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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 15th Apr 2019, 14:46
  #4041 (permalink)  
 
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One lesson which the industry has to learn from this is that all flight crews must know how to restore orderly flight and disable all automation in the case of misbehaving flight control systems. If that's not possible, the cockpit is no longer a place for human beings.
The other lesson would be why on earth are pilots having to do this in the first place? Why are manufacturers building 1960 era aircraft?? Why did Boeing hide knowledge of the MCAS? Nothing else in the world would be built to a 50 year old design yet somehow in aviation it is acceptable.
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 14:50
  #4042 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by gmx View Post
Generally sensible post, however, it is absolutely reasonable to ask whether pilot skill / training was a factor.

The LionAir pre accident crew defused the situation with the help of a jump seat pilot. Once they had the aircraft under control, they re-enabled electric trim only to discover it attempting to nose the plane down again, before disabling it again and flying manually to destination.

That crew defeated AoA-failure-induced MCAS twice, not once.
...snipped...
That one in bold and underlined meant:
1. The crews got lucky they found temporary solution to their "STS running the opposite way" problem.
2. Then they realized they needed an electric motor to trim after all. So, they turned it back on.
3. When the "STS running the wrong way trouble" showed up again, they killed off the electric motor for good.

The crew DIDN'T actually perform the so-called "Runaway Trim NNC", otherwise they'd written about that on their log and/or the ASHOR. They didn't even mention about the stick shaker incident which had consumed their entire flight until they'd landed safely at destination.

As written on the preliminary accident report:
Page 22 KNKT Preliminary Report


AFML
To the MX, they'd written: "IAS (Indicated Air Speed) and ALT (altitude) Disagree and FEEL DIFF PRESS (Feel Differential Pressure) light problem" on the Aircraft Flight Maintenance (AFML).
Page 9 KNKT Preliminary Report

The mystery is the pilot claimed they'd performed the "Runaway Trim NNC" to the Indonesian crash investigator when infact they'd just killed the motor directly without even following any known procedure. As explained here...

Page 20 "Preliminary Aircraft Accident Investigation Report" KNKT

When they declared that they performed three NNC's, including the Runaway Stabilizer one, to the investigator, they had just exaggerated some of their actions and/or had obscured certain details after the fact. Indeed, they conveniently omitted a very important fact: a dead head sitting on jumper seat had been the one suggesting to kill the trim motor during the cockpit's highly tense full-of-warning-and-alarm episode. We now know about this "dead head hero" because there was a leak from the media.

The Indonesian accident investigators need to get to the bottom of these discrepancies, among other things, before reaching their final conclusion within the next 3-4 months.

Last edited by patplan; 15th Apr 2019 at 14:58. Reason: format
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 15:43
  #4043 (permalink)  
 
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As a life-long apostle of Boeing (I am just a private pilot), I feel betrayed by this MCAS fiasco. They abandoned their bedrock principle that pilots can take over complete control if and when they want it.

My suspicion that Boeing is going to get off the hook frustrates me even more.

But, history shows that Boeing will survive this. Remember 737 rudder hardovers?

1. March 1991, United585 in Colorado Springs. It rolled to the right on approach and crashed. What shocked everybody was that the NTSB could not figure out the cause. Their final report (December 1992) guessed that it might be: (i) loss of directional control, or (ii) turbulence.
2. September 1994, USAir427 in Pittsburg. It rolled to the left on approach and crashed. While the second investigation was still underway, there was a third incident. In June 1996, Eastwind517 experienced two episodes of rudder reversal while on approach to Trenton, New Jersey. With the help of a live pilot and a malfunctioning aircraft still in one piece, the NTSB had some clues. Their final
report (March 1999) implicated the PCU servo.

It's long since forgotten now (that's the point of my post), but the 737 was thought to be dangerous. Even the travelling public knew that it could without warning fly you into the ground.

