Camera in the cockpit, yes or no?
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From: 3rd rock from the Sun
Do you erase FDR and QAR data, too? Surely if nothing reportable has happened in your opinion, that data has no value in any kind of future investigations at all, by that logic.
Quite interesting to read how paranoid people are about CVR recordings. Is your airline downloading CVR recordings at every night stop, and chief pilot and management spends their full 8 hours work day just listening to the tapes, day after day?
Quite interesting to read how paranoid people are about CVR recordings. Is your airline downloading CVR recordings at every night stop, and chief pilot and management spends their full 8 hours work day just listening to the tapes, day after day?
CVR's though. The crew need the freedom to be able to talk privately, free from concern that they might be monitored. If they want to slag off management, or talk about leaving for other airlines, then they can do so without fear of retribution, they should not be judged on their opinions. If they don't make it safe to the destination then what was said was said and will be in the investigation. But as long as they made it safely to their destination, then they have the option at the end of the flight to erase that data (and at our firm, we respect that). There is no regular 'download' of CVR data. We have to, in engineering, by law, pull every CVR every 2 years maximum into a workshop and do a detailed monitor that all channels are working properly, clearly. We have procedures to ensure that the listener is on their own, in a soundproof room with headphones, and that person has NOTHING to do with the management chain that leads to the pilots. What they hear, they do not talk about. I'm sure 99.9% of what they hear is exceedingly tedious. I wouldn't want that job.
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From: Texas
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From: London,England
Completely ignoring that there could have been something on the flight, or series of flights, immediately before yours. But, crack on...
As I said above "If you have had a reportable incident or accident, and have survived, then you would be required to preserve the data for the investigation"
If the previous crew had been in that position they would have taken steps to preserve the data by pulling the CB and making a tech log entry to that effect, the CVR will be either be downloaded or pulled and replaced before the aircraft is dispatched again.
GroundedSpanner sums it up perfectly.
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From: In your head.
Like what? They clearly made it to the stand in one piece.
As I said above "If you have had a reportable incident or accident, and have survived, then you would be required to preserve the data for the investigation"
If the previous crew had been in that position they would have taken steps to preserve the data by pulling the CB and making a tech log entry to that effect, the CVR will be either be downloaded or pulled and replaced before the aircraft is dispatched again.
GroundedSpanner sums it up perfectly.
As I said above "If you have had a reportable incident or accident, and have survived, then you would be required to preserve the data for the investigation"
If the previous crew had been in that position they would have taken steps to preserve the data by pulling the CB and making a tech log entry to that effect, the CVR will be either be downloaded or pulled and replaced before the aircraft is dispatched again.
GroundedSpanner sums it up perfectly.
There have also been many instances of crew forgetting to preserve the CVR/FDR so just saying they would do so is factually wrong.
But, again, you crack on.
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From: New Zealand
From the NTSB
NTSB investigators were unable to hear cockpit voice recorder audio from the Jan. 5 Alaska Airlines accident because the data was overwritten. Since 2018, at least 14 NTSB investigations have been hampered because cockpit voice recorder, or CVR, data were overwritten, including seven serious runway incursions that occurred in early 2023.
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From: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Further to NTSB being hampered by lack of CVR data, this is an excerpt from the NTSB report on the Air Canada 759 taxiway overflight incident on July 7, 2017. (NTSB/AIR 18/01)
___________
According to the dispatcher who received the initial notification about the event, the
captain reported that the airplane was lined up with the wrong runway and that a go-around was
performed. The dispatcher also stated that the captain’s report sounded “innocuous” given the
amount of time (16 hours) that had elapsed since the event. However, Air Canada senior personnel
first learned about the severity of the event—the proximity of the incident airplane to the airplanes
on the taxiway—when the TSB sent an e-mail about 2200 EDT on July 9 that advised company
personnel about the incident circumstances. The Air Canada A320 assistant chief pilot stated
that, during a meeting on July 10, the flight crewmembers were told that ACA759 had overflown
airplanes on a taxiway and that the crewmembers’ responses were “shock” and “surprise.” (The
NTSB could not determine if the flight crew was aware, before this meeting, that ACA759 had
flown over airplanes on taxiway C.)
Air Canada’s director of corporate safety, investigation, and research stated that the
incident airplane had flown about 40 hours before Air Canada senior officials became aware of the
severity of the incident and realized that data from the airplane needed to be retrieved. However,
by that point, the CVR information from the incident flight had been overwritten; the CVR
installed in the incident airplane was designed to record 2 hours of operational data.
CVR data for this incident would have provided additional information about the
circumstances leading to the overflight, including the flight crew’s verbalized approach
preparations (during approach set up and approach review) and the timing of pertinent
conversations, such as when the captain asked the first officer to verify that the runway was clear
and when the first officer called for the go-around (compared with when the captain initiated the
go-around). In addition, CVR information would have allowed the NTSB to (1) determine the
timing and content of the flight crew’s conversations during final approach and for any
conversations during and after the go-around and (2) assess the flight crew’s CRM, workload, and
fatigue according to verbalized information and cockpit sounds. The NTSB concludes that,
although the investigation into this incident identified significant safety issues, CVR information,
had it been available, could have provided direct evidence regarding the flight crew’s approach preparation, cockpit coordination, perception of the airport environment, and decision-making.
