Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.
The crux of the problem involves alerting.
The FAA has to consider its own research findings and associated regulations.
and, although the “The United States Government assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.” Congress could reflect on the ethical, moral aspects of any dispensation from the requirements.
”Human Factors Considerations in the Design and Evaluation of Flight Deck Displays and Controls”
https://www.volpe.dot.gov/sites/volp...ontrols_V2.pdf
Other certification agencies could throw the whole book back at the FAA / Boeing; your book, your rules, … you comply.
Page 113 onwards:
Warning: For conditions that require immediate flightcrew awareness and immediate flightcrew response.
Red - if immediate action required
Flightcrew alerts must: [14 CFR 25.1322 (a)]
(1) Provide the flightcrew with the information needed to:
(i) Identify non-normal operation or airplane system conditions, and
(ii) Determine the appropriate actions, if any.
(2) Be readily and easily detectable and intelligible by the flightcrew under all foreseeable operating conditions, including conditions where multiple alerts are provided.
The absence of the words - MCAS or TRIM
Prioritize alerts so that the most urgent alert is presented first to the flightcrew. [AC 25.1322-1, 8]
Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors which could create additional hazards. [14 CFR 23.1309(b)(3), 25.1309(c), 29.1309(c)]
Time-Critical Warnings
Some warnings may be so time-critical for the safe operation of the airplane that general alerts such as a master visual alert and a master aural alert may not provide the flightcrew with immediate awareness of the specific alerting condition that is commensurate with the level of urgency of flightcrew response necessary. In such cases, warning elements dedicated to specific alerting conditions should be provided that give the flightcrew immediate awareness without further reference to other flight deck indications. [AC 25.1322-1, 6.b]
Documentation should include the results of analyses and tests that show that any delayed or inhibited alerts do not adversely impact safety. [AC 25.1322-1, 8.a(5)]
When following the guidance in AC 25.1322-1, document any divergence, and provide the rationale for decisions regarding novel or unusual features used in the design of the alerting system. This will facilitate the certification evaluation because it will enable the FAA to focus on areas where the proposed system diverges from the AC and has new or novel features. [AC 25.1322-1, 13.b]
and finally, but not least; Workload
(c) Operationally-relevant behavior of the installed equipment must be:
(1) Predictable and unambiguous, and
(2) Designed to enable the flightcrew to intervene in a manner appropriate to the task.
(d) To the extent practicable, installed equipment must incorporate means to enable the flightcrew to manage errors resulting from the kinds of flightcrew interactions with the equipment that can be reasonably expected in service.
Relying on a requirement of “train to proficiency” may be unforeseeable, economically impracticable, or unachievable by some pilots without excessive mental workload as compensation. [AC 27-1B, AC 27.1303b(4)(ii)(B)(1); AC 29-2C, AC 29.1303b(4)(ii)(B)(1)]
The FAA has to consider its own research findings and associated regulations.
and, although the “The United States Government assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.” Congress could reflect on the ethical, moral aspects of any dispensation from the requirements.
”Human Factors Considerations in the Design and Evaluation of Flight Deck Displays and Controls”
https://www.volpe.dot.gov/sites/volp...ontrols_V2.pdf
Other certification agencies could throw the whole book back at the FAA / Boeing; your book, your rules, … you comply.
Page 113 onwards:
Warning: For conditions that require immediate flightcrew awareness and immediate flightcrew response.
Red - if immediate action required
Flightcrew alerts must: [14 CFR 25.1322 (a)]
(1) Provide the flightcrew with the information needed to:
(i) Identify non-normal operation or airplane system conditions, and
(ii) Determine the appropriate actions, if any.
(2) Be readily and easily detectable and intelligible by the flightcrew under all foreseeable operating conditions, including conditions where multiple alerts are provided.
The absence of the words - MCAS or TRIM
Prioritize alerts so that the most urgent alert is presented first to the flightcrew. [AC 25.1322-1, 8]
Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors which could create additional hazards. [14 CFR 23.1309(b)(3), 25.1309(c), 29.1309(c)]
Time-Critical Warnings
Some warnings may be so time-critical for the safe operation of the airplane that general alerts such as a master visual alert and a master aural alert may not provide the flightcrew with immediate awareness of the specific alerting condition that is commensurate with the level of urgency of flightcrew response necessary. In such cases, warning elements dedicated to specific alerting conditions should be provided that give the flightcrew immediate awareness without further reference to other flight deck indications. [AC 25.1322-1, 6.b]
Documentation should include the results of analyses and tests that show that any delayed or inhibited alerts do not adversely impact safety. [AC 25.1322-1, 8.a(5)]
When following the guidance in AC 25.1322-1, document any divergence, and provide the rationale for decisions regarding novel or unusual features used in the design of the alerting system. This will facilitate the certification evaluation because it will enable the FAA to focus on areas where the proposed system diverges from the AC and has new or novel features. [AC 25.1322-1, 13.b]
and finally, but not least; Workload
(c) Operationally-relevant behavior of the installed equipment must be:
(1) Predictable and unambiguous, and
(2) Designed to enable the flightcrew to intervene in a manner appropriate to the task.
