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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 25th Apr 2019, 23:07
  #4341 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
If you use "average" in the most commonly used sense meaning the arithmetic mean of a distribution then there is no reason why half of the population should necessarily be "below average".
As i said:
Of course mathematicians get upset with generic use of the term average (mean of them) but that is a different thread somewhere in a forum far far away.
I agree that by that meaning you are correct, a better statement is that if you arrange 101 people by height (or whatever) in a row 50 will be to left of the middle person and 50 to the right.
Would make the joke a bit off though.

The real question on pilots is how to train and test the 'acceptable' not perfect pilot. I sense that a lot of training has devolved into following scripts in a sim. One could make the point that any situation that can be covered by a concise procedure could be automated.

Perhaps training could be changed away from training people to be robots.

An interesting item in the Lion Air report on penultimate flight
The PIC performed three Non-Normal Checklists and none contained the instruction “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”.
This suggest rote following of checklists without overall judgment, possibly compounded by company expectations/pressure.
Seems that when that much stuff hits the fan one would want to get down before something else happened.
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Old 25th Apr 2019, 23:34
  #4342 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Jetstream67 View Post
I can understand a reluctance to fight the aircraft to dramatically alter the trim when the issue is not clear.

Many road vehicle crashes are made worse by tentative breaking when only full force could have helped. (Several car makers initially added brake force acceleration systems to increase partial braking towards full pressure for this reason - now augmented by radar anti-collision systems)
You can either fly the aircraft, or the aircraft will fly you. Your choice.
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Old 25th Apr 2019, 23:46
  #4343 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by 737mgm View Post
why don't you take some time to read up on the procedures to fly the 737. Read the official Boeing documents. Talk to 737 pilots and ask them how they are trained. Of course this will take a lot longer and require much greater effort than posting your oblivious comments but then you might be a little bit closer to actually being able to judge how these pilots performed.
Can we ask the 4 deceased 737 pilots that read up on procedures to fly a 737 (inc the FAA AD), read official Boeing documents and ask them how they were trained? I think that the surviving (currently quiet) crew would be the ones I would want to ask - anyone else is assuming lots of things.

As stated I am not a pilot but a LAME.

It is clear the pilots did not do what was needed when needed within the available conditions including limited height. But that should not have lead to a fatal crash.

Do we know who was doing the take off - Captain or F/O?

If it was the Captain should he have handed over to the FO, if so how long would you expect that decision to take?


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Old 25th Apr 2019, 23:46
  #4344 (permalink)  
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It's not terribly important, but when Chronus quoted on my post in #4340 , 737Driver's embedded quote had vanished leaving the impression my post was 737's. This seems to happen when cut and pasting existing quotes.

I was discussing the hidden switch removal versus it being programmed out of the equation during specific functions. As I mention, I've got a bee in my bonnet about this, since if it really had been removed, it would be an utterly vital issue. Just being programmed out is astonishing enough, and I thought 737's post was very significant - hence this ramble.

This shows the embedded quote carried forward.

Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 02:11
  #4345 (permalink)  
 
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Trim switch ergonomics with stick shaker on

We see several trim switch applications.

​​Why so short and ineffective?

Did the shaker interrupt the switch contact (perhaps not held down with sufficient force)?

Are pilots trained in trimming with shaker on?

Was the pilot used to or schooled in only doing short blips?

How long (or how many blips) would it take to trim out an MCAS excursion – which if recollection is correct moves the stab much faster than the trim switch?

And lastly: how well do pilots perceive stick force when the shaker is on?
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 02:19
  #4346 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Brosa View Post
To me it appears that the last crash was a case of "magenta line".

