Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.
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he FAA and Boeing today completed the certification flight tests on the Boeing 737 MAX. During three days of testing this week, FAA pilots and engineers evaluated Boeing’s proposed changes in connection with the automated flight control system on the aircraft. While completion of the flights is an important milestone, a number of key tasks remain, including evaluating the data gathered during these flights. The agency is following a deliberate process and will take the time it needs to thoroughly review Boeing’s work. We will lift the grounding order only after FAA safety experts are satisfied that the aircraft meets certification standards.
The remaining tasks include:
The remaining tasks include:
· JOEB Validation & FSB Review – The FAA’s Flight Standardization Board (FSB) and the Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB) which includes international partners from Canada, Europe, and Brazil will evaluate minimum pilot training requirements. The FSB will issue a draft report for public comment addressing the findings of the FSB and JOEB.
· Final FSB Report – The FAA will publish a final FSB report after reviewing and addressing public comments.
· Final Design Documentation and TAB Report – The FAA will review Boeing’s final design documentation in order to evaluate compliance with all FAA regulations. The multi-agency Technical Advisory Board (TAB) will also review the final Boeing submission and issue a final report prior to a final determination of compliance by the FAA.
· CANIC & AD – The FAA will issue a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) providing notice of pending significant safety actions and will publish an Airworthiness Directive (AD) that addresses the known issues for grounding. The AD will advise operators of required corrective actions before aircraft may re-enter commercial service.
· FAA Rescinds Grounding Order – This marks the official ungrounding of the aircraft, pending completion by operators of the work specified in the AD, along with any required training.[/QUOTE]
[QUOTE]
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JOEB and FSB
WSJ today reporting, under headline "Next Boeing 737 MAX Government Test Flight Scheduled for Coming Days", that next flight or flights will include what the news item refers to as "federal pilots along with airline crews from around the world" - which would indicate the JOEB, Joint Operations Evaluation Board, I think. (Article on WSJ website includes a bit more content than the version in the print edition.)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/next-bo...d=hp_lead_pos4
Not explained by the article is the source of reported friction between Transport Canada and FAA. Also of note is the content on the website edition regarding FAA dispensing with - the word used in the Journal is "jettisoned" - the average pilot response time assumption which is one of the root sources of the debacle and tragedies. One must wonder, what has replaced it, though? An old Ann Arbor wisdom holds that one must add before one may drop - and while that relates to course registration changes (back in the days of paper forms, press hard you are making seven copies and so on), it works a lot more broadly.
So then, what is the assumption now about response or reaction times?; does it account for differing training backgrounds and particularly with respect to expected completion of hand-flying and/or airmanship experience quanta; does it account for cultural-based cockpit gradients? What exactly does it account for, in other words, what went into the definition of the "new" assumption - if there is one - in the first place? One could reasonably say the former "average" assumption was based on some long-since discarded Right Stuff movie conception, watered down to some baseline destined to be overtaken and swamped by technology advances so badly that the word "average" did not even apply any longer.
FAA's July 1, 2020 update announcement states that the FSB will issue a draft report on "minimum pilot training requirements" based on its findings and those of the JOEB - the draft will be open for public comments when it is completed.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/next-bo...d=hp_lead_pos4
Not explained by the article is the source of reported friction between Transport Canada and FAA. Also of note is the content on the website edition regarding FAA dispensing with - the word used in the Journal is "jettisoned" - the average pilot response time assumption which is one of the root sources of the debacle and tragedies. One must wonder, what has replaced it, though? An old Ann Arbor wisdom holds that one must add before one may drop - and while that relates to course registration changes (back in the days of paper forms, press hard you are making seven copies and so on), it works a lot more broadly.
So then, what is the assumption now about response or reaction times?; does it account for differing training backgrounds and particularly with respect to expected completion of hand-flying and/or airmanship experience quanta; does it account for cultural-based cockpit gradients? What exactly does it account for, in other words, what went into the definition of the "new" assumption - if there is one - in the first place? One could reasonably say the former "average" assumption was based on some long-since discarded Right Stuff movie conception, watered down to some baseline destined to be overtaken and swamped by technology advances so badly that the word "average" did not even apply any longer.
FAA's July 1, 2020 update announcement states that the FSB will issue a draft report on "minimum pilot training requirements" based on its findings and those of the JOEB - the draft will be open for public comments when it is completed.