(d) To the extent practicable, installed equipment must incorporate means to enable the flightcrew to manage errors resulting from the kinds of flightcrew interactions with the equipment that can be reasonably expected in service.
Relying on a requirement of “train to proficiency” may be unforeseeable, economically impracticable, or unachievable by some pilots without excessive mental workload as compensation. [AC 27-1B, AC 27.1303b(4)(ii)(B)(1); AC 29-2C, AC 29.1303b(4)(ii)(B)(1)]
The saga is good for an afternoon soapie, replace "days of our lives".
At some point TBC needs to bring their product into the 21st century. The argument based on crew commonality didn't pass muster when first made, SWA went on to buy other carriers and maintain multiple types, and that was apparently considered to be beneficial. That desire to grandfather was a factor in the actions and inaction's that led to the Max debacle.
I doubt that the wing has much more development left in it to permit it to keep up with the developmental potential that the Airbus has. Tying an extension of the time to conclude the 7 and the 10 with a termination of any further grandfathering of that aircraft would be a win in the short term, and a win long term, as TBC needs to be producing a replacement airframe that can compete with the Airbus.
Changing the alerting functions right now would be a stressed program, and the potential to have a latent failure introduced is a higher risk than accepting the conclusion of a final series of aircraft in this program.
TBC has misbehaved and in normal times should be rapped over the knuckles, but the industry and country needs them to get on and sort out their litter box. senior management separately needs to be held accountable for the 27 years of degradation of the company, the ethics, production shambles and nonsense that have occurred.
IMHO...
At some point TBC needs to bring their product into the 21st century. The argument based on crew commonality didn't pass muster when first made, SWA went on to buy other carriers and maintain multiple types, and that was apparently considered to be beneficial. That desire to grandfather was a factor in the actions and inaction's that led to the Max debacle.
I doubt that the wing has much more development left in it to permit it to keep up with the developmental potential that the Airbus has. Tying an extension of the time to conclude the 7 and the 10 with a termination of any further grandfathering of that aircraft would be a win in the short term, and a win long term, as TBC needs to be producing a replacement airframe that can compete with the Airbus.
Changing the alerting functions right now would be a stressed program, and the potential to have a latent failure introduced is a higher risk than accepting the conclusion of a final series of aircraft in this program.
TBC has misbehaved and in normal times should be rapped over the knuckles, but the industry and country needs them to get on and sort out their litter box. senior management separately needs to be held accountable for the 27 years of degradation of the company, the ethics, production shambles and nonsense that have occurred.
IMHO...
"(2) Be readily and easily detectable and intelligible by the flightcrew under all foreseeable operating conditions, including conditions where multiple alerts are provided."
All three flight crews detected the increased yoke force - and they detected the stick shaker falsely indicating a stall. In human factors nothing is better than tactile feedback to the controls in the hands of the operator.
Still, that's the sort of requirement I was referring to with:
"They don't have any obligation to evaluate every system to ensure it is fail safe; just wash their hands of the results and blame the maker for not accomplishing that all-encompassing task."
Is there a requirement to never make a false warning and never report a false measurement? That's the initiator for the MCAS problem.
Edit: Now I wonder where the warnings for false warnings should be presented.
All three flight crews detected the increased yoke force - and they detected the stick shaker falsely indicating a stall. In human factors nothing is better than tactile feedback to the controls in the hands of the operator.
Still, that's the sort of requirement I was referring to with:
"They don't have any obligation to evaluate every system to ensure it is fail safe; just wash their hands of the results and blame the maker for not accomplishing that all-encompassing task."
Is there a requirement to never make a false warning and never report a false measurement? That's the initiator for the MCAS problem.
Edit: Now I wonder where the warnings for false warnings should be presented.
Last edited by MechEngr; 7th Oct 2022 at 22:25.
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Allied Pilots Association Opposes Extension of Equipment Exemption for Boeing 737-7 MAX and 737-10 MAX Aircraft
FORT WORTH, Texas (Oct. 5, 2022) – The Allied Pilots Association (APA), representing the 15,000 pilots of American Airlines, expressed its strong opposition to any extension of the equipment exemption for the Boeing 737-7 MAX and Boeing 737-10 MAX.The exemption expires in December.
“Boeing needs to proceed with installing modern crew alerting systems on these aircraft to mitigate pilot startle-effect and confusion during complex, compound system malfunctions,” said APA President Capt. Edward Sicher. “Once these systems are installed and pilots have been properly trained on them, our crews will be better able to identify system failures and prioritize corrective actions that could save lives.”
Sicher noted that American Airlines pilots fly more than 300 B-737s for the airline.
“We oppose any extension of the exemption and don’t agree with Boeing’s claim that pilots could become confused when moving from an airplane without the modern alert system to one that is equipped with it. Nothing could be further from our flight deck reality,” Capt. Sicher said. “Consider the Boeing 757 and Boeing 767 – they’re substantially different airplanes, yet operate under a single certificate. Pilots have routinely flown both on the same day without any confusion.
