Second cockpit barrier
The major effective security change was the acknowledgement that no passengers would be allowed in the cockpit. This was realized, too late, by the 4th plane passengers on 9/11. The FAA should have realized it years before given the terrible outcomes where passengers had been allowed access to the controls by the crew and drunk people had caused trouble by forcing their way in.
Given the difficulty passengers had in breaching the existing door on 9/11, it is clear that the existing doors were sufficient. Add in that passengers also generally know the problems they will face if anyone with ill intent gains access to the cockpit and that would seem to eliminate the majority of the problems.
Concepts about shooting and killing the pilots are far fetched given that shooting out a window gives a clear shot at disabling an engine while providing a major distraction for the crew, which is nearly as effective and more obvious in result. Maybe add bullet resistance to cockpit seat backs?
I think the threat of converting a passenger aircraft into a suicide-guided cruise missile is over. Concentrate on fixing maintainer induced problems and crew upset training and the other, repeated sources of crashes.
If they want more security theater, maybe a curtain similarly retained the way cargo nets are, but opaque, so that no one can see the cockpit door and no one can simply rush the opening.
Given the difficulty passengers had in breaching the existing door on 9/11, it is clear that the existing doors were sufficient. Add in that passengers also generally know the problems they will face if anyone with ill intent gains access to the cockpit and that would seem to eliminate the majority of the problems.
Concepts about shooting and killing the pilots are far fetched given that shooting out a window gives a clear shot at disabling an engine while providing a major distraction for the crew, which is nearly as effective and more obvious in result. Maybe add bullet resistance to cockpit seat backs?
I think the threat of converting a passenger aircraft into a suicide-guided cruise missile is over. Concentrate on fixing maintainer induced problems and crew upset training and the other, repeated sources of crashes.
If they want more security theater, maybe a curtain similarly retained the way cargo nets are, but opaque, so that no one can see the cockpit door and no one can simply rush the opening.
Maybe for extra safety passengers should be towed behind in a totally separate aircraft, shackled to the floor, just in case?
Said in jest but a highly salient question.
I understand the perceived risk with the single door is that opportunistic terrorists could, suitably seated, rush the door in the moments when it may be opened. I know placing the food trolley across the aisle at the galley seems awfully ad-hoc, but as a hindrance to the attack pushing it aside or climbing over it will create a lot of commotion, and it probably doubles or triples the reaction time available to get the secure door closed again. Maybe that is all that is needed?
A second locking door worries me. It just seems ripe for unforeseen consequences.
I understand the perceived risk with the single door is that opportunistic terrorists could, suitably seated, rush the door in the moments when it may be opened. I know placing the food trolley across the aisle at the galley seems awfully ad-hoc, but as a hindrance to the attack pushing it aside or climbing over it will create a lot of commotion, and it probably doubles or triples the reaction time available to get the secure door closed again. Maybe that is all that is needed?
A second locking door worries me. It just seems ripe for unforeseen consequences.
MechEngr
I used to be involved in both pilot training and in anti-terrorist work. You are right. From a straight statistical basis, passengers are far more likely to be killed by the pilot rnaking a mistake than they ever are by any kind of onboard terrorist activity. Therefore the money and effort would be far better spent on improved pilot traning
I used to be involved in both pilot training and in anti-terrorist work. You are right. From a straight statistical basis, passengers are far more likely to be killed by the pilot rnaking a mistake than they ever are by any kind of onboard terrorist activity. Therefore the money and effort would be far better spent on improved pilot traning
