Lufty at SFO
Every day I understand more how Brexit and Trump happened. 😆😆😬
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What I do have a problem with is letting ignorant third parties be led astray by nonsense (and I don't use the term "ignorant" in a disparaging way):
Based on the information I have provided, with references, Noel Evans has been misled with fiction and has now gone away to potentially spread that fiction that has been spouted on PPrune.
...
What I do have a problem with is letting ignorant third parties be led astray by nonsense (and I don't use the term "ignorant" in a disparaging way):
Based on the information I have provided, with references, Noel Evans has been misled with fiction and has now gone away to potentially spread that fiction that has been spouted on PPrune.
...
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All that I said was utter nonsense is any idea that I have "now gone away to potentially spread that fiction that has been spouted on PPrune"
Last edited by Saab Dastard; 21st Nov 2023 at 09:19. Reason: Corrected the quote
The emergence of confused consensus
The industry should see the SFO event as an opportunity to learn, reassess safety boundaries.
‘Drifting into failure’ is a metaphor for the slow, incremental movement of systems operations toward (and eventually across) the boundaries of their safety envelope. Pressures of scarcity and competition typically fuel such movement and uncertain technology and incomplete knowledge about where the boundaries actually are, result in people not stopping the movement or even seeing it.
Recognising that a system is drifting into failure is difficult because the entire protective structure (including suppliers, regulators, managerial hierarchies, etc.) seems to slide along with the operational core toward the boundary. Even if an operational system is ‘borrowing more from safety’ than it was previously or than it is elsewhere by operating with smaller failure margins, this may be considered ‘normal’, as the regulator approved it. Almost everybody inside the system does it, goes along, and agrees, implicitly or not, with what is defined as risky or safe.
Also, the departures from previous practice are seldom quick or large or shocking (and thus difficult to detect): rather, there is a slow succession of tiny incremental deviations from what previously was the ‘norm’. Each departure in itself is hardly noteworthy. In fact, such ‘departures’ are part and parcel of normal adaptive system behaviour, as organizations (and their regulators) continually realign themselves and their operations with current interpretations of the balance between profitability and risk (and have to do so in environments of resource scarcity and competition). As a result, large system accidents of the past few decades have revealed that what is considered ‘normal’, or acceptable risk is highly negotiable and subject to all kinds of local pressures and interpretations.
S. Dekker in 'Resilience Concepts and Precepts'
‘Drifting into failure’ is a metaphor for the slow, incremental movement of systems operations toward (and eventually across) the boundaries of their safety envelope. Pressures of scarcity and competition typically fuel such movement and uncertain technology and incomplete knowledge about where the boundaries actually are, result in people not stopping the movement or even seeing it.
Recognising that a system is drifting into failure is difficult because the entire protective structure (including suppliers, regulators, managerial hierarchies, etc.) seems to slide along with the operational core toward the boundary. Even if an operational system is ‘borrowing more from safety’ than it was previously or than it is elsewhere by operating with smaller failure margins, this may be considered ‘normal’, as the regulator approved it. Almost everybody inside the system does it, goes along, and agrees, implicitly or not, with what is defined as risky or safe.
Also, the departures from previous practice are seldom quick or large or shocking (and thus difficult to detect): rather, there is a slow succession of tiny incremental deviations from what previously was the ‘norm’. Each departure in itself is hardly noteworthy. In fact, such ‘departures’ are part and parcel of normal adaptive system behaviour, as organizations (and their regulators) continually realign themselves and their operations with current interpretations of the balance between profitability and risk (and have to do so in environments of resource scarcity and competition). As a result, large system accidents of the past few decades have revealed that what is considered ‘normal’, or acceptable risk is highly negotiable and subject to all kinds of local pressures and interpretations.
S. Dekker in 'Resilience Concepts and Precepts'
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@safetypee, I believe that this concept of system drifting process could also fairly describe the engineering of the B737 Max MCAS.
And, to be fair, that's also the case of all aircraft accidents whose investigation showed that organisational complacency is part of the root causes.
And, to be fair, that's also the case of all aircraft accidents whose investigation showed that organisational complacency is part of the root causes.
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there is a slow succession of tiny incremental deviations from what previously was the ‘norm [......] ’continually realign themselves and their operations with current interpretations of the balance between profitability and risk
We have a saying in French (from Alphonse Allais) that can translate as when you voluntarily exceed the rules/borders , there are no limits anymore on what you can do .. ( une fois passe les bornes il n'y a plus de limites) Those 2 sentences resume well the SFO self separation procedure only aimed to allow more movements in an Airport which runways configuration, according to the rules, would not allow simultaneous approaches.
Last edited by ATC Watcher; 21st Nov 2023 at 11:52. Reason: typos
Excellent reminder safetypee . A similar sentence was also in Perrow's " normal accidents " book if I remember.