1. Stall warning and stick shaker on rotation
Solution: tried to engage the autopilot at 400 ft

2. Apparantly false stick shaker due to erroneous inputs + unreliable airspeed
Solution: tried to engage the autopilot at 600 ft

3. Still stick shaker due to erroneous inputs from left side
Solution: finally succeeded to engage the left autopilot at 1000 ft

4. Aircraft is grossely out of trim and in an overspeed condition, making it hard to fly
Solution: tried to engage the autopilot
We just don't know their motivation. It had been widely reported in the media and elsewhere that MCAS was only active during manual flight, so a pretty obvious (but unfortunately incorrect) response would have been to turn the autopilot on. If it solved the problem, then a much better solution than dinking around with the manual wheel at low altitude.

Note that in your response, you are assuming that the pilots should have known which side the erroneous inputs came from or that the cause of their troubles was an erroneous AOA gauge. For some reason our brains have a really difficult time with 20/20 hindsight, a fact that is detrimental to human factors design. Almost every problem that I ever solved (and that was a big part of my job) was painfully obvious in hindsight. As I said earlier, my company liked to challenge potential hires with difficult puzzles. I ended up getting into the HR loop and was cursed with a good memory. It was almost funny how my fellow employees would tear down candidates for failing to solve puzzles that I clearly recalled them failing just a few years before...
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 06:10
  #4347 (permalink)  
 
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Reading the back and forth on the conundrum of “Pilots completely at fault for being stupid” as set against “Pilots completely not at fault because Boeing designed a $hit system,” and I’ve decided to take a stand. Apologies in advance as this is long, but trust me- it is worth it.

Of all of you out there who have posted here- whether with a desire to blame the pilots entirely or the opposite, how many of you have actually experienced an imminent, binary and life-threatening emergency in your airplane?? One that is so explicit you will either get it right or you will die?? And you have maybe 30 seconds to make that choice.

My guess is the list of aviators who can answer honestly that they have been at that threshold of death is very very small.

I am on that list. And I survived, despite making bad choices along the way.

I share this story because I want people to understand once and for all that while it is fine to offer that the pilots could have done better (they totally could have) the root cause of the MAX crashes was one of design, and human failures only built on that edifice to achieve the final outcome.

I also share this story because I want to try to explain to everyone here, in terms we can all understand, what it is really like when your known world explodes and you have to improvise in order to survive.

In June of 1996 I was in a very high performance unlimited category biplane named the Goshawk. (N345RM) I had departed Livermore CA several minutes earlier and was headed to a legal practice box adjacent to the Tracy airport. While over the Altamont hills at an indicated altitude of 4000MSL I began warming up by pulling to a 45 degree upline and doing snap rolls to the right. I did this once or twice. On the third attempt, once again at approximately 4000+MSL I initiated the snap roll to the right and hit hard left rudder as the wings returned to level to stop the autorotation. When I did this the left rudder pedal/bar shot away from my foot instead of providing actual resistance. The left rudder cable had snapped.

The airplane (which was by design dynamically unstable) paused its rotation for a moment and then began again violently to the right, probably at about 360 degrees per second. And here’s where the chair-jockeys don’t get it. I probably went two or three full revolutions before my mind could accept what I already knew had happened. I immediately pulled power, but the aircraft was already entering a nose-down spin- at a rotational rate of at least 360 degrees per second.

The ROD of a spinning aerobatic biplane is pretty steep, probably on the 1500-2000FPM range. I checked my altimeter, saw I was descending through 4,000 feet and decided to try to recover the airplane before bailing out. AND HERE IS THE IMPORTANT POINT: BECAUSE I REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS COMPLETELY EFFED I would nearly die. My mind knew before then, as it knows now, that if you put a Pitts-like airplane into an autorotational state the only thing that is going to get it out is opposite yaw. With no rudder THERE CANNOT BE ANY OPPOSITE YAW!! I had thousands of hours in similar aircraft, I was an unlimited category competition aerobatic pilot and instructor, and yet when faced with the obvious I could not process it quickly enough, despite having the evidence staring me squarely in the eye, to react quickly enough to prevent me from nearly dying.

