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Boeing, and FAA oversight

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Boeing, and FAA oversight

Old 26th Feb 2020, 18:57
  #281 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by USMCProbe View Post
I always wondered if they subjected the MAX to a full certification, circa 2017, if it would pass. Lots of things have changed in 50 years, including the physical ability, experience, and training of the pilots qualified to fly it.
No, but then the NG wouldn't have passed full cert when it was introduced never mind today.

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Old 26th Feb 2020, 20:33
  #282 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BDAttitude View Post
FAA playing tough with regard to the engine cowling issue (polished down conductive layer during rework, that is). I had already forgotten about that one.
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...-all-737-maxs/

So we're having
- Elevator control forces
- Unable to recover from gross mistrim
- training requirements
- wire separation
- engine cowling
- FOD
- FCC Power on self test
- FCC elevator split indication
- MCAS MEL status

What did I forget?
The 90 second "practical" evacuation test?
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Old 26th Feb 2020, 21:39
  #283 (permalink)  
 
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150k manhours (75 man years) to certify the A220 is an interesting number.

Does anyone know the equivalent FAA number for the Max?
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Old 27th Feb 2020, 08:04
  #284 (permalink)  
 
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Pickle forks and CFM56-7B blade uncontained by cowling were NG only?

So we're having
- Elevator control forces
- Unable to recover from gross mistrim
- training requirements
- wire separation
- engine cowling (lightning strike protection)
- FOD
- FCC Power on self test
- FCC elevator split indication
- MCAS MEL status
- rudder cable vulnerability
- 90 seconds evacutaion (twin overwing exit)
- Pickle fornkners (NG)
- CFM56-7B cowling (NG)
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Old 27th Feb 2020, 08:37
  #285 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BDAttitude View Post
Pickle forks and CFM56-7B blade uncontained by cowling were NG only?
The MAX hasn't suffered from the pickle fork problems, but that's almost certainly because they are all low-time aircraft, obviously.
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Old 27th Feb 2020, 09:29
  #286 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
The MAX hasn't suffered from the pickle fork problems, but that's almost certainly because they are all low-time aircraft, obviously.
That's for sure. As I see, the AD only covers NG series. So the question would be, were there any changes - design wise or manufacturing practices - that would suggest the MAX would be less prone to these problems. Higher performance specs wouldn't help, I guess.
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Old 27th Feb 2020, 12:41
  #287 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BDAttitude View Post
That's for sure. As I see, the AD only covers NG series. So the question would be, were there any changes - design wise or manufacturing practices - that would suggest the MAX would be less prone to these problems. Higher performance specs wouldn't help, I guess.
NG Max comparison

Wing length?
Wing flex?
AUW?
Fuel outboard?

(Questions, not statements)
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Old 27th Feb 2020, 13:44
  #288 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Twitter View Post
NG Max comparison

Originally Posted by BDAttitude View Post
That's for sure. As I see, the AD only covers NG series. So the question would be, were there any changes - design wise or manufacturing practices - that would suggest the MAX would be less prone to these problems. Higher performance specs wouldn't help, I guess.
Wing length?
Wing flex?
AUW?
Fuel outboard?

(Questions, not statements)
Aircraft wings designed for winglets as opposed to 'after market' accessory addition.
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Old 27th Feb 2020, 15:25
  #289 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
The MAX hasn't suffered from the pickle fork problems, but that's almost certainly because they are all low-time aircraft, obviously.
The MAX doesn't have the pickle fork problems because Boeing changed the manufacturer of the forks with or shortly before the MAX.

The new manufactures keeps the tight tolerances for the drilled holes so that the holes don't wear out and cause cracks.
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Old 27th Feb 2020, 17:01
  #290 (permalink)  
 
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Seems it's not just FAA oversight that Boeing are playing fast and loose with . . .

https://web.archive.org/web/20200227...ahu-story.html

Web archive link as I can't read the article from the UK directly.

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Old 27th Feb 2020, 17:49
  #291 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by EDML View Post
The MAX doesn't have the pickle fork problems because Boeing changed the manufacturer of the forks with or shortly before the MAX.

The new manufactures keeps the tight tolerances for the drilled holes so that the holes don't wear out and cause cracks.
My understanding is the original process in question was to force each hole to expand after each hole is drilled so that when the force is removed the inside surface of the hole is left in compression. Being in compression offsets tension caused by loads carried through the fasteners and this offset delays the onset of fatigue cracking.This is independent of the hole diameter variation. Similar processes include shot-peening. The problem was changing from a good process which had a one-time use sleeve to protect the hole and transmit the force from an expansion plug to some other sleeve that was cheaper and either damaged the hole in some way or failed to produce the same deformation.

Drilled holes have all sorts of tiny defects that can lead to the initiation of fatigue cracks; holes can be reamed to removed those, but the holes are still susceptible to load induced fatigue.