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FAA training guidance reportedly issued
Aviation Week's Sean Broderick reporting on Twitter (( article is behind paywall, though ))
"First look at draft of new 737 MAX training, incl. changes to 7 checklists. Two reflect new MCAS; other design changes; other 5 re-worked based on human factors. 190 pg of new/updated material incl. new bulletins, checklists. Pilots, airlines reviewing.
https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/revamped-max-training-prioritizes-getting-pilots-information…One notable from the piece: the FAA's 737 MAX return-to-service directive may go through a formal public notice-and-comment period before it's final. Not always done, but typical for non-emergency directives. If it happens, add 15-30 days to projected ungrounding timelines."
Added: Flight Global article re: American Airlines' pilots union review, apparently more accessible w/o paywall:
https://www.flightglobal.com/airfram...139253.article
"First look at draft of new 737 MAX training, incl. changes to 7 checklists. Two reflect new MCAS; other design changes; other 5 re-worked based on human factors. 190 pg of new/updated material incl. new bulletins, checklists. Pilots, airlines reviewing.
https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/revamped-max-training-prioritizes-getting-pilots-information…One notable from the piece: the FAA's 737 MAX return-to-service directive may go through a formal public notice-and-comment period before it's final. Not always done, but typical for non-emergency directives. If it happens, add 15-30 days to projected ungrounding timelines."
Added: Flight Global article re: American Airlines' pilots union review, apparently more accessible w/o paywall:
https://www.flightglobal.com/airfram...139253.article
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AD issued by FAA relating to biocide in fuel tanks and applicable to 737 MAX.
It appears that the AD prohibits operating 737 MAX aircraft involved in current flight testing programs until compliance with the AD has been attained. Pertains to CFM LEAP 1-B powerplants specifically.
http://services.casa.gov.au/airworth...2020-14-09.pdf
(Further discussion, see Tech Log)
It appears that the AD prohibits operating 737 MAX aircraft involved in current flight testing programs until compliance with the AD has been attained. Pertains to CFM LEAP 1-B powerplants specifically.
http://services.casa.gov.au/airworth...2020-14-09.pdf
(Further discussion, see Tech Log)
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FAA July 21 Update on 737 MAX Recertification:
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=93206
"In the near future, the FAA plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for an Airworthiness Directive (AD) affecting the Boeing 737 MAX. In keeping with our commitment to remain transparent, the NPRM will provide 45 days for the public to comment on proposed design changes and crew procedures to mitigate the safety issues identified during the investigations that followed the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents.
"The agency continues to follow a robust certification process. In addition to the standard FAA certification team, the 737 MAX Technical Advisory Board (TAB) continues to provide valuable review and consultation.
"While the posting of the NPRM is an important milestone, a number of key steps remain. The remaining tasks include:
Also today's Wall Street Journal (by-line, Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel) reports that the NPRM and public comment phase are seen as likely to push return to passenger service into 2021 (along with other factors especially the global pandemic and cratering of air travel demand).
The sorry and tragic saga continues on.
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=93206
"In the near future, the FAA plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for an Airworthiness Directive (AD) affecting the Boeing 737 MAX. In keeping with our commitment to remain transparent, the NPRM will provide 45 days for the public to comment on proposed design changes and crew procedures to mitigate the safety issues identified during the investigations that followed the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents.
"The agency continues to follow a robust certification process. In addition to the standard FAA certification team, the 737 MAX Technical Advisory Board (TAB) continues to provide valuable review and consultation.
"While the posting of the NPRM is an important milestone, a number of key steps remain. The remaining tasks include:
- JOEB Validation & FSB Review – Final planning is underway for the FAA’s Flight Standardization Board (FSB) and the Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB) review of proposed training for flight crews, based on the design change and crew procedures. The results of this evaluation will be included in the updated Flight Standardization Board report, which will also be posted for public comment.
The JOEB will include regulators from Canada, Europe, and Brazil and will evaluate minimum pilot training requirements. The FSB will issue a draft report for public comment addressing the findings of the JOEB. - Final FSB Report – The FAA will publish a final FSB report after reviewing and addressing public comments.
