PAL incident in Guam
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As I am sure many reading this thread now know, this week's Flight International (appeared on my doorstep this morning) has this incident on the front page, and a good article inside. In essence they are saying that the PAL A330 crew was carrying out some form of non-precision approach and for whatever reason got a GPWS warning on approach. To their credit they did not dither and immediately instigated a missed approach. During this go-around the aircraft suffered damage possibly from trees and/or power cables. An extremely close shave!
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The news is that the crew are still grounded and PAL management is readying their termination papers. The funny thing is, it never really made the news! The Second Officer is the one getting all the blame ('coz he's a newbie and the most expedient)! Poor guy! His account was there was a blackout at the airport that time so he never saw the gaping hole on their underbelly (maybe he was such a tall dude he couldn't fit under it). Mechanics in Manila reported it was about 2 sq.ft with severe dents and gashes extending to more than 10 feet in the underbelly. News from contacts in the Philippine ATO said conflicting testimonies from both Captain and F/O include the number of go-arounds they made and the lowest altitude they went down to. Will try to get more info on that.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
Well these are the pilots PAL wanted.
You get what you pay for - or what you DON'T!! Then you start paying the REAL price.
Once again, tho', those who are responsible for putting the eskirols there - the so-called "management" - are the ones on whom the spotlight also needs to be focused.
And NOW is the ideal time for the pilots who lost their jobs, to capitalise on the lowered SAFETY, to the maximum.
There is STILL time for it to make the news, locally and worldwide, to demonstrate the true cost of management's poor decision.
Most passengers will draw the line somewhere, and if that "somewhere" means having to pay more to fly with an airline other than one whose pilots not ONLY fly it into terrain, but then fly a badly damaged aircraft further, they will do so...and leave the other in droves!
You get what you pay for - or what you DON'T!! Then you start paying the REAL price.
Once again, tho', those who are responsible for putting the eskirols there - the so-called "management" - are the ones on whom the spotlight also needs to be focused.
And NOW is the ideal time for the pilots who lost their jobs, to capitalise on the lowered SAFETY, to the maximum.
There is STILL time for it to make the news, locally and worldwide, to demonstrate the true cost of management's poor decision.
Most passengers will draw the line somewhere, and if that "somewhere" means having to pay more to fly with an airline other than one whose pilots not ONLY fly it into terrain, but then fly a badly damaged aircraft further, they will do so...and leave the other in droves!
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Interesting editorial in ‘Flight International’ regarding this incident, the main thrust of which was ‘why can’t airlines learn Flight Safety from previous incidents’? DL uses this latest PAL incident – (let’s call it what it really was - ‘a really close shave that came within inches of being [another] disaster’).
- [where was I?] Oh, yes… DL uses this latest PAL incident as a glaring example of how airlines seem incapable of learning from previous mistakes within the Industry.
….
(Pause while Wiley mounts his well-worn soap box...)
It shouldn’t take anyone with even a passing knowledge of the Industry and the recent history of PAL to understand why the PAL Flight Operations and/or Flight Safety Departments might not be in an ideal position to ‘learn from the Industry’s previous mistakes’. The answer lies in the make up of today’s PAL pilot workforce. I’m not saying that the PAL pilots are any less competent than any other pilot workforce, but the fact is, whatever their individual competencies or level of professionalism might be, they are a hotch potch of returnees and blow-ins from God only knows where who were appointed to their current jobs in circumstances that should be depressingly familiar to just about everyone reading this site. They also work under a system – (a system PAL Management, like others before them in the same Hemisphere, went to some trouble to create) - where they, the pilots, have none of the protections of union representation.
If this crew is anything to go by, PAL management has got the pilot workforce it wanted after they broke the back of the local pilots’ union not too many years ago. We are informed that the pilot who did the walkaround at Agana did not see any damage to the exterior of the aircraft ‘because there was a blackout at the airfield’. It would appear from this comment that the current crop of PAL pilots do not use a flashlight when conducting a walkaround – even when doing one after a go around caused by a GPWS ‘Terrain’ warning (and, I strongly suspect, a clearly discernable impact, which if not noticed by the tech crew up in the cockpit, [which is debatable], would certainly have been noticed by the hapless cabin crew seated at the rear doors of the aircraft.)