“Pilots must have the tools we need to keep our passengers safe. By equipping these aircraft with modern crew alerting systems, Boeing can maintain a strong order book for them, which will in turn protect the jobs of the thousands of hard-working men and women who build the airplanes. Doing so will also help Boeing to continue rebuilding public trust.”
[credit to Dallas Morning News article and 755-BlankBox before that, for making this poster aware of the item]
Allied Pilots Association Opposes Extension of Equipment Exemption for Boeing 737-7 MAX and 737-10 MAX Aircraft
FORT WORTH, Texas (Oct. 5, 2022) – The Allied Pilots Association (APA), representing the 15,000 pilots of American Airlines, expressed its strong opposition to any extension of the equipment exemption for the Boeing 737-7 MAX and Boeing 737-10 MAX.
“Boeing needs to proceed with installing modern crew alerting systems on these aircraft to mitigate pilot startle-effect and confusion during complex, compound system malfunctions,” said APA President Capt. Edward Sicher. “Once these systems are installed and pilots have been properly trained on them, our crews will be better able to identify system failures and prioritize corrective actions that could save lives.”
“We oppose any extension of the exemption and don’t agree with Boeing’s claim that pilots could become confused when moving from an airplane without the modern alert system to one that is equipped with it. Nothing could be further from our flight deck reality,” Capt. Sicher said. “Consider the Boeing 757 and Boeing 767 – they’re substantially different airplanes, yet operate under a single certificate. Pilots have routinely flown both on the same day without any confusion
FORT WORTH, Texas (Oct. 5, 2022) – The Allied Pilots Association (APA), representing the 15,000 pilots of American Airlines, expressed its strong opposition to any extension of the equipment exemption for the Boeing 737-7 MAX and Boeing 737-10 MAX.
“Boeing needs to proceed with installing modern crew alerting systems on these aircraft to mitigate pilot startle-effect and confusion during complex, compound system malfunctions,” said APA President Capt. Edward Sicher. “Once these systems are installed and pilots have been properly trained on them, our crews will be better able to identify system failures and prioritize corrective actions that could save lives.”
“We oppose any extension of the exemption and don’t agree with Boeing’s claim that pilots could become confused when moving from an airplane without the modern alert system to one that is equipped with it. Nothing could be further from our flight deck reality,” Capt. Sicher said. “Consider the Boeing 757 and Boeing 767 – they’re substantially different airplanes, yet operate under a single certificate. Pilots have routinely flown both on the same day without any confusion
The legacy alerting systems have had some areas of issues, such as the use of a sound alert for two different functions, assumption being that as one acts on the ground.... and the other above 10,000' perhaps the crews would not get discombobulated. That didn't pan out in the real world, and a new annunciator was mandated to add to the general visual "noise".
Where would enhanced alerting have made a difference? Would the B737-800W flop into Amsterdam have helped, for a failure of a LRRA that confused the ATR mode and was not picked up by the drivers? Only if it was darned smart, smarter than the designers, and certainly smarter than us mere drivers. Is the enhanced system gonna give wise messaging for that sort of deal? Or where the crew turn off the IRUs to sort out a minor deal, while in IMC? Will it pick up a throttle clutch pack that drops a THR lever during a power change? That would be an interesting logic diagram....
One of the smarter systems about was the A380-800 that had the whoopsie in SGP. There, the crew were inundated with pages upon pages of smart alerts that interrupted their processes, and didn't really help in the immediate actions of back to basics. The 777/787 has some of the best concepts out there, and on occasions, the same smart systems will set the crew off on a wild goose chase. Love the ECL, but occasionally, it isn't what you need. Oddly, the one time that I think the ECL and EICAS would have been very helpful, the FO couldn't read either the ECL, or the EICAS, and we were back to memory of where in the cockpit a couple of switches were.
Smarter systems are not a magic bullet, and if they cause interoperability issues, they may not be desirable for the legacy equipment. I would still think that concluding the Max 7 and 10 and drawing a firm line under any future expansion of the model line in any form would be in the industry, drivers, and manufacturer's interest. Don't have a dog in the fight, but prefer that an well developed, well tested new model starts to be considered. Right now, that would be problematic to the OEM and to industry, and the merits are marginal, and not without unintended risks.
Logically, it is questionable to be OK to fly the same machine with "inferior" systems in the morning, and then fly afternoon tasks with the "new improved" system... do passengers then have to ask the pilots when they last used the system that they are sitting in with said passenger? The OEM missed an opportunity to do a greenfield development following the NG, which was generally a very good program, with a couple of just awful issues that the OEM remains unaccountable for. The delay however has provided an opportunity to improve some matters such as composite damage tolerance, lightning protection etc... and perhaps to come up with a design that gets the Vs to a reasonable value, so we can stop digging jets out of the mud at the far end of the runway.
Unless they are calling for grounding the NG fleet as well, this sounds like arm twisting American Airlines to give ground on the contract negotiation the APA has been working on to get a 20% pay increase and retroactive pay.
The leverage for twisting is that these two models will require training that no other aircraft requires, but the airline has expressed they need to train more pilots currently to stay competitive. So, if there is no extension then American Airlines might not get planes they need for particular routes AND when they do get them, there might not be training available for a significant time.
