Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.
If Boeing’s argument is that they do not owe the truth to regulators and they put that in writing, then such a statement should be the first item considered when reviewing their Organizational Delegation Authority. This would disqualify a DER, and should likewise disqualify any OEM who seeks such authority.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 705
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
GlobalNav - what Boeing has admitted is, at this point, only what is in the Statement of Facts which is part of the DPA (Deferred Prosecution Agreement). I don't think they admitted that they could lie with impunity to any regulator - they did admit that the two technical pilots for whose actions and omissions the company was legally accountable committed misconduct that amounted to fraud and conspiracy. (I'll reread the disheartening Statement of Facts and if I've over-stated or misstated at all, correction will follow.)
The proposed class action in Chicago is a different matter, though. The claim is that pilots in a number of airlines around the world did the things necessary to qualify on the 737 MAX. Then, the crashes, and the grounding, and as a result, their careers are damaged. Approval of the class action procedural level of court action has not been given yet. Instead, Boeing hit back at the lawsuit by arguing that it owed no legal duty to the pilots, even if the company did all the wrongful things claimed in the lawsuit - which have now been expanded by the admissions in the DPA Statement of Facts. It's a technical or procedural type of defense motion.
What burns about the defense motion is that the company is saying, no matter that we screwed over (pardon my lingo) the regulator in point of fact, and too bad that we cut corners so bloodlessly that 346 people perished in aircraft crash disasters. These outrageous and sordid acts which we caused still do not make us legally liable for the harmful effects upon the careers of the pilots whose careers were derailed or otherwise hurt by the grounding. It's not a matter of saying they "didn't really suffer any damages" - instead Boeing is saying "we're not responsible at all - throw the case out before it ever really gets going."
So in other words, if designing a control system, failing to be forthright with the regulators, failing to put the info in the training and FCOMs, and the rest, if all that leads to disaster which in turn leads to a grounding which in turn hurts the careers of aviators? Boeing says, So What? Careers of airport baristas were hurt too by the grounding. Literally, the once-mighty bailiwick of the late and much-missed Wimpy made this argument in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois. No, I'm not counsel of record. If only.
The proposed class action in Chicago is a different matter, though. The claim is that pilots in a number of airlines around the world did the things necessary to qualify on the 737 MAX. Then, the crashes, and the grounding, and as a result, their careers are damaged. Approval of the class action procedural level of court action has not been given yet. Instead, Boeing hit back at the lawsuit by arguing that it owed no legal duty to the pilots, even if the company did all the wrongful things claimed in the lawsuit - which have now been expanded by the admissions in the DPA Statement of Facts. It's a technical or procedural type of defense motion.
What burns about the defense motion is that the company is saying, no matter that we screwed over (pardon my lingo) the regulator in point of fact, and too bad that we cut corners so bloodlessly that 346 people perished in aircraft crash disasters. These outrageous and sordid acts which we caused still do not make us legally liable for the harmful effects upon the careers of the pilots whose careers were derailed or otherwise hurt by the grounding. It's not a matter of saying they "didn't really suffer any damages" - instead Boeing is saying "we're not responsible at all - throw the case out before it ever really gets going."
So in other words, if designing a control system, failing to be forthright with the regulators, failing to put the info in the training and FCOMs, and the rest, if all that leads to disaster which in turn leads to a grounding which in turn hurts the careers of aviators? Boeing says, So What? Careers of airport baristas were hurt too by the grounding. Literally, the once-mighty bailiwick of the late and much-missed Wimpy made this argument in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois. No, I'm not counsel of record. If only.
Is there not a point where someone senior in a corporation recognizes that this kind of argument is not one you want to win?
Getting legal cover for obviously sleazy behavior may save some dimes, but will cost mega bucks going forward. Does anyone remember 'If it ain't Boeing, I'm not going'? Is it in the corporate interest to change that?
Getting legal cover for obviously sleazy behavior may save some dimes, but will cost mega bucks going forward. Does anyone remember 'If it ain't Boeing, I'm not going'? Is it in the corporate interest to change that?
