G-VIIO Las Vegas

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Mouse

So what would be different in an Engine Fire Checklist (Ground) and an Engine Fire Checklist (Air)?

On the ground, you get the thing shut down and both bottles into it immediately. No 30".

Boeing doesn't differentiate, yet. The NTSB, in this and another report, recommends a ground fire procedure be developed by the manufacturers and operators.

[JammedStab]

It doesn't matter whether you are in flight or on the ground. Common sense dictates that you do the memory items portion of the engine fire checklist which will do what was required, shut down the engine and cutoff the fuel. Is there any good reason to delay cutting off the fire because item 8 on the most appropriate checklist happens to say land at the nearest suitable airport?

One needs to use some logic. Stop the aircraft, set the park brake, (possibly make some sort of remain seated PA, if that is the company procedure and appropriate for the situation), then the PIC can do the appropriate Memory Items. Once again, use logic as you don't need to select the autothrottle arm switch off, just quickly do the appropriate memory items. All this can be completed in less than 10 seconds from the parking brake being set. Then if evacuation is required, follow that checklist(which can be accessed quickly because Boeing made it on the back page of the paper QRH(in addition to the e-checklist).

Not sure why the engine fire checklist was called for initially. That can lead to delays in the critical first items, especially with some new guy trying to sort through the electronic checklist and making wrong inputs due to rushing/lack of familiarity, etc.

[wiggy]

Not sure why the engine fire checklist was called for.

If we are still discussing the Vegas accident then that was because during the deceleration the crew got an Engine Fire warning (Bell and EICAS message), it's in the narrative section of the report but not mentioned in the CVR transcript.

[Car RAMROD]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

On the ground, you get the thing shut down and both bottles into it immediately. No 30".

Boeing doesn't differentiate, yet. The NTSB, in this and another report, recommends a ground fire procedure be developed by the manufacturers and operators.

The only potential issue here (depending on a/c type though, I'm not familiar with all Boeings) is if you have fired both bottles into one engine, then get into the evac checklist and the other engine has caught fire too in the mean time. You've now got no bottle for that one. Incredibly remote possibility, yes, but if the other eng hasn't caught fire at this point you'd be firing the 2nd bottle into the one that was originally on fire anyway, presuming it still had the fire warning.

[Chu Chu]

Wouldn't firing the second bottle immediately just displace the extinguishing agent from the first one (rather than restoring the levels after the first shot has begun to dissipate)?

[Locked door]

Ramrod, each engine has two bottles.

The SOP is to wait 30secs between bottles both on the ground and airbourne, firing them both at the same time is outside of SOP and of questionable benefit.

Fore those that don’t realise, the fire extinguishers only discharge between the engine structure and cowling displacing air, they don’t go into the engine core. One squib theoretically can displace all the air in that space (assuming the cowling isn’t damaged), firing both has negligible extra effect. The 30 sec pause is to allow the first extinguishant to take effect, when air (O2) starts to leak back in the second squib forces it back out again giving 60 secs of full retardant.

[lomapaseo]

The crux of the problem with on-ground fire is the pooling under the aircraft in the presence of winds (not just extinguishers or shutoff valves). In that case you want to get out early. How and when the decision is made is a communication issue. It would seem that eyes outside the cockpit would be a benefit but the decision making then bears looking onto.

[Car RAMROD]

Originally Posted by Locked door

Ramrod, each engine has two bottles.

The T7 has 2 bottles per engine? That'd be nice!
I'm only used to two bottles total- one for each or two can be discharged into one eng if required.

Like I said initially- "depending on a/c type though, I'm not familiar with all Boeings"

[JammedStab]

Originally Posted by Car RAMROD

The only potential issue here (depending on a/c type though, I'm not familiar with all Boeings) is if you have fired both bottles into one engine, then get into the evac checklist and the other engine has caught fire too in the mean time. You've now got no bottle for that one. Incredibly remote possibility, yes, but if the other eng hasn't caught fire at this point you'd be firing the 2nd bottle into the one that was originally on fire anyway, presuming it still had the fire warning.

