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MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures

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MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures

Old 26th Jul 2019, 23:21
  #1541 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by jimjim1 View Post

"This is in the 737NG training manual:
Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.Anticipate the trim changes required for the approach.
So in 2019, a training manual recommends a recovery technique not dissimilar to two fishermen simultaneously winding and releasing a fishing reel to unload the tension on the line? 😡
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 00:06
  #1542 (permalink)  
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Erm, I don't think so.

Originally Posted by glofish Well, i guess because the engines had to be mounted fwd/up and their power was increased, their increased pitch-up thrust moment incited Boeing to install the MCAS instead of training the pilots.
Pitch control with engines is absolutely possible and was spectacularly demonstrated with the Sioux City accident on a DC-10. . . . continued.

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Old 27th Jul 2019, 00:22
  #1543 (permalink)  
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Jim59 #1525

I don't buy this average pilot stuff. If the trim can only be operated by a pilot with average strength or higher, in some circumstances, then assuming a normal distribution of strength then 50% of pilots will have less than average strength. If strength greater than that deliverable by 50% of pilots is required to trim in some scenarios then certification should specify the minimum strength required by the pilot and a relevant method for evaluating a pilot's fitness to fly the type.
It seems Lynn Rippelmeyer felt it wise to pump some iron, perhaps before converting onto the 747. Gosh, what a girl. Well worth a Wiki.

Last edited by Loose rivets; 28th Jul 2019 at 00:50.
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 00:51
  #1544 (permalink)  
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When considering the human eye's characteristics, one of the more impressive is our peripheral vision. It's quite capable of seeing the white stripe flashing away while looking forward, but then comes the bad news: our brains will tunnel it out when we're stressed targeting on say, a major issue with the horizon and speeds.

It's hard to test this in a sim, quite simply because our brains have . . . erm, a mind of their own.
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 01:16
  #1545 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Loose rivets View Post
When considering the human eye's characteristics, one of the more impressive is our peripheral vision. It's quite capable of seeing the white stripe flashing away while looking forward, but then comes the bad news: our brains will tunnel it out when we're stressed targeting on say, a major issue with the horizon and speeds.

It's hard to test this in a sim, quite simply because our brains have . . . erm, a mind of their own.
In the video on the trim wheel, that white flash is pretty distinctive. But my understanding is that is in an NG simulator, is not the MAX MCAS trim speed faster?
Would that make it more or less distinctive in the peripheral vision?
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 01:59
  #1546 (permalink)  
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Would that make it more or less distinctive in the peripheral vision?
I'd imagine that one's mindset would have a lot to do with what we saw during an emergency. People like me remember the oddest minutia about mechanical things and that might well keep an open channel for observation of such a system. Some of my old skippers were fine airmen but bewilderingly missed the simplest mechanical clues. It would be interesting to co-relate the reaction to such stimulus with differing people.
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 02:34
  #1547 (permalink)  
 
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With regard to parking space, although dramatic pictures exist, there is much real estate available and when needs must, I have noted MAX flights, thank you, FR24,
Boeing has begun moving undelivered MAX to Moses Lake for storage...to keep building them at this rate, foolish..
and in denial..
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 02:50
  #1548 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
In the video on the trim wheel, that white flash is pretty distinctive. But my understanding is that is in an NG simulator, is not the MAX MCAS trim speed faster?
Would that make it more or less distinctive in the peripheral vision?
Current on the 737 but also used to fly other aircraft which did not have a "Boeing" trim wheel so let me throw out another consideration that seemingly is being overlooked. If a pilot was truly hand flying, hands on the controls and looking at his instruments, the obvious indication that something is wrong with the trim is that the control feel starts getting heavier for no apparent reason. You could cover up the trim wheel entirely and you should still be able to feel that the trim is doing something that it is not supposed to be doing. It really should not matter whether the pilot sees the trim wheel or not because he should be getting direct feedback through the controls. I think a big part of the problem with at least the Ethiopian accident is that it seems the pilot was highly automation dependent, trying to put on the A/P multiple times when he should have focused on hand flying through what was initially a simple case of a false stick shaker. This malfunction does happen on occasion and yes it is a bit confusing at first but many other crews have survived this just fine once they figure out the stick shaker warning is false. I suspect the Ethiopian pilot was not terribly familiar with how the 737 controls feel during the takeoff phase because he was always engaging the A/P right after takeoff. There are a lot of trim changes as you accelerate and retract flaps but you get used to it if you regular hand fly the maneuver. He was apparently uncomfortable with hand flying duties which would explain why he try to fight MCAS with elevator and not electric trim. That and leaving the throttles at takeoff thrust sealed their fate. Would have helped if he had a reasonably experienced FO to help him out. Very sad all way around.
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 04:13
  #1549 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Tomaski View Post
Current on the 737 but also used to fly other aircraft which did not have a "Boeing" trim wheel so let me throw out another consideration that seemingly is being overlooked. If a pilot was truly hand flying, hands on the controls and looking at his instruments, the obvious indication that something is wrong with the trim is that the control feel starts getting heavier for no apparent reason. You could cover up the trim wheel entirely and you should still be able to feel that the trim is doing something that it is not supposed to be doing. It really should not matter whether the pilot sees the trim wheel or not because he should be getting direct feedback through the controls. I think a big part of the problem with at least the Ethiopian accident is that it seems the pilot was highly automation dependent, trying to put on the A/P multiple times when he should have focused on hand flying through what was initially a simple case of a false stick shaker. This malfunction does happen on occasion and yes it is a bit confusing at first but many other crews have survived this just fine once they figure out the stick shaker warning is false. I suspect the Ethiopian pilot was not terribly familiar with how the 737 controls feel during the takeoff phase because he was always engaging the A/P right after takeoff. There are a lot of trim changes as you accelerate and retract flaps but you get used to it if you regular hand fly the maneuver. He was apparently uncomfortable with hand flying duties which would explain why he try to fight MCAS with elevator and not electric trim. That and leaving the throttles at takeoff thrust sealed their fate. Would have helped if he had a reasonably experienced FO to help him out. Very sad all way around.
At 08:39:45, Captain requested flaps up and First-Officer acknowledged. One second later, the flap handle moved from 5 to 0 degrees and flaps retraction began.


