Boeing 737 Max Software Fixes Due to Lion Air Crash Delayed

[DaveReidUK]

Originally Posted by oggers

Because when you design an entirely new aircraft from the ground up you are less likely to make a mistake than when modifying a proven design?

That's an entirely reasonable hypothesis, at least in as far as you can predict mistakes at all (which is debatable).

[Momoe]

Originally Posted by oggers

Because when you design an entirely new aircraft from the ground up you are less likely to make a mistake than when modifying a proven design?

Yes, because the whole design process is 50 years on from the 737 design stage, not saying that mistakes won't be made but the likelihood is infinitely less.

[lomapaseo]

Originally Posted by oggers

Because when you design an entirely new aircraft from the ground up you are less likely to make a mistake than when modifying a proven design?

Historical evidence is show a distinct "bathtub" curve" of hidden errors which result in incidents per flight. The first part of the curve are design escapes which need adjusting, while the latter part are a lot of new operator user entrants taking over basket cases.

New aircraft do not escape this.

To me this is an error of a magnitude that escaped reasonable regulatory control within the current regulations. What I'm not sure of yet is where the process went wrong (weak people or weak process).

In my past life it was my job to oversee this and create processes as needed so I'm gnashing my teeth and pulling at the reins

[BluSdUp]

The In-house Hierarchy.

I am probably wrong, but could it be that the less able were put on the 737 max program as it was safe and boring for the average engineer and test pilots.
I do propose this considering that the MCAS as originally certified must have been done by the most incompetent people money could by!!
I have no patience for FAA and Boeing when it comes to this ****up , it is just not DONE!!
It was the simplest job in the world, add some aerodynamic" stuff" on the tail and voila certified!
But they did not even have the brains to see the engines upsetting effect at high AOA. How is that even possible!
The MCAS is by fare the most insane patch I have ever seen in Aviation!
Boeing let us down.
Cpt B

[BluSdUp]

Next on is: Stall incident!

OK
I have another thing I want to get of my chest:
The next Max incident could be as follows if only MCAS software as proposed is implemented:

A average ( or below ) Crew approaches a stall inadvertently a dark and stormy night.
The MCAS kicks in and they promptly pull and trim copiously against it in the mistaken belief it is a Trim runaway/MCAS fail!
A full stall would likely be the end result.

Considering the 3 events we have now so carefully , can YOU guarantee me this would NEVER happen?
Mr FAA Mr EASA or Mr Boeing.
A human factor and fear has now entered the picture.
The MCAS is not fit for purpose, all considering.
Regards
Cpt B

[Kerosene Kraut]

Why was MCAS made so strong if now a limited version can do the same job?

[GordonR_Cape]

Originally Posted by Kerosene Kraut

Why was MCAS made so strong if now a limited version can do the same job?

The 'strength' of MCAS is almost exactly the same s originally intended. The main differences are the inhibition of false triggers, and limiting to one cycle only. Allowing a minimum g-maneuvering authority on the yoke, is somewhat of a surprise, and AFAIK never suggested on this forum.

[CW247]

As the certification process was a little broken, doesn't somebody now have the right to see evidence not for just the technical fix but the procedural oversight fix too? If the latter hasn't been addressed, how can anyone accept the technical fix?

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by CW247

As the certification process was a little broken, doesn't somebody now have the right to see evidence not for just the technical fix but the procedural oversight fix too? If the latter hasn't been addressed, how can anyone accept the technical fix?

From the newspaper article above:

The source indicates the crew appeared to be overwhelmed and, in a high workload environment, may not have followed the recommended procedures for re-trimming. Boeing’s stabilizer runaway checklist’s second step directs pilots to “control aircraft pitch attitude manually with control column and main electric trim as needed,” according to one U.S. airline’s manual reviewed by Aviation Week. If the runaway condition persists, the cut-out switches should be toggled, the checklist says.

The certification process relies on crews 'flying the plane' (see magenta line video) when something goes awry. All systems eventually rely on giving the bag of bolts to the flight crew - that's what alternate and direct law are about in A and it is why the flight crew are there. It was expected that a response to inappropriate MCAS would be autopilot off, autothrottle off, manual trim to correct to neutral trim then stab trim off and fly the plane. Perhaps certification should not rely on the crews following these NNC and other checklists? That is a big can of worms and leads to autonomous aircraft that can handle non-nominal cases that the crew were there to handle.

[lomapaseo]

Originally Posted by CW247

As the certification process was a little broken, doesn't somebody now have the right to see evidence not for just the technical fix but the procedural oversight fix too? If the latter hasn't been addressed, how can anyone accept the technical fix?

I would suggest patience, it will show up in the news after they fix it. It is probably going to be a strong lesson learned for the rest of the industry in all countries.