- Final Design Documentation and TAB Report – The FAA will review Boeing’s final design documentation to evaluate compliance with all FAA regulations. The multi-agency Technical Advisory Board will also review the final Boeing submission and issue a final report prior to a final determination of compliance by the FAA.
- CANIC & AD – The FAA will issue a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) providing notice of pending significant safety actions and will publish a final Airworthiness Directive (AD) that addresses the known issues for grounding. The AD will advise operators of required corrective actions before aircraft may re-enter commercial service.
- FAA Rescinds Grounding Order – This marks the official ungrounding of the aircraft, pending completion by operators of the work specified in the AD, along with any required training.
- Certificates of Airworthiness – The FAA will retain its authority to issue airworthiness certificates and export certificates for all new 737 MAX airplanes manufactured since the grounding. The FAA will perform in-person, individual reviews of these aircraft.
- Operator Training Programs – The FAA will review and approve training programs for all Part 121 operators.
Also today's Wall Street Journal (by-line, Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel) reports that the NPRM and public comment phase are seen as likely to push return to passenger service into 2021 (along with other factors especially the global pandemic and cratering of air travel demand).
The sorry and tragic saga continues on.
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The sorry and tragic saga continues
The FAA is to use the NPRM process leading to the final rule.
How common is it for a FSB Review to be put to NPRM, or published in draft before public comment ?
Similarly for the JOEB Validation; unusual ?
These processes provide opportunity for world-wide public review of the proposals and expose any conflicting views between FAA and world authorities (previous leaks), all within a US certification process. Choosing to exclude world opinion could inflame the differences, particularly as the accidents were 'non-US'.
This suggests that descending opinion (public opinion *) on operations and training could influence the final FAA rule. If so, interesting times; possible that US operators would have to train to world standards, or the FAA grant and explain any dispensation, messy. Particularly painful if the FAA agrees a lower standard of training, such that the rest of the world is financially disadvantaged, call lawyers.
Worse still if this openness overflows to disagreements over the technical modifications, currently within the FAA regulatory process, but still subject to multi-agency review ( but not necessarily public comment ?)
Should we expect that there is already a closed-doors agreement between the main regulatory authorities to circumvent most of these issues ?
* world wide 'expert' opinion on creditable human contribution in aircraft with system failure, recognition, reaction time, and performance sufficient to achieve an acceptable level of safety. (Aviation expertise or Human Factors expertise in general ).
Might be a lengthy comment / reply section in the NPA.
How common is it for a FSB Review to be put to NPRM, or published in draft before public comment ?
Similarly for the JOEB Validation; unusual ?
These processes provide opportunity for world-wide public review of the proposals and expose any conflicting views between FAA and world authorities (previous leaks), all within a US certification process. Choosing to exclude world opinion could inflame the differences, particularly as the accidents were 'non-US'.
This suggests that descending opinion (public opinion *) on operations and training could influence the final FAA rule. If so, interesting times; possible that US operators would have to train to world standards, or the FAA grant and explain any dispensation, messy. Particularly painful if the FAA agrees a lower standard of training, such that the rest of the world is financially disadvantaged, call lawyers.
Worse still if this openness overflows to disagreements over the technical modifications, currently within the FAA regulatory process, but still subject to multi-agency review ( but not necessarily public comment ?)
Should we expect that there is already a closed-doors agreement between the main regulatory authorities to circumvent most of these issues ?
* world wide 'expert' opinion on creditable human contribution in aircraft with system failure, recognition, reaction time, and performance sufficient to achieve an acceptable level of safety. (Aviation expertise or Human Factors expertise in general ).
Might be a lengthy comment / reply section in the NPA.
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Well there is no, and shouldn't ever be, any rush to get the airplane back in the air. This terrible pandemic has some way to go yet. Aviation as we know only too well is going through a really spell and the devastating effect upon all in our industry is sad to behold. We have to prepare for the worst and of course hope for the best.
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The rumour bouncing through my recollection is that a NPRM framework has not been used previously for FSB or JOEB processes. Caveat: I don't know -- but if it had happened before, would it not be the case that the particular airworthiness certification question or set of issues would be known and would be attached, in the pro pilot community, to the basic background about a given type of transport category aircraft or a given derivative model of a type of transport category aircraft?