At 08:39:50, the selected heading started to change from 072 to 197 degrees and at the same time the Captain asked the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading.


The autopilot then disengaged and at 08:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.


At 08:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.

This suggests something was wrong 3 or 10 seconds prior to the start of MCAS first activation. Would you check and initially disregard the elevator trim wheel (as it was not moving) in that first 3 or 10 seconds and start focusing on other things?

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Old 27th Jul 2019, 05:40
  #1550 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
At 08:39:45, Captain requested flaps up and First-Officer acknowledged. One second later, the flap handle moved from 5 to 0 degrees and flaps retraction began.


At 08:39:50, the selected heading started to change from 072 to 197 degrees and at the same time the Captain asked the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading.


The autopilot then disengaged and at 08:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.


At 08:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.

This suggests something was wrong 3 or 10 seconds prior to the start of MCAS first activation. Would you check and initially disregard the elevator trim wheel (as it was not moving) in that first 3 or 10 seconds and start focusing on other things?
As I understand these things, which is maybe not as much as others, is that the sounds on the CVR and the stuff on the FDR may not be completely synced up as presented in the preliminary report but will be in time for the final so I wouldn't bet the house on a few seconds when comparing the two until the final is out. As someone who routinely hand flies the 737 through clean-up I can tell you that the control pressures are constantly changing, the speed trim is going, and the pilot is using lots of electric trim. A 737 is a real hands on kind of aircraft in this way. If you don't hand fly alot and you have a stick shaker going on then maybe I could see someone thinking they have a "flight control" problem but personally I think the Ethiopian Captain was just confused as to what was going on and that's the first thing that came out of his mouth. He kept trying to engage the A/P and it wouldn't take, the stick shaker was a major distraction and he wasn't picking up on the clues that he had primarily an unreliable airspeed problem. Both Lion Air crews picked up on this right away so not sure why the Ethiopian crew didnt'. Maybe they never saw it in training though after AF447 you think it would be covered in the sim. Maybe the Captain was just having a bad day. Can't put to much blame on a 300hr FO. Anyway back to my original point, if your hands are on the yoke and you are hand flying the aircraft the FEEL of the controls will tell you everything you need to know about the state of the trim without having to bother watching the trim wheel. If the controls are getting heavy and you aren't doing it then something is wrong! If you don't like the feel then TRIM! That's the part I just don't get. The electric trim worked but he just didn't use it (or use it enough).
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 06:51
  #1551 (permalink)  
 
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So disregard current available information of facts & assume personal beliefs?

Best then the grounding of the MAX remain until both reports have been completely synced and then we can determinate if the pilot/s were doing what was required, and when it was required - and exactly when the pilot realised there was a flight control issue.

"A 737 is a real hands on kind of aircraft in this way" just the reason that computer based training is recommended.
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 12:23
  #1552 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
So disregard current available information of facts & assume personal beliefs?

Best then the grounding of the MAX remain until both reports have been completely synced and then we can determinate if the pilot/s were doing what was required, and when it was required - and exactly when the pilot realised there was a flight control issue.

"A 737 is a real hands on kind of aircraft in this way" just the reason that computer based training is recommended.
Trimming should be instinctive and second nature well before pilots are licensed. The first Lion Air flight PF kept the aircraft in trim as did the second Lion Air captain and the aircraft remained controllable. Is there new training to _not_ trim the loads off the control column?
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 12:45
  #1553 (permalink)  
 
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More about the Max

​​​​​​https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...premium-europe
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 12:52
  #1554 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Ian W View Post
Trimming should be instinctive and second nature well before pilots are licensed. The first Lion Air flight PF kept the aircraft in trim as did the second Lion Air captain and the aircraft remained controllable. Is there new training to _not_ trim the loads off the control column?
ET 302 made several trim inputs - they also said they have control problems before MCAS started,

Since then we learn of microprocessor issues.