And what of the pilot of an NG who expects one sort of alert and gets a different one? Or a long term NG pilot moved up who doesn't get the sort of alert he expected.
I agree with FDR - the best plan is to let the 737 series retain the interface it has now and expect that this is the necessary end, though I am unsure that alerts for critical systems necessarily improve safety. What I am sure about is inconsistency can generate a far greater safety issue as the initial MCAS software did.
The leverage for twisting is that these two models will require training that no other aircraft requires, but the airline has expressed they need to train more pilots currently to stay competitive. So, if there is no extension then American Airlines might not get planes they need for particular routes AND when they do get them, there might not be training available for a significant time.
And what of the pilot of an NG who expects one sort of alert and gets a different one? Or a long term NG pilot moved up who doesn't get the sort of alert he expected.
I agree with FDR - the best plan is to let the 737 series retain the interface it has now and expect that this is the necessary end, though I am unsure that alerts for critical systems necessarily improve safety. What I am sure about is inconsistency can generate a far greater safety issue as the initial MCAS software did.
Why is nobody talking about a forced retrofit of MAX 8/9 airframes with the updated alerting system over say a 3 year period. These airframes have a 30 year life span so they should be set up for success with a common superior alerting system.
Yes it’s expensive and disruptive but it only has to prevent one accident to be worth it. Boeing screwed the pooch on this it is past time for them to step up
Yes it’s expensive and disruptive but it only has to prevent one accident to be worth it. Boeing screwed the pooch on this it is past time for them to step up
I agree with FDR - the best plan is to let the 737 series retain the interface it has now and expect that this is the necessary end, though I am unsure that alerts for critical systems necessarily improve safety. What I am sure about is inconsistency can generate a far greater safety issue as the initial MCAS software did.
Comment on arrival : "Gee, it sure was a good thing nothing went wrong. All sorts of things are just different ...".
I wonder if anyone ever did a "Real Max/NG differences" video and stuck it on YouTube.
Thread Starter
Meanwhile, Southwest Pilots want just the opposite of what the American pilots are demanding:
Siding with Boeing, Southwest pilots ask Congress to grant MAX extension | The Seattle Times
Siding with Boeing, Southwest pilots ask Congress to grant MAX extension | The Seattle Times
Breaking ranks with another major pilot group, the president of the Southwest Airlines pilots’ union said Friday that the airline’s 10,000 pilots support Congress granting Boeing the deadline extension it needs to put the final two MAX models into service without changes to a safety alert system.
Describing the 737 MAX as “one of the safest aircraft ever to fly,” union President Casey Murray said changing the flight deck of the newer versions, MAX 7 and MAX 10, could confuse pilots who regularly switch between other models.
Describing the 737 MAX as “one of the safest aircraft ever to fly,” union President Casey Murray said changing the flight deck of the newer versions, MAX 7 and MAX 10, could confuse pilots who regularly switch between other models.
That would be 10,000 exclusively 737 pilots vs 15,000 "some are flying 737s" pilots. I wonder how many AA 737 pilots there are.
What's interesting is, contract negotiations aside, both groups could be correct. That the American Airlines pilots would benefit from the change and the Southwest Airlines pilots would be endangered by the change.
It's certainly possible for AA to buy some upgraded 7s and 10s and SW to buy uniform reporting 7s and 10s and the FAA to let what appears to be a market that is better informed to decide, just as they decide to buy Boeing or Airbus. It would be interesting to see if either group, faced with that possibility, would change their position and expose posturing.
What's interesting is, contract negotiations aside, both groups could be correct. That the American Airlines pilots would benefit from the change and the Southwest Airlines pilots would be endangered by the change.
It's certainly possible for AA to buy some upgraded 7s and 10s and SW to buy uniform reporting 7s and 10s and the FAA to let what appears to be a market that is better informed to decide, just as they decide to buy Boeing or Airbus. It would be interesting to see if either group, faced with that possibility, would change their position and expose posturing.
What I say here will annoy almost all drivers, that's OK.
We seem to have devolved into a compliance evidence based system that is obviously one way to do something, but borrowing shamelessly from The Princess Bride, where Inigo Montoya says:
The average driver can hop from a DC-9 to a B-777, put the pennies in the slot, get noise going, and follow a checklist, grab data and go aviate, following the jepp procedure, anywhere in the world. When they get a surprise, they will respond with "[expletive]".... and a few seconds later, confirm the blue is on the top, they are still flying, and ask for "...checklist please...." Pretty much the rest of the mess before during and after is lip gloss.