(pp 58-59 footnotes omitted).
___________
According to the dispatcher who received the initial notification about the event, the
captain reported that the airplane was lined up with the wrong runway and that a go-around was
performed. The dispatcher also stated that the captain’s report sounded “innocuous” given the
amount of time (16 hours) that had elapsed since the event. However, Air Canada senior personnel
first learned about the severity of the event—the proximity of the incident airplane to the airplanes
on the taxiway—when the TSB sent an e-mail about 2200 EDT on July 9 that advised company
personnel about the incident circumstances. The Air Canada A320 assistant chief pilot stated
that, during a meeting on July 10, the flight crewmembers were told that ACA759 had overflown
airplanes on a taxiway and that the crewmembers’ responses were “shock” and “surprise.” (The
NTSB could not determine if the flight crew was aware, before this meeting, that ACA759 had
flown over airplanes on taxiway C.)
Air Canada’s director of corporate safety, investigation, and research stated that the
incident airplane had flown about 40 hours before Air Canada senior officials became aware of the
severity of the incident and realized that data from the airplane needed to be retrieved. However,
by that point, the CVR information from the incident flight had been overwritten; the CVR
installed in the incident airplane was designed to record 2 hours of operational data.
CVR data for this incident would have provided additional information about the
circumstances leading to the overflight, including the flight crew’s verbalized approach
preparations (during approach set up and approach review) and the timing of pertinent
conversations, such as when the captain asked the first officer to verify that the runway was clear
and when the first officer called for the go-around (compared with when the captain initiated the
go-around). In addition, CVR information would have allowed the NTSB to (1) determine the
timing and content of the flight crew’s conversations during final approach and for any
conversations during and after the go-around and (2) assess the flight crew’s CRM, workload, and
fatigue according to verbalized information and cockpit sounds. The NTSB concludes that,
although the investigation into this incident identified significant safety issues, CVR information,
had it been available, could have provided direct evidence regarding the flight crew’s approach preparation, cockpit coordination, perception of the airport environment, and decision-making.
(pp 58-59 footnotes omitted).
Thread Starter
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From: Bremen
The same 2 hours as the MAX, isn't it? Which is why, when maintenance came to the Alaskan door plug aircraft, the CVR of the event had already been overwritten and lost, since the crew didn't pull the breaker, though SOP tell them to do that.
The GE 3254F EAFR flying on the 787 (I believe) can record 2 hours of images. These get lost as well when nobody pulls the breakers in time. However, under these circumstances you can still ask the crew directly, so I don't really follow why the NTSB is complaining about the duration.
The 2 hour limit also means that what the crew would be deleting when they push the button is mainly their own data.
The GE 3254F EAFR flying on the 787 (I believe) can record 2 hours of images. These get lost as well when nobody pulls the breakers in time. However, under these circumstances you can still ask the crew directly, so I don't really follow why the NTSB is complaining about the duration.
The 2 hour limit also means that what the crew would be deleting when they push the button is mainly their own data.
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From: N/A
Recheck your sources on the MAX, 2 hours is on the older models.
Curiously, the final report addresses the company, stating that more robust SOP must be introduced to preserve CVR recordings.
Which is why, when maintenance came to the Alaskan door plug aircraft, the CVR of the event had already been overwritten and lost, since the crew didn't pull the breaker, though SOP tell them to do that.
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From: London, UK
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From: N/A
Well, you're suggesting that professional pilots would act in a safer way while being recorded by a camera...let's say I wouldn't be shocked to get such replies.
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From: Italy
Having CCTV recording what happens in the cockpit isn't a problem; it's already in use, as mentioned, in other sectors, not to mention NASA, where (almost) everything comes from. However, if we analyze the problem in depth, we'll realize we're still far from finding a solution to these "crazy cockpit" issues. I'm being provocative: I'd argue that there should always be two pilots sitting in the cockpit because if one goes crazy and/or becomes ill, they don't have a "direct and timely replacement." But I'll go further: what if the Captain gets up to go to the toilette and a serious failure occurs that shuts down all the electrical systems or a UPRT? How do we code this? So the safety issue isn't just CCTV.
Thread Starter
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From: Bremen
N704AL was delivered in October 2023, with a L3Harris FA2100 CVR. The NTSB says in the accident report (section 1.8) that it holds a minimum of 2 hours of audio, and the brochures I've seen say it holds a maximum of 2 hours. I'd be happy to be corrected on that, but I did check my sources.
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From: N/A
N704AL was delivered in October 2023, with a L3Harris FA2100 CVR. The NTSB says in the accident report (section 1.8) that it holds a minimum of 2 hours of audio, and the brochures I've seen say it holds a maximum of 2 hours. I'd be happy to be corrected on that, but I did check my sources.
NG 2 hours, mandatory retrofit to 25hrs. MAX 25hrs, if not (early serial #s) mandatory retrofit.
