Latest Boeing News
Quite, and importantly the acquisition was not part of the process by which they obtained (or perhaps more correctly were formed from) the ex Boeing plants. Would be interesting to understand what if any NDAs are in place to protect Boeing and Airbus data.
You really don't want to get too worked up over that. There are very many (possibly a majority) of major component builders who supply to both airframers. Starting, of course, with the engine manufacturers.
SEC investigation reported in media outlets
From one of several media sources (report of investigation also noted on CNBC tv broadcast Squwak Box today):
"The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has opened an investigation into Arlington, Virginia-based Boeing Co. for statements the company made regarding safety practices, following an incident where a panel blew off an Alaska Airlines 737 Max 9 16,000 feet above Oregon in January.
Reuters reported that the SEC investigation will look into whether Boeing or its executives made statements misleading investors, according to a report from Bloomberg News, based on three sources familiar with the development.
Boeing declined to comment on the matter when [media outlet] reached out to the company, while the SEC did not respond to requests for comment."
Editorial comment: one wonders whether, and if so how, this development - if reports are accurate - may affect pending decisions by Department of Justice with regard to the DPA, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, in the criminal case in federal district court in Texas. At least this SLF/attorney wonders.
"The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has opened an investigation into Arlington, Virginia-based Boeing Co. for statements the company made regarding safety practices, following an incident where a panel blew off an Alaska Airlines 737 Max 9 16,000 feet above Oregon in January.
Reuters reported that the SEC investigation will look into whether Boeing or its executives made statements misleading investors, according to a report from Bloomberg News, based on three sources familiar with the development.
Boeing declined to comment on the matter when [media outlet] reached out to the company, while the SEC did not respond to requests for comment."
Editorial comment: one wonders whether, and if so how, this development - if reports are accurate - may affect pending decisions by Department of Justice with regard to the DPA, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, in the criminal case in federal district court in Texas. At least this SLF/attorney wonders.
The US Justice Department on Tuesday notified Boeing that it breached terms of its 2021 agreement in which the company avoided criminal charges for two fatal 737 Max crashes.
After a series of safety missteps earlier this year, including a door plug that blew off an Alaska Airlines flight shortly after takeoff, the Department of Justice said Boeing is now subject to criminal prosecution.
After a series of safety missteps earlier this year, including a door plug that blew off an Alaska Airlines flight shortly after takeoff, the Department of Justice said Boeing is now subject to criminal prosecution.
There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.
The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.
Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.
The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.
Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.
You say this like the only thing going on in the Ethiopian cockpit was a captain and copilot having a leisurely conversation about runaway trim. In reality there was a Jumbotron of cautions and warnings going off due to bad air data and whatnot.
Analysis of crew performance was mixed in all the numerous accident reports, but in general I think there is a consensus that task saturation was a problem for the crew, the copilot of which was also very low in hours.
The AoA sensor single point of failure combined with abnormalities in takeoff tasks would have been difficult for any crew. Some crews might have saved Lion Air. Some or perhaps most would have saved the Ethiopian aircraft. This particular crew did not. The plain fact is, though, is that regardless of crew performance, the design was obviously defective in multiple ways.
Last edited by remi; 15th May 2024 at 08:26.
Asked for comment, Boeing provided an April 29 email from Scott Stocker, who leads the company's 787 program, to employees in South Carolina where the 787 is assembled.
In the email, Stocker said that an employee saw what appeared to be an irregularity in a required 787 conformance test.
Stocker said in the email that after receiving the report, "we quickly reviewed the matter and learned that several people had been violating Company policies by not performing a required test, but recording the work as having been completed."
Stocker said Boeing promptly informed the FAA "about what we learned and are taking swift and serious corrective action with multiple" employees.
He added, "our engineering team has assessed that this misconduct did not create an immediate safety of flight issue."
.In the email, Stocker said that an employee saw what appeared to be an irregularity in a required 787 conformance test.
Stocker said in the email that after receiving the report, "we quickly reviewed the matter and learned that several people had been violating Company policies by not performing a required test, but recording the work as having been completed."
