737 max returning to service ?
How is flight in pitch up when MCAS is inactive - but required for certification?
Have you trained for that? - is it a light or rapid change? - or just it wants to go vertical in an instant?
I guess you can not answer as you have never been there - but why change from the reported 0.6 degrees to a required 2.5 degrees?
That to me as an engineer, is the transition is/will not be slow when the cowls start to create lift. (MCAS runs the high speed trim)
Have you trained for that? - is it a light or rapid change? - or just it wants to go vertical in an instant?
I guess you can not answer as you have never been there - but why change from the reported 0.6 degrees to a required 2.5 degrees?
That to me as an engineer, is the transition is/will not be slow when the cowls start to create lift. (MCAS runs the high speed trim)
My understanding is that to trigger the pre-mod MCAS without an inop AOA sensor on the FCC in use, one would have to produce an upset and depart well beyond the normal operating envelope. That would be pretty bad in any transport category airplane. However with a faulty sensor (pre-mod) the appropriate procedures should not cause a loss of the airplane.
The aircraft could not be approved without the MCAS.
They needed to increase the design limits to meet certification.
Now they massively decrease MCAS.
?? How can it meet certification?
Forget now 1 or 2 AoA sensors.
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Boeing were required to install the MCAS to get it through the FAA certification process Since it then became a safety issue pilots needed to know if it was working. To charge airlines extra to provide a fault warning for the system is scandalous as reported by the New York Times. As such Lawyers should home in on this point.
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"Boeing does not believe pilots should be required to complete training in a flight simulator prior to flying the 737 Max once regulators lift the aircraft’s grounding."
I have worked with regulators, but not in aviation. In the field I have experience of, the regulator has the power to overnight stop all trade by large organisations. In aviation, the same is true, with the difference that their power to ground aircraft, stop airlines from operating and close airfields has been used sufficiently frequently that it is no way a bluff. No airline is too big to ground, no individual model of aircraft too numerous.
So that said, do the regulators actually care what Boeing think about training requirements? The regulators all over the world have grounded the 737 MAX in its various forms. In the current political and media climate, they have no pressure at all to change their mind: September 2019, September 2020, September 2021: not their money, not their planes, not their problem. If the regulators don't like the proposals to put the aircraft back into service, they can just say "nice try, but no". In the end, what they want they get. Boeing can try judicial review or your country's equivalent, but (a) there are a lot of regulators, and a judicial challenge to all of them at once -- including, for example, the Chinese regulator -- would be very difficult and (b) getting the history of two fatal crashes into a court, with full discovery processes, would be to put it mildly a high stakes game.
This isn't Comet, with British stiff upper lip making people feel it was their patriotic duty to fly after a succession of accidents. The 737 MAX will have to satisfy regulators, and regulators will have to satisfy their stakeholders (politicians, passengers). Boeing's opinion on training requirements and three quid gets you a latte.
I have worked with regulators, but not in aviation. In the field I have experience of, the regulator has the power to overnight stop all trade by large organisations. In aviation, the same is true, with the difference that their power to ground aircraft, stop airlines from operating and close airfields has been used sufficiently frequently that it is no way a bluff. No airline is too big to ground, no individual model of aircraft too numerous.
So that said, do the regulators actually care what Boeing think about training requirements? The regulators all over the world have grounded the 737 MAX in its various forms. In the current political and media climate, they have no pressure at all to change their mind: September 2019, September 2020, September 2021: not their money, not their planes, not their problem. If the regulators don't like the proposals to put the aircraft back into service, they can just say "nice try, but no". In the end, what they want they get. Boeing can try judicial review or your country's equivalent, but (a) there are a lot of regulators, and a judicial challenge to all of them at once -- including, for example, the Chinese regulator -- would be very difficult and (b) getting the history of two fatal crashes into a court, with full discovery processes, would be to put it mildly a high stakes game.
