Boeing 737 Max Software Fixes Due to Lion Air Crash Delayed
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Originally Posted by CW247
We are not here to be convinced by a non-aviation professionals' advocacy but the point he makes is a valid one.
On another note: Ala-cart safety features
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EW7woqBR_MI
On another note: Ala-cart safety features
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EW7woqBR_MI
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Resertification delayed past 1 May
According memo FAA has no intentions to look at the new software fix form Boeing this month!
Also
RYR is not counting on any Max for this summer. Ie to end Oktober
Also
RYR is not counting on any Max for this summer. Ie to end Oktober
Originally Posted by KelvinD
CW427's point re adding fire protection material to to flaky kitchen appliance is spot on. However, it seems not to apply to Boeing. Batteries overheating/bursting into flames? No problem. Put them in a fire resistant box. Job jobbed! Never mind fixing the bursting into flames issue!
Boeing completely redesigned the battery and the charging system. However, due to the extent of the damage to the battery during the two battery fires, they were unable to definitively establish what the root cause was. So using a belt and suspenders approach, they put the battery in the steel box.
Before the redesign, 40 787s experienced 2 battery fires in about a year.
There are now ~800 787s in service, averaging ~4000 hours/year utilization (that works out to over 3 million flight hours/year fleetwide). Since the redesign there has been one battery event - a single cell failed but thanks to the battery redesign the fault was contained to a single cell and didn't propagate to the other cells. The cell fault was traced to a manufacturing defect and corrective action was put in place.
BTW, I don't think most of us would want to live in a world where Ralph Nader and his people designed things...
He did something - back in the late 70's or early 80's IIRC - where they designed a "safe" car to show the auto industry how it should be done. They put in pretty much every safety system in existence at the time, but they completely forgot the most important part of safety - not getting in an accident. The thing was so bad to drive it was literally an accident looking for the place to happen.
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The underlying problem is that the trim reversion system ( Manual trim) was unable to work throughout the flight envelope.
I wonder if the manual trim has been revised since the 737-100 . The MAX is longer heavier and has a higher VMO.
How many transport aircraft of its size rely on Manual reversion.
I wonder if the manual trim has been revised since the 737-100 . The MAX is longer heavier and has a higher VMO.
How many transport aircraft of its size rely on Manual reversion.
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Originally Posted by safetypee
But later Thursday, Boeing confirmed to The Washington Post that it had found a second software problem that the Federal Aviation Administration has ordered fixed —
One of the officials familiar with the investigation said that everyone wants a thorough review now, as the worst outcome would be to have another problem emerge later. “You don’t want to be in a situation where there was one contributing factor to an accident, and then three weeks later you find another” problem that could impact a flight.
In a statement, Boeing called the additional problem “relatively minor” but did not offer details of how it affects the plane’s flight-control system. “We are taking steps to thoroughly address this relatively minor issue and already have the solution in work to do that,” it said. Washington Post.
One of the officials familiar with the investigation said that everyone wants a thorough review now, as the worst outcome would be to have another problem emerge later. “You don’t want to be in a situation where there was one contributing factor to an accident, and then three weeks later you find another” problem that could impact a flight.
In a statement, Boeing called the additional problem “relatively minor” but did not offer details of how it affects the plane’s flight-control system. “We are taking steps to thoroughly address this relatively minor issue and already have the solution in work to do that,” it said. Washington Post.
" On Apr 5th 2019 Boeing reported a second "relatively minor" software problem unrelated to MCAS was identified and is being fixed. This fix delays the submission of the MCAS fix to the FAA, that was intended to take place until end of March and is now going to happen in the coming weeks.
The software problem affects flaps and other related flight control hardware. Boeing informed the FAA about the issue, the FAA rated the problem critical to flight safety and have ordered to fix that problem. "
err flaps and other flight control hardware - minor?
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Were there issues with MAX 7? Not that there are that many around.
