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Sheremetyevo Superjet 100 in flames

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Sheremetyevo Superjet 100 in flames

Old 6th May 2019, 16:49
  #201 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by andrasz View Post
Thruster763, the SSJ was certified to EASA standards, so on paper at least it met those same requirements.
I'm aware what it was certfied to. Evidence of two heavy landings suggests it does not actually meet the requirement. There is no test requirement for 25.963 so it's design / analysis.
These are my personal views and my not reflect those of my employer.
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Old 6th May 2019, 17:08
  #202 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DDDriver View Post
BBC confirming (for what thatís worth) lightning strike.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48174169
No they donít, they quote a passenger saying it was struck by lightning just before it crashed as well as saying that it was struck by lightning immediately after takeoff.

They also quote an Aeroflot source confirming that everyone was off within 55 seconds then embed a video which shows people departing the aircraft long after that time.

The usual rubbish reporting Iím afraid, which even the normally reliable BBC isnít immune from! 😡
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Old 6th May 2019, 17:29
  #203 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Speed of Sound View Post
...The usual rubbish reporting Iím afraid, which even the normally reliable BBC isnít immune from!
Oh absolutely. Theyíre especially poor with aviation-related reporting. They were quick enough yesterday to ďconfirmĒ all had survived...
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Old 6th May 2019, 17:35
  #204 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Thruster763 View Post
No, one would not. It is a certification requirement that this does not happen in a survivable accident see FAR/CS 25.963 (d)
https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/def...nt%2021%29.pdf
The BA38 crash would have be a different story if the B777 had not met theis requirement better. Its tanks dd of course have far less fuel in them, but there was no significant leakage.
Not sure about that "far less fuel" on board, because 6,750 kg of fuel did leak, and it was probably sheer luck that it did not ignite. To be precise, the fuel apparently did not leak from the tanks, but from the engine fuel pipe, until it was manually shut off. But almost 7 tonnes is quite a lot.

Look at Section 1.1 of the official report:

After the aircraft came to rest there was a significant fuel leak from the engines. [...] Fuel continued to leak from the engine fuel pipes until the spar valves were manually closed
It should also be noted that the SuperJet is EASA-certified according to CS.25. As far as I can tell, Ireland-based "CityJet" was (past tense) the only European operator, and there are currently none operating it under an EASA type certificate.

The relevant part of CS.25 is 25.963 (d):

Fuel tanks must, so far as it is practicable, be designed, located and installed so that no fuel is released in or near the fuselage or near the engines in quantities sufficient to start a serious fire in otherwise survivable emergency landing conditions, and:
[...]
(5) Fuel tank installations must be such that the tanks will not rupture as a result of an engine pylon or engine mount or landing gear, tearing away as specified in CS 25.721(a) and (c).
An associated paragraph in the AMC (acceptable means of compliance) has been revoked, however, so I don't know how that is typically tested. At any rate, the regulator must at one point have been satisfied that compliance with 25.963 was achieved.

However, it could be argued based on this accident, that it violated this certification specification, because quite clearly "quantities sufficient to start a serious fire" did leak in an evidently otherwise survivable emergency landing.

Bernd

Last edited by bsieker; 6th May 2019 at 17:37. Reason: typos.
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Old 6th May 2019, 17:42
  #205 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Thruster763 View Post
Only practical answer is to stop cabin baggage bigger than will go under a seat, enforce it 100% and remove the ovehead bins. The airlines are never going to do this though.
It really does seem this would be the ideal solution, for a number of reasons. Not only is it safer in an emergency, but it's going to make it easier and faster to get through security. I can understand wanting to keep your phone/laptop/meds/papers/etc with you, but personally, the last thing I'd want is to lug all my clothes and whatnot around with me. Seems like it would make things easier for the flight attendants, too - people not blocking the aisles accessing their suitcases while FA's are trying to serve drinks, etc.

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Old 6th May 2019, 17:46
  #206 (permalink)  
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Changing cabin baggage standards and weights would require all airlines operating the same route to agree. It would require agreements around the world. It will not happen. The Pax want to pay less money and airlines facilitate that for them. Nothing will change - unless you can PROVE that cabin bags in evac cause MUTLIPLE deaths.
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Old 6th May 2019, 18:39
  #207 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by bsieker View Post
Not sure about that "far less fuel" on board, because 6,750 kg of fuel did leak, and it was probably sheer luck that it did not ignite. To be precise, the fuel apparently did not leak from the tanks, but from the engine fuel pipe, until it was manually shut off. But almost 7 tonnes is quite a lot.

Look at Section 1.1 of the official report:



It should also be noted that the SuperJet is EASA-certified according to CS.25. As far as I can tell, Ireland-based "CityJet" was (past tense) the only European operator, and there are currently none operating it under an EASA type certificate.

The relevant part of CS.25 is 25.963 (d):


An associated paragraph in the AMC (acceptable means of compliance) has been revoked, however, so I don't know how that is typically tested. At any rate, the regulator must at one point have been satisfied that compliance with 25.963 was achieved.

However, it could be argued based on this accident, that it violated this certification specification, because quite clearly "quantities sufficient to start a serious fire" did leak in an evidently otherwise survivable emergency landing.