I won’t go into what I believe really happened after the crew landed safely at Agana after their second approach and what led them to decide to fly the aircraft back to main base, but I think there are many here who would come to a very similar conclusion to mine… (see the last line of the paragraph before last if you need a hint).
Forty years ago, the highly trained, very professional Merchant Marine officers and their often troublesome seamen were to a very large degree replaced in the Western world’s commercial maritime fleets when ‘bright’ Management saw that they could replace these ‘expensive’ officers and seamen with ‘cheap’ Third World crews. The loss rate in today’s merchant fleets, although not widely reported in the world press unless it results in an oil slick on a European beach, is now at near astronomical levels, and the level of competency of many merchant marine crews who ply today’s sealanes is questionable at the very least.
How many times have survivors of small boat sinkings testified to cargo ships steaming close by them, (or hitting them!), and disappearing over the horizon without seeing them because obviously no one was on watch? And recently, we have the case of the sunken car ferry in the English Channel where not one but two ships collided with the wreck, one of them after all manner of warnings were issued to the ship – but it just continued on into the clearly marked prohibited zone until it hit the wreck?
This, I fear, is the future for Aviation if the ‘clever’ Managers we see today continue to cut into all the ‘unnecessary’ trappings professional pilots have insisted are necessary to maintain the Industry’s (already fast failing) safety record. And by the time the clever managers are seen to have been wrong, just like in the shipping industry, it will be too late. The ‘cheap’ airlines with their ‘cheap’ crews who can only fly on automatics (which always work, right?) will have taken over, and many smart people, I suspect, will have learnt to conduct business and take their holidays within driving distance of home.
- [where was I?] Oh, yes… DL uses this latest PAL incident as a glaring example of how airlines seem incapable of learning from previous mistakes within the Industry.
….
(Pause while Wiley mounts his well-worn soap box...)
It shouldn’t take anyone with even a passing knowledge of the Industry and the recent history of PAL to understand why the PAL Flight Operations and/or Flight Safety Departments might not be in an ideal position to ‘learn from the Industry’s previous mistakes’. The answer lies in the make up of today’s PAL pilot workforce. I’m not saying that the PAL pilots are any less competent than any other pilot workforce, but the fact is, whatever their individual competencies or level of professionalism might be, they are a hotch potch of returnees and blow-ins from God only knows where who were appointed to their current jobs in circumstances that should be depressingly familiar to just about everyone reading this site. They also work under a system – (a system PAL Management, like others before them in the same Hemisphere, went to some trouble to create) - where they, the pilots, have none of the protections of union representation.
If this crew is anything to go by, PAL management has got the pilot workforce it wanted after they broke the back of the local pilots’ union not too many years ago. We are informed that the pilot who did the walkaround at Agana did not see any damage to the exterior of the aircraft ‘because there was a blackout at the airfield’. It would appear from this comment that the current crop of PAL pilots do not use a flashlight when conducting a walkaround – even when doing one after a go around caused by a GPWS ‘Terrain’ warning (and, I strongly suspect, a clearly discernable impact, which if not noticed by the tech crew up in the cockpit, [which is debatable], would certainly have been noticed by the hapless cabin crew seated at the rear doors of the aircraft.)
I won’t go into what I believe really happened after the crew landed safely at Agana after their second approach and what led them to decide to fly the aircraft back to main base, but I think there are many here who would come to a very similar conclusion to mine… (see the last line of the paragraph before last if you need a hint).
Forty years ago, the highly trained, very professional Merchant Marine officers and their often troublesome seamen were to a very large degree replaced in the Western world’s commercial maritime fleets when ‘bright’ Management saw that they could replace these ‘expensive’ officers and seamen with ‘cheap’ Third World crews. The loss rate in today’s merchant fleets, although not widely reported in the world press unless it results in an oil slick on a European beach, is now at near astronomical levels, and the level of competency of many merchant marine crews who ply today’s sealanes is questionable at the very least.
How many times have survivors of small boat sinkings testified to cargo ships steaming close by them, (or hitting them!), and disappearing over the horizon without seeing them because obviously no one was on watch? And recently, we have the case of the sunken car ferry in the English Channel where not one but two ships collided with the wreck, one of them after all manner of warnings were issued to the ship – but it just continued on into the clearly marked prohibited zone until it hit the wreck?