We don't bingle from a lack of knowledge normally, although on occasions, the drivers and their load have met their demise with no comprehension of what was happening. And that is actually the point; We lose planes for a failure of situational awareness in most events. 441; full back stick? what plane has anyone flown that will not desist the art of flying with full back stick for a couple of minutes? all the rest, 427, 585. Very few cases would insider knowledge massively alter the outcome, and in those cases, it was information that was not included as a matter of course in training programs. UAL 232, the guys are coping with a catastrophic event, and manage to keep the blue up top through both competency and a modicum of good fortune. Fantastic job, the last phugoid nearly turned it to custard, but their clean living came to the fore. UAL 881, the drivers had severe compound emergencies, and simplified the stuff to the point of being in a survival mode, and they got the bird back. Stunningly well composed team. Clipper Young America; RWY 01L, approach lights. The hole they dug was recovered from by using their inherent skills at the most simplistic level, to get the mortally wounded aircraft back onto the deck. XL888T, went out of their box ticking process into "there be dragons" and under perceived time pressure did an ad-hoc test point without proper set up, and then ran out of airspeed, elevator authority, and altitude without comprehending the condition they were in, "USE MANUAL TRIM", an advanced, directive lost in the clamor of all of the bells and whistles that they unleashed all because of an AOA probe that was frozen (sound familiar).
The surviving critical events are most frequently characterized by rational loadshedding of the cues and noise, and reverting to the simplest basics. We teach this, but the difference is getting to happen in real world while dealing with the sudden stress of a critical event.
Assuming that an advanced alerting system will make planes safer is unfortunately not supported by the facts in evidence.
Is flying different types that much of a complication? Maybe, maybe not. I checked my log back a ways, when I was doing some testing, I did 12 different fixed wing and a helicopter flights in the same day, and the only issue was it was hot and a number of the planes had no aircon. Point is simple, push/pull, chat, blue on top etc doesn't change between types. The emergency drills for the all start the same, blue on top; "checklist please..." Everything else is the same. The same thing will kill you in a C-150 or a PA-18-150 as will ruin your retirement in a B777-300ER, although to be fair, PT-22's weredesigned altered to kill students on base turn.... (thanks to Hap Arnold's input into design, good leader though). Losing a primary control is time critical, and that is where we seem to get discombobulated most, and our adherence to bureaucratic processes seems to be limiting. There are classes of aircraft that will behave in manners that are common, as that is how they are designed. There are some outliers, but a pitch issue in a B737 is similar to one in a B747, or an A320 if in alternate control laws. The aerodynamics are pretty agnostic. We are running through the UPRT stuff now, which is in essence a great step forward for aviation but we have added another level of bureaucracy, and my concern is that when trying to apply Ed DeBono's simplicity concepts to what remains a simple set of problems, we are adding more trees to the forest.
How bad is the problem? How many Amazon Prime customers missed their delivery after a B767-300F plants itself at a steep angle into the bay east of Houston? We did the same sort of stuff on the runway at Dubai with a B777 that apparently didn't have the skids added to the fuselage, the A320 that did the carnival 1 arrival into Bahrain, the B738 that put a neat hole into the ground proximate to Rostov runway. These crews got outside of their comfort zone, and did not have enough time or capacity to recover their SA and avoid trying to nudge the earth into a new orbit.
The large planes more or less (MD11's being an outlier) behave in a similar manner. Even T tailed vs conventional, until provoked they are similar (F100 being suitably odd, for reasons of design).
The problem with advanced alerting systems is, even the simplest get overlooked and the crew get outside of their safe space, and have issues determining they have an SA issue, and then have inadequate time to recover the SA loss and recover the aircraft to a safe state.
Having better alerting is fine, but our problems don't stem from the alerting, they arise from how we cope with SA loss in a stressful situation, and that doesn't have a simple solution from within § 25.1322. XL888T had a cockpit-full of state of the art alerting.... and that was in fact part of the problem.
Are there solutions? Sure, stop flying removes the risk, otherwise, the crews need to be able to comprehend their world in real time under levels of stress, and that is not an alerting function, it is a matter of simplicity such that the reduced bandwidth of the driver is not compromised. The recovery thereafter is a formality.
IMHO
[Before the bricks start flying, I can only talk from my experience, and that includes evaluation of over 3500 serious events that had 98% of cases where an SA loss was a primary factor in the event; from many major accident investigations where the crew have little comprehension of their dynamics until the moments at the end of the CVR/FDR recordings. In 110+ types that I've flown, the closest to a mean streak I have encountered in a plane was from the revised layout of the PT-22 following Hap's demand, which turned a sweet handling plane into a little rascal. Still really pretty though, and the engine note of a 3 stack exhaust Kinner radial puts a smile on your face...]
We seem to have devolved into a compliance evidence based system that is obviously one way to do something, but borrowing shamelessly from The Princess Bride, where Inigo Montoya says:
You Keep Using That Word, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means
We don't bingle from a lack of knowledge normally, although on occasions, the drivers and their load have met their demise with no comprehension of what was happening. And that is actually the point; We lose planes for a failure of situational awareness in most events. 441; full back stick? what plane has anyone flown that will not desist the art of flying with full back stick for a couple of minutes? all the rest, 427, 585. Very few cases would insider knowledge massively alter the outcome, and in those cases, it was information that was not included as a matter of course in training programs. UAL 232, the guys are coping with a catastrophic event, and manage to keep the blue up top through both competency and a modicum of good fortune. Fantastic job, the last phugoid nearly turned it to custard, but their clean living came to the fore. UAL 881, the drivers had severe compound emergencies, and simplified the stuff to the point of being in a survival mode, and they got the bird back. Stunningly well composed team. Clipper Young America; RWY 01L, approach lights. The hole they dug was recovered from by using their inherent skills at the most simplistic level, to get the mortally wounded aircraft back onto the deck. XL888T, went out of their box ticking process into "there be dragons" and under perceived time pressure did an ad-hoc test point without proper set up, and then ran out of airspeed, elevator authority, and altitude without comprehending the condition they were in, "USE MANUAL TRIM", an advanced, directive lost in the clamor of all of the bells and whistles that they unleashed all because of an AOA probe that was frozen (sound familiar).
