Convair 340 (C-131D) ZS-BRV crash Pretoria, South Africa

[sgs233a]

Originally Posted by atakacs

As they were having a hard time (and eventually failed) to maintain altitude I'd say you try to run both engine as long as possible. Even a failing engine can still produce thrust.
Not sure that we their plan all along but could explain it.

Depending on it's and the prop's state, could contribute a fair bit of drag rather than thrust, even if still technically running...possibly more than with it shut down and feathered, cowl flaps closed, etc.

[A Squared]

Originally Posted by sgs233a

Depending on it's and the prop's state, could contribute a fair bit of drag rather than thrust, even if still technically running...possibly more than with it shut down and feathered, cowl flaps closed, etc.

It would be interesting to know whether the cockpit gopro showed the BMEP gauges and what the indications were. (I think convairs had BMEP gauges, not 100percent sure.

[atakacs]

Originally Posted by sgs233a

Depending on it's and the prop's state, could contribute a fair bit of drag rather than thrust, even if still technically running...possibly more than with it shut down and feathered, cowl flaps closed, etc.

Agreed.
Would be interesting to know if it was a deliberate decision (not to go through the fire checklist, and if so why) or if they just froze...

[EDML]

The report also supports our theory regarding the failure of the ailerons I spotted on one of the videos.

[The Ancient Geek]

No mention of misfuelling

[voyageur9]

Originally Posted by Offchocks

Both have been heavily involved for a number of years with the Historical Aircraft Restoration Society (HARS) south of Sydney. Together, the aircraft they have flown are the DC3, Caribou, Convair 440, Lockheed Super Constellation, Lockheed Neptune, PBY Catalina plus others.
They have been Senior Check Pilots with Qantas and ....

Given the preliminary report's finding that only the captain's rating included the Convair while the FO didn't have the appropriate type rating, the LAME was handling controls, CRM was lacking and no one followed the engine fire checklist, ... perhaps being Senior Check Pilot with Qantas isn't so impressive or reassuring title for paying pax.

[atakacs]

Not to mention that they were flying to a closed airport...
Still a bit too early to judge their performance

[Chris Scott]

Originally Posted by sgs233a

Depending on it's and the prop's state, could contribute a fair bit of drag rather than thrust, even if still technically running...possibly more than with it shut down and feathered, cowl flaps closed, etc.

Yes, it's unclear from the report if the cockpit-mounted Go-Pro showed the RPM and Manifold Pressure gauges, and indeed whether the readings from the L/H Manifold Pressure gauge were erroneous. As previously discussed, the CSU would have tried to maintain the engine RPM even if the available power was very low - and create drag in the process.

Disappointing that the only mention of the video from the empennage-mounted Go-Pro relates to taxiing performance [1.11.1]. One would have thought that it would have shown the L/H engine fire and any anomalies with the ailerons. As it is, we only have the useful photos and videos taken by the LAME's assistant from the cabin after the fire had started.

The report notes that the a/c was repeatedly drifting left during taxiing, and "furthermore, during the review of the GOPRO camera fitted in the cockpit, the captain was complaining about the stiffness of the rudder." But it doesn't explain how the aircraft is steered for taxiing. Are we to infer that the prime method is rudder and, if so, is it possible that the rudder pedals are linked to a steerable nose-wheel on the ground? (This is an example of why we need someone with Convair experience.)

If the L/H propellor was producing little or no thrust (or even creating drag) after take-off, despite the engine still running, a large degree of right rudder would have been required to maintain heading or to turn right. The PF called the PNF for assistance on the rudder, which would be strange if the rudder was fully serviceable. Normally, for readers not au-fait with multi-engine ops, only a small amount of right aileron would have been necessary to stabilise the a/c with a little right bank (towards the live engine), but the report seems to suggest that the PF was commanding a lot of right aileron. However, as EDML points out, the only images we have seen so far show the left aileron deflected upwards, which doesn't make sense unless it was malfunctioning.

Re CRM and the captain's apparent failure to call for the L/H engine fire drill, is it possible that the pilots were in awe of the LAME, who may have been technically far more experienced on type? If so, and having unconventionally delegated engine control to him, they might have assumed that he would take the appropriate action as and when necessary. On the other hand, he may have been waiting for the captain to call for it. That would indeed be a recipe for a kok-up**. The report suggests that the L/H propellor was receiving much less power and/or rotating slower than the R/H at impact, but that no shut down had been performed by the crew. In the absence of any explanation, it seems incredible that, faced with a failure and fire on the L/H engine and an accompanying loss of climb performance, the captain would wish to keep it running

This preliminary report contains minor discrepancies, and there's no mention of fuel analysis as yet.

[Airbubba]

Originally Posted by voyageur9

Given the preliminary report's finding that only the captain's rating included the Convair while the FO didn't have the appropriate type rating, the LAME was handling controls, CRM was lacking and no one followed the engine fire checklist, ... perhaps being Senior Check Pilot with Qantas isn't so impressive or reassuring title for paying pax.

Originally Posted by atakacs

Not to mention that they were flying to a closed airport...
Still a bit too early to judge their performance

They didn't have the right licenses, they didn't use the right procedures and they flight planned to a closed airport. Then they crashed the plane. Other than that Mrs. Lincoln, they did a terrific job.