We have a saying in French (from Alphonse Allais) that can translate as when you voluntarily exceed the rules/borders , there are no limits anymore on what you can do .. ( une fois passe les bornes il n'y a plus de limites) Those 2 sentences resume well the SFO self separation procedure only aimed to allow more movements in an Airport which runways configuration, according to the rules, would not allow simultaneous approaches.
We have a saying in French (from Alphonse Allais) that can translate as when you voluntarily exceed the rules/borders , there are no limits anymore on what you can do .. ( une fois passe les bornes il n'y a plus de limites) Those 2 sentences resume well the SFO self separation procedure only aimed to allow more movements in an Airport which runways configuration, according to the rules, would not allow simultaneous approaches.
I recall observing the FO taxing out towards 08R in EGKK many moons ago. We were in an orderly queue for departure. Right at the end of the concrete the FO continued straight ahead towards the grass and it was a reflex action of mine to brake and stop the aircraft. The reason for the departure from the yellow line? “That’s what everyone does in Gatwick to avoid jet blasting the following aircraft.”
Normalisation of deviance is ten thousand times slower than hypoxia but a thousand times more lethal. Why; because by it’s very nature; it happens daily and it’s incipient.
It’s always perfectly fine until it’s violently not.
Normalisation of deviance is ten thousand times slower than hypoxia but a thousand times more lethal. Why; because by it’s very nature; it happens daily and it’s incipient.
It’s always perfectly fine until it’s violently not.
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Bluntly: the SFO controller is a complete ****.
The A350 was on an IFR flight from far away and announced early on that he could neither do a visual approach nor do own visual separation.
So it is the controllers job to slot him into the sequence and make the needed room such that the IFR flight gets a proper instrument approach with proper separation assured by the controller.
To advise 10 mins holding to prepare for that is fine, but then after 14 min of holding and a request for an updated EAT by the crew to basically force him to divert (by announcing indefinitive holding) is NOT ok, when other aircraft who have arrived after the A350 are being landed.
It is certainly not the controllers job to "educate" a crew and to play police or judge on an airliners SOP by refusing basic ATC service - also not when a crew is not 100% perfect in their language. Words are words, what counts is the action, and Lufty was completely professional in their actions.
Of course ATC can deal on a desk with this situation in general with Lufthansa and see how to avoid such happenings in the future - I think no reasonable flight ops manager would deny that you have to play along on high density airports, so certainly it could be worked out.
But this is a table exercise and should not be a concern for an ATC controller on the job.
The A350 was on an IFR flight from far away and announced early on that he could neither do a visual approach nor do own visual separation.
So it is the controllers job to slot him into the sequence and make the needed room such that the IFR flight gets a proper instrument approach with proper separation assured by the controller.
To advise 10 mins holding to prepare for that is fine, but then after 14 min of holding and a request for an updated EAT by the crew to basically force him to divert (by announcing indefinitive holding) is NOT ok, when other aircraft who have arrived after the A350 are being landed.
It is certainly not the controllers job to "educate" a crew and to play police or judge on an airliners SOP by refusing basic ATC service - also not when a crew is not 100% perfect in their language. Words are words, what counts is the action, and Lufty was completely professional in their actions.
Of course ATC can deal on a desk with this situation in general with Lufthansa and see how to avoid such happenings in the future - I think no reasonable flight ops manager would deny that you have to play along on high density airports, so certainly it could be worked out.
But this is a table exercise and should not be a concern for an ATC controller on the job.
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Going back to the SFO/LHR comparisons:
SFO seems to be a 'fair weather' airport.
LHR is an 'all weather' airport.
In Cat 1 conditions at LHR things run 'as normal'.
When down to Cat 1 conditions it appears that SFO cannot deal with 'normal'.
This is all useful information. We are planning a trip into the Pacific shortly that will require a stop on the North American west coast. From what I have read above, SFO has dropped to the bottom of the list of options...
SFO seems to be a 'fair weather' airport.
LHR is an 'all weather' airport.
In Cat 1 conditions at LHR things run 'as normal'.
When down to Cat 1 conditions it appears that SFO cannot deal with 'normal'.
This is all useful information. We are planning a trip into the Pacific shortly that will require a stop on the North American west coast. From what I have read above, SFO has dropped to the bottom of the list of options...
Igbo viz
A lot of airlines refuse to allow NIGHT visual approaches. SFO has its own circumstances but why not tune the ILS ..accept the visual and fly loc/gs guidance anyway? I’d use ILS guidance on any night visual. Why not use all resources? I think the controllers screwed him around as heard in the verbal exchanges. Swearing on air is ‘verbotten’also.
Pretty crappy effort from both sides.
Pretty crappy effort from both sides.