What will happen with the MAX 9 and MAX 10, even longer than the MAX 8 aircraft? (9 and 14 feet respectively)
What will happen with the MAX 9 and MAX 10, even longer than the MAX 8 aircraft? (9 and 14 feet respectively)
Originally Posted by Smythe
Were there issues with MAX 7? Not that there are that many around.
What will happen with the MAX 9 and MAX 10, even longer than the MAX 8 aircraft? (9 and 14 feet respectively)
The Max 10 won't fly until later this year, and isn't due to enter service until mid-2020.
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It has been reported that Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg has offered this quip to the public:
Boeing’s board will establish a committee to review how the company designs and develops aircraft, Muilenburg added. The group will “recommend improvements to our policies and procedures” for its 737 Max and other aircraft programmes.
That what is probably the world's most pre-eminent large passenger aircraft designer and manufacturer appears to have serious doubts about its ability to design and develop aircraft is a very telling line. I'll believe it will be a worthwhile exercise only if the committee membership specifically excludes lawyers and MBA-qualified commercial/managerial types, as I suspect that they are at the root of the ills that are found in the shadows in the background of today's Boeing Commercial Airplane Company organisational culture.
https://www.theguardian.com/business...ly-20-per-cent
Boeing’s board will establish a committee to review how the company designs and develops aircraft, Muilenburg added. The group will “recommend improvements to our policies and procedures” for its 737 Max and other aircraft programmes.
That what is probably the world's most pre-eminent large passenger aircraft designer and manufacturer appears to have serious doubts about its ability to design and develop aircraft is a very telling line. I'll believe it will be a worthwhile exercise only if the committee membership specifically excludes lawyers and MBA-qualified commercial/managerial types, as I suspect that they are at the root of the ills that are found in the shadows in the background of today's Boeing Commercial Airplane Company organisational culture.
https://www.theguardian.com/business...ly-20-per-cent
Salute!
There are some disturbing comments from Boeing at the "briefing" the other day;
https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/27/boeing-presents-mcas-fix-to-pilots-regulators-and-med
1) I do not know what is "non-normal" activation of MCAS.
2) I do not understand the "reset" of MCAS. The briefing says a one time activation until the triggering data activates again. Well, duhhhh. The Lion crew had the triggering event continuosly and HAL did his job by moving the stab unless the pilot used manual electric trim.
Some of the "good" ponts of Boeing's brief admitted problems with the manual trim authority. And I have seen several posts here and on other blogs that the aero forces and control column logic can result in a "frozen" stab or stab trim motor. GASP!!
Gums sends...
There are some disturbing comments from Boeing at the "briefing" the other day;
https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/27/boeing-presents-mcas-fix-to-pilots-regulators-and-med
1) I do not know what is "non-normal" activation of MCAS.
2) I do not understand the "reset" of MCAS. The briefing says a one time activation until the triggering data activates again. Well, duhhhh. The Lion crew had the triggering event continuosly and HAL did his job by moving the stab unless the pilot used manual electric trim.
Some of the "good" ponts of Boeing's brief admitted problems with the manual trim authority. And I have seen several posts here and on other blogs that the aero forces and control column logic can result in a "frozen" stab or stab trim motor. GASP!!
Gums sends...
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Originally Posted by CW247
Ralph Nader calls for an appliance style total product recall.
It's not going to be easy to put the MAC airplanes back into service without fixes that go well beyond software patching.
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Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape
With all due respect, Ralph Nader starts his argument with an assertion unsupported by any facts, and makes multiple false statements in many sentences. Not a very useful way to convince us of the merits of his advocacy. I found it nauseating, even though one should feel sympathy for his loss.
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Originally Posted by tdracer
He (Nader) did something - back in the late 70's or early 80's IIRC - where they designed a "safe" car to show the auto industry how it should be done.
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Some years ago I read an interesting book on the development of the 787. Afterwards I somewhat sarcastically remarked that this aircraft will be the end of Boeing.