Ringing in my ears is "trim with me" - not help me with the ***ing trim wheel.

They knew they needed to trim- even if that was a bit late.

Actually the Lion guys kept the aircraft flying - not in a neutral trim but +/- a fair amount.
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 13:09
  #1555 (permalink)  
 
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What is there to say about the Bloomberg article? New intern's first piece, not a lot of spelling or grammar errors, good job.
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 13:26
  #1556 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post

Best then the grounding of the MAX remain until both reports have been completely synced and then we can determinate if the pilot/s were doing what was required, and when it was required - and exactly when the pilot realised there was a flight control issue.

"A 737 is a real hands on kind of aircraft in this way" just the reason that computer based training is recommended.
I'm willing to bet the data streams have been synced long ago its just that we don't know the particulars. The investigators know alot more than has been made public so to a certain extent anyone not on the inside is just guessing until the final report is out. Don't disagree about the lack of training as it has been as much of a problem across the board as the design issues. The 737 is fundamentally a 50 year old design and that design assumed some things about pilot proficiency that may not apply today. Trying to save money on pilot training and hiring can be alot like picking up pennies in front of a bulldozer. It's profitable until is isnt.
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 17:21
  #1557 (permalink)  

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The 737 is fundamentally a 50 year old design and that design assumed some things about pilot proficiency that may not apply today.
When you have pilots in the right hand seat straight out of training school with minimum hours and pilots in the left seat that have the same hours as required to sit in the right seat 40 years ago you could argue that there's a lack of proficiency whether that is in the USA, Europe or anywhere else in the world.

The issue really boils down to the beancounters in the company boards who don't respect the people in their employment or contractors in some cases.
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 17:40
  #1558 (permalink)  
 
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I've been criticized for blaming the pilots for the accidents because they perished and should be respected for that. I guess there is truth in that, and I don't mean to put the blame on them specifically but what about the passengers and their families? Don't they get respect too? Did they not deserve to be flown safely to their destinations? Is there not an implied contract between the passengers and the crew, and of course also between the airline company and the passengers that they will be given at least the minimum standard of professionalism to ensure that this happens? Sure Boeing has made errors but the airline that employed these pilots and did not give them the required training/checking to handle a trim runaway was the start of the problem, not the MCAS/Boeing input. A runaway trim can happen from many causes/failures and MCAS is only one. The problem presented was the trim moving without pilot command. The fix was to trim against it (which was always possible in this case) and retain control. The QRH required that the airplane be trimmed using the trim switch, then if the runaway persisted, turning off the trim switches and proceeding with manual trim. Another way to stop the runaway was to hold the manual trim wheel while turning off the trim switches. All low key stuff with no drama and for this to degenerate into a situation that caused the loss of two aircraft and 300 people is incomprehensible to me. Sure there were distractions caused by the failure of the angle of attack sensor mucking up the stall warning system, but the real problem, screaming out to the pilots, was the way the nose was going down. Simple self-preservation would force them to deal with this first. The ground was coming up fast; nobody could ignore that and there is no indication that these pilots were not aware of that or that they were not trying to stop it from happening. There is further evidence that they were successful, at first, but also evidence that they were not aware of the correct procedures to be used and evidence that they did not follow those procedures, except sporadically and piece-meal. Not professionally or correctly, as a trained flight crew would be expected to do. So what is the answer? Go down the rabbit hole of the MCAS/What did Boeing Do or Not Do, or fight for better pilot training and checking? As we lose the experience of the current airline pilots who are reaching mandatory retirement (they were trained in these procedures and have the cunning necessary to recognize a problem and have a way to handle it) and replace them with pilots who have a far more superficial training experience (CBT is the best you can get now, forget hands on) it is vital that we do more than just V1 cuts, steep turns and approach to stalls during initial and recurrent training. We must identify and train for those loss of control accidents that seem to be increasing, and I am not singling out any country/airline because failures such as this can happen to anybody. Are you ready? Would you know what to do?
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 18:40
  #1559 (permalink)  
 
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it is vital that we do more than just V1 cuts,
using valuable simulator time on a manoeuvre very few pilots ever need to perform and ignoring the real killers out there such as sensor failure

totally agree
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Old 27th Jul 2019, 18:46
  #1560 (permalink)  
 
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Has Boeing ever admitted any sort of mistake or wrongdoing? Or the FAA? It's still the "bad" pilots. Seriously?
Might be for legal reasons but I think it would be a better and more credible strategy to come up with openness and the will to change. This is still way too defensive but not constructive enough from my point of view. Share what Is changed and why. I wish the MAX some safe return but not just because of time rush and financial pressure. Real world pilots will fly it in real world weather. 5000 were sold. So make sure not one will crash like that again please. Change what needs to be changed that goes beyond Boeing and beyond just pilots for sure.
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