The MCAS crashes will be easier for the public to digest. There is no unknown to fear. Boeing made a big mistake, but at least they knew what they were doing.
Pilots who were more experienced, or faster with their NNCs, or better trained to carry through the action items on the checklists, might have saved the day.
As soon as the public hears that Boeing has fixed their mistake and believes that all pilots know how to handle the fix, the re-branded MAX will be airborned once again.

But, I still feel B-trayed. Growing within me is a little more willingness to look at A's design philosophy.
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 16:01
  #4044 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by CaptainMongo View Post
. . .
The Max was certified for flight by aviation regulators world wide. These same regulators decreed no additional simulator training was required, (and if they did what would they have trained in that additional sim? Certainly not Left AOA vane failure at low altitude...). While I will point a big finger at the FAA’s head, I will also ask where were the other world wide regulators? . . .
Long-time operators of the B737, the Brazillians examined the type and created 3 types for the B737 in their 2018 ANAC Report.

First, the FAA FSB Report, then the Brazillian Report:

From the FAA FSB Report 2018



--------------------------------

From the ANAC, Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil
GRUPO DE AVALIAÇÃO DE AERONAVES – GAA
BRAZILIAN AIRCRAFT EVALUATION GROUP

Operational Evaluation Report - B737

From the ANAC Report, pg. 8 - 9:The Boeing 737 series have been in service for many years in Brazil, even before the ANAC Aircraft Evaluation Group (GAA) was established. For that reason, this is the first Operational Evaluation conducted by ANAC on the B-737, specifically the B-737-8MAX. An operational evaluation was conducted by ANAC Aircraft Evaluation Group (GAA) in Miami, FL, USA, during October 2017, where the proposed differences training for the B-737-8MAX was evaluated, considering the B-737-800 as the base aircraft. The evaluation was conducted using the methods described in ANAC IAC 121-1009.

The results presented here for the previous B-737 models (737-200, 737-300, 737-400, 737-500, 737-600, 737-700 and 737-800) are based on the Boeing 737 FAA FSB Report revision 14.

1.2. Objective

The objective of this report is to present the results from the operational evaluation of the B-737 series aircraft.
The content of this report is applicable to operations under the framework of ANAC.

1.3. Purpose
The purpose of this report is to:

Determine the Pilot Type Rating assigned for the B-737 series;
Recommend the requirements for training, checking and currency applicable to flight crew for the B-737 series, and functionalities; and
Present the compliance of the B-737 series with the requirements of the RBHA 91 and RBAC 121.

1.4. Applicability

This report is applicable to:

Brazilian operators of the B-737 series under RBHA 91 and RBAC 121 requirements;
Approved Training Organizations certified under RBAC 142 (Training Centers);
Civil Aviation Inspectors related to safety oversight of the B-737 series;
ANAC Principal Operations Inspectors (POIs) of the B-737 series operators.

2.PILOT TYPE RATING The GAA stablished [sic] 3 (three) different type ratings for the B-737 series aircraft and recommends the update of publication “Instrução Suplementar – IS 61-004” (ANAC type rating list) with the following information:


Last edited by PJ2; 15th Apr 2019 at 16:06. Reason: [sic] denotes that the word "stablished" is in the original document and it is taken to be the word, "established"
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 16:21
  #4045 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by PJ2 View Post
Long-time operators of the B737, the Brazillians examined the type and created 3 types for the B737 in their 2018 ANAC Report.

First, the FAA FSB Report, then the Brazillian Report:

From the FAA FSB Report 2018



--------------------------------

From the ANAC, Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil
GRUPO DE AVALIAÇÃO DE AERONAVES – GAA
BRAZILIAN AIRCRAFT EVALUATION GROUP

Operational Evaluation Report - B737

From the ANAC Report, pg. 8 - 9:The Boeing 737 series have been in service for many years in Brazil, even before the ANAC Aircraft Evaluation Group (GAA) was established. For that reason, this is the first Operational Evaluation conducted by ANAC on the B-737, specifically the B-737-8MAX. An operational evaluation was conducted by ANAC Aircraft Evaluation Group (GAA) in Miami, FL, USA, during October 2017, where the proposed differences training for the B-737-8MAX was evaluated, considering the B-737-800 as the base aircraft. The evaluation was conducted using the methods described in ANAC IAC 121-1009.