It appears that I was wrong!
It appears that I was wrong!
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Originally Posted by gums
Salute!
There are some disturbing comments from Boeing at the "briefing" the other day;
Gums sends...
There are some disturbing comments from Boeing at the "briefing" the other day;
Gums sends...
I poked some of my AWACS friends and there does seem to be (added to with the KC-46 temporary delivery stoppage) evidence of some very sloppy work, on repairs of AWACS and on new deliveries of KC-46s. To be clear, Boeing does not perform all AWACS repairs and contracts much of them out, particularly FMS. But, given the market pressures (both from the US gov't and commercial) I have some significant concerns about QC in the entire assembly for each of the new airframes that are being developed. Nobody can forsee every event, but Boeing is becoming more and more reliant on SW as opposed to cable and pully. That is a fundamental paradigm shift for Boeing. Airbus (as did GD) committed to that decades ago. There are lessons learned. As an industry, they should be shared. There is no winner in any commercial aircraft type taking hundreds of lives and I would expect the airlines that fly both types to put immense pressure on the common good. Probably asking too much, but having read AB's test plans for FBW, they learned a lot - even if they didn't learn everything.
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Originally Posted by b1lanc
Salute gums
I poked some of my AWACS friends and there does seem to be (added to with the KC-46 temporary delivery stoppage) evidence of some very sloppy work, on repairs of AWACS and on new deliveries of KC-46s. To be clear, Boeing does not perform all AWACS repairs and contracts much of them out, particularly FMS. But, given the market pressures (both from the US gov't and commercial) I have some significant concerns about QC in the entire assembly for each of the new airframes that are being developed. Nobody can forsee every event, but Boeing is becoming more and more reliant on SW as opposed to cable and pully. That is a fundamental paradigm shift for Boeing. Airbus (as did GD) committed to that decades ago. There are lessons learned. As an industry, they should be shared. There is no winner in any commercial aircraft type taking hundreds of lives and I would expect the airlines that fly both types to put immense pressure on the common good. Probably asking too much, but having read AB's test plans for FBW, they learned a lot - even if they didn't learn everything.
I poked some of my AWACS friends and there does seem to be (added to with the KC-46 temporary delivery stoppage) evidence of some very sloppy work, on repairs of AWACS and on new deliveries of KC-46s. To be clear, Boeing does not perform all AWACS repairs and contracts much of them out, particularly FMS. But, given the market pressures (both from the US gov't and commercial) I have some significant concerns about QC in the entire assembly for each of the new airframes that are being developed. Nobody can forsee every event, but Boeing is becoming more and more reliant on SW as opposed to cable and pully. That is a fundamental paradigm shift for Boeing. Airbus (as did GD) committed to that decades ago. There are lessons learned. As an industry, they should be shared. There is no winner in any commercial aircraft type taking hundreds of lives and I would expect the airlines that fly both types to put immense pressure on the common good. Probably asking too much, but having read AB's test plans for FBW, they learned a lot - even if they didn't learn everything.
However as long as certification is used as a non-tariff barrier to competition on both sides of the Atlantic, the lessons won't be shared. The 737 couldn't be certified today - that's the whole point - so a competitor couldn't bring in a plane as cheap to fly as the 737 and comply with current rules - someone on the thread has remarked on that. And in Europe any FBW plane will be held to a higher standard today than Airbus when they started out.
Paradoxically this situation may make the industry safer beccause the new entrant is always held to a higher standard than the incumbent.
Political favoritism isn't going away soon. But managers at the FAA certifying the Max in a hurry without input from their own techs and Boeing delegates - that may be a step too far even for the FAA's brief to favor the domestic incumbencies, and on the far side of the line of personal criminal liability.
A city hall supervisor who certifies a building as safe without even waiting for an ok input from the visiting inspector may land in prison when people die.
Edmund
Last edited by edmundronald; 7th Apr 2019 at 01:57.