So I frittered away precious moments trying to use opposite yaw via ailerons, shots of engine thrust, hell I might have even prayed, I don’t know. What I know now is I could have done better. What I also know now, and somehow managed to forget then, was that I was over the Altamont. When I saw 4000’MSL and thought “OK, I’ve got time to play with this” the reality was I was over a hill- that was 2134’ high. Tracy- just 20 miles away and where I was headed sits at 193’ MSL.

In my mind, because I was stupid overwhelmed, or just unable to process everything being thrown at me I had maybe 3500-4000’ to play with. So I could spend 30 seconds fighting the airplane to try to recover it before I had to bail.

In reality I had less than 2000’ before I would be dead.

I spent probably ½ to ¾ of the real time I had to get out of the airplane in it- fighting to try to save it, and I did this by deliberately ignoring what I already knew (I had lost rudder control completely) what I should have known (I was over the Altamont) and what I should have accepted (I had to go- the Goshawk was not going to survive this, the only real question was would I??)

I obviously did reach the (already foregone but stubbornly ignored by me) conclusion that the airplane was unrecoverable and decided to bail out- which is an interesting concept in a stable spinning airplane. I undid my harnesses as I had practiced, and I fought my way out of the airplane- pinned against the left side of the cockpit coaming by the rotational g-forces before eventually getting enough of my upper body into the slipstream that I was basically yanked out of the airplane. I was falling in a fetal position, thought about waiting to pull the ripcord, said eff-it and pulled, and after the shocking introduction to my first and (so far) only canopy opening was struck by the sound of the airplane smacking into the ground just a second or two later. Future calculation efforts would show that my chute opened between 134 and 200 feet above the ground, which at that rate of descent equaled a couple of seconds at best.

Surviving that incident has given me some small window of insight into what happens when your comfy world devolves in seconds into one where you know you are about to die.

The biggest lesson, and the greatest ego-killer was simple: I didn’t respond nearly as I would have hoped I would. It took me countless seconds to register the fact of the failure. I knew as soon as the pedal fired away from my foot what had happened. But my mind simply refused to accept that reality for some short period of time. The second error was equally simple: I thought I was the hero pilot (Neil Williams etc…) who would bring my crippled plane back to the airport, thereby saving the day. That thought nearly cost me my life, as I wasted precious seconds performing an absolutely useless dance of fancy “airmanship” that did nothing but allow my airplane to bring me closer and closer to the ground with every moment.

And now to the main point of this entirely too-long post: For those of you who suppose you will see everything clearly and “FTFA” when your own fatal opportunity presents itself please hear me when I say this: YOU WILL NOT!! The question that will determine your survival is how quickly will you move past that initial shock and be able to function properly again. In my case it was a single (albeit fatal) failure. I was extremely well trained, averse to panic-driven responses, and well-able to handle the emergency I had been presented with. Yet I wasted probably a full minute in an airplane I had no business being in any longer.

In the 737 crashes it was a cascade of failures. My own- very rare life experience tells me that those pilots had little chance given the stressors they were working under, as would the rest of you. These are not the words of someone who doesn’t know what it’s like. I’ve been there. I lived. So please trust me when I tell you that your vaunted talents will wither to nothing if someday you are in this unfortunate position. At best you will be semi-functional, at worst you will be functionally useless.

What you will not be, in any context, is a hero who defies these realities.

Final note: This isn’t about placing blame on anyone. Boeing designed an airplane with a crap system that had random and unmonitored control over the single most important control surface of the aircraft. The FAA paved the way for certification of the airplane, and once in the hands of pilots that airplane not once, but twice flew itself into the ground. (The pilots didn’t- it was MCAS that did, and that’s an important fact to take note of…) You can blame the pilots all you want, but it was the airplane itself that had a failure mode that required the pilots to be perfect or die. Boeing had years to create a functioning system that would not put the pilots in this position and they failed to create one. So the two (six really) pilots were left to defend themselves against an airplane that was trying to kill them. Four failed in that endeavor, and they have my utmost respect and gratitude.

Only those who have walked the path and survived can understand the fine line between winning and dying- which is why I have posted this ridiculously long post tonight.

Sorry for the sermon, just tired of reading the constant back and forth about who we should blame.