The surviving critical events are most frequently characterized by rational loadshedding of the cues and noise, and reverting to the simplest basics. We teach this, but the difference is getting to happen in real world while dealing with the sudden stress of a critical event.
Assuming that an advanced alerting system will make planes safer is unfortunately not supported by the facts in evidence.
Is flying different types that much of a complication? Maybe, maybe not. I checked my log back a ways, when I was doing some testing, I did 12 different fixed wing and a helicopter flights in the same day, and the only issue was it was hot and a number of the planes had no aircon. Point is simple, push/pull, chat, blue on top etc doesn't change between types. The emergency drills for the all start the same, blue on top; "checklist please..." Everything else is the same. The same thing will kill you in a C-150 or a PA-18-150 as will ruin your retirement in a B777-300ER, although to be fair, PT-22's were
How bad is the problem? How many Amazon Prime customers missed their delivery after a B767-300F plants itself at a steep angle into the bay east of Houston? We did the same sort of stuff on the runway at Dubai with a B777 that apparently didn't have the skids added to the fuselage, the A320 that did the carnival 1 arrival into Bahrain, the B738 that put a neat hole into the ground proximate to Rostov runway. These crews got outside of their comfort zone, and did not have enough time or capacity to recover their SA and avoid trying to nudge the earth into a new orbit.
The large planes more or less (MD11's being an outlier) behave in a similar manner. Even T tailed vs conventional, until provoked they are similar (F100 being suitably odd, for reasons of design).
The problem with advanced alerting systems is, even the simplest get overlooked and the crew get outside of their safe space, and have issues determining they have an SA issue, and then have inadequate time to recover the SA loss and recover the aircraft to a safe state.
Having better alerting is fine, but our problems don't stem from the alerting, they arise from how we cope with SA loss in a stressful situation, and that doesn't have a simple solution from within § 25.1322. XL888T had a cockpit-full of state of the art alerting.... and that was in fact part of the problem.
Are there solutions? Sure, stop flying removes the risk, otherwise, the crews need to be able to comprehend their world in real time under levels of stress, and that is not an alerting function, it is a matter of simplicity such that the reduced bandwidth of the driver is not compromised. The recovery thereafter is a formality.
IMHO
[Before the bricks start flying, I can only talk from my experience, and that includes evaluation of over 3500 serious events that had 98% of cases where an SA loss was a primary factor in the event; from many major accident investigations where the crew have little comprehension of their dynamics until the moments at the end of the CVR/FDR recordings. In 110+ types that I've flown, the closest to a mean streak I have encountered in a plane was from the revised layout of the PT-22 following Hap's demand, which turned a sweet handling plane into a little rascal. Still really pretty though, and the engine note of a 3 stack exhaust Kinner radial puts a smile on your face...]
There is a reason that the airliner fatal accident rate is a fraction of what it was 40 years ago. Alerting is a big part of that. For example how many lives has a GPWS and TCAS saved since their introduction? In principle no pilot should ever get into a position where it’s needed, in reality people screw up and these systems saved them. Yes the 737 has both but it is missing the integrated alerting system every other airliner in production has.
No system is perfect but there is a pretty good consensus on what alerting systems a modern airliner should have and the 737 is now the outlier. It is past time the 737 family is updated.
No system is perfect but there is a pretty good consensus on what alerting systems a modern airliner should have and the 737 is now the outlier. It is past time the 737 family is updated.
There is a reason that the airliner fatal accident rate is a fraction of what it was 40 years ago. Alerting is a big part of that. For example how many lives has a GPWS and TCAS saved since their introduction? In principle no pilot should ever get into a position where it’s needed, in reality people screw up and these systems saved them. Yes the 737 has both but it is missing the integrated alerting system every other airliner in production has.
No system is perfect but there is a pretty good consensus on what alerting systems a modern airliner should have and the 737 is now the outlier. It is past time the 737 family is updated.
No system is perfect but there is a pretty good consensus on what alerting systems a modern airliner should have and the 737 is now the outlier. It is past time the 737 family is updated.
fdr, caution in concluding without justifying argument or data:-
“… has had multiple disasters from the crew not understanding …”
The alerting issue must be considered as a combination of human and aircraft, without judging either by accident outcome. Neither is perfect, infallible; highly dependent on context which for the main part depends on the situation and how this is perceived.
Alerting - communicating, is critical in awareness and understanding.
Whilst safety objectives continually seek improvement, first start with a level datum - as low as reasonably practical (tech, money, politics).