This isn't Comet, with British stiff upper lip making people feel it was their patriotic duty to fly after a succession of accidents. The 737 MAX will have to satisfy regulators, and regulators will have to satisfy their stakeholders (politicians, passengers). Boeing's opinion on training requirements and three quid gets you a latte.
Mr. Muilenbergs "denial strategy " might work with shareholders (for the moment). It might also work with the FAA that sits in the same rocking boat. I sincerly doubt that it will work with the authorities in the rest of the world where the POTUS has not made many friends lately. I remember EASA has made life difficult for the Robinson R66 because of lacking servo redundancy even when there where no accidents to prove the point. My best guess is that except the FAA no one will re-certify the Max before the final investigations of the two accidents are out and that could be a while. I think Boeing is in dire need of parking space and cash to pay the unsold production.
Last edited by clearedtocross; 30th Apr 2019 at 16:49.
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XYZZY
Ahh we are back to the Comet are we.
Well, big difference, that was 2000 years ago.
AND:
They fixed the main problem, structural!
MAX has a aerodynamic instability problem that Boeing could easily fix with a tail modification.
Any float pilot knows You have to modify the tail on some aircraft if the floats are sticking out to fare forward when switching from wheel to floats in the summer!
But the Money people demanded a " software fix". Bahh .
Please do not mix basic infancy jetliner development with the Max, even if it does look like similar errors.
The first set the standard for aircraft destructive testing.
The other is criminal ignorance and sets the standard for destructive stress-testing of a large Company.
Lets hope the we do not have to fish a Max out of the Mediterranean the next few years.
Regards
Cpt B
Ahh we are back to the Comet are we.
Well, big difference, that was 2000 years ago.
AND:
They fixed the main problem, structural!
MAX has a aerodynamic instability problem that Boeing could easily fix with a tail modification.
Any float pilot knows You have to modify the tail on some aircraft if the floats are sticking out to fare forward when switching from wheel to floats in the summer!
But the Money people demanded a " software fix". Bahh .
Please do not mix basic infancy jetliner development with the Max, even if it does look like similar errors.
The first set the standard for aircraft destructive testing.
The other is criminal ignorance and sets the standard for destructive stress-testing of a large Company.
Lets hope the we do not have to fish a Max out of the Mediterranean the next few years.
Regards
Cpt B
Authorities
On the Nostalgia forum is this link:
https://www.aerosociety.com/news/aud...he-boeing-727/
It leads to audio interviews with respected acceptance test pilot DPDavies (who wrote the book Handling the Big Jets).
If you are prepared to listen to all the audio about his flights in the V bombers and Concorde, you then get his unwashed straight opinion on the FAA and CAA effectivity and honesty at that time.
It makes for thought provoking listening - years ago of course but very pertinent to this discussion.
https://www.aerosociety.com/news/aud...he-boeing-727/
It leads to audio interviews with respected acceptance test pilot DPDavies (who wrote the book Handling the Big Jets).
If you are prepared to listen to all the audio about his flights in the V bombers and Concorde, you then get his unwashed straight opinion on the FAA and CAA effectivity and honesty at that time.
It makes for thought provoking listening - years ago of course but very pertinent to this discussion.
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Not at all.
I am currently SLF with more than 2 million miles down the back in the last few years and I would happily fly in a Max piloted by someone like RTO or 737 Driver.
However, I am really getting concerned about flying in any aircraft A or B, with some of the other posters here when they are in row 0. You know who you are, rather than fly the aircraft and then follow NNCs apparently you need to know and be briefed on the specific system fault prior to flying the aircraft including basics like just keeping the aircraft in trim, even when it takes the strength of both PF and PM to keep the control column back (and yet the manual electric trim ALWAYS stopped and overrode MCAS). So there they are thumbing a thesaurus about 'runaway' not meaning 'repeated' so we don't trim? Neither of these crashes would have happened if the pilots had trimmed back to unload the pull force as was shown in the penultimate Lion Air flight and the first minutes of the final Lion Air flight - only when the pilots stopped flying the aircraft - trimming - did they crash.