Two bottles total. One would use both bottles and not consider saving one for the other engine in a case like this.

[wiggy]

Originally Posted by Car RAMROD

The T7 has 2 bottles per engine? That'd be nice!
I'm only used to two bottles total- one for each or two can be discharged into one eng if required.

Like I said initially- "depending on a/c type though, I'm not familiar with all Boeings"

There is some misleading info creeping into the thread.... - J S is absolutely correct in stating that the T7 (well the one’s In the BA fit) have two engine fire bottles total...sounds like the same set-up/you use the same logic as what you are used to on whatever you fly.

Eeeeh, Mind you, we are lucky these days when I were a lad I flew a twin jet that had no fire extinguishers......

[Volume]

The big question is: Do the bottles do any good if the actual fire is on the tarmac below the engine where the fuel pools...
For me the bottles are totally useless on the ground, and you should concentrate on other things (stearing the aircraft out of the wind so that fire/smoke spreads away from the fuselage, prepare evacuation, instruct cabin crew, instruct rescue services).

If the engine nacelle is breached, the bottles do almost nothing. Just polute the environment...

[wiggy]

Boeing 777/787 FCTM advice on the matter:

Discharging Fire Bottles during an Evacuation

The evacuation NNC specifies discharge of the engine or APU fire bottles if an engine or APU fire warning light is illuminated. However, evacuation situations can present possibilities regarding the potential for fire that are beyond the scope of the NNC and may not activate an engine or APU fire warning. The crew should consider the following when deciding whether to discharge one or more fire bottles into the engines and/or APU:


if an engine fire warning light is not illuminated, but a fire indication exists or a fire is reported in or near an engine, discharge both available fire bottles into the affected engine

if the APU fire warning light is not illuminated, but a fire indication exists or a fire is reported in or near the APU, discharge the APU bottle

the discharged halon agent is designed to extinguish a fire and has very little or no fire prevention capability in the engine nacelles. Halon dissipates quickly into the atmosphere

[AVR4000]

I have a feeling that a couple of posters in this thread miss the point about information. A fire indication doesn't mean "evacuate immediately" so everything starts with appropriate INFORMATION. Shutting down engines and so on are directly related to this very important piece of the puzzle.

Introducing checklists with different ideas such as "always evacuate when a fire indication is present" or "always evacuate after engine failure" or "always shut down all engines if one of them fail/is on fire" and varieties thereof wouldn't produce appropriate results and would lead to unnecessary evacuations based on indications only.

A proper decision to evacuate the aircraft after an engine failure with fire must be based on proper information relayed through a couple of channels:

Cameras
Cabin crew
ATC
Other channels

This means the ability for the crew to quickly learn what is going on and make the decision to evacuate based on this information. It is also a way to avoid this "engine running" issue. The cause of the engine no 2 running here are a couple of factors:

1. Lack of information about the fire - the pilots stopped the aircraft with the mindset of it being an engine failure and fire, NOT a pooled fuel fire. Keeping the engine running for taxiing clear of the runway was logical based on what they knew when they stopped.
2. The lack of information was further enhanced by the ATC silence, thus giving the impression that the situation wasn't that serious.
3. The result was a rushed decision to evacuate since the fire had been ongoing for a while already and that led to a chaotic execution of the checklists and the still running no 2 kept going for about 44 seconds before they shut it down.

So yes, the lack of appropriate information did delay the evacuation and caused a rushed decision when it came eventually, thus leading to the no 2 engine still running when the doors opened.

The whole case is a clear demonstration that INFORMATION must be available to the flight crew at an early stage so the appropriate decisions can be taken and the "taxi clear of the runway" mindset can be avoided in cases where the aircraft must be abandoned immediately.