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From: Bremen
• Pilots rarely crash into non-stationary objects.
• Air transport pilots are monitored by a comprehensive FDR, so the camera provides little benefit as "poor man's FDR".
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From: Ferrara
" Air transport pilots are monitored by a comprehensive FDR, so the camera provides little benefit as "poor man's FDR"."
As we 've seen recently an FDR tells you what happened in part to the systems etc, but not necessarily in full. A camera in the cockpit would help
As we 've seen recently an FDR tells you what happened in part to the systems etc, but not necessarily in full. A camera in the cockpit would help
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From: New Zealand
- Neither do ship, train, or tram drivers... buses maybe.
- Rarely is not never; there's still a number of mid-air collisions and near-misses (including the various runway incursions the NTSB listed), not to mention all the taxiway collisions, even if usually nonfatal.
- Same goes for trains and trams nowadays, along with all the various control rooms in industrial/chemical/generation facilities.
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From: Bremen
I was talking about it because Someone Somewhere put it up as an example of CVR audio being lost, and NTSB complaining about it. I found it worth giving the context that it wasn't lost because someone erased it (as discussed before), but because it ran into the time limit (or so the report suggests).
EASA: "Under EASA’s Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/2338, aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of 59,500 pounds manufactured after Jan. 1, 2021 must feature a CVR with a recording duration of at least 25 hours and the ability to accurately determine the location of an aircraft accident."
FAA: "Under this landmark mandate, all new US-registered aircraft manufactured after May 16, 2025, must be equipped with 25-hour CVRs. Existing aircraft aren't exempt, they must be retrofitted with these systems by 2030."
So that's "2 months ago" new, with the 25h CVRs certified mid-2023.
I stand corrected.
I was talking about it because Someone Somewhere put it up as an example of CVR audio being lost, and NTSB complaining about it. I found it worth giving the context that it wasn't lost because someone erased it (as discussed before), but because it ran into the time limit (or so the report suggests).
NG 2 hours, mandatory retrofit to 25hrs. MAX 25hrs, if not (early serial #s) mandatory retrofit.
FAA: "Under this landmark mandate, all new US-registered aircraft manufactured after May 16, 2025, must be equipped with 25-hour CVRs. Existing aircraft aren't exempt, they must be retrofitted with these systems by 2030."
So that's "2 months ago" new, with the 25h CVRs certified mid-2023.
I stand corrected.
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From: UK
At the risk of drifting over the centerline of this discussion it strikes me as relevant that the NTSB often makes safety recommendations which the FAA then holds under review and deliberation seemingly indefinitely, or just plain ignores. Requiring video recordings of flight deck actions, as a source of safety improvements, may not yield any significant benefits if the recommendations made by the safety authority to the CAA/regulator fall into interagency or bureaucratic inaction. (I acknowledge many fine-spirited professionals in both federal agencies, FAA and NTSB, who do strive to improve the safety of the NAS and the aviation sector, but only a senseless soul would fail to realize that effectiveness of these federal agencies is not determined solely by the presence of well-intentioned staff.)
With increasing safety - statistically, the argument for more recording and analysis is weakened. Many authorities are now investigating events which would have been classed as an incident. As an industry we are attempting to learn about the intractable nature of human activity, and with this impossibility tend to 'make things up' - the investigative mind fills in the gaps, it jumps to conclusions.
Access to more 'data' does not imply greater understanding. Analysis paralysis, death by data …
Knowledge, and thence understanding requires data in context - what did the crew see, perceive, understand as requiring action; what made sense to them at the time and how was this adjusted during the incident. Real life is a flowing event. Even with the best video, analysis with hindsight becomes a frame by frame montage from the observer's point of view.
The weakness in modern accident and incident investigation is in having fewer yet more diverse and complicated events, without precedence. Investigation skills are difficult to acquire, and cannot be replaced with more technology.
The issue is industrywide; we have to recognise the uncertainty in modern operations and that in some instances we cannot know - but that's not in the investigator's charter (nor lawyers?)
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From: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
The litigation practice (at least in the United States - I'm not familiar enough with other jurisdictions and their systems) is almost entirely "fraternal" in nature. Some lawyers sue on behalf of crash victims, others defend, and very rare are individuals or law firms who hop over that dividing fence. Although in the dead of dark night Counsel may acknowledge the existence of uncertainty especially about "the facts of the case" but also about the applicable law, legal practice obligation for "zealous advocacy" keeps such acknowledgement from becoming known.
But other parts of the bar perform other roles and functions. In initiatives to expand and develop my practice (which do not contemplate working in accident litigation) I have been fortunate to meet a number of attorneys who have played important roles in developing and advocating for reforms of U.S. aviation policy, regulatory and legislative development, and relationships with international groups and organizations . . . (including a U.S. Ambassador/ Permanent Representative to ICAO). None of these attorneys would, I think, deny the existence of uncertainty, if asked to consider the point.
Whether overall - "on balance" - inputs from the non-litigation bar are a net positive for advances in aviation safety or for the aviation sector writ large, is probably quite affected by one's opinion of lawyers in general.