Bernd
Indeed fuel did leak from the engine pipework on BA58, this is not covered under 25.963(d) which is for tanks. I've not looked to see what ammendment of CS.25 the SJ-100 was certified to or if there were any CRIs. Normally compliance this type of requirement is shown by analysis rather than test. EASA may not have reviewed the analysis in detail.
These are my own opinions and my not reflect those of my employer (part of my day job includes fuel tank/system certification).

Last edited by Thruster763; 6th May 2019 at 18:55.
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Old 6th May 2019, 19:07
  #208 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by PAXboy View Post
Changing cabin baggage standards and weights would require all airlines operating the same route to agree. It would require agreements around the world. It will not happen. The Pax want to pay less money and airlines facilitate that for them. Nothing will change - unless you can PROVE that cabin bags in evac cause MUTLIPLE deaths.


ANO should be amend to state that pax attempting to retrieve, or who succeed in exiting the cabin accompanied by, cabin baggage during an emergency evacuation will be subject to criminal proceedings, which may result in a fine and/or custodial sentence.

If I had a loved one perish in such circumstances, and saw footage of at least one individual lumbering across the tarmac with a bag which appeared to be of max weight/dimensions, as can be seen the footage of this incident, I'd be looking to "have words".
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Old 6th May 2019, 19:32
  #209 (permalink)  
 
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Lightning in Europe at this time

I don't remember seeing this cited before - but it is a useful site that shows lightning activity and hope that it will add to the background knowledge of this discussion.
lightningmaps .org / blitzortung /europe/index.php?bo_page=archive&bo_map=0&lang=en&bo_year=2019&bo_m onth=05&bo_day=05&bo_hour_from=16&bo_hour_range=4&bo_animati on=1#bo_arch_strikes_maps_form

I probably haven't the rights to post the full URL so split so you can use it with minimal effort - just remove the spaces.
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Old 6th May 2019, 19:40
  #210 (permalink)  
 
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Would it be too much to ask that those who wish to endlessly discuss passenger evacuation - with or without bags - start their own, dedicated thread? This happens every ing time there is a crash with an evacuation - and the discussion never changes. Those of us who simply want to discuss the accident and the where/why/how end up having to sort through dozens or even hundreds of posts about people evacuating with their carry-on bags...
Now, back to your regularly schedule program
I'm not sure comparisons to BA38 are particularly apt - that was basically a normal touchdown that happened to occur short of the runway with the gear coming off because they sank in the mud - not the high G vertical hit that this appears to have been.
If we assume that a lightning strike did take out multiple electrical systems, this is really worrisome. As I posted earlier, lightning is designed for and the technologies involved are fairly mature. While it can do localized damage at the attach/detach points, it should never take down essential or critical electrical systems. Further, even with FBW and FADEC common place since the mid 1980s, I can't think of a single case where a lightning strike did take down such a system.
This could point to a build quality issue (lightning protection is highly dependent on the integrity of bonding and grounding - a single high resistance electrical connection (and we're talking mili-ohms here) can ruin a systems lightning protection. Maintaining those low resistance bonds on aging aircraft is a big concern - but the Superjet hasn't been around long enough for that to be a likely issue.
Or, it could point to a problem with the existing standards, in which thousands of in-service aircraft could be at risk.
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Old 6th May 2019, 19:44
  #211 (permalink)  
 
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It's such a strange accident, it will be very interesting to see the official report when it's all done.
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Old 6th May 2019, 20:12
  #212 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by tdracer View Post
<SNIP>
I'm not sure comparisons to BA38 are particularly apt - that was basically a normal touchdown that happened to occur short of the runway with the gear coming off because they sank in the mud - not the high G vertical hit that this appears to have been.
If we assume that a lightning strike did take out multiple electrical systems, this is really worrisome. As I posted earlier, lightning is designed for and the technologies involved are fairly mature. While it can do localized damage at the attach/detach points, it should never take down essential or critical electrical systems. Further, even with FBW and FADEC common place since the mid 1980s, I can't think of a single case where a lightning strike did take down such a system.
This could point to a build quality issue (lightning protection is highly dependent on the integrity of bonding and grounding - a single high resistance electrical connection (and we're talking mili-ohms here) can ruin a systems lightning protection. Maintaining those low resistance bonds on aging aircraft is a big concern - but the Superjet hasn't been around long enough for that to be a likely issue.
Or, it could point to a problem with the existing standards, in which thousands of in-service aircraft could be at risk.
The BA58 comparision was for fuel leakage from tanks when the UC is ripped off, that is similar to both this crash and the earlier SJ-100 heavy landing. Lightning protection is ever evolving and as said earlier new construction techniques like carbon composite are a challenge. Electronic devices (inside equipment) are also using smaller geometries and lower voltages potentially making them more vunerable. Even existing standards are subject to review and change. It used to be a 0.08" (2.0mm) aluminium alloy skin was acceptable for a integral tank wall without further analysis or protection, now you have to justify it.
These are my own opinions and may not reflect those of my employer).
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Old 6th May 2019, 20:15
  #213 (permalink)  
 
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My OH and I dutifully take one hold bag on our annual jollies to Tenerife. Weíve only just worked out we could split it into two cabin bags and save fifty quid. Airlines financially incentivising cabin baggage in this way creates a risk. Has anyone assessed that risk properly?
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Old 6th May 2019, 20:37
  #214 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by rab-k View Post
ANO should be amend to state that pax attempting to retrieve, or who succeed in exiting the cabin accompanied by, cabin baggage during an emergency evacuation will be subject to criminal proceedings, which may result in a fine and/or custodial sentence.