Arguments along the lines of: "the crew should have evacuated immediately since they had fire warning" and similar makes no sense. Yes, they did have a fire warning but it still doesn't mean "evacuate" and it would be highly inappropriate to connect it with that course of action.

Delayed and rushed decisions to evacuate is an information problem and it is an obvious issue in this case, especially the lack of external (ATC) sources. The cabin call system could also be scrutinized - i.e. a more obvious indication of incoming high priority emergency calls from the cabin and perhaps fire warning buttons located at the flight attendant stations (i.e. the ability for CC to relay such information to the flight deck if flames are visible outside of the aircraft).

Edit: It is pretty logical and normal to leave an engine running after a failure on the other one when on the runway since shutting down everything without such a need would cause more disruptions to the airport. Taxi clear of the runway after the situation has been assessed is appropriate.

Stopping on the runway is for serious emergencies; moving the aircraft to a different location under power of the remaining engine is logical when the circumstances are such that the passengers should remain on board until appropriate means of exiting the aircraft are ready (airstairs or returning to a gate).

The "shutdown all engines because of a fire indication" item isn't a logical thing to add to the checklists.

And yes, ATC SHOULD SPEAK UP when a crew report that they are aborting take-off if there are visible smoke and flames from the aircraft since such information is extremely important to get to the crew as quick as possible.

"If you see something, say something" is an appropriate principle and a burning aircraft is a good case for it.

It is also more urgent to convey such information to a crew that *doesn't* report a fire when they report "stopping" or "abandoning take-off".

[hans brinker]

On ground emergency checklist

A long time ago I flew the DHC8. It was a new type for the company, before there was only the "little f#kker". Our technical department didn't like the bombardier ECKL, and rewrote the whole thing. While I didn't like everything about it, it was an enormous improvement over the factory one. One thing they added was an "On Ground emergency". For everything fire or smoke related the procedure was the same (going from memory here):
- bring aircraft to a stop
- set parking brake
- mayday call to atc
- pa call to alert flight attendant
- both fuel levers cut-off
- Apu off
- both fire handles pull
- push Apu fire bottle
- push number one bottle for both engines
- asses situation to see if evacuation is required
+ If evacuation required, pa call for evacuation , atc call we are evacuating, batteries off
+ If not pa call remain seated, atc call we need tow truck.

The main idea was, this is not a time to second guessing, we need one thing that covers all. I asked during my PC wouldn't it be better to keep both bottles for the engine that is on fire and the answer was no for three reasons. One, no need to confirm what is on fire, two, no need to wait for 30seconds to fire bottle, you are on the ground, don't fight fire, evacuate, three, no change of forgetting to shut the working engine.
Like i said, didn't agree with necessnecessarily everything, but it would have worked here.

[wiggy]

I have a feeling that a couple of posters in this thread miss the point about information. A fire indication doesn't mean "evacuate immediately" so everything starts with appropriate INFORMATION.

The stop in this case was called for an engine failure.

During the decel there was then a fire warning (bell + EICAS message) on the same engine.

AFAIK the teaching has never been that in the event of a rejected take-off with an associated fire warning one should default to automatically throwing everybody down the slides, though I’d accept that there might be circumstances so dire (e.g. flames actually around the flight deck windows) that you might do that. Maybe trainers such as M. Mouse have an opinion on this issue, or have taught, or have seen it taught differently.

[BAengineer]

Originally Posted by Volume

The big question is: Do the bottles do any good if the actual fire is on the tarmac below the engine where the fuel pools...
For me the bottles are totally useless on the ground, and you should concentrate on other things (stearing the aircraft out of the wind so that fire/smoke spreads away from the fuselage, prepare evacuation, instruct cabin crew, instruct rescue services).

You would have thought that we would have learned the lesson about that from the 1985 Manchester BA disaster...