The results presented here for the previous B-737 models (737-200, 737-300, 737-400, 737-500, 737-600, 737-700 and 737-800) are based on the Boeing 737 FAA FSB Report revision 14.

1.2. Objective

The objective of this report is to present the results from the operational evaluation of the B-737 series aircraft.
The content of this report is applicable to operations under the framework of ANAC.

1.3. Purpose
The purpose of this report is to:

Determine the Pilot Type Rating assigned for the B-737 series;
Recommend the requirements for training, checking and currency applicable to flight crew for the B-737 series, and functionalities; and
Present the compliance of the B-737 series with the requirements of the RBHA 91 and RBAC 121.

1.4. Applicability

This report is applicable to:

Brazilian operators of the B-737 series under RBHA 91 and RBAC 121 requirements;
Approved Training Organizations certified under RBAC 142 (Training Centers);
Civil Aviation Inspectors related to safety oversight of the B-737 series;
ANAC Principal Operations Inspectors (POIs) of the B-737 series operators.

2.PILOT TYPE RATING The GAA stablished [sic] 3 (three) different type ratings for the B-737 series aircraft and recommends the update of publication “Instrução Suplementar – IS 61-004” (ANAC type rating list) with the following information:

And in that Brazilian OER you will see that they identified MCAS as a category B training item. The question is what training the operators in Brazil implemented. GOL grounded their fleet after the Ethiopian crash even though they would have had training on MCAS.*
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 16:29
  #4046 (permalink)  
 
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Published on Monday, April 15, 2019

Boeing completes nearly 100 test flights with new 737 Max software fix

Boeing says flight crews have already completed 96 flights without incident on 737Max jets with a new software update.
It has flown more than 159 hours in total.
No issues have been identified but Boeing will continue to operate test flights for several more weeks before applying for new approval from the FAA.
Southwest Airlines isn't too confident the Max will get the green light any time soon.
The airline will now keep the planes off its schedules until at least August 5.
That will result in about 160 flight cancellations a day during the busy summer season.
America Airlines said it will also ground its Max jets until August 19 at the earliest.
Meanwhile, Sen. Edward Markey and other lawmakers have introduced a bill that would require aircraft makers to provide all safety equipment as standard at no extra charge.
The Air Line Pilots Association has backed the bill proposal.
The planes involved in crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia did not have the optional tools that may have been able to alert pilots to malfunctioning sensors which are thought to have played a role in the accidents.
https://www.travelmole.com/news_feat...ews_id=2037018
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 16:56
  #4047 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by gmx View Post
Generally sensible post, however, it is absolutely reasonable to ask whether pilot skill / training was a factor.

The LionAir pre accident crew defused the situation with the help of a jump seat pilot. Once they had the aircraft under control, they re-enabled electric trim only to discover it attempting to nose the plane down again, before disabling it again and flying manually to destination.

That crew defeated AoA-failure-induced MCAS twice, not once.

One lesson which the industry has to learn from this is that all flight crews must know how to restore orderly flight and disable all automation in the case of misbehaving flight control systems. If that's not possible, the cockpit is no longer a place for human beings.
I , for one, don't want to fly in a plane flown by HAL. Someone previously said something about a big switch that turns Everything Automatic OFF and leaves the pilots in charge. This could work well provided pilots are well trained and have not been worked to fatigue and have plenty of hand flying experience that is kept up to date and all the systems of the aircraft still work at the pilots command. Trying to trim by hand being shown to be not effective (to put it lightly) as an example.

