Boeing at X-Roads?
The BBC is still regarded by many people as authoritative and unbiased. So a big article with such negative remarks tends to move the dial with consumers, especially those who don't read the aviation press and those who don't live in the US, i.e. most of the world. That's my reason for posting the article. I didn't say whether I thought it was fair or balanced.
I would think that pretty much everyone here at pprune is well informed about the risks of commercial flights and would agree that the article is sensationalist and may alarm some passengers unduly. My advice to Dennis Tajer, and others who speak to the media about Boeing, is that they should get some media training and take care to modify their speech so that they don't help to generate irresponsible clickbait.
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I don't know what you're driving at with those remarks. Do you think that I wrote the article, or that I represent the BBC, or that pprune influences the masses?
The BBC is still regarded by many people as authoritative and unbiased. So a big article with such negative remarks tends to move the dial with consumers, especially those who don't read the aviation press and those who don't live in the US, i.e. most of the world. That's my reason for posting the article. I didn't say whether I thought it was fair or balanced.
I would think that pretty much everyone here at pprune is well informed about the risks of commercial flights and would agree that the article is sensationalist and may alarm some passengers unduly. My advice to Dennis Tajer, and others who speak to the media about Boeing, is that they should get some media training and take care to modify their speech so that they don't help to generate irresponsible clickbait.
The BBC is still regarded by many people as authoritative and unbiased. So a big article with such negative remarks tends to move the dial with consumers, especially those who don't read the aviation press and those who don't live in the US, i.e. most of the world. That's my reason for posting the article. I didn't say whether I thought it was fair or balanced.
I would think that pretty much everyone here at pprune is well informed about the risks of commercial flights and would agree that the article is sensationalist and may alarm some passengers unduly. My advice to Dennis Tajer, and others who speak to the media about Boeing, is that they should get some media training and take care to modify their speech so that they don't help to generate irresponsible clickbait.
I especially agree with your third paragraph. As to whether the article's content makes things worse for acceptance by the flying public, in context of the aftermath of the door plug incident I'm much less convinced that the APA pilot's remarks will be taken as unequivocal.
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I think Mr Tajer, who has been flying Boeings pretty exclusively all his career, since KC135s in the military, and who is a MAX captain, probably has a better handle on current reality than just about any poster here, and is also pretty savvy about representing the views of all his members as well.
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Okay, let's say, with regard to the post earlier in which I aimed at journalist sensationalist and opportunistic rehashing of non-news (everything but the APA chief's comments) and unthinkingly also failed to credit the APA chief's credibility, and therefore now I add instead, "strike that [from the record]."
What is Capt. Tajer trying to accomplish? --or if that isn't worth discussing, then how do his comments drive the Boeing corporate crisis in any particular direction? I wouldn't anticipate that driving airline company customers away from MAX flights would be good for his membership (or would it?) Does what he said help the airline company in its presumed wrangling with Boeing taking place beyond the hearing and sight of reporters (and leakers)? Or is it in a sense "for the record", to be used in some future negotiation or adjustment of grievance? I'm asking, labor lawyer that I once was.
What is Capt. Tajer trying to accomplish? --or if that isn't worth discussing, then how do his comments drive the Boeing corporate crisis in any particular direction? I wouldn't anticipate that driving airline company customers away from MAX flights would be good for his membership (or would it?) Does what he said help the airline company in its presumed wrangling with Boeing taking place beyond the hearing and sight of reporters (and leakers)? Or is it in a sense "for the record", to be used in some future negotiation or adjustment of grievance? I'm asking, labor lawyer that I once was.
What is Capt. Tajer trying to accomplish? --or if that isn't worth discussing, then how do his comments drive the Boeing corporate crisis in any particular direction? I wouldn't anticipate that driving airline company customers away from MAX flights would be good for his membership (or would it?) Does what he said help the airline company in its presumed wrangling with Boeing taking place beyond the hearing and sight of reporters (and leakers)? Or is it in a sense "for the record", to be used in some future negotiation or adjustment of grievance? I'm asking, labor lawyer that I once was.
Boeing can put on the big boy pants and make actual changes (like replacing the C-suite) or continue business as usual, the latter of which seems to be the plan.
I imagine a lot of single aisle Boeing pilots are pondering whether a switch to Airbus might be a better choice for career progression.
As there is a severe lack of supply on the Airbus side, such a switch could see sitting on their butts awaiting a call.
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What obligation do pilots' labor representatives have to perform as Boeing PR flacks?
Boeing can put on the big boy pants and make actual changes (like replacing the C-suite) or continue business as usual, the latter of which seems to be the plan.