Link to the Final on my incident: Well despite being a member for years I haven't reached the vaunted 10-post threshold for posting URLs. Search "NTSB June 17, 1996 N345RM" for the final report.

Regards,
dce
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 06:26
  #4348 (permalink)  
 
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Dce

that is an excellent post and so true
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 06:51
  #4349 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by wonkazoo View Post
Reading the back and forth on the conundrum of “Pilots completely at fault for being stupid” as set against “Pilots completely not at fault because Boeing designed a $hit system,” and I’ve decided to take a stand. Apologies in advance as this is long, but trust me- it is worth it.

Of all of you out there who have posted here- whether with a desire to blame the pilots entirely or the opposite, how many of you have actually experienced an imminent, binary and life-threatening emergency in your airplane?? One that is so explicit you will either get it right or you will die?? And you have maybe 30 seconds to make that choice.

My guess is the list of aviators who can answer honestly that they have been at that threshold of death is very very small.

I am on that list. And I survived, despite making bad choices along the way.

I share this story because I want people to understand once and for all that while it is fine to offer that the pilots could have done better (they totally could have) the root cause of the MAX crashes was one of design, and human failures only built on that edifice to achieve the final outcome.

I also share this story because I want to try to explain to everyone here, in terms we can all understand, what it is really like when your known world explodes and you have to improvise in order to survive.

In June of 1996 I was in a very high performance unlimited category biplane named the Goshawk. (N345RM) I had departed Livermore CA several minutes earlier and was headed to a legal practice box adjacent to the Tracy airport. While over the Altamont hills at an indicated altitude of 4000MSL I began warming up by pulling to a 45 degree upline and doing snap rolls to the right. I did this once or twice. On the third attempt, once again at approximately 4000+MSL I initiated the snap roll to the right and hit hard left rudder as the wings returned to level to stop the autorotation. When I did this the left rudder pedal/bar shot away from my foot instead of providing actual resistance. The left rudder cable had snapped.

The airplane (which was by design dynamically unstable) paused its rotation for a moment and then began again violently to the right, probably at about 360 degrees per second. And here’s where the chair-jockeys don’t get it. I probably went two or three full revolutions before my mind could accept what I already knew had happened. I immediately pulled power, but the aircraft was already entering a nose-down spin- at a rotational rate of at least 360 degrees per second.

The ROD of a spinning aerobatic biplane is pretty steep, probably on the 1500-2000FPM range. I checked my altimeter, saw I was descending through 4,000 feet and decided to try to recover the airplane before bailing out. AND HERE IS THE IMPORTANT POINT: BECAUSE I REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS COMPLETELY EFFED I would nearly die. My mind knew before then, as it knows now, that if you put a Pitts-like airplane into an autorotational state the only thing that is going to get it out is opposite yaw. With no rudder THERE CANNOT BE ANY OPPOSITE YAW!! I had thousands of hours in similar aircraft, I was an unlimited category competition aerobatic pilot and instructor, and yet when faced with the obvious I could not process it quickly enough, despite having the evidence staring me squarely in the eye, to react quickly enough to prevent me from nearly dying.

So I frittered away precious moments trying to use opposite yaw via ailerons, shots of engine thrust, hell I might have even prayed, I don’t know. What I know now is I could have done better. What I also know now, and somehow managed to forget then, was that I was over the Altamont. When I saw 4000’MSL and thought “OK, I’ve got time to play with this” the reality was I was over a hill- that was 2134’ high. Tracy- just 20 miles away and where I was headed sits at 193’ MSL.

In my mind, because I was stupid overwhelmed, or just unable to process everything being thrown at me I had maybe 3500-4000’ to play with. So I could spend 30 seconds fighting the airplane to try to recover it before I had to bail.

In reality I had less than 2000’ before I would be dead.

I spent probably ½ to ¾ of the real time I had to get out of the airplane in it- fighting to try to save it, and I did this by deliberately ignoring what I already knew (I had lost rudder control completely) what I should have known (I was over the Altamont) and what I should have accepted (I had to go- the Goshawk was not going to survive this, the only real question was would I??)