So yes - I am a concerned SLF now: But on ALL flights as I might be in an aircraft zoom climbed into a high level stall and held the wrong side of the drag curve, or one where the PF just decided to stop trimming.
I am currently SLF with more than 2 million miles down the back in the last few years and I would happily fly in a Max piloted by someone like RTO or 737 Driver.
However, I am really getting concerned about flying in any aircraft A or B, with some of the other posters here when they are in row 0. You know who you are, rather than fly the aircraft and then follow NNCs apparently you need to know and be briefed on the specific system fault prior to flying the aircraft including basics like just keeping the aircraft in trim, even when it takes the strength of both PF and PM to keep the control column back (and yet the manual electric trim ALWAYS stopped and overrode MCAS). So there they are thumbing a thesaurus about 'runaway' not meaning 'repeated' so we don't trim? Neither of these crashes would have happened if the pilots had trimmed back to unload the pull force as was shown in the penultimate Lion Air flight and the first minutes of the final Lion Air flight - only when the pilots stopped flying the aircraft - trimming - did they crash.
So yes - I am a concerned SLF now: But on ALL flights as I might be in an aircraft zoom climbed into a high level stall and held the wrong side of the drag curve, or one where the PF just decided to stop trimming.
Pegase Driver
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The only reason airlines are backing the MAX is that they need to get their fleet back in the air and keep them flying, they are dependent on them and can't simply switch. It's like being stuck in a bad marriage, walking out is easier said than done. Airlines that already have a significant percentage of their fleet in the MAX or have a major future commitment to the type must be getting desperate for a solution. Imagine the effect on a major B737 operator such as Southwest Airlines if the MAX is permanently grounded and they're faced with waiting years for an all new Boeing narrowbody or switching to Airbus with a years long waiting list.
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To be fair, there's no way a mass exodus from B to A would ever happen, even if there was a desire, not least because A have an order backlog of a little under 6000 narrow bodies.
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Well I for one have lost complete faith in the Max or should I say the top brass at Boeing.
‘I will never fly on any flight scheduled as a Max as for me the aircraft is fundamentally unsafe and needs to be permanently withdrawn.
‘I will never fly on any flight scheduled as a Max as for me the aircraft is fundamentally unsafe and needs to be permanently withdrawn.
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happily my airlines of choice haven’t lost a passenger in over 30 years and in some cases- never. And the Max has been flying for three years and the STAB TRIM pretty much unchanged has been on Boeing’s since the 707. 1950s design.
my choice of airline is directly related to the standards they apply to safety.
Happy flying
y
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"you should have a set of go to pitch and power settings for various phases of flight."
I strongly feel that this should be the most essential training item for any unreliable , or uncertain airspeed issue combined with revert to gyro attitude display
This is basic stuff that has somehow been obscured by the "magenta line"
The "flight manager" should disappear and be replaced by gyro attitude display in any case of sensor disagree or does not compute situation
I strongly feel that this should be the most essential training item for any unreliable , or uncertain airspeed issue combined with revert to gyro attitude display
This is basic stuff that has somehow been obscured by the "magenta line"
The "flight manager" should disappear and be replaced by gyro attitude display in any case of sensor disagree or does not compute situation
This is the sort of training that is still carried out by many first class airlines. Moreover pilots who pride themselves on knowing stuff like this devour it. You shouldn’t need magenta lines and speed tapes to fly a plane to a safe landing. Take QF 72 with 60+ faults. On a 747 - which I flew along with 707/737/757/767 L1011, in similar catastrophic circumstances with say an uncontrolled fire, the pilot might have said “I’ll just lower the gear on the emergency system land flapless at 200 kts and do no checklists.” On ground in a few minutes safely. But to do this you have to know how to fly and realize you’re not flying an X BOX that you imagine knows more than you do.