I imagine a lot of single aisle Boeing pilots are pondering whether a switch to Airbus might be a better choice for career progression.
Boeing can put on the big boy pants and make actual changes (like replacing the C-suite) or continue business as usual, the latter of which seems to be the plan.
I imagine a lot of single aisle Boeing pilots are pondering whether a switch to Airbus might be a better choice for career progression.
Funny thing about the single aisle pilots pondering a move to Airbus. A class of international pilots sued Boeing, arguing that their efforts to obtain 737 MAX ratings turned out to be wasted effort due to the type being grounded. Their case was dismissed by the trial court (in Chicago) and the federal appellate court reportedly was quite skeptical of the claims in oral argument last fall. (Not aware of any appellate ruling yet.) It would be ironic if line pilots now pondering as described in fact move to Airbus, to some degree validating what the international pilots in the class action were asserting.
So I doubt that airlines are really too bummed about this. Comac not too much either.
The MAX is an adequate narrow body airliner. There are many ways it could be better but it does the job. The pilots tolerate it because they don’t have a choice but I really think that the vast majority of them don’t think it is actively unsafe. The airline executives are OK buying it because it is the MAX now or an Airbus in 5 yrs maybe, and they can drive a harder bargain with Boeing than Airbus.
The fundamental problem is Boeing has used up all their runway. The serial and unforgivable design and production fu*kups mean they have no margin left. One accident caused by a Boeing design or production issue and it’s over, the type will be grounded and it will never be used in passenger service again and Boeing is done.
Unfortunately the Boeing C suite is unwilling and in any case probably unable to address the root causes of the issues Boeing is facing now. The future of Boeing is a coin toss. Heads they by good luck manage to avoid an extinction event and continue to muddle through or tails the generalized corporate incompetence catches up with them and we wake up with the picture of the entirely preventable smoking hole….
The fundamental problem is Boeing has used up all their runway. The serial and unforgivable design and production fu*kups mean they have no margin left. One accident caused by a Boeing design or production issue and it’s over, the type will be grounded and it will never be used in passenger service again and Boeing is done.
Unfortunately the Boeing C suite is unwilling and in any case probably unable to address the root causes of the issues Boeing is facing now. The future of Boeing is a coin toss. Heads they by good luck manage to avoid an extinction event and continue to muddle through or tails the generalized corporate incompetence catches up with them and we wake up with the picture of the entirely preventable smoking hole….
Paxing All Over The World
When companies - of almost any size - have this kind of problem (one that could end them) - they have a couple of SOPS, which often go in this sequence:
You will notice that these responses are the almost identical to a five year old boy caught out by his parents ...
- Deny everything
- Blame anyone outside the company
- Throw a couple of people or a division under the bus
- Bin the CEO
- Go to court - to continue denying everything
You will notice that these responses are the almost identical to a five year old boy caught out by his parents ...
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Saudia are awaiting confirmation for A320 slots (150 aircraft) but it doesn't look promising
"We insist on having more than 150," Al Shahrani said in an interview at the Dubai Airshow. "We are waiting for confirmation from the manufacturer that they are able to produce more than 150."
That's November 14 2023 and they said they wanted to announce by year's end, it's now bern 4 months so draw your own conclusions
"We insist on having more than 150," Al Shahrani said in an interview at the Dubai Airshow. "We are waiting for confirmation from the manufacturer that they are able to produce more than 150."
That's November 14 2023 and they said they wanted to announce by year's end, it's now bern 4 months so draw your own conclusions
Heaven forbid but if there was another Max fatal crash traced to MCAS or some other bit of dodgy design could the CEO and his colleagues face corporate manslaughter charges.. Corporate ethos is never going to change until some one in the C-suite goes to Jail, ie money cannot make the problem go away.
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When companies - of almost any size - have this kind of problem (one that could end them) - they have a couple of SOPS, which often go in this sequence:
You will notice that these responses are the almost identical to a five year old boy caught out by his parents ...
- Deny everything
- Blame anyone outside the company
- Throw a couple of people or a division under the bus
- Bin the CEO
- Go to court - to continue denying everything
You will notice that these responses are the almost identical to a five year old boy caught out by his parents ...
Publicity wise, how did that go?
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Perhaps my memory has failed, but almost immediately after the ET-302 crash I recall the CEO of Boeing fell on his sword and claimed the company had the sole blame for the entire problem. There was no denial and no Boeing blame for anyone else. It does not appear Boeing went after anyone inside the company, only getting to item 4, Bin the CEO. For item 5, they took full responsibility and almost immediately (compared to typical corporations) settled for huge amounts to Ethiopian and the immediate families of the dead.