I obviously did reach the (already foregone but stubbornly ignored by me) conclusion that the airplane was unrecoverable and decided to bail out- which is an interesting concept in a stable spinning airplane. I undid my harnesses as I had practiced, and I fought my way out of the airplane- pinned against the left side of the cockpit coaming by the rotational g-forces before eventually getting enough of my upper body into the slipstream that I was basically yanked out of the airplane. I was falling in a fetal position, thought about waiting to pull the ripcord, said eff-it and pulled, and after the shocking introduction to my first and (so far) only canopy opening was struck by the sound of the airplane smacking into the ground just a second or two later. Future calculation efforts would show that my chute opened between 134 and 200 feet above the ground, which at that rate of descent equaled a couple of seconds at best.

Surviving that incident has given me some small window of insight into what happens when your comfy world devolves in seconds into one where you know you are about to die.

The biggest lesson, and the greatest ego-killer was simple: I didn’t respond nearly as I would have hoped I would. It took me countless seconds to register the fact of the failure. I knew as soon as the pedal fired away from my foot what had happened. But my mind simply refused to accept that reality for some short period of time. The second error was equally simple: I thought I was the hero pilot (Neil Williams etc…) who would bring my crippled plane back to the airport, thereby saving the day. That thought nearly cost me my life, as I wasted precious seconds performing an absolutely useless dance of fancy “airmanship” that did nothing but allow my airplane to bring me closer and closer to the ground with every moment.

And now to the main point of this entirely too-long post: For those of you who suppose you will see everything clearly and “FTFA” when your own fatal opportunity presents itself please hear me when I say this: YOU WILL NOT!! The question that will determine your survival is how quickly will you move past that initial shock and be able to function properly again. In my case it was a single (albeit fatal) failure. I was extremely well trained, averse to panic-driven responses, and well-able to handle the emergency I had been presented with. Yet I wasted probably a full minute in an airplane I had no business being in any longer.

In the 737 crashes it was a cascade of failures. My own- very rare life experience tells me that those pilots had little chance given the stressors they were working under, as would the rest of you. These are not the words of someone who doesn’t know what it’s like. I’ve been there. I lived. So please trust me when I tell you that your vaunted talents will wither to nothing if someday you are in this unfortunate position. At best you will be semi-functional, at worst you will be functionally useless.

What you will not be, in any context, is a hero who defies these realities.

Final note: This isn’t about placing blame on anyone. Boeing designed an airplane with a crap system that had random and unmonitored control over the single most important control surface of the aircraft. The FAA paved the way for certification of the airplane, and once in the hands of pilots that airplane not once, but twice flew itself into the ground. (The pilots didn’t- it was MCAS that did, and that’s an important fact to take note of…) You can blame the pilots all you want, but it was the airplane itself that had a failure mode that required the pilots to be perfect or die. Boeing had years to create a functioning system that would not put the pilots in this position and they failed to create one. So the two (six really) pilots were left to defend themselves against an airplane that was trying to kill them. Four failed in that endeavor, and they have my utmost respect and gratitude.

Only those who have walked the path and survived can understand the fine line between winning and dying- which is why I have posted this ridiculously long post tonight.

Sorry for the sermon, just tired of reading the constant back and forth about who we should blame.

Link to the Final on my incident: Well despite being a member for years I haven't reached the vaunted 10-post threshold for posting URLs. Search "NTSB June 17, 1996 N345RM" for the final report.

Regards,
dce

Thanks for sharing your brush with the dark side.

A couple of serious questions if you do not mind.

During your event did pitch and power enter your mind?

Were you a airline pilot or just aerobatics?

How long did you actually spend trying to fight it, and how long did it feel like you fought it (I expect they are not the same answer).
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 06:53
  #4350 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by wonkazoo View Post
Link to the Final on my incident: Well despite being a member for years I haven't reached the vaunted 10-post threshold for posting URLs. Search "NTSB June 17, 1996 N345RM" for the final report.
Final report.