The industry has judged the MAX as ‘unreasonable’ thus the variants should be levelled-up.
Previous variants (old 737) might be judged as reasonable based on lengthy in-service risk assessment, but never to the extent that the past safety record implies future success, particularly with human activity in both operations and safety judgement.
P.S. “Improved alerting is great, but doesn't stop the crews losing SA.”
If crews lose something, both pilots simultaneously, then what was this something they had beforehand - and how was it obtained … magic?
“… has had multiple disasters from the crew not understanding …”
The alerting issue must be considered as a combination of human and aircraft, without judging either by accident outcome. Neither is perfect, infallible; highly dependent on context which for the main part depends on the situation and how this is perceived.
Alerting - communicating, is critical in awareness and understanding.
Whilst safety objectives continually seek improvement, first start with a level datum - as low as reasonably practical (tech, money, politics).
The industry has judged the MAX as ‘unreasonable’ thus the variants should be levelled-up.
Previous variants (old 737) might be judged as reasonable based on lengthy in-service risk assessment, but never to the extent that the past safety record implies future success, particularly with human activity in both operations and safety judgement.
P.S. “Improved alerting is great, but doesn't stop the crews losing SA.”
If crews lose something, both pilots simultaneously, then what was this something they had beforehand - and how was it obtained … magic?
fdr, caution in concluding without justifying argument or data:-
“… has had multiple disasters from the crew not understanding …”
The alerting issue must be considered as a combination of human and aircraft, without judging either by accident outcome. Neither is perfect, infallible; highly dependent on context which for the main part depends on the situation and how this is perceived.
Alerting - communicating, is critical in awareness and understanding.
Whilst safety objectives continually seek improvement, first start with a level datum - as low as reasonably practical (tech, money, politics).
The industry has judged the MAX as ‘unreasonable’ thus the variants should be levelled-up.
Previous variants (old 737) might be judged as reasonable based on lengthy in-service risk assessment, but never to the extent that the past safety record implies future success, particularly with human activity in both operations and safety judgement.
P.S. “Improved alerting is great, but doesn't stop the crews losing SA.”
If crews lose something, both pilots simultaneously, then what was this something they had beforehand - and how was it obtained … magic?
“… has had multiple disasters from the crew not understanding …”
The alerting issue must be considered as a combination of human and aircraft, without judging either by accident outcome. Neither is perfect, infallible; highly dependent on context which for the main part depends on the situation and how this is perceived.
Alerting - communicating, is critical in awareness and understanding.
Whilst safety objectives continually seek improvement, first start with a level datum - as low as reasonably practical (tech, money, politics).
The industry has judged the MAX as ‘unreasonable’ thus the variants should be levelled-up.
Previous variants (old 737) might be judged as reasonable based on lengthy in-service risk assessment, but never to the extent that the past safety record implies future success, particularly with human activity in both operations and safety judgement.
P.S. “Improved alerting is great, but doesn't stop the crews losing SA.”
If crews lose something, both pilots simultaneously, then what was this something they had beforehand - and how was it obtained … magic?
The industry considers that the lack of system safety analysis of the Max was an issue, and that the lack of advice that the plane had such a system, and what may precipitate a failure would be, and what the consequences would be was utterly lacking to the OEM's great embarrassment and responsibility. I remain more concerned that the Max has the same manual backup that is unable to function throughout the envelope that it may be required to, if it is substantially out of trim.
P.S.; re caution in concluding without justifying argument or data:-
“… has had multiple disasters from the crew not understanding …”
Would love to give the database of the A330 wild rides that I have investigated, but they are not public domain. What is in public domain are the events where wild rides eventuated in spite of having world leading system alerting functions. These are from memory, but are the ones that I was generally familiar with. Don't get me wrong, advanced alerting is faaaantastic. It won't fix every problem, people will still lose SA, in spite of, and as a result of the best of breed. The human in the loop is still a desirable piece of gear, as for every one of the oddities that follows, ~500,000 flights landed safely due to (or in spite of) the presence of a crew that can interpret and deal with non linear, stochastic events.
In the context of the B737, putting lipstick on the pig isn't going to solve the immediate issues of design, they aren't even int he areas that have the highest risks. Put a set of flaps on it that gives a reasonable Vref, so the crews don't continue to use the end fence as an arrestor wire. They aren't going to fix the stabilizer anytime soon on the plane, but at least teach it!. The Airbus has issues, the B737 has own goals in design trades, they took a brilliant flap system (refer to Peter Randolph's paper on Jet transport High Lift devices...) and they ended up with cheaper, simpler, lighter, and higher Vrefs compared to what could have been achieved. That's a beancounters tradeoff, not an operational safety one involving drivers.
- HDA 323
- INDON AIR ASIA 8501
- USAIR 1702
- XL888T
- Smartlynx Estonia ES-SAN MYX-9001
- PIA 8303
- LH1829 dual AOA failure
- AA300 smart plane…
- Air France 296
- Air Inter 148
- GulfAir 072
- Airbus Industry 129
- Air Transat 236
- Air France 447
- Odd ball CI-202
- Emirates 407
Last edited by fdr; 9th Oct 2022 at 10:58. Reason: P.S.:
Why is nobody talking about a forced retrofit of MAX 8/9 airframes with the updated alerting system over say a 3 year period. These airframes have a 30 year life span so they should be set up for success with a common superior alerting system.