[thf]

Originally Posted by Ian W

The certification process relies on crews 'flying the plane' (see magenta line video) when something goes awry. All systems eventually rely on giving the bag of bolts to the flight crew - that's what alternate and direct law are about in A and it is why the flight crew are there. It was expected that a response to inappropriate MCAS would be autopilot off, autothrottle off, manual trim to correct to neutral trim then stab trim off and fly the plane. Perhaps certification should not rely on the crews following these NNC and other checklists?

If certification wants to rely on crews following NNC and checklists, certification must ensure that pilots are adequately informed about and trained on new failure modes. Would you say initial certification of the MAX has succeeded in this?

[CurtainTwitcher]

Originally Posted by Ian W

From the newspaper article above:


The certification process relies on crews 'flying the plane' (see magenta line video) when something goes awry. All systems eventually rely on giving the bag of bolts to the flight crew - that's what alternate and direct law are about in A and it is why the flight crew are there. It was expected that a response to inappropriate MCAS would be autopilot off, autothrottle off, manual trim to correct to neutral trim then stab trim off and fly the plane. Perhaps certification should not rely on the crews following these NNC and other checklists? That is a big can of worms and leads to autonomous aircraft that can handle non-nominal cases that the crew were there to handle.

All three crews did NOT follow the "Approach to Stall and or Stick Shaker" NNM immediately as required by the QRH with stick shaker activation.

Originally Posted by Boeing 737 QRH

"Immediately do the following at the first indication of stall (buffet or stick shaker).

"smoothly apply node down elevator to reduce the angle of attack until until buffet or stick shaker stops".

If they blindly followed the QRH, there would a couple of smoking holes just off the end of the runway as per my post #3631. I will say that again, all 3 crews failed to immediately perform the required procedure that Boeing requires. Why was that?

It was as obvious to them, as it is to us that there was something was not right and the safest option was to NOT perform the approach to stall NNM. They had good visibility and excellent Situational Awareness (SA) through the windows to overcome the instinct and urge to lower the nose as everything in their training had taught them to do.

It gets much more challenging when you are dealing with a complex problem, noise and incomplete information, your ability keep SA deteriorates very quickly. Boeing also says in the checklist instructions that only single failures are considered, and the crew have to deviate from procedure(s) in the case of multiple problems.

Originally Posted by Boeing QRH Non-Normal Checklist Instructions

---
While every attempt is made to supply needed non-normal checklists, it is not possible to develop checklists for all conceivable situations
---
In some multiple failure situations, the flight crew may need to combine the elements of more than one checklist. In all situations, the Captain must assess the situation and use good judgement to determine the safest course of action.
---
The Flight Crew must be aware that the checklists cannot be created for all conceivable situations and not intended to replace good judgement. In some situations, at the Captains discretion, deviation from a checklist can be needed

All three crews made a good choice not following the Approach to Stall NNM immediately and kept the aircraft flying. So this is a more complex issue than simply failing to follow a procedure. Sometimes you are required to not follow something. That is the difficult part about flying, deciding exactly what the problem is what to do, or not to do.

[Smythe]

Posted on the other thread as well. Looks like there are a few other things that need to be mentioned.

Before last month’s crash of a flight that began in Ethiopia, Boeing Co. said in a legal document that large, upgraded 737s “cannot be used at what are referred to as ‘high/hot’ airports."

Boeing cited the performance of the 737 Max 8 in a case brought before the U.S. International Trade Commission in 2017. Boeing charged that unfair competition from Bombardier -- which beat out Boeing for a large order from Delta Air Lines -- threatened its 737-700 and Max 7, the smallest of its upgraded single-aisle jets. By pointing out the limitations of the Max 8, the planemaker sought to preserve market share for the 700 and Max 7.

At an elevation of 7,657 feet -- or more than a mile high -- Addis Ababa’s Bole International Airport falls into that category. High elevations require longer runways and faster speeds for takeoff. The Ethiopian airport’s altitude hasn’t been cited as a factor in the downing of Flight 302 and likely didn’t cause the crash. But it could have exacerbated the situation because an airplane’s performance degrades at higher altitudes, said a 737 pilot who flies into high-elevation airports such as Denver and agreed to speak on background since he’s not authorized to talk with the media.

Documents in the trade case referred to at least 16 U.S. airports considered “high and hot” and therefore unsuitable for the Max 8, though the names of those facilities weren’t made public. Asked during a trade commission hearing to specify which airports, an expert witness for Boeing replied that “sometimes Denver would qualify as that.” The expert, Jerry Nickelsburg, an adjunct economics professor at UCLA, added that “Mexico City certainly qualifies as that.”

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...rtain-airports

[RickNRoll]

Originally Posted by Smythe

Posted on the other thread as well. Looks like there are a few other things that need to be mentioned.

Before last month’s crash of a flight that began in Ethiopia, Boeing Co. said in a legal document that large, upgraded 737s “cannot be used at what are referred to as ‘high/hot’ airports."