Stocker said Boeing promptly informed the FAA "about what we learned and are taking swift and serious corrective action with multiple" employees.
He added, "our engineering team has assessed that this misconduct did not create an immediate safety of flight issue."
If employees performed exceptionally well, management would happily take the credit, but of course this is "employee misconduct" not "management failure."
My perhaps naive view is that something involving "several people" in a regimented environment like aviation manufacture is definitively a management issue. Is it a failure to provide an independent check? Is it a failure to oversee a team? Is it *wink wink* *nudge nudge* encouraging a team to violate company and legally mandated procedures? Whatever it is, it's not a spontaneously arising cabal of assemblers who have decided all on their own to do something that doesn't pay them more yet is the worst kind of safety failure in aviation and has the direst possible consequences for career.
Last edited by remi; 15th May 2024 at 08:10.
The post replied to is a month old, yes - but having a proper understanding of the multiple causes of the Ethiopian accident will take on greater importance (in the view of this SLF/attorney) in the context of Boeing now losing the protection of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement.
Some very eminent worthies in the world of civil aviation law, policy and regulation have been heavily critical of U.S. Department of Justice and FBI putting Boeing under the criminal investigation microscope, specifically regarding the Alaska 1282 door plug incident and, more broadly, in the aftermath of the two MAX crashes which resulted in the charges deferred by the DPA. And not to forget the prosecution of the unfortunately chatty (Jedi mind tricks and so on) Boeing pilot, Mark Forkner. If justice was miscarrying in the fact of his being charged and put on trial, at least his acquittal stopped it.
What this latest development leaves in front of those who hold responsibility for the civil aviation sector in the United States is the question of whether, despite the objections that bringing in the feds for criminal inquiries causes people to avoid coming forward, avoid reporting and disclosing what they know, are there not exceptional cases with respect to which accountability in a court of law is in fact proper recourse for serious wrongdoing? We say so often these days (regarding certain poor weather and money received for silence) "no person is above the law." Corporate persons, too?
Collapse of the DPA, if the news reports are accurate, is no cause for rejoicing, unless one wishes to witness Boeing driven toward oblivion (or whatever word fits the approach of corporate demise). Nevertheless, it would seem both logical, and accurate as a matter of law, that the families of the people killed in the two crashes will now have proper opportunities to be heard and to exercise their statutory rights as (technically defined) "crime victims" in a United States District Court.
It does verge on the pedantic to say this, but I will anyway. Legal counsel for the families of the people killed in the crashes are going to have an extraordinary, and very likely wholly unprecedented, experience preparing them for their day in court under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Perhaps Counsel will visit some of the law schools and other types of schools where courses relevant to aviation safety, and law and policy and regulation, are taught. It is easily imagined that the representation of these family members will yield impactful lessons, stories and insights about how important it is that everyone working in civil aviation take good care that the wrongdoing of the MAX saga never occur again.
Some very eminent worthies in the world of civil aviation law, policy and regulation have been heavily critical of U.S. Department of Justice and FBI putting Boeing under the criminal investigation microscope, specifically regarding the Alaska 1282 door plug incident and, more broadly, in the aftermath of the two MAX crashes which resulted in the charges deferred by the DPA. And not to forget the prosecution of the unfortunately chatty (Jedi mind tricks and so on) Boeing pilot, Mark Forkner. If justice was miscarrying in the fact of his being charged and put on trial, at least his acquittal stopped it.
What this latest development leaves in front of those who hold responsibility for the civil aviation sector in the United States is the question of whether, despite the objections that bringing in the feds for criminal inquiries causes people to avoid coming forward, avoid reporting and disclosing what they know, are there not exceptional cases with respect to which accountability in a court of law is in fact proper recourse for serious wrongdoing? We say so often these days (regarding certain poor weather and money received for silence) "no person is above the law." Corporate persons, too?