If I am recalling properly the EASA position publicly has been stated as having a preference for a third AOA input or, as a possibly satisfactory alternative, input of synthetic airspeed. I agree with the assessment that the opportunity for comments by disparate authorities and experts (some of whom might not be actually expert or authoritative) creates a potential for a long and drawn out, and convoluted, process (if that is a correct reading of safetypee's post).
Can't help but wondering if the Special Conditions which were part of the 787 type certification with regard to its use of lithium-ion batteries had been subjected to NPRM for commenters far and wide, what result might have obtained? (That is, on the assumption noted above that the NPRM process for 737 MAX now is a one-off, first-time deal, in Dep't of Transportation/FAA's ongoing efforts to cope with the monumental shooting-in-the-foot by the manufacturer.)
If I am recalling properly the EASA position publicly has been stated as having a preference for a third AOA input or, as a possibly satisfactory alternative, input of synthetic airspeed. I agree with the assessment that the opportunity for comments by disparate authorities and experts (some of whom might not be actually expert or authoritative) creates a potential for a long and drawn out, and convoluted, process (if that is a correct reading of safetypee's post).
Can't help but wondering if the Special Conditions which were part of the 787 type certification with regard to its use of lithium-ion batteries had been subjected to NPRM for commenters far and wide, what result might have obtained? (That is, on the assumption noted above that the NPRM process for 737 MAX now is a one-off, first-time deal, in Dep't of Transportation/FAA's ongoing efforts to cope with the monumental shooting-in-the-foot by the manufacturer.)
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WillowRun, thanks.
Maybe a first time; not necessarily mitigating the 'shooting-in-the-foot by the manufacturer', but to demonstrate robust corrective action and restore confidence in the FAA's role in this saga; - because they provided the gun for Boeing.
wrench 1, part 39 appears to relate to the AD process, the implementation of the ruling.
If the content of the AD involves certification aspects, which MCAS does - design and procedures, then your 'admin tasks' are very relevant, if not the central issue. Re FAA press release ' … comment on proposed design changes and crew procedures to mitigate the safety issues identified …'
Maybe a first time; not necessarily mitigating the 'shooting-in-the-foot by the manufacturer', but to demonstrate robust corrective action and restore confidence in the FAA's role in this saga; - because they provided the gun for Boeing.
wrench 1, part 39 appears to relate to the AD process, the implementation of the ruling.
If the content of the AD involves certification aspects, which MCAS does - design and procedures, then your 'admin tasks' are very relevant, if not the central issue. Re FAA press release ' … comment on proposed design changes and crew procedures to mitigate the safety issues identified …'
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To elaborate on what Wrench1 wrote, the law in the US driving this is the Administrative Procedures Act, which requires public notice and opportunity for comment, and requires agencies to address comments received, for all changes to regulations unless there is an emergency as defined in the Act. That includes airworthiness directives issued under 14 CFR part 39. The airplanes are grounded, so there is no emergency from a safety standpoint.
There also is a requirement in the FAA authorization statute for any emergency orders by the FAA Administrator to be followed by a public proceeding as defined in the law, which was not done after the grounding order. The FAA theoretically can't simply rescind or revise the order at this point without holding such a proceeding or they'd be violating that law.
Failure to follow either of these requirements in this case seems likely to invite court challenges by various parties, so I suspect the FAA is going to be careful to follow the law. This is a situation where trying to skip steps may cause additional delay versus following the required steps.
Whenever an AD requires a change in design to be incorporated, both the certification procedures of 14 CFR part 21 (which requires evaluation of compliance with airworthiness standards) and the regulatory promulgation process requirements of 14 CFR part 39 and the Administratve Procedures Act are required to be followed. Normally this is done sequentially, but it can be done in parallel or even in reverse (resulting in ADs that say "fix in a manner acceptable to the FAA"). The design changes to address the issues with the Max are apparently in the late stages of the certification process. It sounds like the FAA's plan is that, once the design changes are approved, the AD process will begin with issuance of an NPRM. The process for promulgating an AD when public notice and opportunity for comment prior to the final rule are provided typically takes at least six months. There are likely to be many comments, so I doubt the process will be faster than that in this case.
There also is a requirement in the FAA authorization statute for any emergency orders by the FAA Administrator to be followed by a public proceeding as defined in the law, which was not done after the grounding order. The FAA theoretically can't simply rescind or revise the order at this point without holding such a proceeding or they'd be violating that law.