This, I fear, is the future for Aviation if the ‘clever’ Managers we see today continue to cut into all the ‘unnecessary’ trappings professional pilots have insisted are necessary to maintain the Industry’s (already fast failing) safety record. And by the time the clever managers are seen to have been wrong, just like in the shipping industry, it will be too late. The ‘cheap’ airlines with their ‘cheap’ crews who can only fly on automatics (which always work, right?) will have taken over, and many smart people, I suspect, will have learnt to conduct business and take their holidays within driving distance of home.
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Thanks for that Flight International post. Truly frightening. How can an airline with PAL's experience gamble with people's lives by letting scabs onto planes they (pilots with questionable experience/training) don't deserve to fly??
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How can an airline with PAL's experience gamble with people's lives by letting scabs onto planes they (pilots with questionable experience/training) don't deserve to fly??
And before anyone asks for dsetails of these allegations, to be specific - one word: 'Cairns'.
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I’ve just read the FI editorial and Wiley is spot on in what he says. If anything, he pulled his punches in what he said.
In his pontificating, the FI editor has shown extraordinary ignorance of recent events within PAL, and risks being lumped in with his colleagues at the ‘Sun’ or ‘News of the World’ by professionals within the industry. One quote in particular stood out: “If anyone at PAL did read it, (the NTSB report of the 1997 crash of the Korean aircraft on the same hill in Guam) [i] they seem not to have passed the lessons on to the airline’s operations department and flight crews.[i]”
Dear Ed: as Wiley so succinctly put it, thanks to PAL’s (mis)management, none of the current PAL flight crews were employed by PAL, (at least under their current blackleg contracts), when the NTSB report on the 1997 crash was published. It’s a new workforce, employed by PAL management to break the backs of a professional group of pilots, and no one in that new workforce is going to risk going his job by telling that management anything they don’t want to hear.
Wouldn’t it be fantastic if ‘the industry’ took on board what the editor of FI was saying and saw that the current direction in which many of them are headed with their continual undermining of the status their pilots once enjoyed is heading for disaster, and if pilots are afraid to tell said management any ‘bad news’, (as this crew appeared to be), the industry is headed towards self destruction.
Wiley’s right – the way the industry’s going, twenty years from now Aviation will be like the Merchant Marine of today, with Third Word crews on Third World wages operating the aircraft fleets of the world – because any young man with half a brain in his head will have seen that, no matter how much he might like the idea of flying, it simply isn’t worth getting into. The managements of the day will still find crews, but they’ll be pale shadows of what airline crews once were.
In his pontificating, the FI editor has shown extraordinary ignorance of recent events within PAL, and risks being lumped in with his colleagues at the ‘Sun’ or ‘News of the World’ by professionals within the industry. One quote in particular stood out: “If anyone at PAL did read it, (the NTSB report of the 1997 crash of the Korean aircraft on the same hill in Guam) [i] they seem not to have passed the lessons on to the airline’s operations department and flight crews.[i]”
Dear Ed: as Wiley so succinctly put it, thanks to PAL’s (mis)management, none of the current PAL flight crews were employed by PAL, (at least under their current blackleg contracts), when the NTSB report on the 1997 crash was published. It’s a new workforce, employed by PAL management to break the backs of a professional group of pilots, and no one in that new workforce is going to risk going his job by telling that management anything they don’t want to hear.
Wouldn’t it be fantastic if ‘the industry’ took on board what the editor of FI was saying and saw that the current direction in which many of them are headed with their continual undermining of the status their pilots once enjoyed is heading for disaster, and if pilots are afraid to tell said management any ‘bad news’, (as this crew appeared to be), the industry is headed towards self destruction.
Wiley’s right – the way the industry’s going, twenty years from now Aviation will be like the Merchant Marine of today, with Third Word crews on Third World wages operating the aircraft fleets of the world – because any young man with half a brain in his head will have seen that, no matter how much he might like the idea of flying, it simply isn’t worth getting into. The managements of the day will still find crews, but they’ll be pale shadows of what airline crews once were.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
Excellent posts, gents. I believe the real CAUSE of this ACCIDENT (and let's use the correct terminology - it was an ACCIDENT, because the aircraft was damaged) had its seeds planted a couple of years back, when striking pilots were replaced by eskirols - the Tagalog word for scab labour.