Collapse of the DPA, if the news reports are accurate, is no cause for rejoicing, unless one wishes to witness Boeing driven toward oblivion (or whatever word fits the approach of corporate demise). Nevertheless, it would seem both logical, and accurate as a matter of law, that the families of the people killed in the two crashes will now have proper opportunities to be heard and to exercise their statutory rights as (technically defined) "crime victims" in a United States District Court.
It does verge on the pedantic to say this, but I will anyway. Legal counsel for the families of the people killed in the crashes are going to have an extraordinary, and very likely wholly unprecedented, experience preparing them for their day in court under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Perhaps Counsel will visit some of the law schools and other types of schools where courses relevant to aviation safety, and law and policy and regulation, are taught. It is easily imagined that the representation of these family members will yield impactful lessons, stories and insights about how important it is that everyone working in civil aviation take good care that the wrongdoing of the MAX saga never occur again.
The post replied to is a month old, yes - but having a proper understanding of the multiple causes of the Ethiopian accident will take on greater importance (in the view of this SLF/attorney) in the context of Boeing now losing the protection of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement.
[...]
It does verge on the pedantic to say this, but I will anyway. Legal counsel for the families of the people killed in the crashes are going to have an extraordinary, and very likely wholly unprecedented, experience preparing them for their day in court under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Perhaps Counsel will visit some of the law schools and other types of schools where courses relevant to aviation safety, and law and policy and regulation, are taught. It is easily imagined that the representation of these family members will yield impactful lessons, stories and insights about how important it is that everyone working in civil aviation take good care that the wrongdoing of the MAX saga never occur again.
[...]
It does verge on the pedantic to say this, but I will anyway. Legal counsel for the families of the people killed in the crashes are going to have an extraordinary, and very likely wholly unprecedented, experience preparing them for their day in court under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Perhaps Counsel will visit some of the law schools and other types of schools where courses relevant to aviation safety, and law and policy and regulation, are taught. It is easily imagined that the representation of these family members will yield impactful lessons, stories and insights about how important it is that everyone working in civil aviation take good care that the wrongdoing of the MAX saga never occur again.
I much prefer the treatment of fatal transportation accidents in common law countries to that in civil law countries. Treating accidents as de facto crime scenes and routinely seeking prosecution of pilots, captains, engineers, controllers, etc., is at best not helpful to fact finding and safety improvements, and most likely corrosive. Humans are always involved in fatal accidents, but safety requires expecting failure, and overt malfeasance aside, a human failing at a critical task is literally doing what is expected of humans.
As anyone with any common sense regarding human behavior can deduce from the fact that even extreme punishment appears to have relatively little effect on crime, criminal liability for unintentional or negligent failure isn't going to make employees straighten up and fly right. It may make them want to, but being humans, they will fail anyway.
But ... Willfully, carefully, and deliberately engineering systems over a period of years in a manner that is clearly opposed to both best practices and common sense is not a pilot making mistakes in a situation where failing to perform the right action in 15 seconds will destroy a plane full of passengers.
I don't think this is a case of "putting the ATC in jail," but more a case of mundane corporate crime for financial or personal gain. You could think of it as a fraud upon safety.
Last edited by remi; 15th May 2024 at 08:23.
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Asked for comment, Boeing provided an April 29 email from Scott Stocker, who leads the company's 787 program, to employees in South Carolina where the 787 is assembled.
In the email, Stocker said that an employee saw what appeared to be an irregularity in a required 787 conformance test.
Stocker said in the email that after receiving the report, "we quickly reviewed the matter and learned that several people had been violating Company policies by not performing a required test, but recording the work as having been completed."
Stocker said Boeing promptly informed the FAA "about what we learned and are taking swift and serious corrective action with multiple" employees.
He added, "our engineering team has assessed that this misconduct did not create an immediate safety of flight issue."
.In the email, Stocker said that an employee saw what appeared to be an irregularity in a required 787 conformance test.
Stocker said in the email that after receiving the report, "we quickly reviewed the matter and learned that several people had been violating Company policies by not performing a required test, but recording the work as having been completed."