.
Would you ever get a grip. You want to try and convict people because in a life or death situation they behave the wrong way? Were you ever in one?

I was. And I did not react in the way I thought I would. And I have never been able to work out why because my reaction was totally NOT what I would have expected of myself. And I was very, very lucky to survive it.

Some amount of bulls****ers on this thread.

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Old 6th May 2019, 20:45
  #215 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by rab-k View Post
ANO should be amend to state that pax attempting to retrieve, or who succeed in exiting the cabin accompanied by, cabin baggage during an emergency evacuation will be subject to criminal proceedings, which may result in a fine and/or custodial sentence.
Panicked people in an emergency are extremely unlikely to either remember such a legal threat or to pay much attention to it if they do. A pointless suggestion that ignores the reality of human behavior, IMHO.

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Old 6th May 2019, 20:45
  #216 (permalink)  
 
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Like it or not, cabin baggage appears to have been an issue for at least some of the pax which for them turned this accident from survivable to non-survivable. This is an aspect that will be addressed by the accident investigators because they are required to do so by Annex 13.

IMO, the investigation needs to look primarily at why the approach became unstable, why the hard landing led to fuel tank rupture, and why so many pax died.

It is apparent from some of the video evidence that the hull breach from the extrenal fire occurred quite early (+50 secs?) - you can see smoke issuing from the top of the forward doors while there are still people coming down the slides - which means that those at the rear of the aircraft would have rapidly been in an unsurvivable cabin environment. There is also a 6-7 second hiatus in pax flow from the forward right slide which ends with someone carrying a large bag; that delay will have costs lives.

I am strongly of the opinion that central locking for for the overheads is the only way to go. It certainly stands more chance of success than trying to persuade airlines to stop permitting cabin baggage, which is not necessary. Once people learn the overheads will only be released once on stand, they will be less likely to try to retrieve items, and if they try they will soon be moved on. If they are not locked it only takes one person to open them before others follow suit, and that will impede the escape of those behind them, whether from the time delay or from a newly introduced trip hazard. How much more evidence do we need for change, and how many more will have to die before something is done?

Now let's add seat pitch into the mix. The FAA and EASA have refused to rule on seat pitch, the FAA claiming that the low pitches being considered (27"/608cm) would not affect someone's ability to leave their seat quickly. That is worth thinking about as an official position, because even the most cursory examination would show that you reach a physical limit at some point. And what about seating density? All exits are rated for pax flow per 90 seconds, but unless you pay to be in PE or business+ where the pax/metre equation is lowest, you are likely to be up against the limits.
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Old 6th May 2019, 20:47
  #217 (permalink)  
 
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I fear the brave guy who went back up the slide did so to try to unblock a logjam of struggling bodies and baggage blocking the aisle. For some while before that the egress of pax had become slow and intermittent which bespeaks a difficulty reaching the door at all, and the two items that were all he managed to release that came down the slide look to me more like bags than bodies. He deserves a medal.

The industry must rapidly get to grips with the homicidally irrational behaviour of some pax on evacuation. Locking bins coulld be easily and relatively cheaply retrofitted and would completely solve the baggage problem, in the meantime well publicised prosecutions would not be misplaced at all. I think some people are being far too laissez-faire over such blatantly selfish action that any reasonable person can see is potentially hazardous.
It would only take a couple of people stumbling over bags at or before the lobby before others begin scrambling over them and you have an immovable Hillsborough type bottleneck-crush situation. I have little doubt that is what happened here. With no overwing exits anyone caught in or behind that would be inevitably condemned to death.
It simply must not be allowed to happen like that.

We'll look back at unlocked bins in 20 years time and marvel how they were ever permitted.

Last edited by meleagertoo; 6th May 2019 at 21:05.
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Old 6th May 2019, 21:02
  #218 (permalink)  
 
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Anybody mentioned smokehoods yet?

34 years since the Manchester accident, smokehoods might have helped a few of the passengers get out. Thoughts?
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Old 6th May 2019, 21:20
  #219 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by meleagertoo View Post
. . . in the meantime well publicised prosecutions would not be misplaced at all.
They would be entirely misplaced, as well as ineffective. Attempting to criminalize undesirable behavior in a life-threatening emergency is a fool's errand.What's more, any such prosecution would be unlikely in the extreme to result in conviction. Defense counsel and experts in behavioral psychology would eviscerate the prosecution and the chances of convincing jurors to convict would be negligible at best.

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Old 6th May 2019, 21:28
  #220 (permalink)  
 
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Pax vid of approach to first bounce.

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