Yes it’s expensive and disruptive but it only has to prevent one accident to be worth it. Boeing screwed the pooch on this it is past time for them to step up
Yes it’s expensive and disruptive but it only has to prevent one accident to be worth it. Boeing screwed the pooch on this it is past time for them to step up
Perhaps because Boeing and its customers are hoping that if they stay schtum, maybe the FAA and Congress won't notice this rather large elephant in the regulations room?
If Congress doesn't change the rules, and Boeing doesn't decide to scrap the MAX-7 & MAX-10, then there ought to be major pressure for the MAX-8 & MAX-9 to be brought up to the 'new standard' that will have been set by the MAX-7 & MAX-10
I don't think it will happen, though
Captain Sullenberger's viewpoint
Captain Sullenberger opposes an extension to the equipment exemption. From Simple Flying article:
The legendary pilot Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger has added his name to those lobbying to deny the Boeing 737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 an exemption to the upcoming federal requirement to install Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) into their cockpits. Per Jon Ostrower of The Air Current, Sullenberger is concerned about the “startle effect” Allied Pilots Association mentioned in their October 5 statement, which can delay a pilot's response to any in-flight event, much less an emergency.
"As someone who has been in the Left Seat of an airliner when very suddenly faced with an extreme emergency of a lifetime, I can tell you from firsthand experience that the startle effect is real and it is huge, which means that the airliners we fly must have the most effective and state-of-the-art crew alerting systems so that pilots can quickly determine the nature and severity of emergencies and act rapidly and correctly to keep safe everyone on board, passengers and crew alike.
I agree with Allied Pilots Association and their opposition to the extension of Boeing's current equipment exemption, which allows them to put older crew alerting systems on new 737 MAX airplanes. Instead, the Federal Aviation Administration must require Boeing to install modern crew alerting systems on them."
"As someone who has been in the Left Seat of an airliner when very suddenly faced with an extreme emergency of a lifetime, I can tell you from firsthand experience that the startle effect is real and it is huge, which means that the airliners we fly must have the most effective and state-of-the-art crew alerting systems so that pilots can quickly determine the nature and severity of emergencies and act rapidly and correctly to keep safe everyone on board, passengers and crew alike.
I agree with Allied Pilots Association and their opposition to the extension of Boeing's current equipment exemption, which allows them to put older crew alerting systems on new 737 MAX airplanes. Instead, the Federal Aviation Administration must require Boeing to install modern crew alerting systems on them."
Last edited by John Marsh; 18th Oct 2022 at 17:48. Reason: Terminology
I'd be more inclined to accept his opinion if he started with the ADIRUs falsely reporting stalls, the genesis of both crashes. I don't see an alerting system being proposed that reported false reports of other reporting systems. I'd also be backing him if he was for grounding every single existing plane immediately until it was fitted with a state-of-the-art crew alerting system if he believed them to be fundamentally unsafe.
Since neither of these seem of any concern, it just comes across as ax-grinding
I support the decision of the purchasing airlines to specify if they want to fly with the long-time standard configuration or to buy the entirely new one. If American Airlines, for example, decides they need it then it's up to Boeing to decide if it's worth the separate certification costs to provide it. If Southwest's risk analysis shows that the alerting system won't make their operations safer then the existing option should be available to them. Make two new models for each variant: -7AS and -10AS for the alerting system version. If those aren't economical to produce or there are no buyers then Boeing can cancel those variants.
Since neither of these seem of any concern, it just comes across as ax-grinding
I support the decision of the purchasing airlines to specify if they want to fly with the long-time standard configuration or to buy the entirely new one. If American Airlines, for example, decides they need it then it's up to Boeing to decide if it's worth the separate certification costs to provide it. If Southwest's risk analysis shows that the alerting system won't make their operations safer then the existing option should be available to them. Make two new models for each variant: -7AS and -10AS for the alerting system version. If those aren't economical to produce or there are no buyers then Boeing can cancel those variants.
Captain Sullenberger opposes an extension to the equipment exemption. From Simple Flying article:
Sully makes the case that enhanced crew alerting is essentially a bandaid. It is odd, that the mess of alerts and distractions in Sully's cockpit are greater than they would have been in a B737. Enhanced alerting functions provide some benefits in some cases, not all, and can also act as a distraction. I contend (and I am no fan of Boeing as a company) that forcing a change that would by necessity be rushed is not an overall improvement to aviations safety.
For a fair position, Sully should try the same event in a geriatric B737NG, and record the distractions. I fly both types, Boeing and Airbus, and cannot see an overriding justification to the position that seems to be developing at all levels. By all means make things better, but do it for the right reasons and in a logical manner to come up with real enhancements.
We have a set of rules for all of aviation, and the number of bandaids that sit on top of bandaids is an endemic, and systemic frustration.