This is why expansion rivets are so popular - they force the surrounding material into compression. But with bolts, that isn't available, so the holes need a secondary treatment.
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Old 1st Mar 2020, 21:48
  #292 (permalink)  
 
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apparently, the "new" way of how Boeing is conducting, or better said "conducting" tests is a real shame. Something needs to change in this company, or more people are going to die because their fixation on profit over safety of their product.

https://www.engadget.com/2020/02/29/...flight-report/
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Old 5th Mar 2020, 22:05
  #293 (permalink)  
 
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Disable 737Max Stick-shaker or No?

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...pilot-guidance
Boeing Max Overhaul Sparks U.S.-Canada Rift Over Pilot Guidance
By Alan Levin and Julie Johnsson
March 5, 2020, 3:01 PM EST
  • Regulators’ disagreement on issue is raising tension on plane
  • Warning system for aerodynamic stall activated in two crashes
Canadian aviation regulators are at odds with their U.S. counterparts over guidance for pilots of the Boeing Co. 737 Max during an emergency, threatening to open a schism between nations critical to the plane’s return to service.

Canadian officials have insisted in contentious meetings that Max pilots should be instructed to disable a key warning system to avoid distraction during an emergency. Their counterparts at the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration argue that such a change would create additional risks, according to two people familiar with the discussions who asked not to be named because of their sensitivity.

While the disagreement doesn’t appear to threaten the grounded plane’s return to service in the U.S. and possibly other nations, it could slow the schedule in Canada, the people said. It also highlights continuing tension among global regulators sparked by two fatal crashes that rocked confidence in the FAA and now threaten a tradition of international cooperation in aviation.

Canada Minister of Transport Marc Garneau, speaking to reporters in Washington Thursday, said the country is in talks with other nations on the plane and may go its own way on some issues.

“If there are certain things that we will do differently from other countries, which is a possibility, that is not excluded,” Garneau said.

While each country around the world will make its own decision on allowing the Max jets to fly again, the FAA is the lead agency because the plane was certified in the U.S. The European Aviation Safety Agency, Canada and Brazil, all of which have major aircraft manufacturing industries, are also working with the FAA on the decision.

The dispute with Canada revolves around the so-called stick shaker, which causes the control column and yoke to vibrate aggressively and also causes a loud thumping noise. It is designed to get pilots’ attention when they are approaching a dangerous aerodynamic stall, which would cause a loss of lift and has been one of the biggest causes of airline accidents around the world.

As a result of malfunctioning sensors, the 737 Max’s stick shaker activated on the captain’s side of the planes in both fatal accidents -- on a Lion Air plane in October 2018 that went down in the Java Sea near Indonesia and an Ethiopian Airlines jet that crashed near Addis Ababa in March 2019.

The stick shaker appears to have added to the confusion in the cockpit in both cases.

Concerned about that, Canadian officials have said they believe pilots should be able to cut power to the stick shaker under circumstances similar to those in the accidents, three people familiar with the discussions said. Such cases would include when it was activated erroneously on only one side of the plane, said one of the people.

The change sought by the Canadians wouldn’t require a physical alteration to the plane but would add instructions for disabling the stick shaker to pilot procedures.

Garneau didn’t address the stick shaker issue directly at the Washington event, but said that Canada is concerned that pilots aren’t too distracted by emergencies similar to what occurred in the crashes.

“Crew workload in a very demanding environment physically is a factor that is essential to take into consideration because you have only so much time to respond,” he said.

Pilot Distraction
However, FAA officials have disagreed with the suggestion, according to people familiar with their position.

It would set a bad precedent to give pilots permission to cut power to such a critical warning system, one person said. Additionally, U.S. officials are also worried that attempting to reach the circuit breaker panel to switch it off during an emergency could cause dangerous distractions.

Amy Butcher, Garneau’s director of communication, said it would be premature to talk about specific recommendations the agency is making relative to the Max.

“We won’t hesitate to take any additional steps necessary to ensure all of our concerns have been addressed before approving a possible return to service of this aircraft,” she said.

The FAA didn’t comment directly on the issue when asked about it. “We haven’t made any official decisions and continue to have transparent discussions with all the regulators about a variety of issues,” the agency said in a statement.

A Boeing spokesman said, “We continue to work with the FAA to provide them the information they need to safely return the Max to service.” The planemaker says its estimate of a mid-year return to service is unchanged.

The updated Max software is designed to be simpler for pilots to handle if malfunctions such as those in the accidents occur. Instead of commanding a dive repeatedly, as planes did before the two crashes, the new system will only activate once and it will be easier to override. The company also is pouring resources into redesigning future cockpits to be more intuitive.