Originally Posted by Blunderbus
SFO has its own circumstances but why not tune the ILS ..accept the visual and fly loc/gs guidance anyway?
1. The Quiet Bridge Visual arrival is not aligned with the ILS (post #90);
2. The QB requires aircraft to visually self-separate with the adjacent aircraft down final because the runways are so close together; independent approaches (vis or ILS) can't be flown;
3. LH SOPs do not permit visual self-separation.
It's all on the first few pages of the thread:
1. The Quiet Bridge Visual arrival is not aligned with the ILS (post #90);
2. The QB requires aircraft to visually self-separate with the adjacent aircraft down final because the runways are so close together; independent approaches (vis or ILS) can't be flown;
3. LH SOPs do not permit visual self-separation.
1. The Quiet Bridge Visual arrival is not aligned with the ILS (post #90);
2. The QB requires aircraft to visually self-separate with the adjacent aircraft down final because the runways are so close together; independent approaches (vis or ILS) can't be flown;
3. LH SOPs do not permit visual self-separation.
Originally Posted by West Coast
For clarity, on point one are you referring to the Quiet Bridge visual or the FMS Bridge visual?
At home for the Holiday, far from a plane.
A lot of airlines refuse to allow NIGHT visual approaches. SFO has its own circumstances but why not tune the ILS ..accept the visual and fly loc/gs guidance anyway? I’d use ILS guidance on any night visual. Why not use all resources? I think the controllers screwed him around as heard in the verbal exchanges. Swearing on air is ‘verbotten’also.
Pretty crappy effort from both sides.
Pretty crappy effort from both sides.
It's all on the first few pages of the thread:
1. The Quiet Bridge Visual arrival is not aligned with the ILS (post #90);
2. The QB requires aircraft to visually self-separate with the adjacent aircraft down final because the runways are so close together; independent approaches (vis or ILS) can't be flown;
3. LH SOPs do not permit visual self-separation.
1. The Quiet Bridge Visual arrival is not aligned with the ILS (post #90);
2. The QB requires aircraft to visually self-separate with the adjacent aircraft down final because the runways are so close together; independent approaches (vis or ILS) can't be flown;
3. LH SOPs do not permit visual self-separation.
Both the QB Visual for 28R and the Tip Toe Visual for 28L require some electronic guidance. They're both charted/published and if you check them out you'll see what's required. Both their respective ILS's are depicted. If you study them you'll find:
28L (TIp Toe Visual) is a straight-in approach. Tuning/ IDing the ILS freq is mandatory since the LOC is the primary lateral guidance source (not merely a backup) that you're required and cleared to intercept and track inbound to the runway. You can fly it coupled all the way and use the GS which is set at a lower path angle than 28R's. The 28L LOC must be working for this Visual.
28R (QB Visual), as mentioned, has a 6 degree offset based off the SFO VOR (095R) until the Bridge @ 6 DME SFO, so both must be working. However, you do indeed tune the 28R ILS because that will be a source to establish your straight-in alignment and path once inside the Bridge. GS for 28R has the higher path angle. The slight maneuver to align oneself straight-in for 28R inside 6 DME is more clearly depicted on some plates than others. Inside 6 the Loc is just about alive.
So both Visuals require operating ground-based NAV; the SFO VOR DME and the 28L LOC with a requirement for use. ATC clearance for one of these charted Visual Approaches requires one to follow the plate, and for neither does "Cleared for the QB or TT Visual" mean establishing oneself inbound visually or by following another aircraft to the same runway. There is the expectation that inside 6 DME both will track their respective LOCs. By this time they will have had each other in sight for miles while tracking electronic guidance designed to produce the gentle 6 degree convergence. The speed assignments will include the directive for the aircraft slightly aft to not overtake the one ahead.
"Maintain visual separation"....this clearance means exactly what It says, and 'Maintain" does not equate to "Visually establish and maintain separation". Establishment of separation between the aircraft is accomplished by the design layout of the electronic guidance paths and each aircraft flying that electronic guidance as cleared. For the final-turn intercepts ATC will establish through speed control and alt assignment a slight fore/aft stagger plus high-side./low-side vertical separation. The glide paths have slightly different slopes. After establishing inbound, If both aircraft follow their respective clearances and charted electronic guidance, separation continues to be maintained without doing anything except to visually monitor the other aircraft in case someone F's-up by drifting off-course or off-speed.
The only aspect of these Visuals that differs from an instrument approach is, if on the QB inside of 6 DME, the necessity of turning a bit further left in order to ease into the groove/intercept the 28R Loc for the last few miles.
Most likely some ,if not all, of the LH crew had flown the very same Visuals during the daytime (when they normally arrive when on schedule) and were in no way surprised they were in use. They were handcuffed by their SOPs. Bummer.
Last edited by PukinDog; 23rd Nov 2023 at 09:49.