MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
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Meanwhile, how do you maintain type rating when the only model of that type in inventory were the Max?
https://news.yahoo.com/lone-737-max-...110156734.html
https://news.yahoo.com/lone-737-max-...110156734.html
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FAA chief meets Boeing officials, tries out Max simulator
Sep. 19, 2019 at 3:28 pm Updated Sep. 19, 2019 at 6:04 p
DALLAS (AP) — The chief of the Federal Aviation Administration tested the Boeing 737 Max in a flight simulator Thursday, but the FAA declined to say how its updated anti-stall software performed.
Dickson, a former Air Force fighter pilot who flew earlier versions of the 737 during a long career at Delta Air Lines, had two sessions in a flight simulator to test changes Boeing has made to MCAS — making it less powerful and easier for pilots to control. In the first session, he practiced simulations of normal flights.
“It handles like a 737,” he told The Associated Press after an initial simulator run replicating normal flight conditions. “The airplane handles very well from everything I can tell.”
Later Dickson tested situations in which MCAS kicked in and pushed the nose down, but the FAA declined to make Dickson available for comment on that simulation.
Dickson said he will fly a Max jet — not just a simulator — before the plane is ungrounded.
“It handles like a 737,” he told The Associated Press after an initial simulator run replicating normal flight conditions. “The airplane handles very well from everything I can tell.”
Later Dickson tested situations in which MCAS kicked in and pushed the nose down, but the FAA declined to make Dickson available for comment on that simulation.
Dickson said he will fly a Max jet — not just a simulator — before the plane is ungrounded.
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link post not allowed. google below for the link.
komonews.com/news/local/faa-chief-meets-boeing-officials-tries-out-max-simulator
Not super informative, but progress, maybe.
Kinda thin on the testing news, but interesting that Ryanair is predicting Feb or March return to service. After possible changes required by EASA. So will the FAA then need to re-re-certify those changes?
komonews.com/news/local/faa-chief-meets-boeing-officials-tries-out-max-simulator
Not super informative, but progress, maybe.
"After practicing simulations of normal flights, he planned to go back in the simulator and test failure situations later Thursday.
It handles like a 737," he told The Associated Press. "The airplane handles very well from everything I can tell."
Dickson said he will fly a Max jet — not just a simulator — before the plane is ungrounded.
It handles like a 737," he told The Associated Press. "The airplane handles very well from everything I can tell."
Dickson said he will fly a Max jet — not just a simulator — before the plane is ungrounded.
The CEO of Ireland's Ryanair said Thursday he doesn't expect the plane to be back in service until February or March.
Canaccord Genuity analyst Ken Herbert, just back from a big aviation conference in Europe, said consensus in the industry is that, while the FAA might un-ground the Max before the end of the year, Europe's regulator is expected to take about three months longer — and could require Chicago-based Boeing to make additional changes to the plane. Regulators in Canada and India have also indicated they could break with the FAA.
Canaccord Genuity analyst Ken Herbert, just back from a big aviation conference in Europe, said consensus in the industry is that, while the FAA might un-ground the Max before the end of the year, Europe's regulator is expected to take about three months longer — and could require Chicago-based Boeing to make additional changes to the plane. Regulators in Canada and India have also indicated they could break with the FAA.
https://www.theguardian.com/business...s-it-all-clear
Australia’s air safety regulator (CASA) may refuse permission for Boeing 737 Max planes to fly even if its US counterpart revokes an order grounding the aircraft:
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The new system, DCAC-MRM (Define and Control Aircraft Configuration/Manufacturing Resource Management), had started in development in 1993, because production, parts supply and configuration control was already in chaos, the result of multiple computer systems that had been used to extend the basically WW2-era system that defined which parts were in which individual airplane. The problem was made worse in the early-90s recession, in which many of the experienced employees who made the creaky system work took buyout offers. DCAC-MRM fell way behind schedule and Boeing (real, legacy Boeing, long before Harry S. arrived) tried to launch multiple NG variants almost simultaneously with the old system.
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This article is long and ugly, but not comprehensive.
Readers of this article in the New Republic will no less about the 737 MAX after reading it than before. It knowingly makes false statements to sensationalize a serious question. If the author and her editor wanted to write their own opinion piece, they should have started a blog.
Readers of this article in the New Republic will no less about the 737 MAX after reading it than before. It knowingly makes false statements to sensationalize a serious question. If the author and her editor wanted to write their own opinion piece, they should have started a blog.
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" The problem was made worse in the early-90s recession, in which many of the experienced employees who made the creaky system work took buyout offers."
It was during that same period that The NG was undergoing major revisions in models, adding winglets, etc.