[Volume]

I have a feeling that a couple of posters in this thread miss the point about information. A fire indication doesn't mean "evacuate immediately"

I think the point is: a fire indication does not neccesarily mean an engine fire. (in the sense of "usual engine fire within the engine fire zone for which the aircraft is designed")
A fire indication should not trigger anything automatic immediately. No standard engine fire procedure, no evacuation.
An engine fire warning should trigger a (very quick) investigation into the situation, followed by appropriate action. It is an anachronistic situation, that in many aircraft the passengers can see the fire situation clearly on their IFE (in colour and HD...), but neither the cockpit nor the cabin crew has a clue.

It would be interesting to see a statistic: How many engine fire indication do indeed indicate that there is a fire the aircraft and the fire warning/extinguishing system, the fire containment and the procedure is designed for? How many are false warnings? How many are a totally different situation (like a catastrophic engine failure, a fire originating outside the designated fire zone the extinguishing system can handle, a fire already spreading beyond the fire zone)?

No matter whether you finally will evacuate, it is always a good idea to prepare for an evacuation as early as possible, as typically time is a critical factor.
As we have seen in singapore, the decision to leave evyone on board and let the fire brigade do their job fast and without disturbancy may be the more clever action. Anyway you should as soon as possible think through the different alternatives and prepare as fast as possible. Whether you actually will evacuate may be decided later, but no time should be lost prior to that decision. You can not revover time lost. Turning the aircraft into a favourable position with respect to the wind or to improve access for the fire services will never hurt.

Firing both bottles following the SOP may save your a**** because nobody can accuse you of doing something wrong, Sometimes it is more important to save everybody on board.

You would have thought that we would have learned the lesson

"we" may have learned the lesson, but do we teach it to new pilots?

[sudden twang]

Originally Posted by BAengineer

You would have thought that we would have learned the lesson about that from the 1985 Manchester BA disaster...

How many times have you had an assymetric RTO on a 777?
How many crews have you observed in a777 simulator attempting to turn as they slow from an RTO?
Yes we have learned the lesson from Pete’s event in MAN and VOLUME we do teach it to all new and old but it’s quite difficult to do sometimes with RTO braking. What can be more important is stopping on the tarmac quickly and completing the process efficiently ( as opposed to quickly).
a turn during an RTO is often prebriefed eg turn into any fire works for a headwind but is the reverse for a tailwind, would not be required with a Xwind for one engine but critical for the other etc.
My experience?
Number of RTOs in the a/c single figures
number of RTOs in a Sim 3 figures
number of RTOs observed in a Sim 4 figures. BWDIK

[Dairyground]

For everything fire or smoke related the procedure was the same (going from memory here):
- bring aircraft to a stop
- set parking brake
- mayday call to atc
- pa call to alert flight attendant
- both fuel levers cut-off
- Apu off
- both fire handles pull
- push Apu fire bottle
- push number one bottle for both engines
- asses situation to see if evacuation is required
+ If evacuation required, pa call for evacuation , atc call we are evacuating, batteries off
+ If not pa call remain seated, atc call we need tow truck.

As someone with past involvement in procedure design and risk management, though not in aviation, I am surprised at the order of the early items in this list. I would expect fuel cut off to appear early, certainly before setting the parking brake. In the G-VIIO case the residual momentum and the dying thrust from the operating engine could probably have moved the aircraft clear of the pool of burning fuel.

[lomapaseo]

As someone with past involvement in procedure design and risk management, though not in aviation, I am surprised at the order of the early items in this list. I would expect fuel cut off to appear early, certainly before setting the parking brake. In the G-VIIO case the residual momentum and the dying thrust from the operating engine could probably have moved the aircraft clear of the pool of burning fuel.

Valid considerations, but one must consider the cause effect of specific annunciations in order to design for a desired response.. What you assume is correct but statistical experience must be also considered "Pool" fires are thankfully rarities as a cause for the initial annunciations to the crew. Thus the expected response from the crew is reflected in the current procedures.

The issue in my mind is how to annunciate to the crew in a timely fashion that a pool fire has occurred and that appropriate reaction is expected.