Y
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Mr. Muilenbergs "denial strategy " might work with shareholders (for the moment). It might also work with the FAA that sits in the same rocking boat. I sincerly doubt that it will work with the authorities in the rest of the world where the POTUS has not made many friends lately. I remember EASA has made life difficult for the Robinson R66 because of lacking servo redundancy even when there where no accidents to prove the point. My best guess is that except the FAA no one will re-certify the Max before the final investigations of the two accidents are out and that could be a while. I think Boeing is in dire need of parking space and cash to pay the unsold production.
My best guess is that except the FAA no one will re-certify the Max before the final investigations of the two accidents are out
Don’t hold your breath for the final report which will no doubt absolve the pilots. I asked yesterday a large group about what caused the demise of the last jet liner to be grounded forever- Concorde.
Readers- please close your eyes and think what you believe and pause for ten seconds——————————
they all said more or less the same thing “debris on runway left by previous aircraft which damaged plane etc etc”.
oh dear!
We are in similar territory here.
Y
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RTO
I would fly with you in command in a heartbeat on a Max with an engine out and no flaps. Why.? Because you clearly know how to fly.
Y
ps should have added in “...and with multiple conflicting warnings”
As can this guy.....
https://www.abc.net.au/radio/program...pigny/10337426
I would fly with you in command in a heartbeat on a Max with an engine out and no flaps. Why.? Because you clearly know how to fly.
Y
ps should have added in “...and with multiple conflicting warnings”
As can this guy.....
https://www.abc.net.au/radio/program...pigny/10337426
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yanrair, I think you and I would disagree on apportionment of ultimate responsibility, but there is no escaping the fact that MCAS was a rather simplistic sticking plaster. For sure, lawyers will do their thing and we will continue to argue over ‘kludges’, airmanship etc, but can anyone seriously deny that the 737 has evolved as far as it can? Boeing have about 7000 or so on order; that should give them plenty of time to design the 737’s replacement, from scratch.
Not at all.
I am currently SLF with more than 2 million miles down the back in the last few years and I would happily fly in a Max piloted by someone like RTO or 737 Driver.
However, I am really getting concerned about flying in any aircraft A or B, with some of the other posters here when they are in row 0. You know who you are, rather than fly the aircraft and then follow NNCs apparently you need to know and be briefed on the specific system fault prior to flying the aircraft including basics like just keeping the aircraft in trim, even when it takes the strength of both PF and PM to keep the control column back (and yet the manual electric trim ALWAYS stopped and overrode MCAS). So there they are thumbing a thesaurus about 'runaway' not meaning 'repeated' so we don't trim? Neither of these crashes would have happened if the pilots had trimmed back to unload the pull force as was shown in the penultimate Lion Air flight and the first minutes of the final Lion Air flight - only when the pilots stopped flying the aircraft - trimming - did they crash.
So yes - I am a concerned SLF now: But on ALL flights as I might be in an aircraft zoom climbed into a high level stall and held the wrong side of the drag curve, or one where the PF just decided to stop trimming.
I am currently SLF with more than 2 million miles down the back in the last few years and I would happily fly in a Max piloted by someone like RTO or 737 Driver.
However, I am really getting concerned about flying in any aircraft A or B, with some of the other posters here when they are in row 0. You know who you are, rather than fly the aircraft and then follow NNCs apparently you need to know and be briefed on the specific system fault prior to flying the aircraft including basics like just keeping the aircraft in trim, even when it takes the strength of both PF and PM to keep the control column back (and yet the manual electric trim ALWAYS stopped and overrode MCAS). So there they are thumbing a thesaurus about 'runaway' not meaning 'repeated' so we don't trim? Neither of these crashes would have happened if the pilots had trimmed back to unload the pull force as was shown in the penultimate Lion Air flight and the first minutes of the final Lion Air flight - only when the pilots stopped flying the aircraft - trimming - did they crash.