Boeing cited the performance of the 737 Max 8 in a case brought before the U.S. International Trade Commission in 2017. Boeing charged that unfair competition from Bombardier -- which beat out Boeing for a large order from Delta Air Lines -- threatened its 737-700 and Max 7, the smallest of its upgraded single-aisle jets. By pointing out the limitations of the Max 8, the planemaker sought to preserve market share for the 700 and Max 7.

At an elevation of 7,657 feet -- or more than a mile high -- Addis Ababa’s Bole International Airport falls into that category. High elevations require longer runways and faster speeds for takeoff. The Ethiopian airport’s altitude hasn’t been cited as a factor in the downing of Flight 302 and likely didn’t cause the crash. But it could have exacerbated the situation because an airplane’s performance degrades at higher altitudes, said a 737 pilot who flies into high-elevation airports such as Denver and agreed to speak on background since he’s not authorized to talk with the media.

Documents in the trade case referred to at least 16 U.S. airports considered “high and hot” and therefore unsuitable for the Max 8, though the names of those facilities weren’t made public. Asked during a trade commission hearing to specify which airports, an expert witness for Boeing replied that “sometimes Denver would qualify as that.” The expert, Jerry Nickelsburg, an adjunct economics professor at UCLA, added that “Mexico City certainly qualifies as that.”

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...rtain-airports

I don't know what's worth mentioning about it other than Boeing was being a bully towards Bombardier.

[Capn Bloggs]

But it could have exacerbated the situation because an airplane’s performance degrades at higher altitudes, said a 737 pilot who flies into high-elevation airports such as Denver

What a load of rubbish. Within 6 1/2 minutes it was doing 350KIAS at 7000ft AGL. Hardly a performance dog and a complete irrelevance to the accident.

Can we get back on thread now?

[edmundronald]

I don't know if this has been posted yet - the Max has been removed from schedules by some until Aug 19th.
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/14/b...max/index.html

Edmund

[Longtimer]

Canada transport minister wants simulator training for 737 MAX fix

Canada transport minister wants simulator training for 737 MAX fix

ReutersApril 17, 2019

By Allison Lampert

MONTREAL (Reuters) - Canada called on Wednesday for pilots to receive training on simulators for new Boeing 737 MAX software, rather than computer courses, going a step beyond proposals by U.S. regulators and opening the door to disagreement over measures to end a global grounding of the jets after two fatal crashes.

Boeing Co is under pressure to deliver a software update and new training proposals for the MAX to global regulators following a Lion Air crash in October and an Ethiopian crash in March, which killed 346 people combined.

In comments to Reuters, Canadian Transport Minister Marc Garneau said computer-based training, which some pilots had received to transition from older versions of Boeing's 737 to the latest 737 MAX, would not go far enough to satisfy Canada.

"It's not going to be a question of pulling out an iPad and spending an hour on it," he said in Montreal. "Simulators are the very best way, from a training point of view, to go over exactly what could happen in a real way and to react properly to it."

Garneua's comments came after a draft report from a U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) appointed board recommended additional training without requiring a simulator.

Canada's call for obligatory training time illustrates the challenges faced by the FAA panel, which includes foreign regulators, in securing a common global blueprint for the ungrounding of the 737 MAX.

The FAA declined to comment.

Garneau said the training must include time in a simulator so pilots can rehearse the circumstances of the Lion Air crash in Indonesia last October.

In that crash as well as the Ethiopian Airlines disaster, pilots lost control of the planes soon after taking off. Investigators are focused in part on an anti-stall system called the MCAS, or maneuvering characteristics augmentation system, which can repeatedly push the plane's nose down.

Canada already took measures on pilot training following the Lion Air crash, working with Canadian MAX operators WestJet Airlines, Air Canada and Sunwing to require a five-step memorized pilot checklist for runaway stabilizer.

United Airlines, which owns 14 MAX, said it does not currently plan to add simulator training to its regime, which already requires pilots to memorize steps for runaway stabilizer.

"But obviously, if federal - if the regulatory authorities request that as added training, we will comply with that request," United's Chief Operating Officer Gregory Hart said on a conference call on Wednesday.



(Reporting by Allison Lampert in Montreal; additional reporting by Tracy Rucinski in Chicago and David Shepardosn in Washington; editing by G Crosse and Marguerita Choy)

[bill fly]

If the FAA has already approved Boeing’s training plan, before the “fix” has been approved, either the tail wags the dog, or they know what the fix is and intend to approve it anyway...

[ATC Watcher]

I have read somewhere that there were only a handful ( even on one hand ) of MAX sims in the world, more will be delivered later this year but not enough to train everyone in a short time right after the "fix " is released. .Or will the training be possible on a normal NG sim ?

[bill fly]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

I have read somewhere that there were only a handful ( even on one hand ) of MAX sims in the world, more will be delivered later this year but not enough to train everyone in a short time right after the "fix " is released. .Or will the training be possible on a normal NG sim ?

If they want to train the non normal (AoA duff) case, I guess the Max sims will be doing good business. Unless they put out a switchable mod for the NG sim...