As with most all industrial disputes, the first to break ranks to secure themselves a position back in the company, are the INCOMPETENTS and the MARGINAL cases - those who were struggling to maintain standards (and their jobs) in normal times.
These (in general) are the pilots PAL has NOW.
This is the information that ex-PAL pilots - as RESPONSIBLE citizens - should be distributing not only to intending Philippine Airlines travellers, but also to the Philippine Government, as a cause for concern that the national flag carrier is well down the path to giving the Philippines a nasty reputation wrt aviation (lack of) Safety.
As with most all industrial disputes, the first to break ranks to secure themselves a position back in the company, are the INCOMPETENTS and the MARGINAL cases - those who were struggling to maintain standards (and their jobs) in normal times.
These (in general) are the pilots PAL has NOW.
This is the information that ex-PAL pilots - as RESPONSIBLE citizens - should be distributing not only to intending Philippine Airlines travellers, but also to the Philippine Government, as a cause for concern that the national flag carrier is well down the path to giving the Philippines a nasty reputation wrt aviation (lack of) Safety.
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Interestings thoughts on the Merchant Marine, but as I've said before on these pages, the decline in standards in merchant shipping coincided with the transfer of people to aviation. Nobody cares about the one ship that sinks every day, or the the car carrier in the channel, because they didn't carry people. As long as aeroplanes carry passengers, high standards will be required. The market will see to that.
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Leaks have already been given to nosey reporters but how can it be reported as the owner also happens to have in his payroll all of the newspaper editors in Manila?
The current crop of scab pilots in PAL can never match the experience level that was there before the strike. Most of these crawlbacks did just what they did because they have half the wit to qualify in the real world, thus their belief that only PAL will make them realize their dream of becoming airline pilots. I guess it's the riding public who will evidently pay for this management policy. They want cheap rides, PAL has cheap pilots with cheaper maintenance to go with it!
The current crop of scab pilots in PAL can never match the experience level that was there before the strike. Most of these crawlbacks did just what they did because they have half the wit to qualify in the real world, thus their belief that only PAL will make them realize their dream of becoming airline pilots. I guess it's the riding public who will evidently pay for this management policy. They want cheap rides, PAL has cheap pilots with cheaper maintenance to go with it!
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Some pretty erudite comments in this thread. And to think that all these years I have been flying in ignorance of the great truth - and that is only non-union pilots have accidents. Be a paid up union member and you will fly infallible. Quick - where do I sign up?
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With gear down & flap 3 for a circling approach, planning a flap full approach, is the first warning expected to be "too low, flap"? I would be very surprised if they made a prompt go-around based on this warning.
If a straight-in approach was planned, and the full landing configuration existed, is there reason to believe there would be any GPWS warning at all?
If a straight-in approach was planned, and the full landing configuration existed, is there reason to believe there would be any GPWS warning at all?
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preliminary factual report available from NTSB.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...31X00137&key=1
All a bit queer. Tower's MSAW light went off but they did not tell the aircraft.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...31X00137&key=1
All a bit queer. Tower's MSAW light went off but they did not tell the aircraft.
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The word on the ground at Agana is that the loaders couldn't open the rear hold due damage.
The crew must have known of the damage, surely.
The minima for the LLZ without DME is 1440 ft from memory, so designed to stop you from hitting Nimitz Hill.
I would have thought that the FMC map would have given enough info re distance to run ( IF you were going to treat the approach as if it had DME) as it should have been sufficiently accurate from updates from Saipan on descent. Bottom line I guess, don't go below minima.
A severe case of get home itus. I would not like to be in the crews shoes right now.
The crew must have known of the damage, surely.
The minima for the LLZ without DME is 1440 ft from memory, so designed to stop you from hitting Nimitz Hill.
I would have thought that the FMC map would have given enough info re distance to run ( IF you were going to treat the approach as if it had DME) as it should have been sufficiently accurate from updates from Saipan on descent. Bottom line I guess, don't go below minima.
A severe case of get home itus. I would not like to be in the crews shoes right now.
Last edited by Roadrunner; 7th Feb 2003 at 23:31.