We have unmanned drones that are commanded from the ground. I don't want to fly in a unmanned drone flown by someone on the ground either. So let's get pilots working with all the tools available with a big ALL AUTOMATICS OFF switch but all flight controls , gauges, etc all working. Let's keep the pilots well practiced and well trained.

Better than HAL. At least until we fly regularly into SPACE because manual flight won't really be possible. When we do NYC to TOKYO in 90 mins by flying into space, pilots may still be in the cockpit but they probably will be pushing buttons . Me thinks.

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Old 15th Apr 2019, 16:59
  #4048 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by jimtx View Post
. . . The question is what training the operators in Brazil implemented. . . .
Precisely. Did they follow their own advice...?

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Old 15th Apr 2019, 19:30
  #4049 (permalink)  
 
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Useful video on the MCAS software updates from pilot Juan Browne:

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Old 15th Apr 2019, 20:11
  #4050 (permalink)  
 
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Useful and informative, although we've heard most of this already. It was important that he emphasized keeping in practice with hand-flying, even for very experienced pilots, but in briefly mentioning why hand-flying isn't practiced more, he completely blew off what I thought was a major factor in that: airlines don't WANT you to hand-fly, one of the main reasons being, supposedly, better gas mileage. Is it time for regulators to mandate a certain amount of hand-flying by pilots so that they won't get fired for doing it? (Given the pilot shortage, it seems unlikely that ppl should lose their jobs for it.)
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 20:15
  #4051 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Takwis View Post
Stabilizer trim was not mentioned in my MAX training at all. The labels, or functions, of the cutout switches were not mentioned or noticed.
That's very interesting. WAAAAY back right after Lion Air first happened we were discussing the switch nomenclature change, and user TriStar_drvr posted this picture of his MAX computer-based training... so it was covered in at least some airline's training, in a very superficial manner.

Indonesian aircraft missing off Jakarta




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Old 15th Apr 2019, 20:33
  #4052 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by slacktide View Post
That's very interesting. WAAAAY back right after Lion Air first happened we were discussing the switch nomenclature change, and user TriStar_drvr posted this picture of his MAX computer-based training... so it was covered in at least some airline's training, in a very superficial manner.

Indonesian aircraft missing off Jakarta
Interesting, but inconclusive. My first reaction is that like many words in English "both" is ambiguous, it can mean "together" (noun) or "either" (adverb), which have very different connotations. The placard does not state that the function of the switches has changed, it is only implied if you already understand the consequences of the MCAS trim changes. I may be being obtuse, but a competent lawyer will see right though that...
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 21:19
  #4053 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by neville_nobody View Post


The other lesson would be why on earth are pilots having to do this in the first place? Why are manufacturers building 1960 era aircraft?? Why did Boeing hide knowledge of the MCAS? Nothing else in the world would be built to a 50 year old design yet somehow in aviation it is acceptable.
The 737 is still an old generation aircraft, with lots of old generation failings.
Most of the development on it has been to increase its profitability not it's safety........ It does make a lot of money for operators and Boeing though. So far.
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 21:21
  #4054 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape View Post
Interesting, but inconclusive. My first reaction is that like many words in English "both" is ambiguous, it can mean "together" (noun) or "either" (adverb), which have very different connotations. The placard does not state that the function of the switches has changed, it is only implied if you already understand the consequences of the MCAS trim changes. I may be being obtuse, but a competent lawyer will see right though that...
Given the grammar ambiguity the title of the bullet/callout "nomenclature has changed" adds to the possibility to interpret it either way, much clearer would be "function has changed".
Another try to minimize difference ?

Accurate description is "EITHER switch will deactivate both"

Last edited by MurphyWasRight; 15th Apr 2019 at 21:21. Reason: typo
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 21:37
  #4055 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by YYZjim View Post

But, history shows that Boeing will survive this. Remember 737 rudder hardovers?