[A Squared]

Originally Posted by voyageur9

while the FO didn't have the appropriate type rating,

Was he required to? I have no idea what the SA laws are, but I know that for a non-revenue non-airline flight like this in the US, the FO would not be required to have a type rating, just have received certain type specific training. On the other hand, some countries require a "type rating" in a duchess. I have no idea where South Africa falls in this range.

Originally Posted by voyageur9

the LAME was handling controls,

Odd for a 2 pilot certificated aircraft, however if it was a DC-6, this is exactly how it would be flown. Without more information, I'd be reluctant to classify this particular aspect and reckless or irresponsible.

[andrasz]

Originally Posted by voyageur9

... perhaps being Senior Check Pilot with Qantas isn't so impressive or reassuring title for paying pax.

If my memory is correct, it was also a Senior Check Pilot who drove the golf cart at Don Muang...

[A Squared]

Originally Posted by Chris Scott

Yes, it's unclear from the report if the cockpit-mounted Go-Pro showed the RPM and Manifold Pressure gauges, and indeed whether the readings from the L/H Manifold Pressure gauge were erroneous.

I'd say that it was indeed clear from the report that at least the tachometers were visible in the footage:

The cockpit GOPRO recording also shows that the left engine RPM gauge was fluctuating and that later the left engine fire master caution light was illuminating and an audible warning sound was heard. The GOPRO recording also shows the control wheel deflected to the right and the captain indicating that they had lost aileron, and requesting rudder input from the FO.

[Bleve]

Originally Posted by voyageur9

... perhaps being Senior Check Pilot with Qantas isn't so impressive or reassuring title for paying pax.

That is a grossly offensive comment. The two pilots are still in hospital in a critical condition, unable to give their version of events and you want to take the opportunity to put the boot into Qantas? Shame, shame on you.

[Airbubba]

Originally Posted by A Squared

Was he required to? I have no idea what the SA laws are, but I know that for a non-revenue non-airline flight like this in the US, the FO would not be required to have a type rating, just have received certain type specific training. On the other hand, some countries require a "type rating" in a duchess. I have no idea where South Africa falls in this range.

From the preliminary findings posted above:

2.7 The Aircraft Flight Manual requires two pilots to operate the aircraft and both need to be rated on the aircraft, however the documents and licenses made available to Investigation team indicates only Captain rated on the aircraft (Convair 330/440).

[A Squared]

Originally Posted by atakacs

Agreed.
Would be interesting to know if it was a deliberate decision (not to go through the fire checklist, and if so why) or if they just froze...

Well, the report says:

It also shows that though the pilots and LAME were informed of the left engine fire, they were asking each other which engine was on fire. At no stage did the pilots or the LAME discuss or attempt to extinguish the left engine fire, as the left engine fire extinguishing system was never activated.

Other parts of the report indicate that the cockpit GoPro footage picked up the crews conversation. The absence of a discussion on whether to shut down the engine seems to suggest that it was not a conscious decision. If they had made a choice to not shut down the burning engine because they needed the thrust for performance, I would have expected there to have been at least some discussion or statement between the crew about that.

[A Squared]

Originally Posted by Airbubba

From the preliminary findings posted above:

Thanks, missed that in my earlier perusal.

[A Squared]

Originally Posted by Bleve

That is a grossly offensive comment. The two pilots are still in hospital in a critical condition, unable to give their version of events and you want to take the opportunity to put the boot into Qantas? Shame, shame on you.

Well, to be fair, there are a number of facts, not subject to the pilots' version of the accident, which appear not to reflect well on them here.

[The Ancient Geek]

They didn't have the right licenses, they didn't use the right procedures and they flight planned to a closed airport. Then they crashed the plane. Other than that Mrs. Lincoln, they did a terrific job.

The closed airfield was notified in a new NOTAM which did not reach the FAWB controller until after the flight
had departed.
They had valid Australian licenses which had not been fully validated for the SA registered aircraft. A paperwork issue.

[A Squared]

Originally Posted by The Ancient Geek

They had valid Australian licenses which had not been fully validated for the SA registered aircraft. A paperwork issue.

The FO had a valid Australian Air Transport, Commercial and Private Pilot Licence, however he was not type rated on the aircraft (Convair 340/440).

Looks like more than a "paperwork" issue. Looks like the FO needed a CV340 type rating and didn't have one, on any license.

[Chris Scott]

Originally Posted by A Squared

I'd say that it was indeed clear from the report that at least the tachometers were visible in the footage:

Thanks A Squared, I shouldn't have included RPM gauges in that sentence. But my comment on the Manifold Pressure gauge stands. Yes, the report seems to confirm the fluctuating RPM of the L/H engine that I originally inferred from the video taken from the airport boundary.

Unfortunately I can't pick out the specific engine gauges in the nice cockpit photo that megan posted here:
https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/610956-convair-340-c-131d-zs-brv-crash-pretoria-south-africa.html#post10201954

I also infer that the crew had little confidence in the L/H Manifold Pressure gauge, and that might have contributed to any loss of awareness of engine performance.