Publicity wise, how did that go?
Publicity wise, how did that go?
Given the probably dozen or so times we've gone around and round about the Ethiopian accident, I'm not contesting validity of your assessments of blame upon the pilots, airline management, and government. The question is, after the information which had come out after the first crash, was not the die cast? I mean, "Boeing blames the pilots" would not seem to have gone over well, even with bringing the airline and government into the blame picture too.
Among other reasons, even a watered down explanation of what the Ethiopian pilots didn't do properly and/or did wrongly would have been way beyond the knowledge of flying skills of the general public (says this SLF/attorney without any flying hours at all).
"do you believe Boeing actually could have pointed out some, let alone all, of the failings of Ethiopian entities and the pilots which you have emphasized in many post"
They could not because Ethiopian lied and withheld the information for a year.
Boeing could have said "We await the publication of the preliminary report before commenting and expects its publication in 30 days."
They could not because Ethiopian lied and withheld the information for a year.
Boeing could have said "We await the publication of the preliminary report before commenting and expects its publication in 30 days."
Perhaps my memory has failed, but almost immediately after the ET-302 crash I recall the CEO of Boeing fell on his sword and claimed the company had the sole blame for the entire problem. There was no denial and no Boeing blame for anyone else. It does not appear Boeing went after anyone inside the company, only getting to item 4, Bin the CEO. For item 5, they took full responsibility and almost immediately (compared to typical corporations) settled for huge amounts to Ethiopian and the immediate families of the dead.
Publicity wise, how did that go?
Publicity wise, how did that go?
I mean, whatever may have happened to their customer service, their maintenance is clearly scraping the bottom. Either that or a rash of loose Boeing parts has suddenly emerged.
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"do you believe Boeing actually could have pointed out some, let alone all, of the failings of Ethiopian entities and the pilots which you have emphasized in many post"
They could not because Ethiopian lied and withheld the information for a year.
Boeing could have said "We await the publication of the preliminary report before commenting and expects its publication in 30 days."
They could not because Ethiopian lied and withheld the information for a year.
Boeing could have said "We await the publication of the preliminary report before commenting and expects its publication in 30 days."
Also, and more importantly, even if we give complete endorsement to the indictments of some or all of the airline company, the pilots, and the government, how does that assertedly suppressed truth exonerate any of Boeing's mistakes or wrongful acts or any other similar characterization of the manufacturer's acts or omissions? The strategy mistake of reworking the venerable 737 into a variant-too-far -- still terrible for Boeing, isn't it? Everything Boeing did wrong about the MAX-plus-MCAS would be the same, even if blame assessments were finely and promptly articulated against the Ethiopian participants in that air crash disaster.
Though it's a term I generally avoid like the overhead bins, try this "thought experiment": if all the blame which you assert should have been assessed against the Ethiopian airline, pilots and/or government had been asserted effectively - and by extension of logic none of the sword-falling and blame-accepting about the second MAX crash had occurred - what improvement in Boeing's posture, reputation, prospects, cadres of the-end-is-near cynics, what improvement would have resulted? I mean, Jedi mind-tricks is a pretty heavy burden to escape. Of course, Jedi mind-tricks and the litany of all the things wrong with the MAX-plus-MCAS. And just for the record, in many posts on the relevant threads I attacked and tried (admittedly from some rather cheap seats, i.e., the forum here) to negate, the feds' prosecution of Mark Forkner (for the uninformed, the Boeing chap who gained notoriety for claiming to have used the above-mentioned mind tricks on an unsuspecting FAA).
(By the way, and I hope this sort-of disclaimer isn't actually needed, but I am not trying for any sarcasm about your views on these issues - respect for knowledge and experience, such as your posts on a range of subjects shows, is not something I want to fail at showing.)
EDIT: Today's Wall Street Journal (March 20) publishes a piece by columnist Holman Jenkins, Jr. which very largely confirms much of MechEngr's views, if I understand both sets of views correctly.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 20th Mar 2024 at 14:33. Reason: Extension of post to acknowledge WSJ column viewpoint
"how would remaining silent, in effect, and awaiting for the preliminary report at 30 days post-accident have resulted in the true information being revealed?"
The only reason not to reveal the information in 30 days would be what the real reason for the delay was - a coverup. It would have been trivial to release the FDR and CVR data in 30 days. The Lion Air investigation did. The longer the delay the more pressure shifts from Boeing to Ethiopia.
My view is any shared responsibility was severed by the failure to act on the Emergency AD.
"The strategy mistake of reworking the venerable 737 into a variant-too-far -- still terrible for Boeing, isn't it?"