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: Castletown
Posts: 241
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Stick gradients" isn't the correct terminology for flight control tests pertaining to FAR part 25. It is referred to as "stick force gradient' when we conduct flight tests!
Please ensure that you do due diligence in research so as not to relay incorrect information to other people reading these forums since this may lead to confusion!
Please ensure that you do due diligence in research so as not to relay incorrect information to other people reading these forums since this may lead to confusion!
Is there somewhere a, succinct, well-worded statement of just what changes Boeing have actually made to the aircraft and/or its software, which have given the ability for it to be re-certified.
I presume Boeing themselves are not capable of writing this without their lawyers making a nonsense of it, but has some independent organisation done so ? Just a couple of pages, maybe just one, is presumably enough, not something the size of War and Peace.
I presume Boeing themselves are not capable of writing this without their lawyers making a nonsense of it, but has some independent organisation done so ? Just a couple of pages, maybe just one, is presumably enough, not something the size of War and Peace.
Join Date: Nov 2003
Location: UK
Posts: 493
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
WHBM try this: 737 MAX - MCAS (b737.org.uk)
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: IRS NAV ONLY
Posts: 1,219
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thread Starter
The article in the Seattle Times states that - now that they have the major regulators on-board (FAA, Canada, EASA, Brazil), they expect to have the others by mid-year.
China could be interesting...
China could be interesting...
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 705
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
EASA announcement
Dated Jan. 27, 2021, by EASA (from its website):
EASA declares Boeing 737 MAX safe to return to service in Europe | EASA (europa.eu)
EASA declares Boeing 737 MAX safe to return to service in Europe | EASA (europa.eu)
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: Castletown
Posts: 241
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
tdracer
Internal Chinese flights use a variety of equipment types depending on where the ultimate destination is.
Arguably, the 737 is used by many airlines for internal flights as compared with the A320 for example.
Internal Chinese flights use a variety of equipment types depending on where the ultimate destination is.
Arguably, the 737 is used by many airlines for internal flights as compared with the A320 for example.
There is a capitalist answer to the problems of Boeing, summed up in the slogan "Creative destruction." Over two decades or so, Boeing has abandoned the things that made it truly respected and trusted by everyone who ever set foot in an aeroplane, all in pursuit of financial success. The consequences of this management policy is that it is now vulnerable to the external shock of the pandemic. The company Boeing is, perhaps, no longer the best entity to manage its productive assets, both plant and skilled workers. As the company was moving more and more to an outsourcing model, with shared risk, there would be the less disruption in breaking it up into manageable, more nimble, and more ethical productive units.
Paradoxically, then, an entropy increase permits both the destruction or unstructuring of a closed system and the creation of a new system to nullify the march toward randomness and death. Taken together, the entropy notion associated with the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the basic goal of individuals and societies seem to work in dialectic harmony driving and regulating the destructive/creative, or deductive/inductive, action—that we have described herein as a dialectic engine. The result is a changing and expanding universe of mental concepts matched to a changing and expanding universe of observed reality.
Out of entropy arise the seeds of creation.
JB was mainly referring to entrenched ideology, institutionalized thinking and practices, and as a blue suiter, he sure had enough examples for his theories. Growing mushrooms out of the necrotic corporate body of TBC is probably not a great solution but it is always an option. TBC may well be better off showing some humility and soul searching and take substantive action to contemplate their navel, and own the problem and use that to start anew with... gosh, maybe a real, meaningful corporate ethics that starts at the top with some moral conviction. The last effort was a cynical expedient and was as effective as would be expected, and in the end, the shareholders get what they wished for.
It was people with moral fortitude such as Boyd, Spinney, Christie, Spray, Riccioni and Co that resulted in the Viper, the A-10, exposed the BFV misleading survivability trials, and who developed E-M theory, the aerial attack study, Patterns of Conflict, and the OODA Loop. He was hated by the airforce bosses, the people who turned up to his funeral were marines, which says about all that needs to be said about integrity and institutions.