— With assistance by Peter Robison, and Kait Bolongaro
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Old 6th Mar 2020, 04:49
  #294 (permalink)  
 
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I saw this suggestion on a video by a 737 pilot several months ago; I think he showed the breaker was over the shoulder of the left seat. I don't know if this disables both stick shakers, but if a system is lying it does little good to allow it to continue to lie. The first Lion Air flight went nearly 90 minutes with the shaker telling the crew of impending doom and they apparently did nothing specific about it. That suggests it either isn't a big deal or that the pilots ignored a critical warning.
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Old 6th Mar 2020, 11:54
  #295 (permalink)  

 
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Natalie Kitroeff and David Gelles at the New York Times have an interesting piece on the views of Boeing CEO David Calhoun.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/b...core-ios-share
In his eight weeks on the job, Boeing’s chief executive, David L. Calhoun, has come to one overriding conclusion: Things inside the aerospace giant were even worse than he had thought.

In a wide-ranging interview this week, Mr. Calhoun criticized his predecessor in blunt terms and said he was focused on transforming the internal culture of a company mired in crisis after two crashes killed 346 people.

To get Boeing back on track, Mr. Calhoun said, he is working to mend relationships with angry airlines, win back the confidence of international regulators and appease an anxious President Trump — all while moving as quickly as possible to get the grounded 737 Max back in the air.

“It’s more than I imagined it would be, honestly,” Mr. Calhoun said, describing the problems he is confronting. “And it speaks to the weaknesses of our leadership.”

Boeing’s previous chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, was fired in December after presiding over a series of embarrassing setbacks that culminated in the shutdown of the 737 factory this year.

Mr. Calhoun ….. has been involved in this mess from the beginning. ….Mr. Calhoun has been on Boeing’s board since 2009, and was elevated to chairman late last year.

Before becoming the chief executive, he vigorously defended Mr. Muilenburg, saying in a CNBC appearance in November that Mr. Muilenburg “has done everything right” and should not resign. One month later, the board ousted Mr. Muilenburg and announced Mr. Calhoun as his replacement.
“Boards are invested in their C.E.O.s until they’re not,” Mr. Calhoun said.
“We had a backup plan,” he added. “I am the backup plan.”

Now that he’s in charge, Mr. Calhoun has become more willing to openly criticize Mr. Muilenburg. He said the former chief executive had turbocharged Boeing’s production rates before the supply chain was ready, a move that sent Boeing shares to an all-time high but compromised quality.
………
Mr. Muilenburg declined to comment.
airsound
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Old 6th Mar 2020, 14:03
  #296 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by airsound View Post
Natalie Kitroeff and David Gelles at the New York Times have an interesting piece on the views of Boeing CEO David Calhoun.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/b...core-ios-share


airsound
Originally Posted by Calhoun
“I’ll never be able to judge what motivated Dennis, whether it was a stock price that was going to continue to go up and up, or whether it was just beating the other guy to the next rate increase,” he said. He added later, “If anybody ran over the rainbow for the pot of gold on stock, it would have been him.”
So says the Blackstone guy. Not been a fan of Muilendings ... but what a prick. It's cold out there.
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Old 6th Mar 2020, 16:12
  #297 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by airsound View Post
Natalie Kitroeff and David Gelles at the New York Times have an interesting piece on the views of Boeing CEO David Calhoun.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/b...core-ios-share


airsound
Yup - everything that Muilenburg did while the Board and this guy were watching and approving is terrible. </sarcasm>

This is exactly why CEOs get big payouts, it's in exchange for the chance they'll be attacked mercilessly after they are out. Meanwhile, the board members who had the responsibility of oversight for what the CEO was doing can claim pure blamelessness to the press while having enriched themselves from the behavior they approved of just months before.

OTOH it's an effective technique to roll blame onto an individual for publicity purposes. Scape goat is the old-fashioned term.
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Old 6th Mar 2020, 16:58
  #298 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by MechEngr View Post
I saw this suggestion on a video by a 737 pilot several months ago; I think he showed the breaker was over the shoulder of the left seat. I don't know if this disables both stick shakers, but if a system is lying it does little good to allow it to continue to lie. The first Lion Air flight went nearly 90 minutes with the shaker telling the crew of impending doom and they apparently did nothing specific about it. That suggests it either isn't a big deal or that the pilots ignored a critical warning.
How about cancelling the stick-shaker via the same switch used to cancel the audible fire warning?
The cancel function might be made available only when the AOA disagree is active...?
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Old 6th Mar 2020, 23:02
  #299 (permalink)  
 
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https://transportation.house.gov/imo...rch%202020.pdf

preliminary Congressioanal report. Boeng should be cut in smaller companies and put under special scrutiny. FAA should get rid of all of its employees, who took active part in this shameful story.

Last edited by kontrolor; 6th Mar 2020 at 23:16.
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Old 7th Mar 2020, 02:39
  #300 (permalink)  
 
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coupling the FCC's for "redundancy" is foolish. The 2 systems are independent for a reason.

Virtually nothing in an aircraft system is real time, but processed through filters and algorithms. There are many, many resolution errors that are adapted for in the programming.

It is not a surprise, when you couple them, that are multiple disagree warnings between the 2 systems.

Guess Boeing forgot why there are single channel vs dual operations.

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