1. March 1991, United585 in Colorado Springs. It rolled to the right on approach and crashed. What shocked everybody was that the NTSB could not figure out the cause. Their final report (December 1992) guessed that it might be: (i) loss of directional control, or (ii) turbulence.
2. September 1994, USAir427 in Pittsburg. It rolled to the left on approach and crashed. While the second investigation was still underway, there was a third incident. In June 1996, Eastwind517 experienced two episodes of rudder reversal while on approach to Trenton, New Jersey. With the help of a live pilot and a malfunctioning aircraft still in one piece, the NTSB had some clues. Their final
report (March 1999) implicated the PCU servo.
.
I do remember this, we used to practice recoveries in the SIM, not at all easy. You had to maintain extra speed on the approach so the ailerons would have enough authority over the full rudder. As far as I remember the 737 wasn't grounded then but it was a long time ago.
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 21:42
  #4056 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape View Post
Interesting, but inconclusive. My first reaction is that like many words in English "both" is ambiguous, it can mean "together" (noun) or "either" (adverb), which have very different connotations. The placard does not state that the function of the switches has changed, it is only implied if you already understand the consequences of the MCAS trim changes. I may be being obtuse, but a competent lawyer will see right though that...
Just curious, how many would read that slide, take perfunctory note of the change, and move on, and how many would stop short, and start asking "What? What does this change mean? Is this just a labeling change? Can I still cut out the auto trim separately from the manual electric trim? What has changed about the trim operation? Where can I find out more?" and what would be the result of such inquiries made to the company training department/chief pilot?

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Old 15th Apr 2019, 22:14
  #4057 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by ams6110 View Post
Just curious, how many would read that slide, take perfunctory note of the change, and move on, and how many would stop short, and start asking "What? What does this change mean? Is this just a labeling change? Can I still cut out the auto trim separately from the manual electric trim? What has changed about the trim operation? Where can I find out more?" and what would be the result of such inquiries made to the company training department/chief pilot?
Given the "nomenclature changed" label and awkward text I would guess that at least some who might have gone "huh" would decide it had to a be label change only since it would be hard to believe that critical core functionality had changed, at least without a strong warning.
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 23:02
  #4058 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Sucram View Post
I do remember this, we used to practice recoveries in the SIM, not at all easy. You had to maintain extra speed on the approach so the ailerons would have enough authority over the full rudder. As far as I remember the 737 wasn't grounded then but it was a long time ago.
That is spot on Sucram. 220 kts permitted safe flight with aileron countering full rudder. If below 220 a quick acceleration to 220 did the trick.
Y
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Old 15th Apr 2019, 23:42
  #4059 (permalink)  
 
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I say again....

Originally Posted by ams6110 View Post
Just curious, how many would read that slide, take perfunctory note of the change, and move on, and how many would stop short, and start asking "What? What does this change mean? Is this just a labeling change? Can I still cut out the auto trim separately from the manual electric trim? What has changed about the trim operation? Where can I find out more?" and what would be the result of such inquiries made to the company training department/chief pilot?
I posted this yesterday morning, but I think it got buried awaiting moderator approval (hopefully I'll be off probation soon )

Procedurally, it does not matter what the switches do or how they are labeled. You could call the switches "Hank" and "Frank", and it does not matter. From Boeing's perspective, you don't have to know what these switches are connected to. Whether the NG or the MAX, you always cutoff BOTH switches when called for in the NNC.

It wasn't always so on the NG. A while back, the 737NG stab runaway procedure was changed so that BOTH cutout switches are always selected together, and we no longer try to isolate the offending circuit. I was kind of curious why the change, but I was simply told that Boeing thought this was a better to handle runaway trim. The conspiracy theorist in me now says that Boeing did this because they were looking down the road at the MAX certification and were looking for any opportunity to harmonize procedures.
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Old 16th Apr 2019, 04:08
  #4060 (permalink)  
 
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I for one, don't want to fly in a plane flown by HAL.
Are you a pilot?

Have you ever flown in a modern Airbus?

You do realise that if HAL had been flying (AP in) then the MCAS would not have activated?
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