Stocker said Boeing promptly informed the FAA "about what we learned and are taking swift and serious corrective action with multiple" employees.
He added, "our engineering team has assessed that this misconduct did not create an immediate safety of flight issue."
If employees performed exceptionally well, management would happily take the credit, but of course this is "employee misconduct" not "management failure."
My perhaps naive view is that something involving "several people" in a regimented environment like aviation manufacture is definitively a management issue. Is it a failure to provide an independent check? Is it a failure to oversee a team? Is it *wink wink* *nudge nudge* encouraging a team to violate company and legally mandated procedures? Whatever it is, it's not a spontaneously arising cabal of assemblers who have decided all on their own to do something that doesn't pay them more yet is the worst kind of safety failure in aviation and has the direst possible consequences for career.
@ Claybird
The charts with the colour background and details about aircraft production and et cetera: where are these published, please, if it is a publicly available source? If it isn't available publicly, could you please give descriptive information about where these are found? They are quite interesting charts, .... or whatever would be the proper nomenclature.
The charts with the colour background and details about aircraft production and et cetera: where are these published, please, if it is a publicly available source? If it isn't available publicly, could you please give descriptive information about where these are found? They are quite interesting charts, .... or whatever would be the proper nomenclature.
Does the expression white-anted still carry meaning around these parts?
Last edited by Lascaille; 15th May 2024 at 15:05. Reason: adding
It does verge on the pedantic to say this, but I will anyway. Legal counsel for the families of the people killed in the crashes are going to have an extraordinary, and very likely wholly unprecedented, experience preparing them for their day in court under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Perhaps Counsel will visit some of the law schools and other types of schools where courses relevant to aviation safety, and law and policy and regulation, are taught. It is easily imagined that the representation of these family members will yield impactful lessons, stories and insights about how important it is that everyone working in civil aviation take good care that the wrongdoing of the MAX saga never occur again.
This link may or may not work: Google Docs
They're snapshots on Google Docs, not sure whether they're one-off or are regularly posted.
This link may or may not work: Google Docs
This link may or may not work: Google Docs
I was wondering if whomever posted them there was technically permitted to do so. If not - that goes back to what I suggested before about Boeing possibly being white-anted.
It's more likely that the information is from Boeing - the 787 listing certainly is.
Dave,
Have you looked at the rightmost column on the FLIGHTS tabs (the first 2 tabs in the spreadsheet)? You will see the Flightaware report links for those. I specifically only mentioned the FLIGHTS tabs, as you are correct that the other tabs do not have any reference to information that is obviously publicly available.
Have you looked at the rightmost column on the FLIGHTS tabs (the first 2 tabs in the spreadsheet)? You will see the Flightaware report links for those. I specifically only mentioned the FLIGHTS tabs, as you are correct that the other tabs do not have any reference to information that is obviously publicly available.
Dave,
Have you looked at the rightmost column on the FLIGHTS tabs (the first 2 tabs in the spreadsheet)? You will see the Flightaware report links for those. I specifically only mentioned the FLIGHTS tabs, as you are correct that the other tabs do not have any reference to information that is obviously publicly available.
Have you looked at the rightmost column on the FLIGHTS tabs (the first 2 tabs in the spreadsheet)? You will see the Flightaware report links for those. I specifically only mentioned the FLIGHTS tabs, as you are correct that the other tabs do not have any reference to information that is obviously publicly available.
Worth noting, though, that the link won't necessarily bring up the page for the flight in question where that BOEnnn flight number has been subsequently reused.
Failure Richly Rewarded
Boeing shareholders loyal to their CEO approve $33 million compensation for Mr Calhoun. The way things are going, he better cash that check quickly.
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He can't cash that check. Nor should he be able to.
An extensive law enforcement investigation has determined the cause of Boeing whistleblower John Barnett’s death was suicide, according to documents released Friday by the Charleston Police Department.
Boeing whistleblower John Barnett died by suicide, police investigation concludes
Boeing whistleblower John Barnett died by suicide, police investigation concludes