Attached Files
File Type: pdf
N345RM Final Report.pdf (88.6 KB, 137 views)
DaveReidUK is offline  
Old 26th Apr 2019, 07:06
  #4351 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2015
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
Thanks for sharing your brush with the dark side.

A couple of serious questions if you do not mind.

During your event did pitch and power enter your mind?

Were you a airline pilot or just aerobatics?

How long did you actually spend trying to fight it, and how long did it feel like you fought it (I expect they are not the same answer).
As I wrote- I tried to use thrust (power) to bump it out of it's spin. When a dynamically unstable airplane is in auto-rotation pitch alone doesn't have the ability to recover the aircraft. It can tighten or loosen the auto-rotation by virtue of decreasing or increasing the AOA (Hmmm, have I read about AOA recently??), but pitch authority alone (of which there was tons in this airplane) cannot overcome the autorotative state as it does not affect yaw, which is the critical factor in a stabilized spin. (Inside wing stalled, outside wing flying...) I did try pro-spin and anti-spin aileron with the power changes. Frankly I genuinely thought I could bump it out of it's stable autorotative state. Which was my pilot-ego speaking louder than my science-pilot self.

"Airline pilot or just aerobatics?" Well that's an interesting question, but I've never flown heavy iron, nor have I suggested I have. But I did somehow survive roughly 4400 hours of PIC time in an immense variety of airplanes and helicopters, each of which obeys the same exact physics as a 737 Max-8.

I cannot tell you how long I spent trying to recover the airplane (as opposed to fighting it). IN round numbers when I realized what had happened I looked at the altimeter, saw something around 4000' MSL and thought "I have some time." Roughly speaking I was on the ground a minute or a minute and a half later.
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 07:11
  #4352 (permalink)  
 
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Wonkazoo

Don't apologise for the length, really excellent post, thank you.

Regards - and respect.

Alchad
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 07:17
  #4353 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
Final report.
There is also a summary of the accident here: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=133835

Edit: The dry report contains nothing like the first-hand version in this thread:
attempts at regaining control were unsuccessful
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 07:22
  #4354 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2015
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Posts: 65
One more quick note before I totter off to bed.

We all like to think of ourselves as calm and cool. The Chuck Yeager persona etc.

I really hope you all hear what I am trying to say here- more than I ever have before.

When I landed awkwardly, (I tried to flare my round chute) I was then dragged for a couple hundred feet or so as the winds were blowing around 15KT and a chute is alas a big kite. I finally got it collapsed enough to unbuckle the harness and stop the whole sad circus in its tracks.

And there I lay, in the dry grass of a California summer, on the container of my parachute and harness, panting like a dog who has run miles, and looking at my hands as my pulse thudded through my fingers in a way I've never felt before or since.

My mind would take years to process that I had just been in a knife fight for my survival, but my body knew exactly what had happened. I am known for being calm, especially when stuff gets silly. What most people don't know is that I have lain helpless on my stomach, with three fractured vertebra, staring at my hands all while panting uncontrollably.

Because despite being calm I almost ran out of answers. (Actually I did run out of answers- which helped as the only option was to bail out- much to my family's presumed happiness.)

We like to see ourselves as heroes- who will always do the right thing when the chips are down.

The reality as far less noble. Which is why compassion for those who were put in a situation just like mine, but who were so minutely less fortunate, is completely appropriate,

Cheers-
dce
wonkazoo is offline  
Old 26th Apr 2019, 07:26
  #4355 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by wonkazoo View Post
As I wrote- I tried to use thrust (power) to bump it out of it's spin. When a dynamically unstable airplane is in auto-rotation pitch alone doesn't have the ability to recover the aircraft. It can tighten or loosen the auto-rotation by virtue of decreasing or increasing the AOA (Hmmm, have I read about AOA recently??), but pitch authority alone (of which there was tons in this airplane) cannot overcome the autorotative state as it does not affect yaw, which is the critical factor in a stabilized spin. (Inside wing stalled, outside wing flying...) I did try pro-spin and anti-spin aileron with the power changes. Frankly I genuinely thought I could bump it out of it's stable autorotative state. Which was my pilot-ego speaking louder than my science-pilot self.

