known" through 5 different ways, they will NOT talk about it until ALL 5 ways to verify it are investigated.
That's how the comission's secretary explained their "corroboration" process.
Some more info that have come up:
-Spanair communicated the airport operations center that it was planning on switching planes for that flight. Another airplane was selected and was going to take over. They finally called back and decided they didn't need to, as the fault (probe heater) was thought to have been fixed.
-Rescue operations were extremely fast, reaching the site within 5 minutes since the airport controllers noticed the accident (a witness video shows them arriving in a very short time).
-If traffic in Barajas airport would've continued normally, another runaway would've been used from that point on for take-off, due to the tail wind. The Spanair flight was the last one that was going to be allowed to take off in that direction/strip because of the changing weather conditions (wind).
-The judge has been told to expect to receive the recordings from CVR in less than a month.
-Doctors report all remaining hospitalized survivors doing better. Only one remains in very serious condition, but also recovering. Two survivors have been sent to other hospital from Madrid per their requests. One has flown to Las Palmas and another to a hospital in Finland.
-All victims finally identified in a reportly extremely difficulty process by forensic specialists, even with DNA tests, due to the state of some remains and many of the passengers being close relatives among them (brothers, entire families, etc). Also, one child victim was adopted and no DNA was available, so he had to be identified by exclusion and other means.
Their definition of "contrasted facts" is sort-of like this: If they find that there are say 4 ways to measure the airplane speed, say from ground radar data, FDR recorder, timing of video images and physical evidence in rests of some instrument found, they will NOT state the speed of the plane until ALL THE POSSIBLE SOURCES TO OBTAIN SUCH INFORMATION have been investigated. Once all possible sources are "done with", then they know they can not obtain any more information about that matter in any other way and publish the "fact" as to "the best of their knowledge".
If a specific event has only one source of possible information, they just state what that source says. But if that specific event can be "known" through 5 different ways, they will NOT talk about it until ALL 5 ways to verify it are investigated.
That's how the comission's secretary explained their "corroboration" process.
Some more info that have come up:
-Spanair communicated the airport operations center that it was planning on switching planes for that flight. Another airplane was selected and was going to take over. They finally called back and decided they didn't need to, as the fault (probe heater) was thought to have been fixed.
-Rescue operations were extremely fast, reaching the site within 5 minutes since the airport controllers noticed the accident (a witness video shows them arriving in a very short time).
-If traffic in Barajas airport would've continued normally, another runaway would've been used from that point on for take-off, due to the tail wind. The Spanair flight was the last one that was going to be allowed to take off in that direction/strip because of the changing weather conditions (wind).
-The judge has been told to expect to receive the recordings from CVR in less than a month.
-Doctors report all remaining hospitalized survivors doing better. Only one remains in very serious condition, but also recovering. Two survivors have been sent to other hospital from Madrid per their requests. One has flown to Las Palmas and another to a hospital in Finland.
-All victims finally identified in a reportly extremely difficulty process by forensic specialists, even with DNA tests, due to the state of some remains and many of the passengers being close relatives among them (brothers, entire families, etc). Also, one child victim was adopted and no DNA was available, so he had to be identified by exclusion and other means.
Last edited by justme69; 30th Aug 2008 at 07:57.