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Originally Posted by b1lanc
Salute gums
but having read AB's test plans for FBW, they learned a lot - even if they didn't learn everything.
but having read AB's test plans for FBW, they learned a lot - even if they didn't learn everything.
Is that the one you are talking about?
From the opening paragraphs
The first generation of electrical flight control systems with digital technology appeared on several civil aircraft at the start of the 1980’s including the Airbus A310. These systems control the slats‚ flaps and spoilers. These systems have very stringent safety requirements (in the sense that the runaway of these control surfaces is generally classified as Catastrophic and must then be extremely improbable). However‚ loss of a function is permitted‚ as the only consequences are a supportable increase in the crew’s workload.
The first generation of electrical flight control systems with digital technology appeared on several civil aircraft at the start of the 1980’s including the Airbus A310. These systems control the slats‚ flaps and spoilers. These systems have very stringent safety requirements (in the sense that the runaway of these control surfaces is generally classified as Catastrophic and must then be extremely improbable). However‚ loss of a function is permitted‚ as the only consequences are a supportable increase in the crew’s workload.
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Originally Posted by edmundronald
It could be argued that the whole point of certification is to allow safety standards to be racheted up and lessons learnt to be shared.
However as long as certification is used as a non-tariff barrier to competition on both sides of the Atlantic, the lessons won't be shared. The 737 couldn't be certified today - that's the whole point - so a competitor couldn't bring in a plane as cheap to fly as the 737 and comply with current rules - someone on the thread has remarked on that. And in Europe any FBW plane will be held to a higher standard today than Airbus when they started out.
Paradoxically this situation may make the industry safer beccause the new entrant is always held to a higher standard than the incumbent.
Political favoritism and corruption isn't going away soon. But managers at the FAA certifying the Max in a hurry without input from their own techs and Boeing delegates - that may be a step too far even for the FAA's brief to favor the domestic incumbencies, and on the far side of the line of personal criminal liability.
Edmund
However as long as certification is used as a non-tariff barrier to competition on both sides of the Atlantic, the lessons won't be shared. The 737 couldn't be certified today - that's the whole point - so a competitor couldn't bring in a plane as cheap to fly as the 737 and comply with current rules - someone on the thread has remarked on that. And in Europe any FBW plane will be held to a higher standard today than Airbus when they started out.
Paradoxically this situation may make the industry safer beccause the new entrant is always held to a higher standard than the incumbent.
Political favoritism and corruption isn't going away soon. But managers at the FAA certifying the Max in a hurry without input from their own techs and Boeing delegates - that may be a step too far even for the FAA's brief to favor the domestic incumbencies, and on the far side of the line of personal criminal liability.
Edmund
2) Cite your source for "FAA certifying Max in a hurry". That's utter BS. EASA ceritified it also. Were they also in a hurry?
3) It does no airline any good that flys both types. Regardless of the the certification process, an AB or B going down is not only reflective of the manufacturer but also of the airline. It impacts both manufacturers.
What a crock.
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Originally Posted by b1lanc
1) 737 Max is not FBW.
2) Cite your source for "FAA certifying Max in a hurry". That's utter BS. EASA ceritified it also. Were they also in a hurry?
3) It does no airline any good that flys both types. Regardless of the the certification process, an AB or B going down is not only reflective of the manufacturer but also of the airline. It impacts both manufacturers.
What a crock.
2) Cite your source for "FAA certifying Max in a hurry". That's utter BS. EASA ceritified it also. Were they also in a hurry?
3) It does no airline any good that flys both types. Regardless of the the certification process, an AB or B going down is not only reflective of the manufacturer but also of the airline. It impacts both manufacturers.
What a crock.
EASA did not really certify it. There is an agreement to accept certification of each other agencies, which has been now voided for the MAX and it's software fix. Before that EASA simply believed that the FAA had done its due diligence and rubber stamped their certification.