Failure to follow either of these requirements in this case seems likely to invite court challenges by various parties, so I suspect the FAA is going to be careful to follow the law. This is a situation where trying to skip steps may cause additional delay versus following the required steps.
Whenever an AD requires a change in design to be incorporated, both the certification procedures of 14 CFR part 21 (which requires evaluation of compliance with airworthiness standards) and the regulatory promulgation process requirements of 14 CFR part 39 and the Administratve Procedures Act are required to be followed. Normally this is done sequentially, but it can be done in parallel or even in reverse (resulting in ADs that say "fix in a manner acceptable to the FAA"). The design changes to address the issues with the Max are apparently in the late stages of the certification process. It sounds like the FAA's plan is that, once the design changes are approved, the AD process will begin with issuance of an NPRM. The process for promulgating an AD when public notice and opportunity for comment prior to the final rule are provided typically takes at least six months. There are likely to be many comments, so I doubt the process will be faster than that in this case.
Last edited by Dave Therhino; 23rd Jul 2020 at 19:34. Reason: Added comment on time for AD process
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If I understand what safetypee means, then I more than agree - the "administrative" items with regard to the JOEB and FSB outputs are very relevant and potentially quite significant for purposes of restoring the assurance of safety of the airplane. Additionally to these, the Department of Transportation Inspector General (I.G.) report on the certification lapses with this aircraft - the first, according to the I.G., of a number of reports on the lapses - states that public comments will be sought by FAA on another highly relevant reform (a new policy with respect to FAA oversight of the ODA process, taking account of input from an Expert Review Panel mandated by Section 213 of the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act). And beyond all that, the FAA also is establishing and implementing an Organization Designation Authorization Office, and assuredly the Senate and House Committees in the Congress will have "comments" on that initiative as well.*
On the subject of public comments and/or the NPRM process in a situation the same or substantially similar as the 737 MAX safety crisis, I can think of two somewhat - or maybe quite similar - prior instances to look at. One, the actions taken after a DC-10 (American Airlines Fl. 191) crashed shortly after takeoff from Chicago O'Hare International Airport on May 25, 1979. I haven't yet dug back into the FAA administrative record to examine, that is to research, what specific actions were taken and what exact form or format they took. (Whether official documents and records from 41 years ago have been moved into an internet-accessible form will be an interesting side note - the published court decision in the lawsuit filed by British Caledonian contains a lot of interesting record citations.)
The other instance involved the actions taken after the two Lithium-Ion battery fires on new Boeing 787 aircraft a few years ago (one in Boston, the other in Japan).
In both instances, significant changes were made to the airplanes afterwards, in the case of the Ten, quite substantial, if I recall properly, in terms of hydraulic lines. So if the law was, back then and at the time of the 787 incidents, the same as wrench1 has stated or implied, then the ADs relating to these two prior instances should be relevant. Not necessarily in a sense of relevance for what is happening to get the 737 MAX back into service as such - but in a context of the aviation safety ecosystem, anyway I see these past instances and their administrative law components (as they may exist) as relevant, quite.
*source is the memo from the DOT General Counsel appended to the I.G.'s June 29, 2020 report (which itself is the subject of another thread here).
On the subject of public comments and/or the NPRM process in a situation the same or substantially similar as the 737 MAX safety crisis, I can think of two somewhat - or maybe quite similar - prior instances to look at. One, the actions taken after a DC-10 (American Airlines Fl. 191) crashed shortly after takeoff from Chicago O'Hare International Airport on May 25, 1979. I haven't yet dug back into the FAA administrative record to examine, that is to research, what specific actions were taken and what exact form or format they took. (Whether official documents and records from 41 years ago have been moved into an internet-accessible form will be an interesting side note - the published court decision in the lawsuit filed by British Caledonian contains a lot of interesting record citations.)
The other instance involved the actions taken after the two Lithium-Ion battery fires on new Boeing 787 aircraft a few years ago (one in Boston, the other in Japan).
In both instances, significant changes were made to the airplanes afterwards, in the case of the Ten, quite substantial, if I recall properly, in terms of hydraulic lines. So if the law was, back then and at the time of the 787 incidents, the same as wrench1 has stated or implied, then the ADs relating to these two prior instances should be relevant. Not necessarily in a sense of relevance for what is happening to get the 737 MAX back into service as such - but in a context of the aviation safety ecosystem, anyway I see these past instances and their administrative law components (as they may exist) as relevant, quite.