Boeings management will be remembered too, but not in a good way, nor will TBCs responses to the failures in their processes be forgotten easily without renewal.
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: moraira,spain-Norfolk, UK
Age: 81
Posts: 389
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I remember from a course back when I worked:-
'Expecting tomorrow to be a variation on today is a bad idea'
Don't remember the presenter, well respected in the day.
A number of companies (UK) have found the combination
Covid & Brexit & online shopping made their tomorrow un-survivable.
I hope someone in Boeing is pondering the conundrum,
Covid + crashes + changed travel patterns, may make survival
as they are now very difficult.
'Expecting tomorrow to be a variation on today is a bad idea'
Don't remember the presenter, well respected in the day.
A number of companies (UK) have found the combination
Covid & Brexit & online shopping made their tomorrow un-survivable.
I hope someone in Boeing is pondering the conundrum,
Covid + crashes + changed travel patterns, may make survival
as they are now very difficult.
Further to posts #622 and #630, on 25 Feb FAA assessed $5.4m in deferred penalties under terms of 2015 agreement whereby Boeing pledged to improve regulatory compliance. See Press Release – Boeing to Pay $6.6 Million in Penalties to FAA
Didn’t happen. Two MAXs crashed. DPA found criminal culpability and levied penalties totalling almost $3 billion
The 2015 agreement refers back to TWA 800 accident 25 years ago, and Boeing’s tardiness in fixing risk of fuel tank explosions. See https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/the-l...08-gm27r0.html.
Didn’t happen. Two MAXs crashed. DPA found criminal culpability and levied penalties totalling almost $3 billion
The 2015 agreement refers back to TWA 800 accident 25 years ago, and Boeing’s tardiness in fixing risk of fuel tank explosions. See https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/the-l...08-gm27r0.html.
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: Castletown
Posts: 241
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Interesting reading the article in your last link.
I was under the impression that the Nitrogen Generation system for center tanks had been installed in some types, for example B737/747/767.
Maybe TD can give us some more information.
I was under the impression that the Nitrogen Generation system for center tanks had been installed in some types, for example B737/747/767.
Maybe TD can give us some more information.
Thread Starter
Not much...
I know that Boeing developed Nitrogen Gen Systems (NGS) to inert the center wing tanks (and, IIRC, the wing tanks for the 787 since the carbon composite construction tends to insulate the fuel and keep it at a higher (combustible) temp longer than metal wing tanks). Further, somewhere around 2010 all new production aircraft had NGS systems installed, and retrofit kits were made available for in-service aircraft.
My limited understanding of the original FAA fines was related to Boeing rather seriously underestimating the difficulty of developing commercially viable NGS systems and missing the originally agreed to dates for production and retrofit availablity (apparently the NGS hardware proved rather unreliable in the service demonstrator tests and it took a lot of time and money to get them up to the reliability necessary for commercial airlines operating 8-12 hours/day for over 20 years).
I know that Boeing developed Nitrogen Gen Systems (NGS) to inert the center wing tanks (and, IIRC, the wing tanks for the 787 since the carbon composite construction tends to insulate the fuel and keep it at a higher (combustible) temp longer than metal wing tanks). Further, somewhere around 2010 all new production aircraft had NGS systems installed, and retrofit kits were made available for in-service aircraft.
My limited understanding of the original FAA fines was related to Boeing rather seriously underestimating the difficulty of developing commercially viable NGS systems and missing the originally agreed to dates for production and retrofit availablity (apparently the NGS hardware proved rather unreliable in the service demonstrator tests and it took a lot of time and money to get them up to the reliability necessary for commercial airlines operating 8-12 hours/day for over 20 years).

Join Date: May 2016
Location: victoria
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It seems the political race of deniel of the complete terminatin of the max family or the bankruptcy of boeing and sale to the chineese. Bankruptcy chapter 11 only buys time but it wont buy the radical restructurin required to save the company which is stuck together by a failed culture and politics.