Originally Posted by
sgs233a
Depending on it's and the prop's state, could contribute a fair bit of drag rather than thrust, even if still technically running...possibly more than with it shut down and feathered, cowl flaps closed, etc.
Yes, it's unclear from the report if the cockpit-mounted Go-Pro showed the RPM and Manifold Pressure gauges, and indeed whether the readings from the L/H Manifold Pressure gauge were erroneous. As previously discussed, the CSU would have tried to maintain the engine RPM even if the available power was very low - and create drag in the process.
Disappointing that the only mention of the video from the empennage-mounted Go-Pro relates to taxiing performance [1.11.1]. One would have thought that it would have shown the L/H engine fire and any anomalies with the ailerons. As it is, we only have the useful photos and videos taken by the LAME's assistant from the cabin after the fire had started.
The report notes that the a/c was repeatedly drifting left during taxiing, and "furthermore, during the review of the GOPRO camera fitted in the cockpit, the captain was complaining about the stiffness of the rudder." But it doesn't explain how the aircraft is steered for taxiing. Are we to infer that the prime method is rudder and, if so, is it possible that the rudder pedals are linked to a steerable nose-wheel on the ground? (This is an example of why we need someone with Convair experience.)
If the L/H propellor was producing little or no thrust (or even creating drag) after take-off, despite the engine still running, a large degree of right rudder would have been required to maintain heading or to turn right. The PF called the PNF for assistance on the rudder, which would be strange if the rudder was fully serviceable. Normally, for readers not
au-fait with multi-engine ops, only a small amount of right aileron would have been necessary to stabilise the a/c with a little right bank (towards the live engine), but the report seems to suggest that the PF was commanding a lot of right aileron. However, as
EDML points out, the only images we have seen so far show the left aileron deflected upwards, which doesn't make sense unless it was malfunctioning.
Re CRM and the captain's apparent failure to call for the L/H engine fire drill, is it possible that the pilots were in awe of the LAME, who may have been technically far more experienced on type? If so, and having unconventionally delegated engine control to him, they might have assumed that he would take the appropriate action as and when necessary. On the other hand, he may have been waiting for the captain to call for it. That would indeed be a recipe for a kok-up**. The report suggests that the L/H propellor was receiving much less power and/or rotating slower than the R/H at impact, but that no shut down had been performed by the crew. In the absence of any explanation, it seems incredible that, faced with a failure and fire on the L/H engine and an accompanying loss of climb performance, the captain would wish to keep it running
This preliminary report contains minor discrepancies, and there's no mention of fuel analysis as yet.