"Airline pilot or just aerobatics?" Well that's an interesting question, but I've never flown heavy iron, nor have I suggested I have. But I did somehow survive roughly 4400 hours of PIC time in an immense variety of airplanes and helicopters, each of which obeys the same exact physics as a 737 Max-8.

I cannot tell you how long I spent trying to recover the airplane (as opposed to fighting it). IN round numbers when I realized what had happened I looked at the altimeter, saw something around 4000' MSL and thought "I have some time." Roughly speaking I was on the ground a minute or a minute and a half later.
Cheers, was just some questions based on some posts on this thread.

Far from your experience, I have had a couple of near departed events in my life and thinking rationally at the time is somewhat fuzzy.

I have also witnessed a few fiery actual crashes both fixed wing and a rotary (I expect GF rights played a big part in the rotary one S269 C to D) - very strange how different we react at that time. The pilot that was in a bad way and passed soon after lead us to the problem.

Also involved very closely with a loss of aircraft (RIP) on a private fly away - again very different the way people acted and after recalled the event during personal chats and the ATSB investigation.

Thanks for detailing your account.
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 07:39
  #4356 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by wonkazoo View Post
The reality as far less noble. Which is why compassion for those who were put in a situation just like mine, but who were so minutely less fortunate, is completely appropriate,

Cheers-
dce
Thanks Sir for this. Really.
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Old 26th Apr 2019, 07:50
  #4357 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2015
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Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape View Post
There is also a summary of the accident here: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=133835

Edit: The dry report contains nothing like the first-hand version in this thread:
One quick note/mea culpa:

The "Pushed himself back into his seat' charade was because I was (technically) (Well really) performing aerobatic maneuvers within 4NM of an airway. Which meant if I admitted to deliberately entering the maneuver I could be busted by the feds. Since I had to hike a couple of miles back to civilization (with one sneaker and a sock) I had plenty of time to find a rational explanation for how my airplane entered into an autorotative state without doing actual aerobatics.

Second note: The report is inaccurate and confusing when it says I was in the box when the failure occurred. A simple look at the map will tell you that the failure occurred over the Altamont.

Last Note, and a good one: Our family (Including my 10 and 12 year-olds) is going to go to the crash site on June 17th. The actual location is a bit unknown as it was in the middle of a ton of grass, some hillsides, two ponds, and a gazillion cows. But the image I first saw when I looked up from my hands will never leave me, and the wreck can't be far from there. Granted most pieces were removed 20 years ago, but the engine case was buried up the the middle of the last bank, so I'm betting if we look hard enough we'll find evidence of the event.

All of which is simply amazing. I went from seconds separating me from life, to a family and a life unknown.

Lucky am I...
dce
wonkazoo is offline  
Old 26th Apr 2019, 08:04
  #4358 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: Europe
Posts: 95
Thank you so much Wonkazoo. If you don't mind, I will copy your post - and send it to some of my Hot Shot buddies - yeah, still buddies - who still are adament that they would have saved the Lion Air and ET flights. Thank you Sir. From a 16k hours Airline guy, who doesn't know if I could have done better...
MD80767 Driver is offline  
Old 26th Apr 2019, 08:36
  #4359 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: London
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Great post dce. Should be mandatory reading on any human factors refresher
BleedingOn is offline  
Old 26th Apr 2019, 08:46
  #4360 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2005
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Originally Posted by wonkazoo View Post
My guess is the list of aviators who can answer honestly that they have been at that threshold of death is very very small.
A small proportion but not a small number. Everyone who has ever ejected, bailed, or faced a major malfunction could be asked and most likely have a range of opinions on the human factors of ET302.
oggers is offline  

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