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This may have been discussed already but I don't remember having seen it. So:
A damaged / misbehaving AoA transducer causes atleast:
- a stall warning
- UAS warning
- erroneous MCAS activation
In what order would a std 737 pilot start to make sense of the situation? Following either Boeing procedures or company SOPs?
I also understood that a Brazilian airline got information of MCAS unlike others. Do we know how their SOPs instruct to handle an erratic activation?
Just trying to put legos in proper order.
A damaged / misbehaving AoA transducer causes atleast:
- a stall warning
- UAS warning
- erroneous MCAS activation
In what order would a std 737 pilot start to make sense of the situation? Following either Boeing procedures or company SOPs?
I also understood that a Brazilian airline got information of MCAS unlike others. Do we know how their SOPs instruct to handle an erratic activation?
Just trying to put legos in proper order.
20driver
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Level B differences are those differences in systems, controls, and indicators that have only minor procedural differences. Level B differences are of great enough degree to require formal training in general operational subjects, aircraft systems, or both, but are not of great enough degree to require systems integration training.
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The NYT published this yesterday
it is pretty much word for word what I have been saying for months here- and many others
Itsa failure of governance and training and a sick race to the bottom safety culture .
the MCAS failing was a manageable if undesired failure which could”.and was handled fine the day before the firstbt
fatsl crash
interested in comment on this esp. from the camp who prefer to blame it on Boeing or FAA
Yanrair
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/m...x-crashes.html
it is pretty much word for word what I have been saying for months here- and many others
Itsa failure of governance and training and a sick race to the bottom safety culture .
the MCAS failing was a manageable if undesired failure which could”.and was handled fine the day before the firstbt
fatsl crash
interested in comment on this esp. from the camp who prefer to blame it on Boeing or FAA
Yanrair
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/m...x-crashes.html
Psychophysiological entity
it is pretty much word for word what I have been saying for months here
We all know we could handle the situation, yes, and this includes my 80 year-old bones, if we had the hindsight of the crash details. While you can draw some conclusions from the prior flight, the third hand may have been a god-send that saved the day and we have no idea what would have happened if he'd not been on board.
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yanrair, in another thread, post #1216 I wrote:
Boeing unwittingly performed a very large scale statistical study. Given Boeing's aim was to change as little as possible in the MAX, virtually everything was constant with the exception of the MCAS software (engines and other changes have not been implicated in the accidents). Exactly as you state, same crew, same training, even the same problems & vulnerabilities with the AoA sensor (same part number, willing to be corrected). That single change has been the software.
So at first blush it is the so we can attribute the MAX accidents to that piece of software. If crews cannot handle that single software change, either the software was wrong, or the industry failed to sufficiently prepare the crews for the design expectations. How many millions of 737 departures have there been since 1967? As far as I can determine, not a single of the 172 hull loss on the 737 has been attributed to a runaway trim prior to the MAX. Two in a very short space of time for the MAX? That is why airworthiness authorities had to act.
The primary blame is the aircraft, secondary to the industry and its race to the bottom minimal investment in pilot training. The cornerstone of the sales pitch for the MAX was a single hour of home ipad study for each pilot, ie no cost at all to most operators.
No doubt, a statistical analysis of the chances of these accidents being attributable to random crew error vs random aircraft error is so monumentally in favour of an aircraft malfunction, given the natural experiment that had been performed since 1967, the airworthiness authorities felt they had no choice but to had to act. They simply could could afford a third accident, without a monumental blow to public & pilot confidence, not just in the aircraft, but the entire system of aircraft certification.
So at first blush it is the so we can attribute the MAX accidents to that piece of software. If crews cannot handle that single software change, either the software was wrong, or the industry failed to sufficiently prepare the crews for the design expectations. How many millions of 737 departures have there been since 1967? As far as I can determine, not a single of the 172 hull loss on the 737 has been attributed to a runaway trim prior to the MAX. Two in a very short space of time for the MAX? That is why airworthiness authorities had to act.
The primary blame is the aircraft, secondary to the industry and its race to the bottom minimal investment in pilot training. The cornerstone of the sales pitch for the MAX was a single hour of home ipad study for each pilot, ie no cost at all to most operators.
Plastic PPRuNer
"Once I had a railroad, made it run
Made it race against time.
Once I had a railroad,
Now it's gone
Say Buddy, Can you spare me a dime?"
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Ahhhh, the Past.....
Made it race against time.
Once I had a railroad,
Now it's gone
Say Buddy, Can you spare me a dime?"
Mac
Ahhhh, the Past.....
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Are you describing the flight where:
- the 2-man crew failed to handle the problem
- and the day was only saved by a 3rd dead-heading pilot on the flight deck
... as "was handled fine"?