*source is the memo from the DOT General Counsel appended to the I.G.'s June 29, 2020 report (which itself is the subject of another thread here).
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wrench1, thank you for all the clarifications.
Part of my interest relates to the ongoing Congressional agitation (to put it politely) around matters, and/or issues, concerning modifying, reforming, rebuilding/starting over, the ODA process. While the FAA as regulator deals with its APA obligations (as you point out) the Congress will try to keep up, and also try to envision the next set of problems in the future and define via legislation what could be successful or effective in keeping those problems from occurring, or minimizing them. The various admin actions will get a lot of airtime as part of that . . . and as part of the international commercial issues bound to arise or recur.
At the same time, to anticipate a shortage, let alone absence, of grandstanders on Capitol Hill - and among aviation interest groups and lobbies - would be a bit disappointing. Meaning, to understand separation between AD/NPRM under administrative law, and the comparatively only policy-making admin maneuvers, is a big point.
Part of my interest relates to the ongoing Congressional agitation (to put it politely) around matters, and/or issues, concerning modifying, reforming, rebuilding/starting over, the ODA process. While the FAA as regulator deals with its APA obligations (as you point out) the Congress will try to keep up, and also try to envision the next set of problems in the future and define via legislation what could be successful or effective in keeping those problems from occurring, or minimizing them. The various admin actions will get a lot of airtime as part of that . . . and as part of the international commercial issues bound to arise or recur.
At the same time, to anticipate a shortage, let alone absence, of grandstanders on Capitol Hill - and among aviation interest groups and lobbies - would be a bit disappointing. Meaning, to understand separation between AD/NPRM under administrative law, and the comparatively only policy-making admin maneuvers, is a big point.
Except the problem with Capitol Hill and aviation is that once the aviation "issue" is out of the news we once again become the red-headed step child and are relegated back to our proverbial room. Once the MAX starts flying again and everybody gets that warm fuzzy I don't expect congress to get immediately involved in any aircraft certification legislation. It will merely get passed off to the DoT to correct, etc., etc. and join the existing list of previous aviation correction issues. Besides I don't think there will be a need for any new transport aircraft variants in the near future. Time will tell.......
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Thanks for the clarification wrench 1.
For my continuing education, whilst 'neither the JOEB or FSB carry weight legally to unground the MAX', conversely can (or will) the MAX be ungrounded without JOEB and FSB being acceptable for: -
A. The FAA, (legally possible ?), but politically unlikely.
B. Other regulatory authorities; with potential for different standards of modification, procedures, and training, which might be unacceptable to Boeing (cost), and with little benefit to the FAA seeking to improve world standing and restoring the necessary trust in 'certification' being seen to be well done.
Given that that there may be many HF related comments on the JOEB and FSB, and that previously the FAA was short of the necessary expertise, now seeking to recruit many new HF specialists, will the 'new brigade' be sufficiently competent in aviation matters to be able to respond to wide ranging, and probably more knowledgeable worldly views.
For my continuing education, whilst 'neither the JOEB or FSB carry weight legally to unground the MAX', conversely can (or will) the MAX be ungrounded without JOEB and FSB being acceptable for: -
A. The FAA, (legally possible ?), but politically unlikely.
B. Other regulatory authorities; with potential for different standards of modification, procedures, and training, which might be unacceptable to Boeing (cost), and with little benefit to the FAA seeking to improve world standing and restoring the necessary trust in 'certification' being seen to be well done.
Given that that there may be many HF related comments on the JOEB and FSB, and that previously the FAA was short of the necessary expertise, now seeking to recruit many new HF specialists, will the 'new brigade' be sufficiently competent in aviation matters to be able to respond to wide ranging, and probably more knowledgeable worldly views.
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wrench1
Along with the virus and the constant press about the failings of the MAX and aviation in general (exposure to the virus), I would sadly bet that it will be many months if not years before everybody will get "warm and fuzzy" about flying in general let alone the MAX .
Along with the virus and the constant press about the failings of the MAX and aviation in general (exposure to the virus), I would sadly bet that it will be many months if not years before everybody will get "warm and fuzzy" about flying in general let alone the MAX .