It wasn't a strategy mistake. It was systems engineering overestimating the ability of pilots to handle what was an identified failure symptom for any unwanted trim system output, an outcome that was recognized back to the original aircraft and why the cutout switches were installed. In combination, there was a systems analysis failure to recognize that the SMYD would continue to signal as valid a very incorrect AoA reading, also a long accepted by industry condition, along with issuing the false stall warning, which wasn't a new feature on the MAX, and that valid, but incorrect would be used by the SMYD, the autopilot, and the MCAS software.
When the latter was recognized for Lion Air, Boeing set to change the software to deal with that problem. The FAA and all other operators accepted the Emergency AD as sufficient. I have been unable to find any discussion immediately after the Emergency AD that demanded all the MAX aircraft be immediately grounded on the basis that pilots were simply unable to perform. ALPA, CAAs world wide, airlines; none that I know of looked at the event and did a halt or grounding or demanded pilots walk off the job.
It was the second crash where the information was withheld that caused the giant publicity explosion for Boeing. Had the operator said "The pilots didn't study, weren't tested, never trained, and did not one thing in the AD" I think Boeing would not have every sticky tray table blamed on the Boeing board today.
"how does that assertedly suppressed truth exonerate any of Boeing's mistakes or wrongful acts or any other similar characterization of the manufacturer's acts or omissions?"
To the extent that the issue is "boeing at the cross roads" it would mean that these discussions would likely not have happened, just as they didn't come up after the Lion Air preliminary report was issued.
The unwanted software response of MCAS was entirely due to a failure to create an accurate systems architecture model by the systems engineering group. Had an accurate model been included in the original spec to the software developers this discussion would never have happened. The "dual input" discussions were about ensuring MCAS operated when it should, not about preventing operation when it shouldn't. It was a case no one identified. More money, more time, more review, were not likely to turn up this accepted performance by the SMYD as a problem source.
Had an MCAS equivalent been used by Airbus, AF447 would not have happened. The plane would see the nose up, real AoA and work to force the nose down against the pilot input to the contrary. This no doubt influenced the development of MCAS where a meaningful physical feedback was possible.
The only reason not to reveal the information in 30 days would be what the real reason for the delay was - a coverup. It would have been trivial to release the FDR and CVR data in 30 days. The Lion Air investigation did. The longer the delay the more pressure shifts from Boeing to Ethiopia.
My view is any shared responsibility was severed by the failure to act on the Emergency AD.
"The strategy mistake of reworking the venerable 737 into a variant-too-far -- still terrible for Boeing, isn't it?"
It wasn't a strategy mistake. It was systems engineering overestimating the ability of pilots to handle what was an identified failure symptom for any unwanted trim system output, an outcome that was recognized back to the original aircraft and why the cutout switches were installed. In combination, there was a systems analysis failure to recognize that the SMYD would continue to signal as valid a very incorrect AoA reading, also a long accepted by industry condition, along with issuing the false stall warning, which wasn't a new feature on the MAX, and that valid, but incorrect would be used by the SMYD, the autopilot, and the MCAS software.
When the latter was recognized for Lion Air, Boeing set to change the software to deal with that problem. The FAA and all other operators accepted the Emergency AD as sufficient. I have been unable to find any discussion immediately after the Emergency AD that demanded all the MAX aircraft be immediately grounded on the basis that pilots were simply unable to perform. ALPA, CAAs world wide, airlines; none that I know of looked at the event and did a halt or grounding or demanded pilots walk off the job.
It was the second crash where the information was withheld that caused the giant publicity explosion for Boeing. Had the operator said "The pilots didn't study, weren't tested, never trained, and did not one thing in the AD" I think Boeing would not have every sticky tray table blamed on the Boeing board today.
"how does that assertedly suppressed truth exonerate any of Boeing's mistakes or wrongful acts or any other similar characterization of the manufacturer's acts or omissions?"
To the extent that the issue is "boeing at the cross roads" it would mean that these discussions would likely not have happened, just as they didn't come up after the Lion Air preliminary report was issued.
The unwanted software response of MCAS was entirely due to a failure to create an accurate systems architecture model by the systems engineering group. Had an accurate model been included in the original spec to the software developers this discussion would never have happened. The "dual input" discussions were about ensuring MCAS operated when it should, not about preventing operation when it shouldn't. It was a case no one identified. More money, more time, more review, were not likely to turn up this accepted performance by the SMYD as a problem source.
Had an MCAS equivalent been used by Airbus, AF447 would not have happened. The plane would see the nose up, real AoA and work to force the nose down against the pilot input to the contrary. This no doubt influenced the development of MCAS where a meaningful physical feedback was possible.