So yes - I am a concerned SLF now: But on ALL flights as I might be in an aircraft zoom climbed into a high level stall and held the wrong side of the drag curve, or one where the PF just decided to stop trimming.
Although now retired and only SLF but I have over 10 ,000 hours command time on 73s 75s and 76 s.
I have never flown a Max but have looked at a LOT of documentation re MCAS.
I still cant understand how the Max was certified for operation with just ONE component able to drive the most powerful control surface.
Further , despite current Boeing. philosophy, I would want to know and understand EVERYTHING. about a system, particularly one which could kill me, exactly how it works, how it can fail. and how to deal with it and have seen and practiced operation and failures in the simulator, BEFORE becoming type rated.
Many years ago I was posted to an RAF squadron as a replacement pilot for one killed in the Valiant crash believed to have been caused by a runaway stab. The aircraft were not modified BUT we all went into the sim to practice the recovery procedure as it was found that full elevator could just overcome the stab. Deflection. Boeing please note.
After that experience I absolutely beleive that if MCAS is retained its authority should not be greater than can be overcome be elevator input.
Until the. MAX crashes I had the very highest respect for Boeing aircraft. With the Max MCAS they, to quote a senior retired NTSB. inspector , dropped the ball, bigtime.
I am sure the Max will be returned to service in due course as a very safe aircraft. But in its single A of A Sensor coupled to its MCAS system it should never have been certified.
When I did my 737 conversion at Boeing in Seattle back in 1980 our instructors were adamant that all their aircraft were designed to be flown with ease by any and all of the worlds airline pilots. The Max seems to have beaten four with tragic results.
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 1st May 2019 at 08:20.
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Since MCAS
You don’t need any of this in my opinion. A sim. Trainer on current NG sims can simulate MCAS by repeatedly introducing RUNAWAY STAB every time the pilot stops trimming ANU which will cause the wheel to spin AND again, until pilot counteracts and when in trim, - selects switches OFF . You only need a different sim. Where there are physical differences or significant handling differences. Since MCAS behaves like runaway stab. In the main, I think the trainer can do all that is needed here. Also refresh the guys on how to cope with stick shakers and unreliable airspeed in initial climb.
Cheers
Y
Simulators are indeed few and far between, but on the other hand there are +400 frames standing idle on the ground, why not bring them to use? Sure, it costs a hell of a lot more than using a sim, but, using them will reduce the time needed to get all crews trained.
So, how about we have Boeing trainers train the airline TRI/TREs in the real aircraft, and then have the TRI/TREs train the TCs in their grounded fleet, who in turn may train the line pilots, either in real aircraft or in simulators as available.
Such an approach would also have a large and positive effect on regaining public/airline/pilot trust. But such pragmatism is of course far less appealing to your average bean counting CEO than a 1-hour iPad session.
So, how about we have Boeing trainers train the airline TRI/TREs in the real aircraft, and then have the TRI/TREs train the TCs in their grounded fleet, who in turn may train the line pilots, either in real aircraft or in simulators as available.
Such an approach would also have a large and positive effect on regaining public/airline/pilot trust. But such pragmatism is of course far less appealing to your average bean counting CEO than a 1-hour iPad session.
Cheers
Y
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yanrair, I think you and I would disagree on apportionment of ultimate responsibility, but there is no escaping the fact that MCAS was a rather simplistic sticking plaster. For sure, lawyers will do their thing and we will continue to argue over ‘kludges’, airmanship etc, but can anyone seriously deny that the 737 has evolved as far as it can? Boeing have about 7000 or so on order; that should give them plenty of time to design the 737’s replacement, from scratch.
in another thread I pointed out by way of agreement with you that the 737 is not a sixties design but actually it’s a 707 fifties design with two engines missing and will eventually when max retires have flown for over 100 years! Now, is this unreasonable? To have a trim system from 1950 still the same a century later? My view, if it’s not broke don’t fix it. MCAS is in need of three design changes. Fix those and off we go
y